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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This thesis is intended as being a contribution to the debate on the loss of land,
the causes, the characteristics of the problem and possible measures that can be
enacted to deal with it, particularly in the case of pastoralists. The research was
conducted as part of the "Access to Land for Low Income Groups in the Third
World" programme begun in the mid-1980s b^ the "Department for the Human
Geography of Developing Régions" of the Faculty of Policy Sciences of the
Catholic University of Nijmegen. This survey later became part of the research
programme of the "Nijmegen Institute for Comparative Studies in Development
and Cultural Change' (NICCOS) of that same University.
Since the beginning of the 1980s the loss of land suffered by pastoralists
became the focus of several studies (see Campbell 1979a, Weicker 1982, Little
1987 and others). The afore-mentioned studies concentrated on the conflicts
about and the compétition for land between nomadic pastoralism and other
types of land use such as cultivation and wildlife parks. Other researchere have
studied groups such as indians, inuit, aboriginals, landless agricultural
labourers, small farmers or squatters in urban areas who are all fighting for
their rights to land (e.g Dorner & Saliba 1981, Mbithi & Barnes 1973, Sinha
1984, Kleinpenning 1986, Maas 1986). The struggle for land has become a
world-wide phenomenon, not restricted to a particular society, place or time.
Moreover, considering the doubling of the world's population within the next
30 years and the limited area of land available an increase in the number of
landless agricultural workers and marginal farmers seems inévitable in the near
future.
This concern was reflected in the délibérations of the World Conference
on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development of 1979 which stressed the
importance of access to land and other productive resources as a key
determinant for rural development and the improvement of rural incomes and
living standards (see Moreno 1984:v).
The research presented in this book began in January 1987 and was initially
meant to be a continuation of fieldwork conducted among the Turkana
pastoralists of north-western Kenya. Already having lost many of their cattle
large numbers of these pastoralists had become destitute and dependent on the
"Food-for-Work" programmes offered by several international organizations. It
was intended to follow-up the pastoralists who had been able to rebuild their
herds and flocks once again. New developments such as an increase in the
areas cultivated alongside the seasonal rivers and because of tensions with
neighbouring pastoral groups from Uganda and the Sudan in particular (e.g.
Toposa) interfered with this.
However, reports from Turkana in rmd-1987 indicated that conducting a
survey in the border zone with Uganda and Sudan would have been too
dangerous at that time because of politica! unrest and civil wars going on in
both northern Uganda and southern Sudan. As a result, and after much
VI
considération, it was decided to chose another area m which to conduct thé
survey.
In 1982, during my stay in Kikelelwa, a small village at the foot of Mt.
Kilimanjaro in thé Kenyan Kajiado District, I had personally witnessed thé rise
in thé struggle for land between Kikuyu and Kamba immigrants and Maasai
pastoralists who had been the original inhabitants of the area. This expérience
together with hearing many reports from Kajiado of the growing importance of
thé influx of non-Maasai in the district finally made this alternative study thé
most interesting. Moreover an opportunity presented itself for assisting thé
University of Amsterdam in their supportive activities of a newly starled
integrated régional development project. The Arid and Semi-Arid Development
Programme (ASAL) of Kajiado District, funded by thé Netherlands Ministry of
Development Co-operation (DOIS), requested assistance in thé collection of
Maasai literature and in thé conducting of surveys.
In thé préparation, conduction and analysis of the research as in thé final
writing of this book I have been assisted by many people. In Kenya I owe a
gréât debt to Mr. James Kipkan and Mr. Rinus van Klinken and all personnel
of thé ASAL programme for their useful co-operation and their logistic
support. Thanks are also due to Emily Kimani for additional typing. Mr. A.
Gutu, Mr. Gideon Kuluo and Mr. P. Ngari and ail liaison offïcers of the
ASAL-Programme, particularly those in thé departments of Water, Livestock
and Agriculture were of gréât help in thé collection of background data and
maps. My thanks also to staff members of SNV-Nairobi for logistic support, to
Mike Mwangi who provided additional basic maps, to Agnes Kikaye for
reviewing thé livestock data, to Oliver Kantai for providing some literature and
his co-operation in conducting additional fieldwork in Esokota and Nairobi, to
Father Frans Mol of thé Maasai Centre in Lemek for his hospitality, permission
to copy meters of literature, his educating me in my understanding of some of
thé spécifie Maasai features and for commenting on earlier drafts of chapters 5
and 6, to Killian Holland of the McGill University of Montréal for interesting
discussions, to Ruud van Dijck and Jaap van Woerden of the United Nations
Environment Programme for providing literature and remote sensing data and
to Peter de Leeuw of thé International Livestock Centre for Africa for literature
and discussion time.
Much gratitude is due to Mr. J. oie Seitah for thé hospitality I enjoyed at
his home and for his tireless answering of ail my questions on thé facts and
figures of Maasai society. He also made a most fruitful contribution to the
training of the research-assistants. These young Maasai performed a tremendous
and tiring job while walking or biking many kilomètres day and night in
Maasailand looking for willing respondents. I want to express my deepest
respect and appréciation to Lemaron Kaanto, Bernard Katitia, Alfred Kesheko,
William Kereto, Abraham Koshopa, Paul Kunoni, John Leboo, Amos
Lemayian, Stephen Masenke, Jean Masinde, Joseph Muyaa, Joseph Nkasikasi,
Daniel Nkobei, Julius Paita, Anthony Sarorit, Siaka Seita, Jonathan Simel,
Peter Shungeya and Thomas Tipanko. I would also hke to thank all those 543
respondents who spent so much of their time in listening to and answering our
questions. Ashe Oleng.
Finally I would like to mention my gratitude to all those people who,
over the years, opened their homes and gave me their friendship which made
our stay in Kenya a most pleasant expérience. First and foremost I would like
to mention Jos Miesen who, since my first arrivai, has always been a great help
and a friend. Thanks also to Niels de Vos, Theo Winder, Jos Verhaak and
Martin van Leeuwen and to Leonie and Rinus van Klinken for their hospitality,
to the Catholic Church of Kajiado (particularly to Father Alexander Gollaz) for
accommodation and a most interesting Christmas Day among the Maasai
herders of Lenkism, to Kennedy Dulo, Luis Mutharia, John Kihiu Mwangi and
Moses Mwangi for the best friday nights ever and to the families of Michael
and Agnes Kikaye and Pauline Sairo for sharing their homes and meals with us
while we were m Kajiado.
In the Netherlands a similar number of people deserve a word of thanks. Prof.
Martin Doornbos, Prof. Jan Hinderink and Prof. Gerrit Huizer for reading the
manuscript; Mrs. Angela Needham for helping with the correction of my
Dutch-English; Ans Wilders for drawing the maps and figures; Huub Schlundt
Bodien and Marie-José Rutten for additional figures and maps of Embolioi,
Kitengela, Empuyiankat and Poka; Fred Muijrers for making the bar-diagrams;
Monique Rutten for reviewing and cross-checking literature références; Paul
Hendriks for valuable hints on the data analysis and for allowing me the use of
his computer from time to time, Hans Korfage for information on Sua Pan-
Botswana and Bert Toxopeus of the International Institute for Aerospace
Survey and Earth Sciences (ITC/Enschede) for additional literature. For
supplementary agro-climatic information I am grateful to Mr. R. van de Weg
and Mr. L. Touber of DLO-Starmg Centrum/Wageningen and Mr. H. Braun of
ILRIAVageningen. Thanks are also due to my previous colleagues of the
Department of Human Geography of the Catholic University of Nijmegen and
to Mrs. Rietje van Dalen for logistic support. I would like to express my
particular thanks to my three supervisors, Prof. Jan Kleinpenning, Dr. Ton
Dietz and Dr. Bart Peperkamp. They contributed much with their confidence
and their careful reading of and valuable comments on the draft versions of the
manuscript. Also, I am very grateful to Ton Dietz for the opportunity offered
by him to join the ASAL-Kajiado backstopping activities.
Finally, the support and interest shown by friends and relatives is highly
appreciated. Much gratitude to my mother and to my late father to whom this
book is dedicated. A special word of thankfulness to my wife Jacqueline who,
besides experiencing some of the "good times" in Kajiado more than anyone
was confronted with the "bad times" in the writing of this book, and to our
daughter Céline, who knows only the bad times. They deserve an apology.
Marcel Rutten Hastière-Lavaux/Nijmegen, September 1992
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INTRODUCTION
0.1 Nomadic Pastoralism Losing Ground
More than 30 per cent of the earth's land surface is arid or semi-arid, and
covers large areas of Australia, North and South America, Asia and Africa.
They mainly comprise of grazing lands with an annual rainfall below 500-700
mm and low carrying capacity. Estimâtes indicate that not less than half of
Africa's total land area, some 1,300 to 1,600 million ha, is devoted to animal
husbandry and that some 50 million Africans are either wholly or largely
dependent upon it (see Bos & Peperkamp 1989:32). Some of thèse livestock
keepers are nomadic pastoralists occupying tropical Africa's arid and semi-arid
areas, totalling some 1,200 million hectares.' In Africa, approximately 120
différent pastoralist ethnie groups can be distinguished, numbering between a
mère few thousand to several millions (see Jahnke 1982:68). As such the
majority of the world's pastoralists are to be found in Africa which accounts
for some 50-60 per cent, with Asia 25-30 per cent, America 15 per cent and
Australia having l per cent. The most important single countries in terms of
absolute numbers of pastoralists are Sudan, USA, Somalia, Chad, Ethiopia,
Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, India and China (see Sandford 1983a:2).
From the end of the second millennium B.C. African nomadic pastoralism
has developed locally in an almost continuons band from the Atlantic to the
Indian Océans in African savanna and steppe zones (see Unesco/UNEP/FAO
1979:265). Figure 0.1 shows the geographical position of the three main
pastoral groups of tropical Africa: Nilo-Saharan; Afro-Asiatic and Congo-
Kordofanian. Each of these major groups is made up of some 12 subgroups
composed of several clusters of related pastoral ethnie groups.2
1 An estimation of the extent of the arid and semi-arid areas and the number of people
engagea in nomadic pastoralism dépends, of course, on one's définition of these concepts. For
example, Jahnke using a dry région classification based on précipitation and evaporation more or
less congruent with a 1,000 mm rainfall line and 0-180 growing days (a day during which
précipitation exceeds potential evaporation), gives a figure of over 90 million out of a total of 238
million agricultural people living in Africa's tropical dry régions, excluding thé Western Sahara,
Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Egypt and South Africa, by 1979 (see Jahnke 1982:17/235). Sandford
(1983a:2 and 1983b:ll) mentions a total of 30-40 million people living in the world's dry areas
having 'animal-bascd' économies of which 15-25 million African pastoral people, representing 6-
10 per cent of tropical Africa's total rural population. Duming and Brough (1992:67) speak of 30-
43 million "pastoralists" scattered on thé world's dry lands by thé early 1990s. For 1990, thé
World Bank estimated for Sub-Saharan Africa alone a number of 495 million people 71 per cent
of whom were living in thé rural areas. Using Sandford's 6-10 per cent figure, this would mean
some 21-35 million pastoralists living in Sub-Saharan Africa by 1990 (see World Bank
1992:219/279).
2 For example, thé Nilo-Saharan group is Subdivided into thé Saharan, Nubian, Beir, West
Nilotic, East Nilotic and South Nilotic subgroups. The East Nilotic subgroup is composed of the
Karimojong and thé Maasai cluster. The Maasai pastoral people, together with thé Sambura, thé
agro-pastoral Njemps and thé (now) agricultural Arusha people belong to thé Maasai cluster.
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1 Afro-Asiatic group
A1 Somitic (e.g. Maurs)
A2 Berber (Tuareg)
A3 North Cushitic (Beja)
A4 East Cushitic (e.g. Somali)
2 Congo-Kordofanian group
C1 West Atlantic (e.g.Fulani - Bororo)
C2 Benue-Congo (e.g. Tswana)
3 Nilo-Saharan group
N1 Saharan (e.g. Teda)
N2 Nubian (Midob)
N3 Beir (Didinga)
N4 West Nilotic (e.g. Nuer)
N5 East Nilotic
a Maasai cluster 1 Samburu
2 Maasai
b Karimojong cluster (e.g. Turkana)
N6 South Nilotic (e.g. Pokot)
Figure 0.1 Pastoral Peoples of Tropical Africa
Source: simplifiée) frora Jahnke 1982:70
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Nowadays, it appears that most of these pastoral societies are threatened in
their very existence. Once called "the lords of the plains" roaming around with
their large herds on extensive pastures the nomadic pastoral future now seems
to have turned bleak. The processes of structural impoverishment and acute
major crises of hunger and starvation of man and of animais, although not new
phenomena, have seemed to become more frequent in recent tunes. The 1970s
disaster in the Sahel is among the most well known examples of the
breakdown of the pastoral way of life.
According to Jahnke (1982:89) the 'notion of pastoralism under pressure is
on the whole more valid than the notion of a free-ranging husbandry man with
an abundance of livestock and land resources at his disposai'. Schwartz and
Schwartz (1985:5) state that it becomes more and more evident that nomadic
societies 'show a decreasing selfreliance in terms of food production'.
According to Hjort (1982:24) 'growing scores of people [are] being pushed out
of the pastoral economy'. Dietz (1987:13) wonders 'whether there is any
chance of survival of a pastoral way of life'. His question is most
pessimistically answered by Neville and Rada Dyson-Hudson stating that 'The
collective future of traditional pastoralists is (...) at risk in East Africa. By the
end of the Century they may belong merely to memory, as traditional African
hunter-gatherer populations already do' (Dyson-Hudson & Dyson-Hudson
1982:213).
Sometimes not just the mode of existence, even the people themselves are
thought to be on the road to extinction. As early as 1910 H. and S. Hinde
published their book "The Last of the Masai".3 In the early 1930s a médical
survey among the Maasai of Kenya's Kajiado District revealed that the birth
rate among the Maasai was not high enough to maintain the population as a
result of gonorrhoeal infections (see KDAR 1931:4). In spite of this the Maasai
nowadays number more than ever before. This is true of most pastoralist ethnie
groups, making Sandford conclude that pastoralism is not dying out. He agrées
that pastoral people are leaving pastoralism and that it is proportionally less
important in the economy than 50 years ago. Nevertheless, hè believes that
'most of the areas which are pastoral at present will continue to be so in future
and many millions of people will continue to be pastoralists' (Sandford
1983a:2/3).
To some researchers this growth of the human population is in fact the main
cause of the economie problems of today's pastoralists. Droughts, rangeland
dégradation, reduced access to and control over land and an unfavourable if not
hostile politica! and economie environment are also among the main causes
mentioned. Opinions as to the relative importance of each of these causes
differ between several schools of thought within and between disciplines, now
and in the past. Nevertheless, they all share the view that traditional nomadic
Throughout this book I will use the modem spelling of the group's name (i.e. Maasai).
Before the 1970s most authors used the name "Masai", "Masaï" or "Massai".
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pastoralism is losing ground.4
Figure 0.2 Location of Kajiado District in Kenya
4 Only a few cases were found in which traditional pastoralism gained in structural
importance within a group's economy. Holy (1987:210) reports of the increased importance of
nomadic pastoralism within the mixed-agricultural economy of the Berti living in Northern Darfur
Province, Sudan. A combination of climatic conditions, water improvements and political factors
enabled the Berti to invest their wealth in livestock. A similar description is given by Haaland
(1972) for the neighbouring Fur. Unesco/UNEP/FAO (1979:284) report of Fulani groups in Niger
and Nigeria who, just before the 1970s drought, changed back from agriculture towards nomadic
pastoralism. A less recent example concerns the Turkana pastoralists of noflhwestem Kenya; after
departing in the 18th Century from ihe Karimojong cluster centred in northern Uganda, they
concentrated on livestock herding as the ecological conditions in their new home area were not as
favourable as in Uganda.
By the early 1980s, the International Livestock Centre for Africa (ILCA) made
a survey of the Maasai pastoralists of Kajiado District located at the southern
tip of Kenya's Rif t Valley province (see figure 0.2). Several sources
concerning data for thé human as well as thé livestock population of the
district between 1948 and 1984 were plotted against each other.5
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Figure 0.3 Cattle and Pastoral Human Populations Kajiado District 1948-84
Source: Bekure et al. 1987:82
Figure 0.3 shows thé résulte of this analysis. A consistent rise in thé number of
Maasai pastoralists in combination with a fluctuating cattle population has led
to a steady décline in thé cattle/people ratio. As a rule of thumb it is estimated
ILCA's estimations of livestock populations are notoriously inaccurate; even human
population figures for nomadic societies are problematic. The livestock figures represent
compromises among thé often conflicting estimâtes originating largely from govemment records.
The human population figures are based on census as done in 1948, 1962, 1969, 1979 with an
estimated correction factor for non-pastoralists (see Bekure et al. 1987:127).
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that to subsist entirely on a diet of milk and méat, a minimum of about 10
cattle/person is required.6 Thus, it can be concluded that since the early 1960s
the Maasai of Kajiado District, on average, no longer accord with this basic
condition. After the 1984 drought cattie wealth dropped to a low of less than 3
cattle per person.
Though aware of the questionable reliability of dated information a trend can
be discerned in Maasai prosperity in this Century. For instance, by the early
1930s a report suggested that the 'average Maasai household of five persons
has an allowance of over one and a half square mile of country to itself. The
official number of cattle for 1930 is 720,000, but a more recent actual account
made by the veterinary départaient in the Kajiado District indicates that the
numbers are much in excess of that estimate and are probably more than a
million' (KLC 1934:5).
From these data, concerning the whole of Kenyan Maasailand (i.e. both
Kajiado and the neighbouring Narok District), it can be calculated that some
48,000 Maasai possessing approximately 720,000 to 1,000,000 cattle had on
average 15-20 cattle per person in the early 1930s. Nowadays, according to a
recent livestock census conducted in Kajiado District, some 120,000 Maasai
pastoralists share approximately 633,000 head of cattle, a cattle/person ratio of
5.3 (MoLD 1988:iii).7
Besidés an increasing Maasai population and virtually stable livestock numbers
the land area available has been decreasing over the years. Population densities
have been rising not only as a result of the growth of the Maasai population,
other non-Maasai groups have migrated towards this area. Moreover, in an
absolute sense, the Maasai territory has become much smaller, especially as the
outcome of the process of colonization of East Africa by the end of the last
Century. In this study we will concentrate on the diminishing availability of the
land resource for the Maasai pastoralists of Kajiado District. Let us, by way of
introduction, briefly examine the Maasai ownership of land over the last
Century.
At the end of the nineteenth century and before the arrivai of the British and
Germans in East Africa, the Maasai pastoralists occupied an area located at a
latitude of between 1° north of the Equator to about 6° south at some places
over 200 km in width. lts surface area as presented by several authors ranged
between 116,000 km2 (Jacobs 1963) and 207,000 km2 (Huntingford 1953).
Approximately 44,000 km2 (Jacobs 1963) to 100,000 km2 (Voshaar 1979) was
This is based on a référence adult requirement of 2,300 Kcal per day, an output of l litte of
milk per laclating cow (700 Kcal) and a fraction of some 20 per cent of the cows in milk. Eacb
head of cattle is assumed to provide an additional SO KcaJ/day as méat (see Bekure et al.
1987:127).
7 After analyzing thé crude 1988 Livestock Census data we estimate that approximately
26,000 cattle and 80,000 shoats belong to non-Maasai. Kikuyu and Sonjo were thé main owners.
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located in présent day Kenya.8 The Maasai territory at the end of the
nineteenth century and that of today is shown in figure O.4.
35' 39°
Figure 0.4 Maasailand around 1890 and in 1990
After the arrivai of the British the Maasai were removed from their best
grazing areas and restricted into two separated Maasai reserves totalling some
23,620 km2 by a treaty in 1904. In 1912/13 the majority of the northern Maasai
For an assessment of the 19th century Maasai area, maps provided by several authors were
analyzed and our measurements provided the following figures for the extent of pre-colonial
Maasailand: Jacobs (1963) 116,000 km2; Ochieng' (1985) 123,000 km2; Hollis (1905) 126,000
km2; Bekure et al. (1987) 155,000 km2; Voshaar (1979) 160,000 km2; Leys (1924 repr. 1973)
some 200,000 km2; Huntingford (1953) 120,000 km2. Figures for Kenya Maasailand ranged as
follows: Jacobs (1963) 44,000 km2; Hollis (1905) 55,000 km'; Leys (1924 repr. 1973) 64,000 km2;
Ochieng' (1985) 69,000 km2; Huntingford (1953) 70,000 km2 and Voshaar (1979) 100,000 km2.
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were regrouped in an enlarged southern reserve comprising an area of
approximately 37,800 km2 (see Sandford 1919:3). Moreover, in terms of
quality the loss was even more sévère as green pastures located in ecologically
favourable areas had to be abandoned and were replaced with a less
comfortable habitat, heavily infested by tsetse fly and mostly lacking sufficient
water and all year round grazing. According to Morgan (1972:215) of the
31,000 km2 (excluding forest reserves) of European setüed lands, 18,000 km2
consisted of old Maasai grazing grounds, evacuated under the agreements of
1904 and 1913. Minor adjustments in later years resulted in a Maasai territory
of 39,300 km2 by 1934 (see Hailey 1950 repr. 1957:167).
The 1979 Kenya population census gives a figure of 211,651 Kenya Maasai
living in Kajiado and Narok districts totalling 39,618 km2. This area, however,
had to be shared with 147,655 non-Maasai inhabiting the towns and better-
watered areas, as well as with a few of the most populär Kenyan game parks.
Leaving these réductions aside for the moment, it can be calculated that during
this Century the Kenya Maasai area was reduced to almost half of its former
territory. At the same time the population occupying it, Maasai and non-
Maasai, has increased almost fifteenfold from 43,000 in 1915 to probably over
630,000 nowadays (see Sindiga 1986:163).
0.2 Objectives and Methods of Survey
The object of this study "nomadic pastoralism" can also be seen as two
separate issues, the "nomadic" referring to access to and mobile movements
over land, the "pastoralism" to the ownership and production of livestock and
the use of pastures. As Galaty (1978:1) points out the fïrst is mainly a political
and the second largely an economically governed phenomenon. As we will see
in the Maasai context the two sphères are inter-related and our study of Maasai
society should also operate from both perspectives.
The main thème of this book, however, is foremost to study one spécifie
phenomenon; the loss, privatization of and compétition for land within the
Maasai pastoral way of life.
The loss of grazing pastures due to increased cultivation, the establishment
of Game Parks and minéral exploitation is said to undermine the livestock
economy of Maasai pastoralists in Kajiado District. Furthermore, the recent
subdivision of group ranches into too small individual holdings is feared will
resuit in the selling of land to outsiders. This research examines the outcome of
this process as well as the Maasai response of economie intensification and
diversification, including increasing the productivity of the herd, cultivation,
wage-employment, out-migration and so on.
Taking into account the geographical context this main objective has been
operationalized through the following research questions:
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- international level: what is the world-wide trend concerning the availability
of land for nomadic pastoralism? Have international political and economie
forces directly or indirectly affected the man-land relationship in Kajiado
District?
- national level: which particular physical, economie, démographie and other
features of Kenya are operative in the context of the availability of land?
What is the central government's policy towards the Kenyan land issue and
livestock development?
- regional level: what is the structure and dynamic of the Kenyan dry régions?
Which is the regional development policy applied in these régions?
- local level: what are the economie, political, socio-cultural features of
Kajiado District as of today? How did these develop since the arrivai of the
British colonizers by the late 1880s? What happened to Maasai access to
land during the last Century? What is the balance between demand and
availability of land then and now? Which factors are responsible for the
decreasing availability of land? What is the outcome of the process of
individualization of communally owned land? Will it increase the marketing
of livestock and bring about improvements in the sphère of water
development and grazing management? To what extent is the reported selling
of individualized plots taking place? Who are these sellers and buyers? For
what purpose do buyers use the newly acquired parcels? Are the Maasai
selling land to buy poverty?
The methods of research applied in the préparation of this book included an in-
depth analysis of the relevant literature covering nomadic pastoralism. Part of
this exercise had been carried out in the context of another study undertaken
by the author in 1984 among the Turkana nomadic pastoralists of north-west
Kenya. Spécifie literature concerning Maasai pastoralists was collected at
several universities in the Netherlands, the University of Cambridge and the
University of London in Gréât Britain. In Kenya, the bulk of information
available in the form of books, research papers, annual reports, policy papers,
mimeos, maps, remote sensing data, closed and open files and newspapers was
obtained from the University of Nairobi, the National Archives, the Kajiado
District Information and Documentation Centre, the International Livestock
Centre for Africa (ILCA), the Kajiado Arid and Semi-Arid Lands Programme
(ASAL), the Ministries of Livestock Development, Agriculture and Education,
the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and private collections.
Father Frans Mol's private collection of literature on Maasai turned out to be
particularly helpful. However, entering his library makes one feel as if hit by a
sledge-hammer as it is a visual expression of the enonnous amount of ink and
paper used by early travellers, colonial politicians, missionaries,
anthropologists, geographers, historians, biologists, ecologists and even fiction
writers on the pastoral Maasai.
Among the most informative, at least for this study, have been the works of
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Jacobs (1963), Leys (1924), Merker (1904), Mol (1978), Sandford (1919),
Sorrenson (1968), Waller (1976), mainly dealing with the history and
anthropology of the Maasai, Bekure et al. (1987), Campbell (1978), Evangelou
(1984), Galaty (1980), Grandin (1981), Halderman (1972), Holland (1986),
Metson (1974), White and Meadows (1981), Njoka (1979), Sindiga (1986) and
Tobiko (1989a) chiefly concerned with the Maasai economy and habitat.
In addition to the literature survey I attended a fulltime five month course on
"Land Ecology and Rural Survey" at the International Institute for Aerospace
and Earth Sciences (ITC) at Enschede in the Netherlands. It enlarged my
knowledge of the ecological peculiarities of the tropical rangelands.
In Kenya, co-operation was sought with the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands
(ASAL) Programme of Kajiado District. Backstopping of this Netherlands
sponsored programme was entrusted in the hands of the University of
Amsterdam. As an assistant backstopper I supported the programme with the
statistical handling and analysis of a district-wide survey conducted in co-
operation with the Ministry of Agriculture. Other, small scale surveys
concerning livestock marketing, agricultural diversification and women group
activities were also dealt with.
Furthermore, a conference entitled "the Future of Maasai Pastoralists in
Kajiado District" held in Limuru, Kenya, was attended in May 1989. Besides
being a conference visitor, I was lucky enough to be able to participate in the
organization of note-taking and the production of the conference proceedings.
This job helped me to become acquainted with up-to-date information from a
variety of sources, including Maasai pastoralists, government officials,
missionaries, politicians and fellow researchers. Another forum, the Ol Maa
meetings in Nairobi, also acted as a catalyst in my understanding of the present
Problems facing Maasai pastoralists. Other key-informants had already been
interviewed during my stay in Kajiado from October 1988 until March 1989.
The actual fieldwork was conducted from September 1989 until April 1990.
Criteria for the sélection of our research locations were formulated and
discussed with key informants. Seven group ranches were finally chosen in
which the survey would be conducted: Olkinos, Embolioi, Elang'ata Wuas,
Lorngosua, Kiboko, Meto and Poka. In addition we did two more spécifie
surveys concerning employment among (young) Maasai in Esokota group
ranch and Nairobi and another one about agricultural Maasai in Bartimaro
group ranch (these case studies will be published at a later date).
In total 26 Maasai secondary school leavers were tested for conducting the
interviews of which 20 were finally selected.9 An important prerequisite was
that they should originale from the locations being researched. Expérience
during the testing of the questionnaire had made clear that the openness of the
Unfortunately, we had to drop Poka from our sample because the enumeiator left his job
after findiug another one in Nairobi and no time was left to appoint and train another assistant.
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respondents and the validity of their answers greatly increased when the
interviewer belonged to the same Maasai section. His familiarity with the area
allowed the checking of information provided. Furthermore, parallel carrying
forward of the survey in every location at the same time overcame the problem
of comparability of data which would have resulted from a sequential
collection.
Groups of 2 to 4 students were stationed in their "home" group ranches. This
also helped to solve the immense logistic problems of accommodation and
transport. As most respondents could only be interviewed during evening time,
it was necessary to spend the night at the household's résidence. Non-Maasai
or Maasai from other locations would have had sévère problems in arranging
for this, especially in the Kaputiei group ranches (i.e. Olkinos, Embolioi, Poka
and Kiboko). Every group was provided with at least one bicycle and a letter
of introduction. As far as possible we had informed local chiefs of the start of
the survey. In genera! every interviewer operated on his own except where, for
reasons of wildlife danger, it was better to move in teams of two persons.
We have tried to reach to a uniform distribution of respondents taking into
account the human population densities within the ranch. The sélection of the
households was random. The location of every respondent's home was marked
on a map. A Kajiado District General Event Calendar and a group ranch
spécifie time table were produced to assist the respondents and interviewers in
locating historical happenings. These calendars combined dates and spécifie
events such as the construction of a road, the drilling of a borehole, a period of
sévère drought, the conducting of special ceremonies and the opening of a
school, dispensary or training centre.
Before the actual fieldwork went ahead the group of interviewers had a two-
week fulltime training course in Kajiado. The concepts, objectives and methods
of survey were discussed in füll detail in order to come to as uniform an
understanding of the purpose and exécution of the research as possible.
Research questions were formulated, field-tested and reformulated. In order to
be able to make trend déductions we attempted to stay as close as possible to
other survey formats used by Metson (1974), White and Meadows (1981) and
ILCA (1981) during the late 1970s and early 1980s period.
In the first week of the survey we visited all groups to discuss problems that
had possibly arisen. Revisits were carried out at a later stage. In addition, all
the interviewers reported at a three week interval at Kajiado to recover
somewhat and to refresh mind and body. Expériences were shared and
discussed. Papers providing spécifie information about selected aspects were
produced by every research team. Their interest in the topic became most
obvious in discussions between themselves and with civil servants and policy
makers. The enthusiasm and input showed by these young Maasai was very
stimulating for us. Their work has contributed enormously to the writing of this
book.
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0.3 Organization of the book
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Chapter l intrcxluces some of the main concepts used in this book such as
nomadic pastoralism, land, land use rights, landlessness and poverty. Référence
will be made to the Maasai situation. In addition, trends in the use of land
world-wide as well as in Kenya will be shown. Finally, a framework used for
the analysis of the access to land will be discussed.
Chapter 2 highlights the Kenyan economy. Special attention is paid to the
livestock sector in a regional, national and international context. Next, the
national development policy is discussed before turning to one of the country's
most burning issues, the unequal distribution and availability of land.
Chapter 3 concentrâtes on a sketch of the semi-arid and arid lands of Kenya.
This acts as a frame of référence for the Maasai pastoralists of Kajiado District
in respect of land potential, livestock and wildlife density and démographie
characteristics.
Chapter 4 provides more detailed information about Kajiado District
conceming ils people, economy, ecology and physical infrastructure as of
today. A brief outline of some aspects of Maasai society will also be "discussed.
Chapter 5 outlines the history of land use and land policy in Kajiado District
as it developed since the late 1880s until 1963, the time of Kenya's
independence from Great Britain.
Chapter 6 follows a similar approach though here we concentrate on the
Maasai economy and development policy in Kajiado District during this
period. Référence to the overall performance of the Kenyan economy and
Colonial development policy will often be made.
Chapter 7 discusses post-Colonial land policy and the state of affaire in
Kajiado District. Attention is paid mainly to the création, performance and
subdivision of group ranches. The growing importance of wildlife conservation
and cultivation since the mid-1960s will also be dealt with.
Chapter 8 présents the results of this survey obtained among the Maasai of
Kajiado District concerning the effects of group ranch subdivision. The
ecological and economie viability of individualized plots, the processes of
fencing and reduced mobility.
Chapter 9 deals with the further fragmentation, transfer and mortgage of the
newly created plots. The kind of Investments and improvements made by this
new group of individual ranchers are presented.
Chapter 10 provides information concerning the personal characteristics of
the Maasai pastoralists and the intensification, diversification and
commercialization of their (livestock) household économies. Notice is given of
the major problems as mentioned by the Maasai pastoralists of today. This
should provide an answer to the future of the Maasai of Kajiado District
considering the steadily growing number of Maasai people with a diminishing
area of land available.
CHAPTER l
CONCEPTS AND FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
1.1 Concepts of Nomadic Pastoralism, Grazing Capacity,
Land and Poverty
1.1.1 The Concepts of Nomadic Pastoralism and Grazing Capacity
Pastoralists are people who make a living by keeping livestock that act as a
direct intermediate between man and his natura! environment, the pastures.
Indigestible plants are converted into milk, méat, fat and blood for human
consumption and/or provide an indirect source of income through the sale or
barter of animais and their produce, including wool, hides and skins, manure
and horns.
Like hunting and ranching, pastoralism, belongs to the main catégories of
rangeland utilization. It is a form of "extensive grazing", meaning that use is
made of the land by grazing animais without an overall improvement of the
végétation being undertaken by (re)seeding or fertilizing or allowing for
improvements like local feedlots or water supplies.
Zonneveld (1984:94) has subdivided pastoralism according to various "key
attributes", such as produce, stock type, objectives and mobility:
Produce: - meat pastoralism, milk pastoralism, wool (by-product mainly);
Stock type: - small stock pastoralism, cattle pastoralism, reindeer pastoralism
(see Ingold 1980:202), Hama and alpaca pastoralism;
Objectives: - subsistence pastoralism, commercial pastoralism;
Mobility: - village communal grazing, transhumance, nomadism, ranching.
Let us consider some of these sub-classifications in detail. The distinction
made concerning "produce" is a relative one. Milk pastoralists will also eat
meat and vice versa. Milk pastoralism is the most common. The division made
along the line of stock type is a relative one, especially as far as cattle and
small stock are concerned. For example, in Kenya most pastoral households
have both cattle and small stock. We would like to add "camel pastoralism",
which in most north-African countries especially is of major, if not sole,
importance.
Using the "produce" criterium a division can also be made concerning thé
relative importance of pastoralism within thé households' overall economy (see
Dietz 1987:15). When at least 50 per cent of thé pastoralists' income is based
on thé livestock enterprise the term "pure pastoralism" is often applied. Others,
however, prefer to reserve this term for those pastoralists who live solely from
thé produce of their herds. Besides livestock, pastoralists may satisfy their
needs through cultivation. If they obtain between 10 and 50 per cent of their
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income from animais they are classified as "agro-pastoral". When non-
agricultural income covers more than half of the food needs one speaks of a
"mixed economy".
Starting from thé production "objective" point of view it is possible to
differentiate between subsistence and commercial pastoralism; thé former
implies that livestock products directiy provide more than half of the food
needs, while in thé latter case food is bought with the proceeds of the selling
or bartering of animais and their produce.
The last key for sub-classifying pastoralism is that of "mobility". As with thé
degree of pastoralism, it is possible to distinguish a kind of gradation in thé
mobility aspect, ranging from hyper mobile, having no fixed home and putting
up a tent or hut wherever grass and water is available to being completely
sedentary.
It should be stressed that thé nomadic movements are not the resuit of the
pastoralist's wish to travel. These are foremost determined by thé low
ecological potential of thé grazing areas; minimal and/or unreliable rains,
sometimes failing altogether, and the high evapotranspiration or extrême cold
resulting in low and seasonal and geographically variable herbaceous biomass
availability. In other words, thé pastoralists are forced to move their animais in
search for grazing. Other factors affecting mobility are thé need to avoid
disease-affected and insecure areas. Actual migration patterns are also
influenced by thé location of trading centres, agricultural areas and quarantine
régulations imposed by thé Government. In other words, mobility is necessary
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Figure 1.1 Types of Livestock Keeping
Source: Zonneveld 1984:94
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One speaks of village communal grazing if herding is centred around a village
and the walking distance does not exceed 20 km (see figure 1.1).
A spécifie intermediate form of mobility is transhumance: the seasonal
movement of herds and flocks accompanied by herdsmen only, along more or
less fixed trekking-routes to wet-season grazing grounds returning to their
sedentary base where the rest of the families live permanently in the dry
season. For example, the Bororo of Niger and the Tuareg of Mali make long
treks of over 100 km every year. Where ecological conditions become better,
i.e. the intermediate zone between semi-arid and sub-humid allowing for
agriculture, the nomadic movements are short or rather infrequent; e.g. the
Nandi of Kenya.
Nomadism refers to those cases in which all household members are
constantly on the move during the dry season either together or, as in the case
of the Turkana of Kenya, split up from each other taking care of a spécifie part
of the total herd.1 During the wet season the members and their livestock
regroup on the wet season pastures whenever there is an abundance of grazing
for all of the household's animais. This is a constant process of dispersion and
concentration in order to use the scarce available resources optimally.
Ranching refers to a situation whereby 'the herds are kept for sale on a
spécifie, sometimes fenced, area, in which water resources are controlled, herds
are divided into différent âge and sex groups, parasites and predators are
controlled, thé range is managed and use of fire is regulated'
(Unesco/UNEP/FAO 1979:265). Wild animais may also be kept and managed
as well as domesticated. According to Zonneveld (1984:96) ranching was
introduced in thé last Century. Hanches can only exist where dry season grazing
areas are available. For arid and semi-arid areas this means that a ranch has to
extend over many thousands of hectares. Improved ranch Systems which make
use of reseeding and fertilizing as in thé United States, can be much smaller.
A spécifie ranching System, which will be the focus of this study, is the
"group-ranch" in which thé exclusive grazing rights of a large tract of
(unfenced) land are given to a spécifie group of families. lts objective lies
somewhere in-between that of regulär ranching (one of the most
commercialized forms of livestock keeping oriented at an outside market), and
that of subsistence pastoralism (foremost geared to maximize (milk) output in
order to support the human population and the reproduction of the herd).
Traditional Maasai pastoralism was (moderately) nomadic, cattle-, milk- and
Unfortunately, several authors while referring to pastoralists speak of "nomads" (see e.g.
Unesco/UNEP/FAO 1979:465). There is also the confusing concept of "semi-pastoralism". Some
authors use it in the context of agro-pastoralism or a mixed economy. Others stress the nomadic
aspect and seem to speak of semi-sedentary pastoralists when referring to pastoralists following
transhumance or a kind of reduced mobility, either in time or space, as compared to "fully-
nomadic" people. When semi-pastoralism exists together with setni-nomadism as is not seldom the
case, there is no problem. It would be better to avoid this terminology.
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subsistence-oriented. Nowadays, the Maasai human population has become
more sedentary and organized along the lines of "group-ranches". These are,
however, in a process of dissolution resulting in the individualization of
landownership. Cattle are still the most important kind of stock within the
Maasai herds, though sheep and goats have grown in importance. Recentiy,
some camels have been introduced. In addition, the diversification of and
commercialization of processes of the Maasai household economy as well as
changing food habits are increasingly visible.
The extent of mobility is foremost related to the quality of the rangeland;
forage quantity and quality, availability of water, présence of pests and
diseases, érosion hazard, climatic hardship and the like. The number of animais
that can be maintained per area unit as determined by all site factors, without
reducing the quality'of the land is called the carrying capacity of the land. The
term grazing capacity can be defined as the number of animais that can graze
on a certain area without doing damage, based on the amount of forage
available, presuming all other factors are favourable (see Zonneveld 1984:107).
Grazing capacity therefore refers to a potential situation. An approximation of
the grazing capacity is obtained by dividing the rangeland forage growth by the
herbivore requirements2:
«4*
G = grazing capacity in animal umts/area unit (eg. AU/ha);
F = forage production in weight/area unit/unit of time (e.g. kg/ha/year). The yearly Consumable
Dry Matter (CDM) production (y) is determined by the annual rainfall (x) in mm per year
multiplied by a certain constant (b: 1-10) depending on soil, rainfall seasonality, altitude and
the like. The outcome has to be added to another fixed constant (a: -400 to 100, depending
on the area). For semi-arid Kenya these constants are set at -100 to -240 and 3.8 to 6.0 for a
and b respectively);
R = herbivore requirement of dry matter (DM) in weight/animal unit/unit of time (e.g.
kg/AU/year). The daily DM forage requirements of large herbivores varies from 2 to 4 per
cent of the body weight. Also the quality of DM, expressed in terms of crude protein contents
(CP) is of importance in this respect. In genera! CP requirements are set at 7% of consumable
dry matter, whereas 10% is préférable. Mulüplying the N(itrogen) content by 6.25 gives the
CP percentage;
P = proper-use factor (PUF) in décimal (0-1); maximum proportion of forage growth that can be
gtazed each year from a given type of forage without inducing a downward trend in forage
production. For arid and semi-arid rangelands a rule of thumb is that the potential forage
consumption is half the forage growth (PUF = 0.5).
2 The following is based on lecture notes of the International Institute for Aerospace Survey
and Earth Sciences (TTC) written by van Gils, van Wijngaarden and Zonneveld (see Gils van et al.
1985a and Gils van et al. 1985b).
Comparing the actual grazing capacity (i.e. taking into account other land
qualities like water availability and so on) with the stocking rate (i.e. the
number of animais per surface area present over a certain period (e.g.
AU/ha/year)) an idea may be formed about the grazing intensity. If the
stocking rate is lower then the range is understocked, if higher tjien it is
overstocked. In both cases there is a danger of détérioration of the rangeland
(see Gils van et al. 1985a:19).
Finally, we should consider the application of a uniform animal or 'stock unit'
to convert différent types of animais (i.e. cattle, camels, goats and sheep) into a
single figure enabling us to make an overall estimation of the total feed
requirement and/or production potential for a certain area or group of people.
In général animais are compared on the basis of liveweight only. Others go
further by applying metabolic weight, by including âge or by referring to thé
food producing capacity.
Unfortunately, as a resuit of thèse différent approaches, a world-wide
accepted définition of the stock unit is not yet available. Several units can be
traced in thé literature. Dahl and Hjort (1976) use a 'Standard Stock Unit'
(SSU) of 215 kg, which places goats at 0.33 SSU and sheep at 0.20 SSU. Pratt
and Gwynne (1977/8) also speak of SSU, though they refer to a steer with a
liveweight of 450 kg or to a Zébu cow with calf of 300 kg ('Zébu Unit'). For
goats and sheep they use équivalents of 0.14 - 0.20 SSU, depending on actual
liveweights. The UNDP/FAO Kenya Range Management Project Preliminary
Survey conducted in the late 1960s grounded their 12 year span livestock
development projections on 'Kenya Stock Units' (KSU) of an average of 0.55
for cattle and 0.07 for small stock (see section 7.2.5). Some years later the
Kenyan Range Management Division (RMD) used a 'Stock Unit' of 1.25 for a
mature bull, 1.0 for cow with calf, 1 year old steers and heifers 0.5, 2 year old
cattle 0.75, 3 year and over 1.0 SU (see section 7.2.6). The Kenyan Rangeland
Ecological Monitoring Unit (KREMU) speaks of 'Tropical Animal Units'
(TLU) as équivalent to a 250 kg animal and uses conversion factors of 1.2,
0.72 and 0.072 for camels, cattle and small stock, respectively (see Mbugua
1986:419 and section 3.4). By contrast Jahnke (1982) speaking of 'Tropical
Livestock Units' (TLU) uses conversion factors of 1.0, 0.7 and 0.1 for camels,
cattle and shoats.
For their Kajiado District survey executed during thé early 1980s thé
International Livestock Centre for Africa (ILCA) used 'Livestock Equivalents'
(LE) for livestock species conversion towards a standard 250 kg liveweight
animal. The LE approach is based on metabolic weight as it gives a more
précise indication of thé feed requirements of the herd. The average conversion
factors used are 0.71 for cattle and 0.17 for small stock. The Ministry of
Livestock Development in Kajiado used for their 'Stock Unit' (SU) a mean
figure of 0.6 for cattle and 0.125 for small stock (see section 8.3.2).
In other words, one should be very careful about estimâtes and especially
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about slrong statements concerning situations of 'overgrazing' or 'livestock
déficits for human consumption'. Application of different livestock units will
result in different outcomes which could be in conflict. In chapter 8 we will
deal further with this confusing concept.
1.1.2 The Concepts of Land, Land Use Rights and Landkssness
Besides livestock thé pastoral way of production needs land. Land has been
defined by the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations as an
area on the earth's surface, the characteristics of which embrace all reasonably
stable, or predictable cyclic attributes of thé biosphère vertically above and
below this area, including those of thé atmosphère, the soil and the underlying
rock (geology), the water regime (hydrology), the plant and animal populations
and the results of past, present and future uses of the land by man (see
Zonneveld 1984:111).
Let us consider some juridical issues in relation to land. Simply put, land
tenure concepts define how individuals gain access to and acquire use rights
over land, either temporarily or permanenüy (see Ezemoah 1987:36), There are
many ways in which rights of land are laid down. It is possible that title deeds
have been given out (statutory law) or that land is transferred by a traditional
law of succession (customary law).
Hellen (1977:54-74) makes a twofold division within the category of land
which falls under the régulations of the statutory law:
1. private land - all land which is owned, held or occupied under a freehold
title, or a leasehold title, or a certificate or claim, or which is
registered as private land under a Registered Land Act.
2. public land - all land which is occupied, used or acquired by the
Government and any other land not being customary or
private land.
Land underlying customary law can be distinguished as:
1. communally used
2. individually used
3. reserve land - not yet allotted
Nowadays, in many countries of Africa, the customary laws of succession are
under pressure as a result of a process towards individualization and
exclusivity of tenure. By implementing a programme of land consolidation,
adjudication and registration, often part of a large-scale land-reform policy
and/or new land législation, the change from customary to statutory land law
and from communal to individual ownership is being brought about.
In Kenya too, traditional systems of land tenure and land use are vanishing
slowly but surely. It should be realized that there was no such thing as a
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uniform traditional land tenure System for all ethnie groups in Kenya. Each
group had its own System with certain peculiarities that others lacked in their
land tenure arrangements. For instance, the githàka System of the Kikuyu
agriculturalists differs in many respects from the land régulations aniong the
Maasai pastoralists (see e.g. Sonius n.d.). Still, for all groups there was no such
thing as land being a marketable commodity as land came under British rule
by the end of the 1890s (see chapter 5). In 1902 an Ordinance was passed by
the new rulers proclaiming that all public land (i.e. unoccupied land) was
Crown land which, for the time being, was subject to the control of His
Majesty. In practice this meant that land under customary law, which seemed
to be unoccupied but was, in many cases, only temporarily abandoned or
sometimes still in use, was alienated and given in leasehold or even granted in
freehold to the newcomers. When the Kikuyu returned to find the lands of their
people occupied by selders it had been, from their point of view, stolen (see
Best & de Blij 1977:440).
Reserves allocated to the principal ethnie groups in the first quarter of this
Century, created another category of land ownership; Native land. In fact this
was reserve land all held under traditional tribal systems of allocation and
rights. In later years this division in land tenure catégories in Kenya was
regrouped into:
- Government land: land, directly administered by the Commissioner of Lands,
held on behalf of the Government; forest reserves and national parks. Leases
of 33 or 99 years are sometimes offered to interested parties;
- Trust land: land not gazetted or allocated on title but held in trust under
customary law by the county council, a "native" administrative body, for the
ethnie group occupying that particular territory, and
- Private land: registered land in private ownership or held on lease from the
Government (see World Bank 1975:455).
Landïessness or near-landlessness seems to be on the rise all over the world in
the urban as well as in the rural areas. Landless agricultural workers do not
have access to this productive resource necessary for making a living. Near-
landlessness has been defined by Leonard (1989:13) as 'access to plots of land
too small to provide a minimal livelihood under existing land use patterns and
technical capabilities'. Recent estimâtes place some 13 per cent of all rural
households in developing countries as landless and almost 60 per cent have too
litüe land to subsist on (see section 1.2.1).
How do the Maasai traditionally view land-related issues such as ownership,
rights of use and inheritance?
Tobiko (1989a:25) states that, to a Maasai, land (en-kop) includes 'both the
solum and anything growing or otherwise naturally implanted in the soil -
végétation, trees, grass, etc.'. Maasai customary land law régulâtes the access
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to and use of postures and water. The most important sociological entity along
which the application of the Maasai customary land law proceeds is the 'ol-
osho' or section. In total among the Kenyan Maasai there are 12 distinct
sections each having their own name (Kaputiei, Matapato, Purko, Kisonko,
Ildamat, Dalalekutuk, Keekonyokie, Loodokilani, Loita, Siria, Uasinkishu and
Moitanik) and together they comprise the Maasai pastoral group.3
Every section has its own spécifie géographie location in Maasailand and
forms thé basic, as well as the ultimate unit of land ownership and resource
utilization. The senior elders in any section form the governing body. Land at
sectional level is communally owned. Members of each section, enjoy equal
rights of access to all natural resources (grass, water, sait licks) of their section.
However, the use of land also has some restrictions. For instance, dry season
pastures are not entered by any person of the Community until the time cornes
to retreat to these mostly swampy or upland places. Additionally, a family is
allowed to mark a small 'traditional private pasture' (ol-okerï), tracts of land
located immediately opposite the family gâtes to a kraal camp (homestead),
reserved for the grazing of a family's calves, sick, aged and weak animais.
Grazing on another's ol-okeri without permission is a serious social wrong.
But, as Tobiko explains 'in spite of its private nature, olokeri did not confer
upon the "owner" any semblance of private ownership; it is merely a socially
recognized "private-reserve" that confers no title whatsoever, it is neither
inheritable nor disposable by whatever means. Moreover, it only belongs to the
"owner" so long as hè is in occupation of it; so that if hè migrâtes to another
place, his olokeri ceased, whereon, another person may subsequentiy carve his
on the same site' (Tobiko 1989a:35).
Another restriction concerning the free use of land among the Maasai is
operative on the wet season pasture (emparnat) of a certain section. Most
people have their own locality of résidence in the lower plains which they
prefer and return to whenever possible during the wet season. Where a person
erects his homestead hè acquires exclusive rights over it. These rights will
retain some sort of "reversionary" rights over both the seulement itself and the
spot on which it is erected. No outsider can lay claims to the site and, even if
the owners abandon it, it remains unoccupied and undistributed unless a
relative or friend is allowed to live there. No one may occupy it without the
owners* permission and they can return there at any time to live in it again.
Settlements in the dry-season higher lands are temporary in nature. Also "man-
made" water sources are more or less privately "owned". Land around such a
well also falls under the control of the well-digger. This person, however, has
no exclusive say in the use of it.
Finally, Maasai of a different section in search of water and green pastures
are not allowed to trespass onto another section's area without permission
being granted by this section. In principle, however, permission is always
granted. The Maasai recognise the fact that by allowing others to enter their
area they create a reciprocal right which, as history has repeatedly
demonstrated, will most likely be needed at one time in the years to come.
1.1.3 The Concept of Poverty
Another concept which needs some clarification is poverty. Several définitions
have been used in the past each having its own merits and difficulties.4
Nonetheless, all approaches should be handled with caution. According to a
World Bank Report (1990) poverty is the inability to attain a minimal standard
of living. This seems to be a simple définition but its operationalization still
causes gréât difficulties. The World Bank Report uses a measure of
consumption below US$ 370 per person per year as thé poverty line. On a
régional level social indicators like life expectancy, child mortality and school
enrôlaient are also included. Undernutrition is a well known symptom of
poverty - largely concentrated among thé landless, sharecroppers, small farmers
and small-scale fishermen. The close relationship between illiteracy and
poverty is also confirmed in country surveys (see WCARRD 1988:103).
According to thé World Bank's US$ 370 consumption poverty line
approximately 1,115 million people in thé developing world, that is some 33
per cent, were living in absolute poverty by 1985 (see World Bank 1990:28).5
South Asia (525 million poor), East Asia (280 million poor) and Sub-Saharan
Africa (180 million poor) are thé régions inhabiting most of thé poor with only
thé latter expected to increase their absolute number of poor people by the end
of the Century to some 265 million people living below a minimal standard.
This would mean a continuation of the trend for this région in thé 1965-1985
period when poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa was sévère and especially since thé
beginning of thé 1980s, even increased sharply.6
Consumption per capita stagnated and primary enrôlaient rates
(approximately 60 per cent by 1980) decreased by almost 7 per cent between
1980 and 1985. Child mortality by 1980 was almost 200 deaths per thousand
children under 5 years of âge and has been reduced by only a meagre 5 per
cent since then. Life expectancy has increased from 42 years in 1965 to 50
In Tanzania we find the Sikiiari, Laitayiok and the main body of Kisonko Maasai.
For example, Greer and Thorbecke (1986) use a nutritional approach for Kenya by defuung
'food poverty' as an attempt to raeasure whether individuals consume enough food - or have the
means to do so - to enjoy a minimum désirable level of physical health.
5 The Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO) gives an esumate of
789 million poor people for 1980 (excluding China and Asian centrally planned économies), half
of whom were living in South Asia (see WCARRD 1988:7).
Newest figures indicate that the 1990 Report projection for the year 2000 (décline to some
825 million poor world-wide) has been to optimistic. Latest estimâtes foresee a total of 1,107
million poor people of which 304 million will réside in Sub-Saharan Africa. This is 49.7 percent
of the latter's total expected population for the year 2000 (see World Bank 1992:30).
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years by 1985 but is still the world's lowest. Malnutrition is on the rise, and
the number of underweight children has grown substantially. All other régions
in the world score much better in comparison.
Kenya, in terms of GNP per capita ranking 25th on the scale of poorest
countries by 1992, seems to reflect the overall trend for the whole of Sub-
Saharan Africa sketched above.7 'Estimâtes of the proportion of the total
population living in poverty in Kenya in the mid-1970s range from 30 (Collier
and Lal) to 45 per cent (Crawford and Thorbecke)' (Hunt 1985:33). As Hunt
points out both studies were based on a considérable amount of guesswork.
Still, both surveys show that poverty in Kenya is a widespread phenomenon
and that the majority of the poor are living in the rural areas.
The rural poor are a heterogeneous group, comprising of smallholders, large-
farm squatters and pastoralists, but who share common disadvantages. These
include limited assets, environmental vulnerability, lack of access to public
services and amenities, specifically éducation and médical facilities. The
(near)-landless constitute the largest single poverty group in the developing
régions. Pastoralists are also among the poor, though their situation seems to
be less structural as sévère periods of stress are followed by times of recovery.































































































TOTAL 14,295 4,210 29.5 100.0 100.0
Source: autnors compilation trom wono uaruc iy8j:43-2üö/c:oiiier ana Lal iy»0
Collier and Lal (1980 and 1986) took 2,000 Kenyan Shillings a year (at 1974
priées) as the rural poverty incarne line for a smallholder household in Kenya.
The line is mainly chosen to be able to compare one rural group with thé other
The World Bank includes 43 low-income économies with GNP per capita between 80 US$
(Mozambique) and some 600 US$ (Viet Nam). Kenya scores a 370 US$ per capita GNP. Of this
group 28 are African countries (see World Bank 1992:218).
instead of measuring thé total number of poor people. Table 1.1 shows thé
spread of poverty in Kenya by 1974 according to Collier and Lai (1980).
Crawford and Thorbecke give a figure of 89 per cent of the poor living in the
rural sector, while Collier and Lal's estimate is even as high as 98.6 per cent
composed of smallholders (71.0 per cent), pure pastoralists (14.6 per cent),
pastoralists who farm (0.6 per cent), migrant farmers (2.6 per cent), landless
with poor occupations (5.0 per cent) and large-farm squatters (4.8 per cent).8
In absolute terms Collier and Lai estimated pure pastoralists at 725,000
people of whom almost 85 per cent were living below the poverty line set for
this group at Ksh. 4.285A per year per household. This information caused thé
World Bank to conclude that 'pastoralists are possibly thé poorest group in
Kenya' (World Bank 1983:300). For pastoralists who practise some additional
farming (75,000 people), Collier and Lai predicted a relatively well-off
situation with only 33 per cent living in absolute poverty.
Let us examine thé extrême figures provided by Collier and Lai in more détail.
To détermine poverty among Kenyan pastoralists they used a survey done by
Campbell in 1977 among thé Loitokitok section of the Maasai living in the
south-eastern corner of Kajiado District. As their source of information
Campbell estimated the household's average income to be Ksh. 3.270/- for
1976.
Table 1.2 shows data from Campbell's survey as well as thé results of a
research conducted by thé International Livestock Centre for Africa (ILCA)
between 1981 and 1983 among Kajiado Maasai pastoralists. The ILCA survey
estimated an annual household cash income of Ksh. 13.010/- obtained mainly
through thé sale of livestock and ils produce (83 per cent). Other sources of
income such as wages, béer brewing, money transactions, accounted for thé
remaining 17 per cent. Borrowing and loan collections (Ksh. 1,110/-) provided
a total annual cash inflow of Ksh. 14.140/-.9 For a valid comparison with
Campbell's 1976 cash income, however, thèse figures should be corrected for
inflation which amounts to some 15 per cent per year. At 1976 priées BLCA's
Maasai pastoralist household's mean annual cash income would be in the order
of Ksh. 5,782/- per year.10 This is some 77 per cent higher than Campbell's
mean annual cash income, and would, on average, exclude Maasai pastoralists
Because thé 1990 urban population has increased to some 4-5 million or 22-24 per cent of
thé Kenyan human population as compared to thé 1.4 million or 9.8 per cent by 1974, it is
expected that since 1974 thé importance of thé urban poor has grown likewise.
9 This is in thé range of Campbell's figure of 93.43 per cent livestock related income. One
should take into account that this figure applies to pure pastoralists. For Maasai pastoralists who
also farm the livestock related income drops to some 35 per cent only. The ILCA survey does not
discriminate between so called Maasai pure pastoralists and Maasai farmers.
Using the ILCA defined Maasai consumer priée index of 112 for 1976 as compared to 252
for 1982 (1975=100) (see Bekure et al. 1987:372).
Il
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In addition, as highlighted in appendix 1.1, Collier and Lal's estimate is based
on a survey conducted among one group of nomadic pastoralists at a spécifie
time and place, the group being under sévère stress.12 Their assessment also
overrates thé pastoralists' poverty line due to thé omission of the valuation of
subsistance production and thé use of a questionably large household size. In
other words, Collier and Lai's calculation has resulted in an inflated number of
poor pastoral people for thé whole of Kenya.
This statement is confirmed by other surveys showing a less dramatic
situation for Maasai pastoralists. For instance, according to a survey conducted
in 1981/2 by thé Kenyan Central Bureau of Statistics, Kajiado and Narok
households, most of them pastoralists, had the highest average net monthly
income (Ksh. 1.674/-) as compared to other districts of the country (Ksh. 829/-
mean) (see RoK/CBS 1988:33-35). This survey included income in kind
derived from farm enterprises in determining total income. In Narok/Kajiado,
thé proportion of income in kind was an estimated 63 per cent of the total
average monthly household income, while thé national average figure
amounted to 48 per cent. This underscores our statement that among
pastoralists subsistence is of more importance than among smallholders.
Adjustment of thé minimum income of Ksh 4,285/- for 1974 would resuit in a poverty
line of approximately Ksh 5.635A per household for 1976
12 Campbell gives a figure of 60 per cent of lus sample of pastoralist households being
unable to meet subsistence needs from their herds at the time of the survey (i.e m the post
drought situation) as compared to 25 per cent in thé pre-drought situation' (see Campbell
1978.23)
Likewise, the per capita cash mcome poverty line for pastoralists will be lower
than for agriculturalists
Does this mean that we should reject thé idea of widespread poverty among
Maasai and other pastoralists in Kenya altogether?
Not completely; we agrée with Collier and Lal that the poverty concept
should mainly be used to estimate thé relative number of poor people
especially in relation to other groups in Kenyan society. Nevertheless, a more
accurate figure than that provided by Collier and Lai would be welcomed.
Crawford and Thorbecke presumed a still high but considerably lower
percentage of impoverished people of 60 per cent of all Kenyan pastoralists
(totalling 1,365,000 people according to thèse authors - see Hunt 1985:40-54).
Available information provided by other researchere suggests that among thé
Maasai in 'normal' times thé number of poor households, which in most cases
is based on a ranking according to wealth expressed in number of animais in
relation to household size, ranges in the order of 25 to 35 per cent (see
Campbell 1978:23 and King et al. 1982:5). Estimâtes for thé other pastoral
peoples of Kenya vary with thé Pokot and Turkana characterized as being less
well off and the Orma and Borana among the relatively more affluent
pastoralists (see section 3.4).
As late as the early 1930s the Maasai were characterized by the Kenyan
Land Commission as being probably the most wealthy tribe in East Africa,
both in land and the stock they were able to sustain.
This kind of wealth (land and stock) has not been included (directiy) in
Collier and Lal's poverty définition. As Leonard (1989:13) has said the degree
to which landlessness or near-landlessness coincides with poverty is a source
of debate among experts. Unesco sees a strong relationship between
landlessness and poverty at least for certain areas of the world. 'Poverty is
highly correlated with landlessness in South Asia, southern Africa and much of
Latin America. When the poor do own land it is often unproductive [and]
many of the poor have access to land without having ownership rights. In other
cases the poor have access to land that is owned by the community or is
common property. Such arrangements are increasingly jeopardized by
population pressure, privatization, overexploitation of resources, and
détérioration of the environment' (Unesco/UNEP/FAO 1979:31-2).
Comparison over time of resources, including assets like livestock and land,
should bring forward really essential information concerning the level of
poverty. It is the overall trend of prosperity over a long span of time,
excluding short term fluctuations, that should be sought. In the following
chapters we will present this trend for Kenyan pastoralists and Maasai
livestock keepers in particularly. To enable us analyzing the access to land for
Maasai pastoralists we used a framework which we will present in the next
section. Before that we will discuss the world trend in the availability of land
for the agricultural population in the last decades.
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1.2 Access to Land: a Framework For the Analyste
1.2.1 Access to Land World-wide
World-wide during 1980-1990 there was an increase in the agricultural
population of some 193 million, whilst the arable area under production
expanded with only 23.4 million ha as against an increase of 62 million
agricultural people and 38.8 million ha in the period 1970-1980.13 Table 1.3
shows the (agricultural) population figures for some selected régions in the
1970-90 period. From this table it can be concluded that, as f ar as all
developing régions are concerned, the agricultural population increased with
some 235 million people over the 1980-1990 period.
Table 1.3 also shows the high percentage of the agricultural population in
Kenya (77 per cent), Africa (66 per cent) and the Par East (61 per cent) as
compared to the Near East (38 per cent) and Latin America (26 per cent). The
1970 percentages for these régions were 82, 74, 68, 59 and 41 per cent,
respectively. This means that the Near East and Latin America régions in
particular have been able to reduce the relative importance of their agricultural
population, whereas the réductions in other régions were only modest.
Table 1.3 Increase in (Agricultural) Population for Some Selected Developing
Régions 1970-90 (in millions)
























































































Source: FAO/PY 1982 and 1990
Note: the régions mentioned refer to the developing countries only. The Far East figure also
includes centrally planned Asian nations.
Agricultural population is defined as aU persons who depend for their livelihood on
agriculture. This comprises all persons actively engaged in agriculture and their non-working
dependents. For a définition of types of land use see notes table 1.4.
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The change in land available for cultivation is shown in table 1.4. It should be
noted that, in the latter half of the 1980s, the expansion of land for agriculture
Worldwide was only half that of the first period of the decade, whereas the
growth of the agricultural population was slightly higher. This trend, though
less pronounced, can also be deduced for the African Region. From 1979-84
the land available for agriculture in Africa increased by 3.7 million ha as
compared to a 3.5 million ha increase in the 1984-89 period. The African
agricultural population increased by 33.5 and 38.5 million people, respectively.
In Kenya, thé situation is less clear. The growth of the agricultural
population is on the increase. From 1980 to 1990 the number of agricultural
people was estimated to have increased by some 5.0 million (2.4 million and
2.6 million for the first and last half, respectively). The FAO, however,
estimated a larger increase in the amount of arable land in this period (65,000
ha for 1979-84 and 93,000 ha for 1984-1989).
Still, the percentage increase in arable land (4.0 per cent) is very much less
than the growth of the agricultural population (16.4 per cent) in the 1985-90
period. The effect of this imbalance in growth has been increased pressure on
land.
Access to land has become an issue for a growing number of people. In
extreme cases people become landless or near-landless. The FAO estimated
total of landless and near-landless people is 180 million and 817 million,
respectively for 1985 as against 171 and 763 million for 1980. This is an
overall increase of 63 million people classified as landless or near-landless
over the 1980-85 period.
















































































Note: the estimâtes do not include centrally planned économies.
Table 1.5 présents the estimated spread of landless and near-landless people
living in the less developed régions of Africa, Latin America, Near East and
Asia as at 1980 and 1985. It shows that landlessness is foremost a phenomenon
of the Asian countries. Over the continents, nearly two-thirds of landless and
near-landless people live in Asia as against one-fifth in Africa and one-tenth in
Latin America. In terms of percentage of agricultural people being landless or
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near-landless Africa remains less affected though it is estimated that the
increase in landlessness is highest in this continent.
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41 60.0 (<2.0 ha)
41.0
76.0 (<2.0 ha)
source: WCAKKU iysa:taDie i & 3
Note: the gini-coefflcient is a measure of inequality in distribution increasing frora 0 to 1. Thus a
réduction in the gini-coefflcient does not exclude an absolute increase in the number of near-
landless and landless (e.g. India). The high rates of Madagaskar and Reunion are mainly due to
foreign owned plantations.
Table 1.6 shows the inequality in the distribution of land holdings and
percentages of (near-) landlessness in some selected countries. Inequality is at
its most profound in Latin America. Africa shows the least unequal distribution
of land holdings, whilst Asia takes an intermediate position. Among African
countries, Madagascar, Kenya and Reunion show the most distorted land
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distribution pattern. For Kenya this is expressed in a gini-coefficient of 0.77
(1981) and in the percentage of almost 32 per cent of all rural households
estimated as having holdings of less than 1.0 ha.14
1.2.2 The Causes of Landlessness and Near-landlessness
The issue of landlessness has been stipulated by the World Conference on
Agricultural Reform and Rural Development (WCARRD) organized in 1979 as
one of the major obstacles for establishing a "growth with equity" policy.15
The FAO undertook follow-up conferences in 1983 and 1987 which
recommended anew a broadening of the social base of land-ownership by
introducing policy changes relating, among others, to land tenure (see
WCARRD 1988:i).
A review of causes of landlessness and near-landlessness was provided by
Sinha in 1984.16 He concluded that landlessness and near-landlessness were
the result of a complex interaction of topographical, socio-economic and
political forces operating over centuries which made it difficult to disentangle
these causes from one another or to indicate their relative importance (see
Sinha 1984:18).
Still, for most cases of landlessness, Sinha (1984:18-32) after reviewing
several case studies from all over the world, holds one or more of the
following causes to be responsible: land scarcity; low productivity of
agriculture and underdevelopment; colonial legacy; maldistribution of land;
economie incorporation into the world economy and indebtedness. Let us
briefly discuss each of these factors:
First, densely populated areas that suffer from a shortage of land will, over
time, confiront a growing number of landless people. We have seen that
countries in Asia in particular have to deal with the problem of densely
populated areas and land scarcity. Land scarcity also exists in parts of the
developed world (e.g. the Netherlands). For example, in 1988 the potential per
capita availability of arable land in the Netherlands was only 0.06 ha, whereas
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14 Distribution of land in Nandi District, ranking 16th (out of 42) of the most densely
populated districts of Kenya, showed a gini-coefficient of 0.56 for 1987 (see Hebinck 1990:173).
15 The conference was attended by 145 countries and effected the adoption of a Déclaration
of Principles and Ihe Implementation of a Programme of Action which asked the developed and
developing countries to intensify their efforts for alleviating rural poverty.
16 His book was written under the auspices of the FAO in order to challenge the lack of
well-documented information about the many inter-related factors causing landlessness. It was feit
that without a thorough understanding of the causes and effects of landlessness, it would be
extremely difficult to advise govemments on policy alternatives to reverse the present situation and
the trend of the growing significance of landlessness.
it is 0.08 ha in Bangladesh.
However, the potentially inadequate size of a holding does not matter so
much in countries where the scope for non-agricultural employment is very
wide. In 1990 only 3.7 per cent of the economically active population in the
Netherlands was operative in the agricultural sector, while in Bangladesh this
figure was 68.5 per cent. As a result the average actual arable land holding
size per caput of the agricultural population was 1.64 and 0.12 ha for the
Netherlands and Bangladesh, respectively. The trend of absolute numbers of
people engaged in agriculture is a decrease in the rieh countries whereas in the
poor countries it is an increasing trend.
Among the group of developing countries strong différences exist as well in
the importance of the agricultural sector for employment opportunities. The
South American countries, for example, have more opportunities outside
agriculture than do most Asian and African nations. In 1990, 26.1 per cent of
the economically active Latin American population was working in the
agricultural sector whereas this figure for Africa (68.3 per cent) and the Far
East (63.6 per cent) was significantly higher (see FAO/PY 1990).
Secondly, it should be realized that in the world's richest countries the
productivity of agriculture, as well as manufacturing, is much higher. In the
Netherlands the 1988 agricultural output per ha was US$ 12,220. By contrast,
Bangladesh had an output of only US$ 956 per ha. Low productivity in both
agriculture and manufacturing prevents the rapid accélération of economie
development and, as a result, the pressure of population on land continues to
increase, especially in combination with rapid population growth.
A third cause of landlessness is stated to be colonial rule. Sinha reports the
conséquences of the Spanish conquest and the introduction of Spanish land
tenurial arrangements for the Aztecs in Mexico. Land was confiscated and this
legacy simply continued after the time of independence. In the early years of
the 20th Century nearly 96 per cent of rural families possessed no land while
over 8,000 haciendas controlled 40 per cent of Mexico's total area.
Comparable situations developed in Brazil where the Portuguese starled their
plantations and large estâtes at the cost of Indian land and lives. The plantation
System was also introduced in Africa, leaving thé "native" population to subsist
on poorer lands (e.g. in Zimbabwe, Kenya, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco). Myrdal
reported for South Asia on the European policy of encouraging private
property to be superimposed on South Asian traditional tenurial rules, resulting
in thé destruction of the latter (see Sinha 1984:24).
A fourth factor causing landlessness is the concentration of landownership in
the hands of a minority. In Latin America in particular this factor is held
responsible for a great deal of poverty and landlessness. According to the
WCARRD data base comprising 33 selected developing countries, the average
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concentration ratio during the 1970s for a group of 12 Latin American
countries was 0.80 For Asia this was 0.52 (from 9 countries) and for Africa
0.45 (from 12). In most cases, the colonial legacy must have been responsible
for the maldistribution of land. Land reform programmes after Independence
must have assisted the landless somehow. Nevertheless it has often been the
case that the post-Independence period saw a continuation or even a worsening
of biased landownership relations.
For example, Paraguay, which had only a peripheral position in the era of a
"Spanish" Latin America, did not suffer from landlessness at the time of
Independence in 1811. It was only after the Government starled to seil
stateland to willing buyers that a process was starled which ultimately resulted
in Ihe most distorted pattern of landownership in the world. Wealthy people as
well as (foreign) companies were offered an opportunity to acquire large areas
of land at relatively low priées, leaving the have-nots behind (see Kleinpenning
1987:90).
As a fïfth factor, world-wide economie intégration has been mentioned. The
assimilation of the colonies into the world economy has led to the
commercialization of agriculture. The surplus earned from exports was
deposited in the capitals of the colonial powers instead of in those of the
colonized, and provided the wealth for the industrialization and diversification
of their économies.
With the politica! independence of the colonial terrilories, a direct take-over
of land by foreigners was stopped, but dispossession of Ihe peasanls still
continued. In Latin America this was reinforced by the introduction of new
technology (large scale mechanization) causing these large estâtes to lay off
workers (see WCARRD 1988:46). Multinational corporations and the local
elite were responsible for this practice. For example, between 22 and 39 per
cent of cullivatable land in Ihe Dominican Republic was conttolled by one
foreign Company alone (see Sinha 1984:29). More subtle claims on land in Ihe
Third World operate by way of setting aside large parts of agricultural land for
the production of animal feed for western cattle (e.g. tapioca fields in
Thailand).
Incorporation into the world economy has also brought advantages like
sanitation, health and medicine, which, however, have had serious
conséquences for the pressure of population on land.
Finally, landlessness results from indebtedness. Under communal tenure land is
nol a commodity. The adoption of Western concepts of private property,
however, have made land a transferable resource. Farmers who fall into debt as
a resull of harvesl failures, either have lo mortgage Iheir land or lo seil it
straight away. It should be realized that with large numbers of poor households
driven onto marginal lands on steep slopes or semi-arid areas tiie risk of erop
failure has increased. The final resull is that large numbers of former land-
owners either become tenants or share-croppers on the mortgaged lands or they
become landless. In the latter case they engage in rural wage-labour, become
illégal squatters, move to newly opened colonization areas or leave the rural
ärea in a search for urban employaient.
The emerging problem of landlessness in Africa is relaled to a combination of
several factors. The World Conférence on Agrarian Reform and Rural
Developmenl (WCARRD) mentions Iwo main factors which hâve affecled
access to land in Africa (see WCARRD 1988:41).
First, it stresses the high rates of growth of Ihe agricultural population in
Africa, exceeding 2.0 per cent in more than half the countries and al around
3.0 per cent in Kenya, Rwanda, Nigeria and Tanzania in relation lo an
inadéquate compensating expansion of arable area. AH except four African
countries (Cameroon, Gabon, Reunion and Sierra Leone) hâve recorded
déclines in arable land per capita of agricultural population in the period 1980-
1985, as compared with 1975-80.
Secondly, the tenurial situation in mosl African countries is responsible for
the inequality in the distribution of land resulting in an artifïcial shortage. It is
stated that, apart from landlessness caused by shortage of land in certain
countries (such as Lesotho and Rwanda), the major factor affecting
landlessness in Africa is the growing tendency towards Ihe privatization of land
righls, leading to the dispossession of Ihe pooresl in Ihe process of adjudication
or through forced sales due to debt (see WCARRD 1988:41).
However, improvements have been made in some countries. For example,
Reunion, India, Nepal and Korea are among the countries mentioned by the
WCARRD-report that succeeded in bringing about a more equal distribution of
land. In the nexl section we will analyze Governmenl policies lowards land
tenure as practised by different groups of countries.
1.2.3 Government Policies Towards Landlessness
Basically, national land development policies are of two sorts: those designed
to increase economie growth and those intended lo increase equity (see
Davison 1987:30). In the latter approach three types of measures to tackle
landlessness and increase equity can be distinguished: curative, ameliorative
and participatory measures. It should be noted that these measures are not
restricled lo the national Government but, at different levels of intensity they
are also part of policies practised by other countries, international donors and
Non-Governmenlal Organizations.
In the group of curative measures we include land reforms, land setüemenl,
intensification of agriculture, diversification of the economy and reducing
population growth. Ameliorative measures are those such as securing tenancy
and (reasonable) minimum wages or relief of debls. Other ameliorative
measures are those developed within as a result of an increase in interest in Ihe
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rural sector like basic needs programmes (e.g. integrated rural development
programmes) or rural works programmes (e.g. land réclamation, afforestation).
Finally, participatory measures are those activities which help the landless and
the rural poor to organize thernselves. This includes programmes of
consciousness-raising, assisting self-help activities, promotion and improvement
of agricultural co-operatives and the like.
In spite of this broad range of possible measures to improve the access to
land for a large number of the (near-)landless the WCARRD-propagated
strategy of "growth with equity" via a more équitable distribution of assets, has
been followed by virtually no country during the 1980s. In this period attention
for land reform programmes as in the 1970s seems to have declined in most
countries. In fact a continuation -even increase in many countries- of
inequalities occurred in the distribution of land and increasingly large numbers
of marginalized smallholders became dependent upon wage-labour. It seems
that the type of land policy geared at promoting economie growth, either with
or without the Implementation of a set of ameliorative measures, has been the
most favoured.
In Africa, three broad trends of policy governing access to land during the
early 1980s have prevailed. First, in some countries there have been shifts
towards a socialization of land through co-operatives, collectives and state
farms, sometimes coupled with villagization programmes (as in Ethiopia,
Mozambique, the Congo). Secondly, in other countries, there have been shifts
towards or a continuation of the privatization of land, as in Malawi, Kenya,
Liberia, Uganda, Reunion and Botswana. Thirdly, there have been adaptations
of existing tenures to modify the relations between the tribal chiefs and the
state, as in the Gambia and Lesotho (see WCARRD 1988:38).
Within the first group of countries, the need has been recognized for greater
allocation of resources towards the peasant sector and a further strengthening
of the peasant co-operative sector, as state farms are not achieving their
intended results. Here ameliorative and participatory measures should help to
increase economie development.
In the second group of countries, Kenya and Malawi have continued their
programmes of accelerated adjudication and registration of individual titles.
Both countries are reported to face an increasing number of landless people,
raral-urban migration and seulement in marginal areas. In Uganda, the granting
of public lands to large entrepreneurs has led to the émergence of tenancy
Problems. In Botswana, the land tenure changes are partly the result of
increased population and partly the result of Government programmes aimed at
increasing employment and income in rural areas (see Milazi 1988:51).
In the third group of countries, the adaptation of customary tenure to new
needs has taken various forms such as the establishment of land allocation
committees chaired by the chiefs with régulations and leaseholds (Lesotho), or
defïning the rights of the state in relation to the chiefs in the allocation of
unused land, as in the Gambia. These latter arrangement represent a steady
expansion of state power in the régulation of customary tenure. In the Gambia,
it has been recognized that fallow periods have either diminished or have
disappeared as a result of population pressure, while the renting of land has
^become common.
In genera! a switch to the adoption of the second type of land policy can be
recorded among a growing number of African countries. 'The last five years
have seen the wholesale abandonment of economie planning based on social
property concepts to a planning pattern emphasizing some form of private
property rights' (Riddell 1988:39). This will probably sharpen the inequality in
the land distribution which, though less pronounced as in Latin America or
Asia, does exist in Africa. The WCARRD report (1988:38) stated that 'some of
the factors contributing to this inequality seem to have originated from state-
created dualism or the privatization of lands held under customary tenure'.
Indeed, as shown by table 1.6 the highest inequality in land distribution in
Africa is found among the group of countries propagating the privatization of
land (e.g. Liberia, Kenya, Reunion).
Overall, it can be concluded that the trend in most countries of the developing
world is one of a further détérioration in regard to access to land for a majority
of farmers. Groups such as pastoralists, hunter-gatherers, the illiterate and
female agriculturalists are particular victims of the capitalization of land. These
groups cannot compete with the vested interests of powerful groups of rieh
farmers, ranchers or multinationals. Compétition, sometimes evolving into open
conflict manifests itself between these groups. Sometimes the dispossessed
compete over the same lands as for example when marginalized farmers
compete with pastoralists. Finally, this struggle for land can also be recorded
among members belonging to the same group. Let us now turn to the next
section in order to discuss a global framework to help us analyze the factors
causing landlessness and the compétition and conflict arising over land.
1.2.4 A Framework for the Analysis of Landlessness
The scheme presented in figure 1.2 is the result of work done by Kleinpenning
(1986 and 1987), Weicker (1982), Litüe (1987) and Rutten (1985)
incorporating information provided in sections 1.2.2 and I.2.3.17 The starting
point for the création of this framework was a need to disentangle some of the
complexity and interrelated causes and effects operating in the field of
landlessness and the rise of the struggle for land. The scheme is intended to
help us describe and analyze the process of land aliénation and conflicts over
land in Kajiado District of today as well as in the past.
The scheme presented in the latter report was developed by Korfage and Rutten,
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Figure 1.2 Framework for thé Analysis of Access to Land
Source: Kleinpenning 1986; Rutten 1985
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Land as a resource for man has been placed in the centre of the scheme Land
however, is as we have seen, a scarce resource. The extent of this scarcity will
vary over the globe's surface depending on the absolute quantity avaüable
(supply) m relation to the demand for it. It should be realized that both
valables (i.e. supply and demand) should be defined in a relational way (see
Hendnks 1986:149).
The physical quality, relative location, accessibility and form of ownership
(e.g. communal or individual) of a certain pièce of land will make it more or
less suited for certain activities. The demand is also determined by the spécifie
quantitative and qualitative needs of the users. In other words, supply as well
as demand both have a qualitative dimension. Moreover, these dimensions will
vary over time. As a result the scarcity of land may be permanent or
temporary.
The quantitative and qualitative dimension of supply can be defined as "areal
extent' and "use potential", respectively. Por demand these Characteristics
could be renamed as "number of land users" and "user and production-specific
cnaractenstics". For example, the demand made for land by a group of farmers
engaged in irrigated agriculture will differ from that made by pastoralists
ranchers, enterprises, institutions or the Government itself. The potential
productivity of the land in relation to a (minimal) standard of living
requirements, the ability to purchase and use the land as well as possible
motives for spéculation all play a part in determining me final volume of
demand for land. If a free land market exists supply and demand will express
themselves m a particular use value (rent) and exchange value (sale priée)
Ail of this interplay evolves not in a vacuüm, but within a local, régional
national and international context, which can be further sub-divided into an'
économie, social, political, démographie and ecological scène, imbedded in a
dynannc process of change and development.
The local and régional level is the setting where the land use activities are
performed and where the analysis starts. Kleinpenning (1987:44) mentions that
we should at least differentiate between colonization zones and old agricultural
régions because of the striking différences between them. In addition the local
and regional (land use) development policy exercised by the Government
should be considered as well as the existing land tenure situation.
It will be clear that, in most cases, Government policy at local and regional
level is mterlinked with national development policy. Nevertheless, différences
do exist between countries themselves as well as in time concerning the
spécifie prescnbing and regulating power of the national policy for the local
context. Moreover, it is difficult to speak of one uniform Government as
several départaient« each have their spécifie policies that sometimes conflict
(e.g. Mimstry of Wildlife & Tourism versus that of Agriculture or Livestock
Development). Moreover, within a sing_le ministry those responsible at local-
régional level may have different opinions than their superiors have at national
headquarters.
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Notwithstanding these remarks it should be realized that central governtnent
is a very important conditioning force. We have already indicated the choices
the state may make between its economie development policy which is either
geared to economie growth sec or to a policy that also takes account of the
equity issue. These policy objectives détermine which forms of rural land use
are encouraged, e.g. large-scale capitalist forms of production or peasant types
of land use. We also mentioned the curative, ameliorative and participatory
measures that can be implemented to assist certain, land seeking groups (see
section 1.2.3)
Non-governmental institutions such as churches, trade unions, politica! parties
and pressure groups also play a rôle in this respect. They are often directly or
indirecüy involved in assisting the land seeking groups to a greater or lesser
degree.
Processes appear at international level that hâve effects on thé national and
even the local level. Foremost, thé international economie order is
characterized by a differentiated production of goods and a huge flow of
products between countries. The developing countries play a spécifie rôle in
this respect; roughly speaking they supply thé energy and raw materials for thé
production of a large number of industrial goods. Most of this production
occurs in thé rieh countries although, increasingly, multinational firms are
transplanting some of thèse activities to less wealthy countries.
Excépt for some Asian countries, agricultural products still make up the bulk
of exports transported from thé poor to thé rieh countries. Changes in thé
demand and/or priée for thèse products will, in return, affect the agricultural
sector in the developing world, including the way and extent to which land is
used.
Furthermore, supra-national institutions like the World Bank or the
International Monetary Fund play a rôle in land (tenure) policy or in the actual
use of land in the poor countries either directly or indirectly. International
solidarity and support, for example from trade unions and churches, should
also be recognized in this respect.
International organizations active in the field of nature conservation (e.g. the
préservation of the rainforests, the protection of biological diversity and rare
wildlife species and so on) see their efforts ultimately translated into questions
to do with land, unfortunately not infrequently at the cost of access to land for
the marginalized of the human population in the developing countries.
Finally, access to land is bound to change. This means that, besides the
location-specifïc dimension, we should undertake a historica! analysis to clarify
how a particular situation of land use developed.
The problem of land scarcity is expressed in a growing number of landless
people but also in the manifestation of compétition and conflicts concerning
access to land. Compétition for land could be defmed as a situation by which
one or more parties involved are being hindered in converting the necessary
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production needs by the other party without the will to take action against it.
This could develop into a situation of conflict in the case when one or all
parties want to take action at the cost of the other(s).
Compétition and conflicts could take place over use rights to or ownership of
land. Compétition could take place either directly (taking land from the other
party) or indirectly (taking virgin land). Conflicts can be latent (wanting to
counteract) or manifest (actually taking action against the other party). Another
distinction could be made concerning the activities involved. Compétition and
conflicts occurring between actors performing the sanie activity could be called
internai or inter-group conflicts, whereas those between actors of different
activities are classified as extemal or intra-group (see Rutten 1985:32-33,
Little 1987:195).
Where early studies of land use and interactions between pastoral and
agricultural groups emphasized the symbiotic co-operative aspects, nowadays
examples of compétition and conflicts over land are manifold. Restricting
ourselves to Africa the following are but a few examples. The Basarwa in
Botswana, a group of hunter-gatherers, are in process of losing their hunting
areas at the cost of large farm ranching. Maasai pastoralists have seen large
tracts of their grazing land carved out for the exclusive use of wildlife in
National Parks. Tuareg pastoralists in the Niger are faced with increasing
numbers of small-scale farmers disrupting their migration patterns, frequentiy
leading to open conflicts which can include murder. Similar difficulties exist
between Hausa farmers versus Fulbe herders in West Africa and Tugen
cultivators vis-à-vis n Charnus pastoralists in Kenya.
Little has made a classification of three origins of land use conflicts in pastoral
areas; the encroaching farmer, the cultivating herder, and the absentée herd
owner. These last two are ' Symptoms of social differentiation at the community
level, in which rieh and poor producers pursue different land use stratégies that
are potentially compétitive' (Little 1987:207). The "Cultivating Herder Model"
refers to pastoralists who in recent years are turning to farming as part of a
diversification strategy. This involves either rieh pastoralists farming to support
their livestock herding or poor herders virtually forced to cultivât» in order to
survive.
The "Absentée Herd Ownership Model" manifests itself in two ways; private
landowners living off the ranch who employ someone to look after the animais
or livestock traders and other businessmen who buy cattle locally, hire herders
to look after the animais and organize stock movements to the urban markets.
By using local grazing areas these traders are able to fatten the animais at
minimal cost. According to Litüe (1987:206) this development is growing in
significance in Kenya and elsewhere in Africa. Since this group of "part-time"
pastoralists mostly operate outside the indigenous management system it is
likely to be less concerned with long-term conservation practices. This could,
in the long run, give rise to growing compétition and conflicts.
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1.3 Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter we discussed the concepts and framework for analysis which will
be used in outlining the process of access to land among the Maasai pastoralists
of Kajiado District, Kenya. In the world's rangeland areas different types of
livestock-keeping such as subsistence nomadic pastoralism or commercial
ranching exist. Divisions can be made along the lines of produce (meat, milk,
wool), stock type (e.g. catüe, camel, reindeer), objective (subsistence or
commercial) and mobility patterns (e.g. transhumance, nomadism, ranching).
The Maasai pastoralism of today has evolved from nomadic subsistence milk-
oriented cattle keeping towards a mixed situation of group ranching, individual
landownership and commerciali/ed and diversified household économies. Cattle
are still the mainstay of the Maasai herds but small stock is on the increase.
Several methods for recalculating these different types of animais into uniform
stock units have been highlighted. The enormous diversity of these équivalents
stresses the difficulties and care needed in judging the grazing capacity of a
certain area. Besides, uncertainties and the variability in forage production,
herbivore requirements and a proper use factor make any absolute statement
concerning the potential carrying capacity of an area questionable.
Land can also be dealt with in juridical terms. For Africa as a whole and
Kenya in particular we concluded that customary law has, in the last Century,
increasingly been replaced by statutory law and communal by individual
landownership. This statement needs some clarification as we showed for the
Kikuyu and Maasai traditional society that land use was not free for all. For
instance, every Maasai family was allowed exclusive user rights over certain
pièces of land either reserved for their young, sick or weak animais (ol-okeri).
Also, control over a spécifie territory was exercised by each Maasai section.
Access to another section's territory had to be requested.
Another vested idea, reaffirmed by Collier and Lal, concerning sévère poverty
among nomadic pastoralists was criticised by showing that this assessment
suffered from the use of questionable assumptions, overestimations and
omissions (see also appendix 1.1). Instead of some 85 per cent of Kenyan
pastoralists considered to be living below the poverty level we assumed a figure
of approximately 25-35 per cent.
Attention was paid to the concepts of access to land and landlessness.
Référence was made to a clear trend of a decreasing availability of land for
low-income groups resulting in a growing number of landless. The highest
percentages of (near) landless households can be found in the Far East and in
Latin America. In Bangladesh, for instance, 78.0 per cent of all rural households
are within the group of pure or near landless. In the Dominican Republic the
figure of pure landless alone was estimated at 77.0 per cent. For Africa the
highest figure known is for Kenya (31.8 per cent).
In addition to these high percentages of landlessness, the distribution among
the group of owners is highly distorted, meaning that land scarcity is frequently
artificially created. For example, gini-coefficients for Latin America (a measure
of inequality in distribution increasing on a scale from O to 1) are often above
0.80, with Paraguay at the world's top position with 0.94! In Africa and Asia
these figures are in the range of 0.45 to 0.65. Only in Madagascar (0.80 due to
plantations mostly) and Kenya (0.77) is the distribution of land rather distorted.
In Africa the percentage of landless and near-landless is, in général, still on
the low side but it is growing rapidly. Over the 1980-1985 period U was
estimated to have witnessed an increase of 11.8 per cent of pure landless and
10.5 per cent for near landless. The mean figures in the developing régions of
the world stood at 5,3 per cent and 7.1 per cent, respectively. Several causes for
landlessness were reviewed: densely populated areas, low economie
productivity, colonial legacy, maldistribution of land, world-wide economie
intégration and indebtedness (i.e. poverty). For Africa the major factor affecting
landlessness was stated to be the growing tendency towards the privatization of
land rights.
In some countries (e.g. India, Nepal and Korea) a more equal distribution of
land has evolved. Korea, especially (north as well as south) played an active
rôle in achieving this improved situation. Three types of stratégies can be
distinguished in order to tackle landlessness: curative (e.g. land reforms),
ameliorative (e.g. securing tenancy) and participatory (e.g. assisting self-help
activities) measures. However, interest in land reform programmes under the
heading of "growth with equity" did not materialize in the last decades. Instead
inequality continued or became even more sévère.
In Africa, three major lines of policy towards access to land during the early
1980s prevailed. In some countries there was a shift towards the socialization of
land by way of co-operatives and state farms (e.g. Mozambique). In others the
privatization of land was either continued or begun (e.g. Malawi, Kenya). One
of the latest approaches to modernizing traditional tenures in favour of state
control, is taking place in Lesotho.
In général, the switch towards the second type of land policy is what seems to
be prevailing in Africa at the present time. From this an încrease in thé
maldistribution of landownership in Africa is expected. Groups like pastoralists,
hunter-gatherers, illiterate and female agriculturalists will be the victims of the
capitalization of land. These groups are doomed to lose their struggle for land
with thé vested powerful groups of rieh farmers, ranchers or (inter)national
corporations. Increased conflicts and compétition about land between both types
of groups mentioned above and among thé have-nots themselves can be
predicted.
In order to systematically disentangle the complexity of land conflicts and thé
compétition a framework for analysis was presented. Supply and demand for thé
land resource is the starting point for a scheme which involves aspects and
dimensions such as physical quality, relative location, form of ownership,
number and spécifie needs of (potential) users and historie developments. This
interplay occurs within a local, régional, national and international context. In
thé following chapter a start will be made with presenting all of these sphères.
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APPENDIX 1.1 Assessment of Poverty Among Maasai Pastoralists
Por a real assessment of poverty among Maasai pastorallsts the following considérations are
also of importance:
1. First, the pastoral annual income as deflned by Collier and Lal excludes a valuation of the
home consumption of milk and meat from the household's livestock. The formation of capital
through the herd's natural growth of animais is also not included. Exclusion of these means
of livelihood are considered to be too important an omission to allow for, as most Maasai
pastoralists are still mosüy subsistence oriented.
By examining two groups of Maasai in detail DLCA found that, besides the commercial
value of livestock (Ksh. 9,375/-), the herd's output used for direct home consumption (valued
at Ksh. 9.145/-), as well as the "stock inventory change" (i.e. the net growth of the herd and
flock amounting to Ksh. 14.975/-) would raise the mean annual income from livestock alone
to Ksh. 33,495/- per household. In a relative sensé this means that some 28 per cent of the
gross output of the household's herd can be considered as being commercial while 27 per
cent is used for direct subsistence.18 The remaining 45 per cent is saved in the form of herd
and flock accumulation (see Bekure et al. 1987:346/7). Including non-pastoräl income total
gross annual income was Ksh. 38.260/- on average for Maasai pastoral households of the
eastem part of Kajiado District during 1981-83. This means that, at 1976 priées, ILCA's
Maasai pastoralist average total household annual income would be in the order of Ksh.
17.000/-,
A comparison between Collier's smallholders and ILCA's pastoralists shows that the
former are able to provide approximately 35 per cent and the latter some 50 per cent for
home consumptioa Moreover, pastoralists spend a relatively small amount of cash on their
livestock production since they do not pay direcfly for the major inputs of the System, i.e.
family labour, livestock and land (see Bekure et al. 1987:350). Also, expenditure for
schooling and travelling fall far below those made by cultivators. The effect of this ability of
Maasai pastoralists to rely on their own food production for a major part and to have
minimal expenditure for several inputs and services is shown by Campbell for the year 1976;
while Maasai pastoralists and farmers had expenditure ratios as a percentage of income of 81
and 79 per cent respectively, non-Maasai farmers had expenditures of 174 per cent (Kikuyu
farmers) and as high as 286 per cent (other non-Maasai farmers), as a result of being forced
to use cash savings and stored food above the regulär annual income for 1976.
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18 Thus Maasai pastoralists use some 50 percent of their production for their own
consumption. By comparison, smallholders in Nyanza, Western and Central keep approximately 35
per cent of their production for subsistence. According to the ILCA survey more than 80 per cent
of the total home consumption is accounted for by milk. It seems valid to conclude that this fact
severely reduces the need for a cash inflow allowing a lower poverty-line as, for example,
compared to the agricultural smallholders, the landless or the urban poor. Campbell's survey
shows that Maasai farmers and non-Maasai farmers obtained over two-thirds of their subsistence
needs from cultivation. Maize and beans alone were able to produce 64 and 5.4 per cent for
Maasai and 55 and 15 per cent for non-Maasai' subsistence needs, respectively. In addition,
Maasai farmers could rely on their cattle. This made Campbell (1978:36) conclude that 'In terms
of provision of subsistence the non-Maasai farmers faced a more difficult situation than either the
Maasai farmers or many Maasai pastoralists'.
2. A second remark towards Collier and Lal's use of Campbell's data concerns their
statement that '1976 was a post-drought year' and 'income was evidently not regarded as
being temporanly low, for mean expenditure was only Ksh. 2,641/yr' (World Bank
1983:300)."
These are disputable accounts. According to Campbell, and many other authors, 1976 was
one of the worst years since the early 1960s drought. Rainfall amounted to an extreme
minimum of 230 mm on average for Kajiado District. It ended a period of almost continuons
below average rainfall in the drought-stticken Loitokitok area since 1973. Campbell's survey
was conducted at the end of the drought, prior to the heavy rains of March-April 1977. The
data concerning income and expenditure refer to the year 1976 and cannot be considered to
reflect a post-drought situation. As Campbell states 'At the time of the survey (at the end of
the drought) over 60 % of Maasai pastoralists were unable to meet their subsistence needs
from their herds (...) the situation was very serious' (see Campbell 1978:10/23). Assistance
was also provided by relatives and non-relatives, the Government and missions. In spite of
this, returns of livestock related sales were sufficient to buy substantial amounts of grain (see
Campbell 1978:8). An average of 53 per cent of total expenditure was used to buy food
crops.
Taking all these factors together it will be clear that at least the variables affecting Maasai
income and expenditure in 1976 are heavily biased; more animais were sold because of the
drought. On the other hand, priées had dropped considerably, while those for grains had
increased. It is hard to know the net result of these variables for the total cash income earned
by Maasai pastoralists in 1976. Still, it seems rather questionable to use the annual income of
this year as a ürm basis for an estimation of the Maasai household income let alone other
Kenyan pastoralists.
3. A third comment concerns Collier and Lal's guesswork as applied to their handling of the
household size of pure pastoralists. Campbell's survey gives a figure of 13.4 persons or 10.5
adult équivalents for an average Maasai household. Collier and Lal rounded this figure up to
15. By adjusting the Ksh. 2.000/- annual income poverty line for smallholder agriculturalist
households of 7 members, they estimated the pastoralists poverty boundary to be 15/7 x
2,000 = Ksh. 4,285/- a year per household (see table 1.1).
Data from other researchere départ in some cases significant!y from this 15 persons
household size estimate used by Collier and Lal. For example Sindiga (1986:109/217), who
studied Maasai population pressure and related aspects for the Kajiado Maasai, used an
overall 6 persons household size as conflrmed by the 1979 population census (6.23 persons
per household). Studies by other scholars in the Maasai area provide average household size
figures in the range of 9.4 persons (Bille & Anderson 1980:23), 12.0 persons (Bekure et al.
1987:172-181) and 13.8 persons (White & Meadows 1981:16). Différences in household
définition, variations in time, place and conductors of survey, will be responsible for (part of)
this fluctuation.20
Many households are expanded by the incorporation of an individual from another
" By contrast, ILCA calculated a mean annual expenditure of Ksh. 9,393/- for 1981-83 and
only 32 per cent of this amount was spent on food (see Bekure et al. 1987:332).
20 A household according to official Kenyan sources comprises a person or a group of
persons generally of the same kinship who normally réside together in the same house or in
several houses within the same compound and shaie a common source of food and are answerable
to the same head. It is probable that the inclusion or exclusion of dépendants and/or household
members who have temporanly migrated is responsible for the large variation between the varions
estimâtes.
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household or even a whole sub-household (resident raotheis, step-mothers and/or siblings).
The ILCA survey (Bekure et al. 1987:172-3) found a share of 17 per cent of all households
having unsepatated married sons with their wives and children. Dependents are incorporated
into other households because they have insufficient resources to be self-supporting.
Additionally, to offset a labour shortage for herding or domestic tasks 40 per cent of all
households borrow children from other households. Poor households and rieh are involved in
this practice with the former lending out hlgher numbers. ILCA points to the corrélation
between wealth and household size and composition. Rieh households are 80-100 per cent
larger than poor ones and have a smaller percentage of their members coming from the
nuclear family (man, hls wives and children). In fact, it is a social mechanism relieving
shortages of labour for the rieh and helping the poor to overcome insufficient resources.
If one accepts a pastoral household size of less than 15 people, the poverty line for pure
pastoralists should be lowered significanüy. Applying Campbell's household size of 13.4
leads to a réduction of Collier and Lal's poverty line (i.e. Ksh. 4,258/-) to Ksh. 3,829/-
(13.4/7 x 2,000 = Ksh. 3,828/60), while Sindiga's household estimate places it at Ksh.
1.714/- only.
4. Fourthly, different methods of data collection will have influenced the validity of the
information gathered. While the ILCA team interviewed all adult members of households
(n=282) once a month over a two-year period concerning their income and expenditure,
Campbell's data were obtained from the head of the household (n=166) during one visit It is
well known that in the latter case an underestimation of real expenditure and income is
inévitable.
CHAPTER 2
KENYA: ECONOMY, LAND AND PEOPLE
2.1 Introduction
Kenya covers an area of 582,646 km2 of which about four-fifths is arid and
semi-arid, receiving less than 700 mm of rainfall per year (eco-zones V-VII).
Only a mere 18 per cent (104,844 km2) constitutes the medium and high-
potential areas (eco-zones I-IV receiving between 700 and 1,600 mm of rainfall
annually). In total approximately 23.5 million people (1989 estimate) share this
area. However, their distribution is highly concentrated in the high-potential
régions where some 80 per cent of Kenya's population lives. Figure 2.1 shows
the ecological zones and population distribution for Kenya.
Kenya's démographie situation has been characterized as 'among the most
alarming in Africa' (see Bernard 1982:151). A population increase of 3.8 per
cent per year as compared to a world average of some 1.8 ranks Kenya among
thé fastest growing countries in thé world.' This fast population growth in
Kenya is thé resuit of a sharp décline in mortality (from 20 to 11 per 1,000
persons between 1965 and 1988), a still high crude birth rate (from 52 to 47
live births per 1,000 persons) and a continuing high total fertility rate (from 8.0
in 1965 to 6.9 in 1988). Although the average annual population growth figure
is expected to décline to some 3.4 per cent, thé total Kenyan population will
rise to an estimated total of 34 million people by 2000 and by thé year 2025
will amount to some 62 million people (see World Bank 1990:228).2 This
rapid growth is reflected in thé population âge structure of Kenya; 50.9 percent
of its population is between 0-14 years of âge! No other country in thé world
has more than half of its population in this cohort (see World Bank 1990:228).
Table 2.1 shows thé Kenyan âge cohorts. The combination of rapid
population growth in thé face of a limited supply of good agricultural land is
thé central problem of Kenyan development. It affects ail éléments of Kenya's
development strategy. Given thé nature of thé âge structure of the population,
there will be short-run implications on thé Government's ability to provide
basic needs.
Leaving aside thé oil producing countries of thé Middle eastem région experiencing high
growth rates due to immigration, only thé Ivory Coast and Gabon reached higher than average
annual growth rates of 4.0 and 3.9 respectively for thé 1980-1988 period (see World Bank
1990:228/9). The latest figures of me United Nations estimate thé Kenyan mid-1989 population to
number 24,872 people. The 1985-1989 growth was placed as high as 5.0 per cent annually (see
United Nations 1991).
2 The World Bank figures do not take into account the effect of AIDS. Alarming reports
from several parts of Africa, including Kenya, suggest a slowing down in the growth of the
population. Nevertheless, the latest World Bank Report (1992:268) expects a total of 64 million
Kenyans by 2025.
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Table 2.1 Projected Population by Selected Croups in
Kenya, 1989
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source: KOK. i98isa:2U8 table 9.3
In thé long term heavy pressure will be placed on thé economy which is likely
to induce thé major structural and social changes necessary to absorb thé
greater labour force. In other words, thé génération of today has to be absorbed
into productive employaient in thé years to corne in order to prevent
widespread human misery. According to Hunt (1985:1) 'Kenya is on the brink
of a major human crisis. Between 1976 and thé year 2000 8 million people are
expected to enter thé labour force. This in an economy in which in 1982 thé
total labour force was 7.6 million (in 1976 6.2 million). Thèse labour force
entrants are already born'.
Before considering thé implications of the new jobseekers for thé Kenyan
economy, let us first examine thé structure of this economy; its sectors and
their contribution to thé national economy as well as its growth.
2.2 The Kenyan Economy: Structure and Performance
2.2.1 Introduction
The Kenyan economy belongs to thé low-income économies of the world. It
ranks 25th having an average per capita GNP of 370 US$ in 1990. Table 2.2
shows some of the basic indicators for social and économie development for
Kenya in comparison to thé whole of Sub-Saharan Africa, thé low-, middle-
and high-income économies and thé world. The relatively good performance of
thé Kenyan economy, as illustrated by the average annual GNP per capita and
inflation figures, in comparison to the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa is also
demonstrated by table 2.2. Furthermore, life expectancy and literacy confirm
Kenya's favourite position among this group of African countries. A striking
feature of the Kenyan population is its high percentage of those living in the
rural areas as compared to other countries. Besides the capital city of Nairobi,
populated by some 1.5 million people, six more cities, Mombasa, Kisumu,
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Nakuru, Machakos, Meru and Eldoret, fall in the range of above 100,000
inhabitants. In 1989, a total of 4.3 million people was estimated to live in 172
urban centres (having at least 2,000 inhabitants) (see RoK 1988a:74).
Table 2.3 displays Kenya's structure and growth of production. It demonstrates
that the Kenyan economy, after Independence and up to the 1980s, performed
very well and grew at an annual rate of 6.8 percent. This growth was based
largely on the transfer of land from large to small farm use, extension of the
area under cultivation of high value crops and industrialization based on a
strategy of import substitution (see RoK 1988a:4). Economie growth slowed
down to 4.2 percent for the 1980-90 period. This setback had already starled
by the mid-1970s, resulting in an average growth of 4.1 per cent per year
during 1972-1980 only (see World Bank 1983:xi), not much above the
population growth.
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International and national problems were among the causes for Uns reduced
economie growth rate; the energy crises of the 1970s, international recession,
high interest rates, dramatic swings in the prices of Kenya's key exports coffee
and tea the collapse of the East African Community, narrowmg scope for
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efficiënt import substitution, slow agricultural growth due to unfavourable
climatic conditions, diminished scope for the expansion of production on un or
undercultivated high-potential land and a switch to industrialization to the
detriment of agriculture. The manufacturing sector has been increasingly
oriented to the processing of intermediates for the domestic market, making it
more dependent on imported inputs and less capable of generating the exports
required to pay for these Imports.
Although the contribution of the services sector is responsible for 49 percent
of the national GDP it is still agriculture which is considered to be the
mainstay of Kenya's economy as it provides the basis for the development of
other sectors of the economy. Coffee and tea are by far the most important
cash crops, accounting for some 64 percent of the agricultural export total. In
fact, besides petroleum products (12.0 percent), coffee, tea, and horticultural
products are the most important export commodities comprising 26.6, 20.2 and
12.5 per cent for 1988, respectively (see Statistical Abstract 1990:58).
However, exports have grown very slowly, if at all, and have become
concentrated in the above mentioned commodities. The tourism sector has
grown in importance over the last decade, and has even overtaken coffee and
tea as a major source of foreign exchange earnings, but it is also a very
uncertain branch of the economy (see section 7.5).
From table 2.3 we also learn that the growth of the indusfrial sector was
much higher until the 1980s, as compared to this last decade, when it
experienced a very modest rate of growth despite an official Government
policy geared at promoting industrial production. Again, in respect to other
Sub-Saharan countries Kenya's industrial performance was much better, but in
comparison with the industrial growth of other low-income économies outside
Africa, Kenya lagged behind. On the whole the country's terms of trade have
deteriorated and outstanding external debt has risen from 12.4 per cent in 1978
to 35.8 percent of GNP in 1987 (see RoK 1988a:15). This adds to another
bürden; the lack of employment opportunities for a fast growing number of
people. In section 2.3 we will examine this issue in more detail. Before turning
there we should briefly present information concerning the position of the
livestock venture within the agricultural sector of the Kenyan economy.
2.2.2 The Kenyan Livestock Sector
According to the 1989-1993 Development Plan the Kenyan Government aims
at a diversification of agricultural production, while at the same time
specifically promoting seven major commodities; coffee, tea, maize, wheat,
milk, méat and horticultural crops. Coffee and tea should provide agricultural
incomes and exports. Maize, wheat and meat should secure the domestic food
supply, while milk and horticultural products aim at both (see RoK 1988a:106).
From table 2.4 we learn that the growth in the marketed output in monetary
terms has especially occurred in coffee and tea which have overtaken the initial
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leading position of beef and dairy products. The last column shows the
importance of each of the officially marketed products with respect to the
domestic export of Kenya for 1988. Horticulture (12.5 percent), petroleum
products (12.0 percent), hides and skins (2.8 percent) and sodium carbonate
(2.0 percent) are among the other main export commodities.
Table 2.4 Gross Value of Marketed Output of Some Major Agricultural









































































Livestock production in Kenya is a very diverse activity in terms of all aspects
such as production goals and applied technology as well as producer, pasture
and livestock characteristics.3 Beef and dairy animais of différent quality are
kept, mainly by distinct groups of producers in separate régions of the country
geared on thé one side at füll (milk) subsistance and on thé other to intensified
commercialized production of high grade méat for export to Europe.
Table 2.5 shows thèse différent livestock production Systems over the
different ecological zones. The data presented are based on thé 1983 livestock
census performed by thé Ministry of Agriculture and corrected by Sloan. It was
estimated that a total of 10,930,000 cattle, 6,630,000 sheep and 7,730,000 goats
made up thé Kenyan livestock herds and flocks. Out of thèse 32.2, 55.1 and
54.1 per cent respectively belonged to thé pastoralists, mostly for subsistence
reasons. Camels and donkeys are not included in this overview but are
estimated to total some 800,000 and 250,000, respectively, almost ail restricted
to thé low-potential rangeland zone.
The commercial livestock sector comprises large ranches in thé disease free
higher rainfall zone (i.e. zones I, H and JU). This is the zone that was occupied
gradually by thé Europeans when they arrived at the end of the 19th Century,
pushing the African pastoralists towards thé arid and semi-arid régions.
Nowadays, thé ranches are in the hands of companies or rieh individuals either
3 For an indeptb analysis of thé Kenyan livestock sector we would like to refet to studies
done by UNDP/FAO (1967), Raikes (1981), Evangelou (1984) and FAO (1984).
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held under freehold arrangements or leased from thé govemment. Improved
beef and high grade dairy cattle stay on thèse large farms using high inputs of
capital for extra feed and disease-omitting measures.
Table 25 Livestock Population by Zones and Production Systems ('000 head)
Cattle Sheep Goats
Hlgh-potentlal areas





(zones IV and V, part of zone VI)
Smallholder mixed farming
Commercial ranching
Pastoralists (including group ranches)
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source: iseKure et ai. iys/:24
Most improved dairy animais, however, are owned by smallholder farmers in
thé better watered parts of Kenya. These smallholders also keep a major share
of ail indigenous cattle and small stock of Kenya (some 47.8 and 21.3 per cent,
respectively). So, by far thé densest concentrations of cattle are found in
western Kenya, Nyanza and Western Provinces and are kept by peasant
cultivators. Cattle, sheep and goats are often grazed on crop residues and on
any public land available such as roadsides. The animais provide an additional
source of food next to thé crops cultivated on thé small parcels. Milk and
animais are also marketed.
The médium and low-potential zones (i.e. thé semi-arid and arid zones IV,
V, VI and Vu) are inhabited by 4 to 5 million people. Some three quarters of
this human population possess about one third of thé total livestock units under
smallholder mixed farming conditions comprising approximately one quarter of
the rangeland zone. The medium-potential rangeland zones are also inhabited
by commercial ranches including individual ranches, Company ranches and co-
opérative ranches (see section 3.5 and figure 3.4). The remaining quarter of the
human population in the rangelands is made up of (semi)-nomadic pastoralists.
They either stay within group ranches or roam freely around with their animais
in the traditional grazing areas. They keep relatively large herds of mostly
indigenous cattle, small stock, camels and donkeys (almost 70 per cent of all
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livestock units or 61.6, 73.7 and 65.8 per cent of all cattle, sheep and goats in
the Kenyan rangelands, respectively).
Each of these species have their spécifie food requirements and production
characteristics which allow the pastoralists to optimize the use of the natura!
habitat and diminish the risks involved in livestock keeping as set by harsh
environmental conditions. For example, camels and goats are browsers as
opposed to cattle and sheep who are grazers. In addition, each of these species
have different water requirements and rates of survival and reproduction. In
genera! some 60-70 per cent of the pastoralists' cattle are cows as the owners'
main goal is production of milk for subsistence. Increasingly crossbreeds are
brought within these herds to optimize output. Small stock is the main supplier
of méat and often bartered or sold in exchange for other foodstuffs or cash.
Cattle sold by pastoralists is either unproductive, old, sick or weak or very
young steers. This last category is not seldom transported from thé very dry
régions in the north of the country for fattening in thé southern semi-dry areas
and on thé commercial ranches. So, in spite of different farmers' production
goals and régional characteristics, thé distinct livestock enterprises in Kenya
are interlinked to form a stratified, integrated and specialized livestock
production System.4
As stated by several authors and thé Ministry of Livestock Development
itself we should be very careful about livestock (offtake) figures as up dated
basic data is missing.5 Still, to assess thé (potential) capacity of the livestock
sector let us look at some of the production factors involved (i.e. livestock
numbers, breed type of animais and the quantity and quality of land available).
Firstly, the livestock population of Kenya immediately prior to the 1984
drought was estimated to be 11.5 million head of catüe (see Evangelou
1984:7). If this figure is correct, we estirnate that by the late 1980s the Kenyan
stock will have recovered to this same number of cattle or slightly above.
Table 2.6 gives an overview of prédictions about livestock numbers made by
the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (PAO).
4 Still, accordüig to Evangelou, incteased stratification of Kenya's livestock industry is
thougtu to have been impeded by the lack of sufficient finishing facilities for absorbing rangeland
immatures. For example, the World Bank calculated that if Kajiado and Narok were stocked with
1.0 million head (compared to 1.5 million now), in order to stabilize the population, fattening
arrangements would have to be made for 180,000 young steers and heifers annually, and this
number alone would nearly fill the present areas of commercial ranches (see Evangelou 1984:72).
Feedlots for fattening were given high priority by the govemment in the late 1960s. Test trials of
70 day periods in feedlot conditions raised the edible meat content of a low quality carcass by 50
percent, and did so profitably (FAO/World Bank 1977a:73).
For example, Raikes (1981:192) States that the slaughtering of cattle and other stock in
rural areas is very much less controlled and a nuniber of major towns are ringed by "rural"
butcheries, which seil meat to the towns. In addition, there is a substamial illegal urban trade,
which is steadily growing.
1 ;
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Note: f=FAO estimate; *= unofficial reliable source. FAO livestock figures for a particulat year
are often altered in more récent PAO publications. As a resuit we should be very careful in
interpreting this data. For example, thé increase in cattle numbers from 1976 to 1977 is simply due
to new information. For thé years 1987 and 1988 double figures are presented as the FAO
adjusted ils initial estimate. Moreover, for some years thé figures exclude livestock available on
smallholdings of less than 2 ha and/or in the hands of pastoralists. The drop in small stock
numbers after 1970 is due to thé exclusion of thé pastoral areas, whereas thé rise in thé number of
sheep in 1965/66 results from inclusion of animais on holdings of less than 2 ha. Figures for
camels were initially based on village countings only.
The FAO made an estimate for 1988 of 9.8 million cattle and 15.8 million
shoats (see FAO/PY 1988). In its 1989 production yearbook, however, this
1988 figure was changed to 13.1 million cattle and 13.3 million shoats (see
FAO/PY 1989). This again stresses thé lack of reliable data concerning
livestock numbers in Kenya.
Secondly, besides thé number of cattle and small stock we are interested in thé
54
Selling Wealth to Buy Poverty
type of breed of these animais. Raikes estimated that for 1970 there was a total
of 702,000 grade dairy cattle and 422,000 improved beef animais in addition to
some 8,807,000 indigenous Zebu.
As compared to the early 1970s, the number of improved animais is on the
increase. For 1978 the Ministry of Livestock Development assessed a total
cattle population of 10.2 million of which 1,127,000 were improved dairy,
660,000 improved beef and 8,460,000 unimproved animais (see RoK/MLD
1980:10). For 1983 an estimate was made of some 2 million grade dairy
animais mainly in the hands of smallholders from the high-potential zones (see
Bekure et al. 1987:20). Unfortunately we have no figures for the number of
improved beef animais, most of them staving on the large farm commercial
ranches of the medium-potential zone.
Thirdly, the quantity and quality of land available for livestock production in
Kenya should be assessed. The Ministry of Livestock Development estimated
that in 1975 some 50.31 million hectares were available for grazing. This area
was thought to be able to support a total of 12 million livestock units, while
only 6 million were available at that time. The amount of land available was
expected to décline to about 48.7 million hectares by 1990 due to increasing
cultivation and other land uses. As a resuit the supportable number of livestock
units was expected to drop to 10 million livestock units.
Table 2.7 Amount of Land Available for Grazing (Million Hectares) and
Carrying Capacity (Million Livestock Units) per Zone, 1975-90.
1990






Table 2.7 shows that the decrease in land available for grazing is expected to
occur in the high-potential zones (II and III), including patches of these inside
low-potential areas, mainly. Besides a decreasing availability of land for
livestock production the major constraints to livestock development in Kenya
include livestock diseases, poor marketing facilities, low priées, harsh climatic
conditions including periods of sévère droughts, lack of improved breeds and
compétition from wildlife (disease transmission, prédation). As a resuit it is
feared that Kenya's production of méat will, in thé future, possibly not be able
to keep pace with thé growth of thé human population.
The 1977 FAO/World Bank report on méat production and trade in thé Near
East and East Africa projected a déficit in domestically produced sheep and
goat méat of some 15,000 tons for Kenya as early as 1980, increasing towards
25,000 tons for 1985. For 1985 a shortage of beef and veal of approximately
10,000 tons was foreseen. In reality domestic livestock production (i.e.
officially slaughtered animais including méat exported, excluding imported
animais) lagged behind thèse projections in the case of beef and pork, while
thé small stock méat production was more than threefold thé 1985 projection
(see table 2.8).
Table 2.8 Projected and Actual (Officially) Slaughtered Méat of Bovines,
Small Stock and Pigs and Potential Availability for Export in
Kenya 1980-85 ('000 Tons)

































Source: FAU/World Bank iy77â'IIS/134; h'AU/PY 1982, iy»5
In 1980 thé Ministry of Livestock* Development published ils National
Livestock Development Policy document. It stated that thé main objective of
future livestock development policy was to help the nation avoid any shortfalls
in livestock production (see RoK/MLD 1980:1). Thèse stratégies and objectives
were recently restated in thé Sixth National Development Plan (see RoK
1988a:121).
In thé Policy document thé 1980 demand for beef was estimated at 135,000
tons and was projected to increase to well over 200,000 tons by 1990. The
1980 supply was stated to be 140,000 tons of beef. According to thé Sixth
Development Plan thé supply for 1987 was 171,000 tons, while thé 1993
production target was set at 181,000 tons (see RoK 1988a:107/110). This
would mean a projected déficit of 42,000 tons of beef for this last year as thé
1993 demand was calculated to be 223,000 tons. FAO production estimâtes are
higher for production as well as demand. For 1980 the FAO gives an estimate
of 193,000 tons of locally produced beef rising to 228,000 tons for 1989 and
56 Setting Wealth to Buy Poverty
even 330,000 tons for 1990 (see FAO/PY 1983, 1990, 1991 and table 2.9).6
Table 2.9 Livestock Production in Kenya 1964-90
Source: FAU/FY 1987-iyyi; Kautes lyoi; auuuuuu nuauav* *.-«.., ,
Note: Com.= commercial; Sub.= subsistance; Patast.= parastatal; f= FAO estimate; n.f.a. = no
figures available. For 1982-1990 in thé commercial purchase by parastatals columns two figures
have been included to illustrate thé change in tecotding by thé statistical department. Also for
1987 and 1988 we included two sets of data, both FAO estimâtes made in following yearbooks.
Whatever thé exact figures will be, it is feit that Kenya will probably not be
able to become a major exporter of méat as foreseen by the FAO in thé mid-
1980s (see FAO 1985c:84). There is in fact a risk that Kenya will be forcée to
import méat in thé near future. By early 1990 the Minister for Livestock
Development called upon local researchers to find ways to curb thé predicted
6 It should be noted that the FAO 1987 estimate of 212,000 tons of beef published in 1990
differed significantly from the FAO 1987 production figure published one year earher wb.ch stood
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shortfall in thé production of livestock in the country by the turn of the Century
(see KT 18/01/90).
The crux of the matter in this selfsufficiency aspect will be whether thé
growth in livestock production will be able to offset the growth in the Kenyan
human population, which happens to be arnong thé highest in thé world.
Unfortunately, per caput livestock production figures for Kenya are even more
prône to "guestimates" due to thé fact that exact and reliable figures for both
human and livestock population totals are not known. As a resuit FAO
livestock production per caput index figures for 1988 as published in 1989
differ significantly from thé 1988 estimate published in 1990 or again in 1991.
The latter estimate for thé year 1988 of 123.66 suggests a growth in per caput
production as compared to 1979-81 average production level (=100), whereas
thé former figure of 82.04 would imply thé opposite situation (see FAO/PY
1989, 1990, 1991).
The Ministry of Livestock Development foresaw thé same bleak future for
milk. In 1987 1,503,000 tons of milk were produced, mainly by improved
dairy animais from thé high-potential areas. For 1993 this figure is estimated to
rise to 1,693,000 tons, while thé demand will be for 2,500,000 tons. The rising
shortages are reflected in thé décline in thé export volume of livestock related
products. FAO milk production estimâtes for 1987 hâve recently been changed
from 1,001,000 tons to 2,055,000 tons. This again illustrâtes the care that
should be taken in drawing too strong conclusions based on this data. The
FAO estimate for thé production of milk in 1990 is 2,340,000 tons. If correct,
this cornes close to thé expected 1993 demand.
To secure food supplies thé Ministry of Livestock Development, in co-
opération with other ministries and institutions, has several instruments at
national, régional and district level by which it is able to influence production
Marketing of agricultural products in Kenya is dominated by state-controlled
institutions at almost every level. For example, thé Minister of Finance sets thé
priées for most products at producer and consumer levels, as empowered by
thé Priée Control Act. For livestock products this practice has continuée until
recently when thé Government decontrolled (bovine) méat priées at the
producer, wholesale and retail levels. During the 1970s real priées paid to
producers by the state owned méat processing Kenya Méat Commission
(KMC) remained more or less unchanged, whereas for small stock they
déclinée dramatically (see box 2.1).
: J
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Box 2.1 Change in Livestock Priées for Consumers and Producers
Priées paid to producers and consumers of meat, mük and maize over the years are presented
below (see table 2.10). It should be noted that these are official priées. In other words, overall
producer livestock priées will have been above this estimate. Still, the real priées received by
the primary producers will have been less than these figures, as the animal changes hands
several times between the producing household and the Wholesale producer (KMC, private
abattoir or local butcher) before reaching the slaughterhouse.
Retail priées paid outside Nairobi will be slightly higher for processed and packed products
due mainly to transport costs, while ready-made fresh products like meat and milk are often
cheaper than in the Nairobi area.
Official Producer Priées
Beef high grade (CAQ)






Beef high grade (CAQ)










































































































































6.00 300 7.18 379
4.65 745 5.00 809
6.501082 6.501082
Producer priées set for beef are by grade. Sneep and goat meat are not graded. The Price
Conttol Act also fixed maximum retail priées for beef with bone, beef without bone;
mutton/goat meat; liver, heart, longue and kidney; and tripe. The priées vary by locality but do
not take into account different grades. According to Evangelou (1984:58) this has resulted in
butchers mosüy willing to purchase lower-grade carcasses as this brings them a higher net
return per kg. They also offer higher grade meat to restaurants at above authorized priées.
The Kenyan Government deregulated the fixed flcor priées for producers and consumers of
bovine meat in Febmary 1987. The effect of this measure on the total level of marketed
animais is hard to détermine as many other factors, like the closing of the KMC and periods of
drought and disease, influence take off figures from the arid and semi-arid areas. In terms of
profitabüity a figure of approximately 30 per cent rise in livestock farmers' incomes has been
mentioned over a period of two years since the decontrol of livestock priées (see DN 13/01/90).
Evangelou studied livestock marketing in Maasailand in the early 1980s and also concluded
that 'expansion of livestock production in Kenya's Maasailand foremost requires unbiased
pricing policies (...) A priée structure for Kenya's livestock industry which is not biased against
producers stands first among needed institutional reforms' (Evangelou 1984:252).
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World-wide, governments have kept down the cost of living in the cities. Their
policy in fact meant subsidizing food for the urban population at the cost of
rural producers. As stated by the FAO/World Bank 1977 report this so-called
"cheap meat" policy has 'led in some countries to a distorted relationship
between retail priées and domestic producer priées, maintaining the latter at
unprofitable levels' (FAO/World Bank 1977a:45).
In addition to price setting, a large body of législation régulâtes how, where
and when stock and produce may be moved (see Raikes 1981:189-91). The
régulations for the marketing of meat in Kenya are controlled by the KMC and
the Livestock Marketing Division (LMD). The KMC runs two factories: one in
Athi River (near Nairobi) and another in Mbirikani (near Mombasa), while the
LMD is responsible for livestock purchases. Both parastatal bodies have their
roots in the colonial period. In the past the "quarantine policy" has often been
nüsused in favour of the "modern" sector and at the cost of the "traditional"
livestock sector. It blocked fair compétition to keep producer priées of meat
artificially (too) high. Nowadays, quarantine régulations are still in force
permanently or temporarily especially for the northern rangelands. Traders,
however, do violate these rules, resulting in the transportation of animais
between districts as well as countries.
Thus, KMC/LMD face stiff compétition on the local market as producers
prefer to deliver their animais to private abattoirs. At least nine are operative
around Nairobi. Their popularity sterns from higher and immédiate payments,
whereas it takes two weeks to two months for KMC to pay the livestock
keepers while offering less favourable priées. Moreover, producers are not
allowed to have the offal and skins free as the private abattoirs do (see DN
12/10/86).
With a rapidly growing local demand for meat this means that growing
proportions of total supply are diverted away from exports, KMC's main
outlet, to these more lucrative non-official markets (see Raikes 1981:127 and
below). As a result KMC has not been used to füll capacity (1,250 cattle and
700 shoats per day) in the last 15 years. By the middle of the 1980s the KMC
ran into sévère problems as it lost some Ksh. 190 million over the years 1983-
85 (see DN 12/10/86). Recenüy the KMC underwent a major revitalization
after it had been forced to close down by the late 1980s (see box 2.2).7
Moreover, as mentioned by FAO (1985c:84) 'in recent years, disasters of
climate, particularly prolongea drought, and other external circumstances have
considerably limited exports'.
7 The faillite of KMC does not stand alone. The Government of Kenya concluded in its Sixth
Development Plan that parastatals and nationwide monopolies had perfonned poorly due to lack of
compétition and weak management. Most parastatals in Kenya are not cost-effective (see RoK
1989:114). After analyzing the performance of 17 agricultural parastatals from Indépendance to
1984 Barbara Grosh concluded that since 1976 several firms had developed financial problems.
KMC was classified as a firm having cbronic déficits since 1974. The current strategy of
increasing Government contiol was predicted to fail (see Grosh 1986:41).
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Box 2.2 Décline and Revival of the Kenya Meat Commission (KMC)
In the early 1970s KMC's legal monopoly over commercial slaughter was relaxed and private
slaughterhouses were officially permitted to operate for the first time (see Evangelou 1984:66-
68). According to FAO/World Bank figures soire 16 small abattoirs with a daily total capacity
of 300 catüe and 300 sheep slaughterings were licensed by the KMC (see FAO/World Bank
1977a:41). It was intended Üiat KMC concentrated on Kenya's export market, while local urban
markets would be supplied by private firms. Before the collapse of the KMC Kenya was the
third largest supplier of corned beef in Europe (mainly to the U.K.).
The performance of the Kenya Meat Commission starled declining in 1975. By late 1980 it
was operaüng at only two-fifths of its weekly production capacity of 750 tons. KMC's problem
of securing sufficient throughput for profitable opération can be largely attributed to increased
compétition from private abattoirs, especially Üiose in the Nairobi outskirts. The Government
directive to intervene during the drought of 1984 by way of buying large numbers of catüe
irrespective of their condition (at too high priées) is said to have hastened this process of
décline. This opération caused the parastatal to incur losses estimated at Ksh. 36.75 million.
The ill-fated Government abattoir ground to a halt at the height of crippling financial
problems in November 1987. KMC owned farmers some Ksh. 4 million. KMC was revived on
July 24th 1989. It's name was changed to the Kenya National Meat Corporation 60 per cent
being in pnvate hands (shareholders) and the remaining 40 per cent owned by the ADC (see
Standard 23/08/89). Under this new management plans have been made to open branches in
Garissa and Nakuru, bul most importantly to improve ils opérations by timely (next day)
payments to producers, fair payments and (hè Uke.
The Livestock Marketing Division (LMD)
Whereas the processing and sale of meat was in the hands of the KMC, the Livestock
Marketing Division's responsibility was pnmarily the purchase of stock in the pastoralist's
areas. For this purpose stock routes and holding grounds for quarantine (of up to 6 month
periods) to prevent the transmission of diseases (esp. CBPP) were created. LMD was created in
1970 replacing the African Livestock Marketing Organizauon (ALMO). The LMD, though
successful in creating the marketing infrastructure, was not able to compete with the private
traders. For example, Njiru reports for thé Rendille pastoralists in Northern Kenya that only
26.1 percent of all catüe sales in 1980 were sold to LMD, while local shopowners (37.1), local
slaughter (18.8) and itinérant traders (17.9) were thé orner offtake destinations (see Njiru
1986:337).Pnvate traders offered higher priées, direct payment and (illegally) exported animais towards
thé butcheries in Ihe main urban centres, whereas thé LMD concentrated on feeder catüe for
fattening on commercial ranches and slaughter cattle for thé KMC. Since 1983/4, however, thé
Treasury did not provide thé LMD with funds for thé purchase of cattle. lts task was taken over
by the KMC and local traders (see Mweya 1986:327).
Livestock Weights and Offtake Rates
Average carcass weights for (officially marketed) catüe in Kenya have been said to have
declined from 145 kg in thé early 1970s to 125 kg by 1988 (see FAO 1989). Sheep and goat
carcass weights were 12 and 8 kg, respectively. Thèse are somewhat constant weights. By
comparison, average carcass weights for ail Afhcan countnes stand at 146, 13 and 12 kg for
cattle, sheep and goats respectively. Worldwide thèse figures stand at 207, 15 and 12 kg,
respectively.Average animal officiai offtake rates for bovine animais and sheep in Kenya are estimated to
be 13.1 and 36.1 per cent for 1982, while a décade before mis they stood at 10.1 and 28.3 per
cent. In Africa, 1982 offtake rates for cattle and sheep were 11.5 and 30.1 per cent. For thé
countries withm thé European Countries average offtake figures were 33.9 and 57.9 per cent
while Worldwide thèse figures were 17.1 and 35.3 per cent (see FAO 1985a).
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So, although thé number of cattle sold by producers will have increased due to
thé droughts of 1980 and 1984 the average carcass weight will have been
rather low. In thé post-drought years producers, in spite of thé higher priées
offered, will not have been very willing to seil their animais as their main
concern was rebuilding their herds and fattening their animais.8
Kenya is also facing marketing problems for exporting livestock (products)
on thé demand side, either in a quantitative (low demand due to Worldwide
overproduction) or qualitative way (non-tariff barriers like hygiène and disease-
free requirements). Table 2.11 highlights thé decrease of (official) exports of
most livestock products during the 1980s from Kenya, while a slight recovery
occurred at thé end of this period. The problems and revival of KMC will have
certainly influenced Kenya's ability to export livestock products. Increased
local demands, periods of drought and international compétition hâve attributed
to structural or temporary variations in livestock export figures.


























































































































































KMC has been exporting much beef in thé form of processed meat, corned
beef as well as frozen and chilled meat, most of which goes to thé Middle East
and thé United Kingdom. There is, however stiff compétition from other
countries due to a Worldwide overproduction of beef, especially in Europe,
South America and Australia.
8 For example, average bovine carcass weights in 1980 dropped from 130 kg to 125 kg and
recovered to 130 in 1981 (see FAO/PY 1983).
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Table 2.12 Destination of Livestock Exports from Kenya, 1981-89
(K£ '000 - current priées)





























































































































































































Source:ë: Staüstical Aostract li>83, i*UH. lyyU ~~^ „nimals however, are transferredNote: thé detaued destination of live animais .s not known. Most animais, noweve
to neighbouring countnes and thé Near East.
Demand for imports is restricted to a very small number of markets: USA,
Japan, Canada, CIS. Still, the EC is the most important export market for
Kenya's agricultural produce. In total the EC imported 75.2 per cent of
Kenya's agricultural exporte, which is equivalent to a share of 2.0 per cent or
the twelfth place in the EC's agricultural imports from the group of developing
countnes (see Eurostat 1989:67).9
Table 2.12 gives a detailed picture of Kenya's export of livestock
(products). Among the group of developing countnes the most important
suppliers of meat to the EC are Brazil (42.0 per cent), Argentina (27.7 per
cent), former Yugoslavia (11.4 per cent) and Uruguay (7.1 per cent). Kenya
(0.7 per cent) ranked thirteenth in 1986 as it did in 1981, while in 1984 and
1985 it stood at the eighth place.10 In 1985/86 the Comrnon Market was
buying 93.7 per cent of all Kenyan meat experts. Zimbabwe (2.6 per cent) now
ranks above Kenya in fïfth place. Nevertheless, in spite of Kenya enjoying a
special agreement with the EC as part of the Convention of Lomé (giving
access to that Community's market for the export of fresh, chilled or frozen
meat) absolute exports to this market have virtually been non-existent.11
y Kenya was among the top ten suppliers for the following products for each of the
commodities mentioned. Percentages refer to Kenya's EC market share as compared to the group
of all developing countnes. Specifically tea (28.3%), fresh vegetables (17.8%), fiowers (13.0%)
and coffee (5.0%) are supplied to the EC frora Kenya. Other primary products for which Kenya is
among the main suppliers are fruit and vegetable juices (2.1%), fresh tropical fruits (excl. bananas)
(2.1%), preserved vegetables (1.8%), vegetable saps and extracts (4.6%), mits (2.8%), plants, seeds
for pharmacy and perfumery (2.6%) and sheep's and lamb' wool (2.7%).
10 For imports from developing countries, live animais are of minimal importance, the only
supplier worlhy of mention being Yugoslavia (95.2%). If we consider meat of bovine animais
(fresh, chilled or frozen) Argentina takes the lead being responsible for 40.0% of the value of this
import item, followed by Brazil (23.8%). Brazil is by far the largest supplier of other prepared or
preserved meat (70%). In the category other meat (sheep, goals, offal, pigs, poultry etc) it is
Argentina (33%) before Indonesia (25%) and China (24%). Sheepskins are provided by Iran
(65.0%), Lebanon (11.8) and Ethiopia (6.3%). Goatskins are supplied by China (47.6%), Ethiopia
(8.5%) and Nigeria (7.6%) mainly (see Eurostat 1989:34/4445).
11 This special agreement allows an exemption of duty, subject to only 10 per cent of the
variable charge on imports from third-party countries. Botswana, Madagascar and Swaziland also
bave access to the Comrnon Market under this special arrangement. The quota for preferential
access was set at 27,532 tons per annum in 1975 and increased, in 1980, to 30,000. As a result of
outbreaks of diseases, especially Foot & Mouth, as well as due to inadequate availability and
substandard trade services these four countries actually sent much less beef and veal to the EC in
the decade from 1970 to 1980 than had been agreed upon. For example, in 1983 shipments
amounted to 16,300 tons only, practically all from Botswana (see FAO 1985c:55/84).
Overall imports of meat and meat préparations as a share of the EC's agricultural imports
from all developing countries decreased from 12 per cent in 1970 to about only 5 per cent in
1985/86 (see Eurostat 1989:20). Compétition to enter the EC-meat market mainly cornes from
Brazil and Argentina. Moreover, the EC increased its meat exports (8% in 1970,12% in 1985/86),
especially towards the Near East (Egypt (16%), Saudi Arabia (13%)) a second most important
market for Kenyan livestock (products). In 1986 the third most important EC agricultural export
was beef.
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Authorization for imports of beef and veal under this agreement have been
conditional on the existence of satisfactory animal health standards in the
supplier countries. Poot & Mouth disease especially hinders the export of
Kenyan livestock to the EC. In 1989, the Minister of Livestock Development
declared that his Ministry would take bold steps to make Kenya free of Poot &
Mouth disease before 1992 to enable the country's export of beef to the EC
(see DN 02/08/89). Even if this major task were to be realized, Kenya faces a
rising internai demand for méat and méat products that will have to be met.
Table 2.13 shows an overall increasmg trend (in monetary terms) of imports of
live animais and méat products, with decreasing exports throughout thé 1980s.
An exception is thé value of thé trade in dairy products and eggs.
Table 2.13 Value of Import and Export of Livestock Products in Kenya,
Live import 1,334 851 244 ow MU <^u .,„ ._.
animais export 1,554 3,822 3,151 6,094 7,203 1,699 3,217 2,205 1,707 1,751 1,751
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Méat and import 77 63 28 11 22 10 1 14 89 60
meatprep export 4,334 5,8448,3445,99610,3718,3541,969 267 207 1703,800
Dairy prod import 15,068 15,812 4,221 4,721 12,817 4,940 1,868 967 130 1,360 190
and eggs export 947 1,709 2,121 2,431 1,062 842 1,417 2,700 2,659 2,550 2,120
Processing and marketing of milk (products) in Kenya is in the hands of the
Kenya Co-operative Creameries (KCC). This is not a parastatal but a private
body which opérâtes with a state granted monopoly and under some form of
state control.12 It controls almost ail modem dairy sector sales of dairy
produce on official markets. Still, Raikes estimated that only 12 to 20 per cent
of total milk production were official deliveries. It is mamly the small farm
sector which is responsible for. some 65 percent of total milk production (see
Raikes 1981:129).
By the end of 1990 the KCC ran into problems and was placed under
interim management in order to end corrupt practices. The Government also
repeated its intention to ban the KCC monopoly in milk processing to enable
co-operatives to enter this activity (see KT 04/12/90). Over the years the
Company sold as a result of poor milk priées fixed by the Government, some
70 per cent of its products below production costs (see Weekly Review
08/05/92).
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Let us turn to section 2.3 for a more indepth analysis of the Government's
economie development policy as it has emerged over the years since
fodependence. Special attention will be paid to the lack of employment for the
fast growing Kenyan population.
23 (Un)employment and Economie Development Policy
The total Kenyan labour force is expected to rise to 14 million people for the
year 2000, as compared to an estimate of slightiy over 9 million for 1989. At
the same time it is expected that the total number of people living in poverty is
at least likely to doublé by the year 2000 to about 12 million out of a total
population which is expected to rise to over 30 million (see Hunt 1985:101 and
table 1.1). In order to combat poverty, Kenya is in high need of new jobs.
Several authors have dealt with the problem of how to solve the employment
and poverty issue (e.g. ILO 1972, World Bank 1983, Hunt 1985 and
Livingstone 1986). Most of them conclude that it will be virtually impossible
to solve the employment problem unless population growth slows down. These
writers, and the Kenyan Government recognise that this can only be a long
term objective.
After Independence, in December 1963, Kenya inherited a largely rural
economy based primarily on subsistance agriculture and some commercial and
industrial activity which, however, starled to falter, arising from capital flight
and stagnation of Investment as many foreign investors in the country decided
to leave. The new Independent Kenyan Government reacted by the
establishment of a number of parastatal institutions in order to develop a mixed
economy and ensure the graduai transfer of control of the commanding heights
of the economy to indigenous Kenyans. Overall this strategy worked
reasonably well until the difficulties of the early 1970s showed themselves.
Since the mid-1980s, in order to revive its economy, Kenya has tried to
implement a structural adjustment strategy which includes a process of
privatisation of its economy, réduction of import prohibitions, priée
liberalization, improved marketing Systems and cost-sharing in the case of the
Government's provision of basic needs services. The new development strategy
was ouüined in Sessional paper No. l of 1986 and the 1989-1993 National
Development Plan. A process of decentralization, called the District Focus for
Rural Development Strategy, was already embarked upon by 1983 in trying to
streamline the processes of planning and Implementation of projects in the
districts. This should correct the old situation by which decision-making and
project implementation was directed from the Nairobi Headquarters (see e.g.
Rutten 1990). At present, besides contributing to food security, the national
product and foreign exchange earnings, agriculture is still of major importance
in providing employment in Kenya as demonstrated by table 2.14.
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Employaient m Kenya, 1976-
1976
Table 2.14 Agricultural and
Reserve labour torce
Total labour force (87 5% of 15^54 âge cohort)
Source author's compilation ftom
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Although we should be careful in deducting a trend from these figures obtained
from different sources, it can be safely concluded that the importance of the
agricultural sector has not diminished between 1976 and 1988, though there
has probably been a rising level of hidden unemployment in the agricultural
sector. Other classifications of the Kenyan employaient structure, made along
the lines of rural, urban informal, modern wage and modern self-employment,
also show the importance of employaient created by the agricultural sector.
For example, the Kenyan National Development Plan for 1989-1993 reveals
that rural employaient, defined as thé sum of non-wage agriculture, farm and
rural non-farm employaient, remains by far thé largest employer in thé
economy accounting for some 79 per cent (6.2 million people) of total
employaient in 1987 (see RoK 1988a:48). Consequently the mass of the
population heavily dépends upon access to land as ils prime source of income,
as most of them are smallholder producers.
Urban informai employaient, though increasing rapidly, provides a mère 5
per cent of ail Kenyan jobs and only 16 per cent of the Kenyan labour force is
employed in thé modem sector, i.e. all of the public sector, large-scale private
enterprises located in urban centres, large-scale farms and other large-scale
enterprises such as mines located outside the urban centres. Agam, (modern)
agriculture is responsible for over 20 per cent of employaient in the "modern"
sector.
The Kenyan Government is of the opinion that Kenya could support a much
larger population but that the inability of Kenya's natural resource base and
industry to sustain rapid labour force growth tends to lead to low incomes,
unemployment and unacceptable living standards. The Kenyan Government
expects that füll utilization of excess capacity in industry, increased production
of tea and coffee in the agricultural sector and the expansion of small-scale
13 It should be recogoized that the 1988 figures are estimâtes by the Kenyan Government and
are thought to underestunate the reserve labour force The 1988 labour force has been computed
by the Kenyan Administration as a proportion of thé population aged 15-64 years on the basis of
observed participation rates. No définition was provided by thé World Bank report, though it
seems that this is also a percentage of thé 15-64 years of âge cohort This uncertainty should be
kept in mind when dealing with this data
enterprises in both sectors are among the most hopeful opportunities for
combating unemployment For now, as explained in the Sessional paper No. 2
of 1985 on Unemployment, thé Kenyan Government is attempting to croate
new jobs through rapid économie growth which should mainly corne from
import substitution and manufacturing for export and increased productivity
and output from the small farms which utilize more workers per hectare than
do large ones in thé short term as well as programmes of land consolidation
and registration, agricultural crédit, good domestic agricultural priées and new
fiscal and monetary policies in thé middle term (see RoK 1985:3/4). The
Government's 1988-1993 employaient scénario expects thé création of 1.9
million jobs of which more than half should be found in thé small farm sector.
The Kenyan Government nevertheless reaffirms its wish to put more effort
into thé non-agricultural, especially industrial, sector to promote économie
growth and employaient opportunities for its people. The Plan states; 'in thé
circumstances, and in the context of a rising population, Kenya's vision and
eventual goal is to become an industrial nation. Hitherto, we have pursued a
policy of import substitution for consumer goods which is approaching its
limit Further industrialisation will be directed towards thé production of
intermediate goods in the medium-term, with an orientation towards thé export
market, while at the same time establishing a base for thé eventual production
of capital goods' (RoK 1988a:35).
An example of this strategy is the development of a Kenyan automobile
industry as announced in 1986 and which resulted in thé présentation of the
first Nyayo Pioneer car in February 1990. If this development is to be a sound
strategy resulting in a successful venture can only be judged in thé years to
corne. For now it has already been concluded by thé World Bank (1983:xii)
that thé encouragement and promotion of the industrial sector has tilted the
incentive structure toward that sector to thé détriment of agriculture. Still, the
Bank itself believes that thé création of jobs outside thé agricultural sector is
thé best strategy because 'a high and sustained rate of growth of non
agricultural employaient [should be] reached in order to prevent an intolérable
strain on thé agricultural sector. Even with slowing population growth, a 4 per
cent growth rate of non agricultural employaient would force agriculture to
absorb [by thé year 2037] more than five times its présent [1976] number of
workers' (World Bank 1983:345).
Livingstone (1986:158), however, still seeks a solution in thé rural sector
acting as a "sponge" for thé absorption of population and labour. The most
direct way in which thé "sponge effect" has operated so far was by subdivision
of thé family smallholding. This, however, has resulted in a dramatic réduction
over time in the average availability of agricultural land per person (see
section 2.4). It is unclear how long this process can continue. Nevertheless,
Livingstone disagrees with the Kenyan Government and World Bank policy
centred mainly at the création of non-agricultural jobs as a major solution to
the unemployment issue because:
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'accelerated industrial and urban development would not absorb mcreases
m workforce on this scale. Output-employment elasticity is low. The
urban population in Kenya is already expanding without an adequate base
of manufacturing activity. The limited number of jobs involved and the
degree of polarisation associated with industrial development means that
such development does not carry a positive income distribution effect as
between individuals and régions; nor does it do most for the most needy
régions. Most important, industrial development is dependent upon
expansion in agricultural incomes and purchasing power in the domestic
market' (Livingstone 1986:190).
Livingstone, referring to Tidrick (1979), offers two alternative options, both
available within the agricultural sector:
(a) bringing new land into play, through either
(i) expanding agriculture into medium and low-potential areas
(ii) irrigation
(iii) drainage of wet or swampy areas and
(iv) conversion of forest or
(b) fuller use of existing arable lands in the high-potential areas.
The fitst opportunity of expansion towards the medium and low-potential areas
is considered to be an unsound development both on the grounds of ecological
damage and the modest production and employment potential of these régions.
'Indeed it would be désirable actually to reverse some of the migration which
has already taken place were that feasible' (Livingstone 1986:190). The other
options, of opening up new land is thought to be more promising. Especially
the drainage of poorly-drained land is expected to have an employment
potential of some 2 million jobs. Cutting of forest replanted with tea would
provide approximately 800,000 jobs whüe irrigation would create only an
estimated 150,000 jobs at very high cost. By contrast, Senga, also referring to
Tidrick, estimated the irrigation potential to vary between 200,000 and 500,000
hectares, providing a maximum employment of 2 million jobs (see Senga et al.
1980:43). According to Livingstone the best approach would be to make fuller
use of existing arable lands in the high-potential areas and by intensification of
agriculture through the provision of agricultural credit for the purchase of
inputs (see Livingstone 1986:196/7).
Authors like Leo (1984) and Hunt (1985) provide us with a more radical
solution of land reform. They point at the imbalanced distribution of land
among the Kenyan population. The following section will analyze this situation
in more detail.
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2.4 The Unequal Distribution of Land
2.4.1 Introduction
During the 1950s the European hold on power in the British Colony of Kenya
began to weaken following the Mau Mau rébellion. In their struggle for
indépendance it was freedom as well as land for which Kenyans gave their
lives. Since the beginning of this Century the European colonialiste, large, small
and multi-national companies too, had been favoured in every way and very
effectively by a strict land policy operated at the expense of the indigenous
African population. "Scheduled Areas" had been set aside exclusively reserved
for European ownership. The most important of these were the so-called
"White Highlands". This enclave was spatially juxtaposed with African
Reserves or "Non-scheduled Areas" where a majority of the indigenous
population resided in a state of relative politica! and economie deprivation. In
Kikuyuland, for example, a reserve of almost l million hectares surrounded on
all sides by European farmland, the population doubled to more than one
million people over the 1910-1952 period contributing to the classic situation
of land hunger and diminishing returns. What remained of bush and forest land
was cleared, utilized and soil érosion and impoverishment occurred (see Hellen
1977:66).14
By the late 1950s the "White Highlands" comprised of about 3 million
hectares of land, or about 75 percent of the total high-potential land in Kenya.
Divided amongst less than 4,000 farms and estâtes the area yielded more than
80 percent of Kenya's agricultural experts and much of its domestic
requtrements. Mixed farms and ranches each accounted for about 1.4 million
hectares while the remaining area was devoted to plantations (see World Bank
1983:320). These holdings provided employment for 6,900 full-and part-time
European workers and for almost 300,000 Africans (42 per cent of the total
Kenyan wage labour force). They also contained about 1 million landless
Africans (see Best & de Blij 1977:441). The loss of land and land rights was
at the heart of African suffering.
In 1960, only one year af ter the rébellion had ended and just prior to
Independence, the British Government passed an Order in Council ending the
original réservation of the "White Highlands" for farming by Europeans only.
Land transfer schemes, based on a willing buyer/willing seller basis, were
constructed to promote the graduai purchase of land by Africans. Besides the
transfer of undivided large-scale farms, low-density peasant schemes, averaging
some 15 hectares, were created. 'The idea was to introducé into the Highlands
Africans who would farm, if not on the same scale as Europeans, at least on
something approximating it. Their small numbers and their dispersai would
This figure excludes public gtazuig and forest reserves, which together come to some
587,412 hectares (see Middleton 1953 12)
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make them acceptable to Europeans and the latter would help and advise them'
(Carey Jones 1972:271).
However, it was not to be the landless who were able to profit from the first
land transfer programmes but the more prosperous Africans, as the fonner
lacked the capital needed to buy a plot in the "low-density" schemes. To settle
the less well-off African families "high-density" schemes, purchased in large
blocks of some 5,000 acres having a mean plot size of some 11 hectares, were
introduced in areas of relatively low-quality land. Nonetheless, it was clear that
to settle all of the poor more European-held land should be made available.
2.4.2 The Distribution and Àvailability of Land15
After Independence some Europeans took out Kenyan citizenship, but most
European farmers left Kenya within a few years Up till then, the location of
seulement had depended on European farmers offering land for sale on the
condition that the price was such that a viable smallholder scheme could be
mounted.This changed drastically after the introduction of the so-called Million Acre
Seulement Scheme. Introduced mid-1962 and completed in 1971, it settled
some 35,000 mostly landless smallholder families at an estimated cost of
nearly K£ 30 million (see Okoth-Ogendo 1981:331). Finances to buy out the
Europeans were provided, by loans as well as grants, particularly from the
United Kingdom, West Germany and the World Bank. The one million acres
of land were, disregarding the plantations and ranching lands, found on the
periphery of existing African areas, especially in Nyandarua District. Before
the arrivai of the British this area had belonged to the Maasai but was
allocated to the Kikuyu after Independence. Quoting a letter written in
December 1962 from the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Seulement,
Mr. Carey Jones, to the Kenya Council of Ministers, Wasserman describes how
the Kikuyu were favoured in respect of the provision of land at the expense of
other groups in order 'to prevent a flood of Kikuyu from other parts of the
Central Region and from the Rift Valley région (driven by unemployment and
pressures from other tribes) into the parts of the Central Region west and north
of the Aberdare Mountains, which could effectively drive out the Europeans,
and replace them with squatters' (see Wasserman 1976:146-7).
From the early 1960s onwards, beginning with the Kinangop plateau (a
former ritual area of the Maasai), some 24,000 hectares or almost half of the
15 Unfortunately there are no recent figures available concenung the distribution of all types
of landholdings in Kenya The latest figures for smallholder farms date ftom 1979 Moreover, data
available should be handled with great care as m most cases they are extrapolations based on
samples and/or suffer from mconsistencies and incomparabihty due to a change of classifications,
définition or method of operationahzauon The reader should keep this in mind when studying the
following pages
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total seulement schemes area was created in Nyandarua area for some 15,000
settler families. By 1970 some 35,000 families were settled on these schemes.
It is estimated that high-density schemes were the most common type of
schemes and accounted for some 62 percent of the setüernent area (see Odingo
1971:200). Land for seulement was purchased by, or vested in, the Setüement
Fund Trustees who offered it in lots to prospective selders at a price based on
an esttmate of its productive value. Ability to repay the loan was an important
factor in the sélection of settlers. This policy resulted in 'that the majoriry of
the people who were actually settled were far from being the absolutely
landless - the people who had given the politica! impetus for the scheme'
(Okoth-Ogendo 1981:332).
By 1965, so-called "Haraka Schemes" were started to settle squatters on
plots averaging about 10 acres on abandoned or mismanaged European farms.
Another type of seulement scheme, "Shirika", was introduced under which
large farms were run co-operatively. This aspect of scale was in line with the
new official policy, as advised by a British Mission, which propagated the
transfer of large farms and de-emphasized small-scale seulement.
By 1968 the subdivision of large farms in the heart of the former "White-
Highlands" had in effect been abandoned (see Migot-Adholla 1981:49).
Smallholdings were thought to be uneconomic The Government favoured the
purchase of complete farms by African farmers. Approximately 390,000
hectares of land had been transferred in this way by 1968. In Uasin Gishu,
Nakura and Trans Nzoia, the first two former Maasai territories, land was
transferred to individual owners. Table 2.15 summarises the situation of land
transferred to Africans up to 1968
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The total number of officially registered smallholdings stood at 777,000 by
1969 covering an area of some 2,646,000 hectares. Large farms in former
scheduled areas mimbered 3,175 owning a total of 2,690,000 hectares (see
World Bank 1975:510).The new policy of transferring large farms was criticized by the
International Labour Office 1972 mission, which pronounced modest farms to
be more economical than large ones. This statement, at least, will have
tempered opposition to a process of informai subdivision of large farms. Many
land-buying companies which had been formed by the early 1960s were
responsible for this development of unofficial fragmented farms.16 After
acquiring a large farm it was unofficially subdivided among the shareholders of
the Company. The position of large-scale agriculture was further weakened by
the fact that many of the Africans who had bought large-scale farms soon
found themselves in financial difficulties and needed Government assistance,
By 1974, the officially held position by the Government was that large-scale
agriculture, though still welcome, was necessary only in a limited number of
areas, which included the production of wheat and hybrid seed maize and the
maintenance of breeding herds of livestock (see Leo 1984:177).
Other setüement schemes were starled to relieve continued pressure, both
from landless people and from well-off Africans. These were called Stateland
Schemes and Harambee Schemes, also located outside the former scheduled
areas. By the end of the 1970s over 500,000 hectares of land had been taken
over for settlement schemes, mostly from large mixed farms. Of the remaining
900,000 hectares some 35 per cent had been informally (and often illegally)
subdivided. If we include the 185,000 hectares (cropped area only) held by
plantations, about 800,000 hectares of arable land is still farmed on large
holdings of 50 hectares or more. This is about one-half of the area held by
plantations and mixed farms in the Scheduled Areas in 1960. The above
sketched developments resulted in a situation at the end of the 1970s whereby
the Kenyan agricultural area, estimated to be some 8.0 million hectares, was
divided between 1.7 million smallholdings (0-<20 ha), 40,000 "gap farms" (20-
50 ha) and some 2,460 large farms (>50 ha). The distribution of holdings as
well as employaient figures for each of these three catégories is shown in table
2.16.It can be concluded that the land was unevenly distributed. About half of the
land was in farms of less than 20 hectares with an average of approximately 2
hectares, while the other half had an average size of 1,000 hectares. 'In spite of
setüement schemes and unofficial subdivision, however, large mixed farms and
plantations still cover one-seventh of the area devoted to arable agriculture.
Counting gap farms as well, about one-third of the arable agricultural land is
farmed in holdings of over 20 hectares' (World Bank 1983:338). In other
16 From 1963 uittil 1983, 24,000 private land-buying flrms were tegistered in Kenya (see Leo
1984:185).
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words some 2.4 per cent of the Kenyan holdings own some 32 per cent of
arable land in the country.
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1. Gap farms are those not covered by either the fotegrated Rural Survey or the Large Farm Survey. Most
are beheved to be 20-50 hectares in size. Area and mean size are estimâtes;
2. Up to 35 per cent of this area has been subdivided into smallholdings;
3. Includes estimated 144,000 squatters in large farm area;
4. Cropped area only,
5. Ranches larger than 1,000 hectares. Government-operated ranches are excluded.
Information concerning smallholders has been collected in the "Integrated
Rural Surveys" which were conducted in the middle of the 1970s and are
presented in table 2.17. Unfortunately, recent figures are not available apart
from extrapolations made using 1RS data.
Table 2.17 Distribution of Smallholdings by Size





































































100.0Total plots 1,483 100 1,704 100 2,693.6
Total land (ha) 3,458,300 3,458,300 3,216,100
Source: Hunt Wtö:tables 'l.l'l and 7.14 (columns l and '2>; Statisücal Abstract iyü2:tables 9i ariU
96 (column 3)
Furthermore, the 1RS data were collected through sampling within the major
agricultural zones only and different operationalizations are responsible for
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some of the changes which seem to have occurred between different years. Por
example, the much higher number for very small-size holdings in 1976/7 as
compared to 1974/5 is the result of the inclusion of very small "back-garden"
type of holdings which before were excluded. With regard to the large farm
sector more recent figures are available. They show us that the number of large
farms has mcreased from 2,750 in 1966 to 4,097 in 1989, while the total area
in this period decreased slightly from 2,641,900 ha to 2,345,400 ha. The clue
as to this apparent paradox is subdivision of the large farms resulting in a
growing number of small "large farms" as shown by table 2.18 concerning the
distribution over the different size classes.
The réduction of some 11.2 per cent in the total area categonzed as large
farm land in the 1966-1989 period is mainly the result of a loss of the large
farm land use catégories of temporary crops, temporary meadows, forest land
and uncultivated meadows and pastures which outstripped the increase of land
under permanent crops on these farms.
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provisional Inclusion of 0-19 ha of large farms is probably because of subdivision.
Another aspect of the Kenyan land situation that we should consider is
landlessness. Opinions concerning the extent of this phenomenon vary from the
undefinable (Leo 1984) to "guestimates" calculating their number at over two
million people in 1980 (see Okoth Ogendo 1981:337). The latter author states
that the number of absolutely landless people is increasing at a rate of not less
than 1.5 per cent annually. This would imply that by 1990 at least some 2.3
million Kenyans, or approximately 10 per cent of the total population would
fall into the category "landless".
This seems to be in line with the World Bank early 1980's estimate of 11.0
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per cent of all rural households being classified as landless or 7.3 per cent of
all rural households landless and also poor. In addition, 200,000 people have
migrated from high-potential areas, where they were landless, to dry areas
which were marginal for farming. Of these, 110,000 people are estimated to
live below the poverty line of Ksh. 2.000/- per annum per household (see
World Bank 1983:216/340).
Landlessness is thought to be the result of the privatization of land, the
expulsion of squatters from large farms, forced land sales to repay loans and
widowhood or divorce. '(•••) it appears that purchases of land are made by
relatively high-income urban dwellers both with a view to its spéculative return
as well as for retirement purposes. There is a fair amount of absentée
ownership in Kenya. For instance, a survey of a location within Central
Province in 1971 found that 90% of farms over three hectares had absentée
landowners' (World Bank 1983:232). In response the landless migrate away
either to: (a) seulement schemes; (b) large farms, where they are squatters; (c)
semi-arid lands, previously occupied by pastoralists or (d) urban areas.
This latter option seems to have been chosen by a minority of the landless.
Most of them have either moved to settlement schemes, large farms or semi-
arid areas. From thé Central Province people hâve moved to the few medium
to high-potential areas within Narok, Kajiado, Nakuru and Laikipia District
Other groups like thé Luo, Luhya and Kamba from Nyanza, Western and
Eastern Province, respectively, hâve also migrated within and outside their
provinces (to Rift Valley and Coast Province, mainly).
Mbithi and Barnes (1975), Wisner (1978) and Campbell (1978), hâve
reported about this phenomenon of "spontaneous" migration which according
to Livingstone (1986:19) is 'thé single most important way in which population
pressure hos been absorbée". Indeed outmigration by landless people seems to
be one of the most frequent solutions sought for and is responsible for a major
part of rural-rural migration. Pushed by a severely populated area lacking
sufficient land they are pulled towards those areas where land is still in
apparent abundance and where it could be possible to make a living. Table
2.19 shows the most important push and pull areas of Kenya.
Many of thé immigrants farm smallholdings without a legal title, they use
techniques of cultivationi less suited to marginal areas and which can cause
sévère érosion. They are repeatedly confronted with thé marginality and
insecurity of their plots, from a tenurial as well as a climatic point of view.
Moreover, thé movement of thé potentially landless to thé drylands has brought
them into conflict with thé pastoralists, another less weÙ-off group. They
compete for thé same meagre land resources (see e.g. Bos & Peperkamp
1989:35).
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Table 2.19 Lifetime Migration by District and Province, 1979






























































































Rift Valley Province + '»«->,•«'•>
Source: KoKAJBS undateu taoïe 3.3
Table 2.20 présents the estimated availability of good agncultural land per
person for a large number of Kenyan districts.17 Exarrunmg *e dismcts wr*
Lest and highest avaüability of land underlines the picture of push and pull
régions as shown by table 2.19.
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- Table 2.20 Estimated Availability of Good Agricultural Land per Person,
t per District in 1969, 1979, 1989 (in hectares of High-Potential
[ Land Equivalents (hple))
District Population ('000) HPLE HPLE/Capita Decrease

















































































































































































































































































































Source: Livingstone 19X6 table '2.3. Hgures tor najtaao, uarissa, Mandera, Marsabit, Turkana, isioio
and Wajir calculated from Statistical Abstract 1982:96 and Population censuses 1969, 1979.
Last column also based on author's calculaüon.
" v ; -„„„/w in l Notó: estimates of district Populations in 1989 calculated on assumptions that district growth rates17 In eeneral it is thought that actual average availability for the people mvoivea in m 1969-1979 are maintained to 1989. Hve ha of medium and 100 ha of low-potential land are taken as
cultivation will be higher than presented here by Livmgstone bewuse this table^includa, theurban | ^ ival t to l ̂  of M0t.^nm IanA EIgeyo Mafakwet ̂ ^ jn ̂  rf ^ ̂  ̂  ̂
Mdpasteral population as well Furthermore, it should be sttessed that the 1989 figures have been | b^^y changes Flgules haw j^ rounded » aufllor,s estimate
derivedby extrapolation of the 1969-1979 trend. l
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Figure 2.2 Estimated Availability of Good Agricultural Land in Kenya
Figure 2.2 combines the availability of good agricultural land for 1989 with
migration patterns in Kenya. Push régions like Western and Central Province
have a low average availability of good agricultural land while pull régions
like the Rift Valley and Coast Province show a relatively better situation in
this respect.
Table 2.20 also highlights the trend in the availability of good agricultural
land in Kenya over the 1969-89 period. The number of districts having less
than 0.5 hectares of high-potential land équivalents per person increased from
12 to 26 during this time. Kiambu district, once an important outlet for
landseeking people within Central Province, has become one of the most
congested districts Kajiado District, one of Kiambu's main ouüets in turn, has
reached a similar position now. Narok District still has the largest amount of
good agricultural land available, although this has been reduced to 2.66 ha per
person only.
The favourable position of Narok has also been noted in official documents,
where pressure has been excercised for the opening of this district for the non-
Maasai. Citing overall population densities of some 150-200 persons/km2 in
Western, Nyanza and Central provinces the 1975 World Bank report on Kenya
stated that 'The Masai occupy almost all of Narok, but they are relatively few
in numbers, whereas elsewhere large numbers of people of different tribes are
short of land. If the Government does nothing, infiltration will continue until
there is more intense tribal conflict' (World Bank 1975:470). The World Bank
plead for the création of a land market by adjudication and registration of these
Trust lands in order to enable more people to move and restore the population-
land balance. Also, 'the Government should not allow the Masai or the County
Council, as custodians of the Trust Land, to interfère' (World Bank 1975:471).
Besides criticizing the exclusivity of rights to parts of Kenya for particular
ethnie groups, the report also points out the colonial héritage of large scale
farms set aside as Government land within districts with a growing number of
landless people. The World Bank report of 1983 repeated both of these
criticisms concerning the existence and continuance of the Kenyan land
problem, although in a slightly more subtle way. It is recognized that:
'Much of Narok is undoubtedly suitable for farming and economie
pressures are gradually converting some of the best land to cultivation.
However, m the drier pastoral areas there is no major potential for
increased labor absorption. Development strategy in the marginal areas
must be to try to raise the living standards of the existing population
rather than to expand production through in-migration' (World Bank
1983:357-8).
Li order to combat land concentration it is proposed to reduce the
attractiveness of land as a spéculative asset through land taxation, capital gains
taxes on land or legislative restrictions on absentée ownership. In thé following
section we will consider Kenyan land policy in more détail
2.4.3 Kenyan Land (Use) Policy
In ils latest Development Plan, 1989-1993, thé Kenyan Government spent less
than half a page on its land use policy. Concerning issues such as thé System
of land tenure, consolidation, adjudication, registration and thé use to which
land may be put thé Government states that 'Thèse issues exhibit a high degree
of sensitivity and complexity in Kenya where people hâve a strong affinity to
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land on which the great majonty dépends for their sustenance' (RoK
I988a:130). An Independent Land Use Commission was announced with the
task of reviewing questions related to land and advising on optimal land use
patterns for present and future générations in various agro-ecological zones.
In its previous Development Plan for the 1983-1988 period, the Government
had proclaimed that land in the private sector was underutilized because of
absenteeism, spéculation, disputes over land rights, poor management practices,
lack of credit and access to markets (see RoK 1983:50). As we have seen
above, this statement is rather revolutionary when compared with the policy of
the 19760s and 1970s which officially promoted the large farm sector. A
special Task Force, another land use committee, was responsible for this
analysis. Among the recommendations of the Task Force were measures to:
invest Government with greater control of land; abolish freehold tenure in
favour of a System of leasehold; lease to individuals or companies any large
tracts of Government land not being put to productive use; give top priority to
land adjudication; establish a Land Laws Review Commission, and address the
problem of underutilizaüon of land. However, the appointment of yet another
commission and the lack of clear policy guidelines is illustrative of the
indecisiveness of the Kenyan Government.
Besides the transfer of land in the former scheduled areas from European
settlers to African farmers and the création of seulement schemes, the
Government's land use policy has so far been directed to the adjudication and
registration of land in the non-scheduled areas.
At the close of the colonial period the Kenyan land surface was classified
under four catégories of land: Private land, Special Reserve (or Crown Land),
Special Areas (or Trust Land) constituting the native reserves and Non-Special
Areas, comprising 1.0, 1.3, 22.4 and 75.3 per cent of the Kenyan land area,
respectively (see Hellen 1977:67). The Land Adjudication Act of 1962 was the
vehicle for transferring land into freehold statutory estâtes held by Africans.
The Land Control Act of 1967 set up local boards charged with examining
land transactions and protecting the interests of the poor and illiterate (Cohen
1980:390.At the time of Independence less than 600,000 hectares had been registered.
By 1986, in the former non-scheduled areas alone, this figure had increased to
ahnost 7.0 million ha. Ignoring for a moment the initial political incentive, the
rationale behind the replacement of customary land rights by individual tenure
through adjudication of ownership, registration of these units and issue of title
deeds, was to create a collatéral for loans and the encouragement of long term
investments in land and farm development. The consolidation of separate
fragments of land into single land units was aimed at increasing farm
efficiency.Livingstone, however, questions the importance of these measures in the
East African context as 'lack of tiües to land has in no way prevented
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producers from planting tree crops, such as coffee and tea [and] it is not likely
that land titles have had any effect except in the minority of large fully
commercial farm units' (Livingstone 1986:246). Moreover, against the rather
uncertain benefits Livingstone mentions some defmite disadvantages.
The most obvious are increased stratification, as the well-to-do buy out poor
farmers, and the development of landlessness. Indeed, the Fourth Development
Plan acknowledges this by staü'ng that with 'the supplementatkm of land
adjudication and registration, the volume of land transactions among
smallholders has increased. Consequenüy, the incidence of concentration in
land ownership among the better-off small-scale farmers has increased' (RoK
1979:53). Yet, as Cohen remarks, 'trends in this direction were clearly visible
by the mid-1960s, but policies to correct them have yet to émerge. The
government has no policy on land concentration, and wealthy farmers appear to
favor acquisition of land titles over alternative capital Investment' (Cohen
1980:365).
In this respect, it should be mentioned that the process of stratification of
land ownership in Kenya also involves a significant amount of land purchased
for purely spéculative or asset purposes, carrying with it a low degree of land
utilization. Given the problem of population absorption which Kenya faces, this
is not a process which it can afford. In an economy which is largely
agricultural, employment and access to land may be synonymous; no land may
mean no employment. The social conséquences of landlessness would be at
least ameliorated if there was a parallel increase in opportunities for rural
development at a reasonable wage. House and Killick (1980:36) state that it is
doubtful whether this has occurred on a sufficient scale.
To solve the Kenyan problem of landlessness and its related need to find
employment for a rapidly growing number of people a whole range of
measures has been proposed by several scholars and international organizations
such as the World Bank. Among the most important proposais are a réduction
of population growth, création of non-farm employment, the carrying out of a
land policy that prevents the concentration of land holdings and the
intensification of land use. As the former two solutions are mainly long-term
options, the latter two proposais are thought to be the most effective to address
the requests for employment and productivity for the years to come.
With regard to land policy it is stated that this should focus on the
prevention of a concentration in land holdings, encouragement of intensive
development of under-utilized high-potential areas and the discouragement of
land spéculation. Measures to promote an efficient pattem of landholdings
might include:
(a) ceilings on the size of holdings;
(b) capital gains taxes on land transactions;
(c) raising interest rates to increase the costs and reduce relative attractiveness
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of land as a spéculative asset;
(d) controls on new acquisitions (see World Bank 1983:xvm).
In order to redistribute land downwards, Tomlinson (1981:182/3) proposes two
sets of land taxes on holdings above a certain size/income earning potential
and/or unproductively used farms. Both measures are targeted at the large farm
and plantation sector. Because implementation of this measure is thought to be
difficult, direct action such as land ceilings and controls on new acquisitions
are thought to be more effective.
Intensification of land use through the use of high value labour intensive
crops like potatoes, tea and pyrethrum instead of wheat and maize and the use
of more inputs like fertilizers which result in increased yields is another option
for creating employment. In certain parts of Kenya this change has already
materialized a few decades ago (see e.g. Odingo 1971:211). Raising output can
also be realized through improved farming methods and the use of high-
yielding crops. Of course, several constraints such as land quality and market
demand exist but these could at least partially be overcome through the
provision of active Government support. Furthermore, more land in "Kenya
could be brought under cultivation. Drahiage of valley bottoms is thought to be
possible in order to provide an extra l million hectares of high and medium-
potential land offering jobs to some 2 million people (see Livingstone
1986:194). Irrigation, though very risky and costly, forest clearing for tea,
although highly controversial, and dryland agriculture could provide another
120,000, 800,000 and 300,000 jobs, respectively.
The redistribution of land is thought to be another possibility for raising the
intensification of land use and the création of employment opportunities. It was
assumed by many that the breakdown of formerly well-developed European
farms would result in a serious drop in the productivity of the land. These
gloomy forecasts have failed to matérialise. In fact, it turned out that the
subdivision of large farms resulted in an increase of productivity and a rise in
both subsistence and marketable output as the former underutilization of the
land came to an end. The Integrated Rural Surveys in the 1970s revealed that
on holdings of less than 0.5 hectare, output per hectare was 19 times and
employment 33 times greater than on holdings over 8 hectares. This would
mean at the national level that every 10 per cent réduction in holding size
raises output per hectare by 7 per cent and employment by 8 per cent (see
World Bank 1983:71). This same report gives a warning in respect of some
activities like production of sisal, seed maize and ranching which are better
performed on large farms as well as towards subdivision in marginal areas
which could lead to ecological détérioration. The Kenyan Government is being
prompted to take the development of the smallholder section firmly in hand.
So far, the Kenyan Government has taken action to formalize the de facto
spontaneous subdivision of large group-owned farms. However, an active
support of subdivision has yet to be developed. A possible explanation for the
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Government's hésitation in addressing the Kenyan land issue sterns (partly)
from the fact that the urban political elite itself is highly involved in the
acquisition of land. As Hunt (1985:287) displays, referring to a study done by
Kaplinsky, politicians, bureaucrate and ethers of influence are among the large
land-owners. Table 2.21 shows the profession of the most important large-farm
owners in Nakuru and Kiambu districts in the late 1970s.
Table 2.21 Land Ownership in Nakuru and Kiambu Districts, 1979
Nakuru District j Kiambu District
Top 38 owners of 40 individually
owned large mixed farms
(>500 acres)
Number j Top 44 landovmers holding over 30























j Members of Parhament
! Senior Civil Servants
j Other Government Officials
! Ambassadors
j Executives of Parastatals
j Church Officials










Sussex University mimeo cf Hunt 1985 287-8818
The implication of the situation as described above is that the political
constraints to carry out a real land reform is very high indeed. Yet, as Hunt
Highlights in her study, all encompasing land reform reducing farm sizes in the
large, gap and smallholder farm sectors alike in combination with other
measures both in the agricultural sector and outside it, is the most important
option to make a really substantial contribution to alleviating poverty and
unemployment in Kenya, at least for the next decade to come. This will be
very necessary as the projections concerning population size, the potential
labour force, (un)employment and poverty are calling for action.
Kenya's population will have grown from 5.4 million to 45 million people
between 1948 to 2013. By the year 2000 the labour force will have increased
to 14.1 million people, while some 12 million people out of a total of 30
million are estimated to be living in poverty. Since independence, part of the
18 Of the 38 owners of Nakuru eight were having addmonal land in Kiambu Disirict, one of
tue most densely populated areas having an average 0.25 hectares per person in 1979
Furthermore, (uree others had extra land in Nakuru Distnct through their membership of land
owmng companies
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rising labour force has been absorbed through land transfer and the growth of
the modern and informal non-farm sector. Up till the year 2000 these latter
sectors will be able to absorb respectively 13 and 9 per cent of the new labour
force entrants (since 1976) estimated to be 4.3 million by 1990 and 6.1 million
by 2000. Consequently this leaves 15 to 80 per cent of the labour force
increase which will be forced to obtain an income from agriculture.
A redistributive land reform which imposed a 3 hectare ceiling for existing
farms and created new farms averaging 0.75 ha of high-potential land to 4.5 ha
of low-potential land could provide a sufficient number of holdings to absorb
6.2 million new labour force entrants. Assuming an average of two labour
force members per holding would mean that the resulting incomes would be
above the poverty line (see Hunt 1985-.278).19 Off-farm employment could
also be sought as these farms would not provide füll employment throughout
the year. Meanwhile, as stated above, other measures such as a réduction of the
growth of the population and the création of more non-farm employment will
be necessary as beyond the year 2015 the absorption capacity of the
agricultural sector will have been completely used up.
The time of implementation is of the utmost importance. By 1990, it would
still be possible to provide a living for the 4.3 million new labour force
entrants (since 1976) seeking employment within the agricultural sector. Also,
all the agricultural labour force already living in poverty from 1976 and
numbering some 1.75 million by 1990, could be helped. By the year 2000 the
number of new entrants will have grown to 6.1 million people. Early
implementation would lower the cost of compensation, estimated to be some
K£ 132 million in 1979, allow for slighdy larger farm sizes and provide the
opportunity for farmers living in the low-potential areas to move to high-
potential lands.20 Any delay in progressing with this proposed radical land
reform will raise the cost and produce either plots that are not viable or leave a
large number of people without land.
If a short term and impressive land reform is not be carried out, and hopeful
signs have not yet appeared, a process by which the poor may seil land to their
19 Using a 3 ha ceiling redistribution of land in Kenya and taking iiito account the mimimal
farm sizes needed would release a piedicted 1.9 million ha of high potential land in the large and
gap farm sector and an addiüonal 0.7 million ha of variable potential land in the smallholders
sector. This could generale 3.1 million new farms ranging from 0.75 ha to 4.5 ha depending on
the land potential. Because it is expected that a 1-1.5 ha farm needs an input of 0.64 man years
per hectare there would not be füll employment, although the output could be enough to provide a
living above the poverty line as deflned by Collier and Lal.
20 F« this calculation Hunt used a ceiling land price of Ksh. 1.200/- per hectare (Ksh. 500/-
pet acre) allowing for the redistribution of 2.2 million hectares. The compensation money needed
(K£ 132 million) reptesentfid 90 per cent of the Kenya Government new long-term borrowing in
1980 (see Hunt 1985:284-6). High-potential land priées in 1990 averaged some Ksh. 50.000/- per
acre! (author's estimate is based on mean land priées of agricultural plots offered for sale in the
Kenyan daily newspapers).
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wealthy neighbours and migrate to the semi-arid areas will, in all probability,
continue and intensify. In the dry areas these immigrants compete with a fast
growing young génération of landseeking pastoralists and with those Kenyans
interested in land spéculation (see Migot-Adholla 1981:44).
2.5 Summary and Conclusion
This chapter has explored the national and international context for the
livestock producing economy of Maasai pastoralists. We starled this exercise
by analyzing the economie, démographie and physical features of Kenya.
Modestly populated by some 23.5 million people, but experiencing one of the
highest population growth rates in the world (3.8 per cent), the Kenyan
population is expected to increase to a total of 34 million people by the year
2000 and approximately 62-64 million by 2025. The country's labour force is
expected to rise from 9 million people in 1989 to an estimated 14 million
people by 2000. Over this period, the total number of people living in poverty
will probably doublé to some 12 million (approximately 35-40 per cent of the
total population).
Some 80 per cent of the Kenyan population is concentrated in the medium and
high-potential zones covering only some 10 per cent of Kenya's land area. The
rapid population growth will increase the demand for the limited supply of
good agricultural land. Over half of the 1989 Kenya population (i.e. 11.8
million people) was in the 0-14 years of age-cohort, a world record. Kenya
thus faces a large influx of new jobseekers in the years to come. However, the
Kenyan economy is primarily characterized by a large percentage of its
population living in rural areas (78 per cent by 1988). As non-agricultural
opportunities are limited the new jobseekers will mainly be searching for a
small pièce of land in order to make a living.
After Independence in 1963 Kenya inherited a largely rural economy based
primarily on subsistence agriculture. Commercial and industrial activities had
been modest and had already starled to collapse. In the aftermath of Kenya's
independence and up to the early 1980s, the Kenyan economy performed very
well. Both the agricultural and industrial sectors contributed to the overall 6.8
per cent annual growth rate. The establishment of a mixed economy involving
newly created paraslatal organizations turned out to be a successful approach
until the economie difficulties of ihe 1970s showed. Development slowed down
to 4.2 per cent a year for the 1980-90 period. Kenya's export-oriented
agricultural economy faced decreasing world priées for coffee and tea. These
products together were responsible for 48.8 per cent of the country's total
export earnings in 1988. The growth of the industrial sector also lagged
behind.
The Kenyan economy was ranked 25th among the lowest-income économies
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of the world by 1990. The average per capita GNP was US$ 370 only. S tul,
Kenya has a relatively favourable position in companson to other Sub Saharan
coun tries.
Special attention was paid to Kenya's livestock sector. Some 12-14 million
head of cattle, 10-15 million head of small stock and almost l million camels
graze Kenyan pastures covering some 50 million ha. The livestock sector is
characterized by a huge diversity in the aspects involved such as the object of
production, technology, characteristics of producers, pastures and livestock
species. The commercial cattle sector can mainly be found on large farms in
the disease tree, higher-rainfall zone. These ranches are mainly owned by
companies, co-operatives or rieh individuals. Land is either owned or leased
from the government. Livestock, improved beef or high-grade dairy animais,
are kept under capital intensive methods.
The group of smallholders residing in the western better-watered régions of
Kenya keep a large number of Kenya's improved dairy animais for subsistance
as well as for commercial purposes. Most animais, however, are found in thé
Rift Valley and Eastern Provinces covering mainly thé pastoral areas.
Livestock production in Kenya is faced with a decreasing availability of land
(approximately 1.6 million ha between 1975-90), poor marketing facilities, low
priées, harsh climatic conditions, diseases (esp. Fout & Mouth) and
compétition from wildlife species. In fact, by thé 1980s a domestic deficit of
méat was prophesied. No clear solution could be provided if this situation did
indeed occur as several contradicting production estimâtes for thé 1980s were
circulated. Still, by early 1990 a renewed warning for a livestock deficit for the
year 2000 was made.
Kenya's aim of becoming a major livestock exporting country is seriously
hindered by these local problems. Though more live animais were transported
in the latter half of the 1980s, their value decreased. The export of meat and
méat préparations dwindled in both quantity and value. The breakdown of the
export-oriented Kenya Meat Commission will also probably have contributed
to this. Only the export of hides and skins, Kenya's most important source of
livestock earnings, increased over the 1980s.
Besides domestic problems, Kenya faces stiff compétition on the world meat
market as a result of overproduction and hygienic requirements. The European
Community is the main importer of Kenyan meat and horticulture products.
However, in spite of Kenya enjoying a special agreement with the EC for meat
exports which allows for exemption of duty, exports to the Common Market
have been virtually non-existent.
In order to combat poverty, Kenya is in urgent need or job création. At present
the agricultural sector is still of the utmost importance for the provision of
employaient, The Kenyan government's strategy for creating new jobs is based
on import substitution, export-oriented manufacturing and increased production
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from small farms. Eventually, Kenya wants to become an mdusöialized nation.
It is supported in this wish by the World Bank, which sees the diminishing
labour absorbing capacity of the agricultural sector. Others disagree with this
policy which they believe to contribute only marginally to the création of new
jobs.
Two alternative options are being offered, both within the agricultural
sector: bringing new land under agricultural production and making intensified
use of existing arable lands in the high-potential areas. The opportunity for
expansion towards the semi-dry régions is not thought to be viable. The second
alternative is considered to be more hopeful. Drainage of poorly-drained land,
replacing forest with tea and irrigation would create some 3 million jobs.
Other authors underline the unequal distribution of land. This distorted
ownership is a legacy of the colonial period during which high-potential arable
and good pasture land .was reserved for Europeans. Some land reform
programmes had started shortly before and after Independence, However,
except for thé Million Acre Scheme, it was not the landless who profitted from
thèse but thé more prospérons Africans. By the late 1970s it was estimated that
some 2.4 per cent of Kenyan holdings owned some 32 per cent of Kenya's
total arable land.
Landlessness in Kenya is estimated to affect some 10 per cent of the total
population by 1990, and is increasing by at least 1.5 per cent annually.
Landlessness is thought to be thé resuit of thé privatization of land, absentée
landownership, expulsion of squatters from large farms, forced land sales and
widowhood or divorce. Stratégies used by thé landless are to migrate away
either to seulement schemes, large farms, urban areas or, most importantly,
semi-arid lands.
Migrations from Central, Western, Nyanza and Eastern Province towards thé
few medium- to high-potential areas within thé Rift Valley and Coast Province
are especially common. Nakuru, Uasin Gishu, Trans-Nzoia, Laikipia, Narok
and Kajiado are among thé receiving Rift Valley districts. Ail but Kajiado
District were among thé group of districts having thé highest high-potential
land équivalents by the late 1960s. However, by the late 1980s this situation
could be said to hâve changed dramatically. Over this period thé availability of
high-potential land équivalents per capita in the districts mentioned above
decreased between 58 (Uasin Gishu) and 76 per cent (Trans-Nzoia). Nation-
wide this figure stood at 48 per cent. Though Narok District (2.66 hple/cap) is
still considered to have the most favourable position, Kajiado District by
contrast, has now dropped to the least advantageous position in terms of high-
potential land équivalents available for its population (0.18 hple/cap).
Nowadays, 26 districts have less than 0.5 ha/pp of good agricultural land as
compared to 12 districts in 1969.
In order to deal with this problem of diminishing land availability
organizations like the World Bank have urged breaking away from the system
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of Trust land ensuring certain groups exclusive rights of ownership over vast
tracts of land. Instead a free land market should be created in order to enable
more people to migrate away from the most to the less densely populated
régions (especially towards Narok District).
Besides the transfer of land formerly held by Europeans to African farmers
and the création of seulement schemes, the Kenyan land use policy has so far
been directed at the adjudication and registration of land in the "non-
scheduled" areas. The rationale for this replacement of customary land rights
into individual tenure arrangements was to create a collatéral for loans and the
encouragement of long term Investments. A negative conséquence, however,
has been the création of a group of landless, as land became increasingly
concenteated in the hands of a happy few. This newly emerging elite of
African farmers is constituted particularly of businessmen, politicians and civil
servants. This was exemplified in the Nakuru and Kiambu districts by the late
1970s where, in the case of the latter région, 44 landowners, mostly
représentatives of the above mentioned groups, possessed over 30 per cent of
all Africanized land. This probably explains the high political constraints for a
real land reform policy within Kenya. Only recenüy has a more serious attitude
been taken by the Kenyan Government to the land problem. At least the
process of and links between land concentration, spéculation and
undenitilization are now being officially recognized.
Among the solutions proposed to deal with this situation are the imposition
of land ceilings, taxation, higher interest rates on capital loans and increased
control over land acquisition. According to Hunt redistributive land reform
imposing a 3 hectare ceiling and the création of new farms in the released
lands alone could provide a sufficient number of holdings to absorb 6.2 million
new entrants to the labour force. If this was realized by 1990 it would mean
that all the needs of those living in poverty and those looking for land to be
cultivated could be met. Early Implementation would also reduce the costs
involved in the acquisition of large farm land. Unfortunately, the installation of
yet another Land Use Commission to review these questions and advise on
optimal land use patterns is illustrative of the Government's indecisiveness on
this issue. Given the rocketing high-potential land priées, any delay in
accomplishing the proposed land reform will make it less possible a substantial
contribution to be made from this approach.
According to Leo (1984:181) 'Land is Kenya's obsession, as order is
Germany's and self-sufficiency is IsraeFs'. Other authors have made similar
statements concerning the importance of land in the Kenyan context (see e.g.
Hellen 1977, Zwanenberg & King 1975). The Kenyan land question is a
steadily ticking time bomb and a very hot issue. For now, some relief is
provided by migration of landless people to the high-potential zones within the
semi-arid areas. Let us turn to these dry areas of Kenya, home of the
pastoralists and increasingly the asylum of the "spontaneously" landseeking
Kenyan farmers.
f : CHAPTER 3
THE ARID AND SEMI-ARID LANDS (ASAL) OF KENYA
3.1 Introduction
A général outline of the arid and semi-arid areas of Kenya has been discussed
in chapter 2. In this chapter a more detailed présentation of the characteristics
and developments taking place in the semi-arid districts is presented. This
allows for making a judgement concerning Kajiado District's position within
this group of semi-arid areas. In chapter 4 the Kajiado District qualities in the
fields of population, physical geography, economy, infrastructure and land use
will be discussed in more detail.
3.2 Location and Main Characteristics of Arid and Semi-
Arid Kenya
Several criteria and définitions exist to distinguish arid and humid zones.
Figures for rainfall, evaporation and altitude can be found in several
combinations and given weighted significance to produce a map of the dry and
wet zones of a région (see e.g. Sombroek et al. 1982:43). Different terms have
been used by various authors to designate essentially the same kind of zone.
The resulting maps differ mainly in detail and the location of boundaries and
intermediate zones like semi-arid1 and sub-humid régions. More problematic is
the sometimes overlapping categorization providing difficulties of
comparability. Dietz (1987:36), for example, found that what was called 'semi-
arid' by a UNESCO-map covered the 'semi-arid' as well as parüy the 'arid'
zone locations of the Kenya Soil Survey map of 1982. Moreover, within one
category, areas are included which vary in respect of certain spécifie
characteristics. For example, comparable average rainfall figures can be the
resuit of a low but year round rainfall pattern or of a high but concentrated
period of précipitation. In combination with soil characteristics this will be of
utmost importance for thé possibility or impossibility of producing certain
crops. The ecological zone IV (sub-humid to semi-arid) in particular differs in
terms of vulnerability to drought.
Figure 3.1 présents thé semi-arid zone and district boundaries for Kenya. The
map, which includes ecological zones VI, V and risky IV, stresses thé low
agricultural potential of Kenya. The position of the semi-arid areas in
démographie, économie and social respects as compared to other régions and
Kenya as a whole has been presented by Dietz and Koninx (1984). A summary
of this exercise has been displayed in Dietz (1987). As thé 1989 Kenyan
population census is still not published Dietz' figures are the most update
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Figure 3.1 Kenya: Semi-Arid Zone and District Boundaries
Source: adapted from Dietz 1987 figure 2.5
1 Aiiother spatial classification has been made by Tomlinson (1981) dividing Kenya into core
and periphenU areas. He uses income levels, agriculturaï potential, production modes and
population density figures of the early 1970s to define flve typicaî régions.
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ïn Kenya as a whole 45 per cent is arid while 38 per cent of the land area is
classified as semi-arid, Nine districts have more than 75 per cent of their area
in the semi-arid zone: Kajiado, Samburu, Kitui, Laikipia, Taita-Taveta,
Machakos, Baringo, Lamu and West-Pokot. Table 3.1 compares the position of
(hese semi-arid districts within Kenya on a variety of variables.2
Table 3.1 Ecological, Démographie and Socio-Economie Position of Kajiado
District and the Semi-Arid Districts in Kenya as at 1979
Total area (km2 x 1,000)
Population density (inn/km2 1979)
Sex ratio (M/F 20-50 years 1979)
Population growth 1969-79
Wage labour (as % of population 15-60 year 1979)
Wage labouiers in private sector
(as % of ail wage earners 1979)
Wage income per capita 1979 (Ksh.)
Esümated agriculturaï production value/capita
(in Ksh. for 1977)
Civil servants per 1,000 people (1979)
School atteiKlance (% of all eligible children 1979)




























































- , —-, —. T, **.-• «llvl ap^AalUlA A.l
Note: KD = Kajiado District, SAD = Semi-Arid Districts, AD = Arid Districts, HD = Humid
Districts, KEN = Kenya. Urban Districts (Nairobi and Mombasa) are not presented in this table
but are included in the Kenya total. Narok, Meru, Embu, Elgeyo Marakwet, Kilifi and Kwale are
left out of this analysis and excluded from the Kenya total as well due to their mixed ecological
potential which prévenu a clear categorization of these régions.
From this data it can be concluded that the group of 'semi-arid districts' on
most variables, ëxcept for the intercensal annual population growth rate, scores
between the humid and the very-arid groups. Kajiado District is also shown.
Among the group of semi-arid districts it is in a relatively weak position in
respect to éducation. Table 3.1 also stresses Kajiado's relatively high
population growth rate which is mainly thé resuit of immigration, although
overall population density is still low. The highest densities in semi-arid areas
can be found in Machakos and parts of Kitui.
Due to continuing immigration and relatively higher population growth rates
of agriculturaï groups, thé balance between pastoralists and non-pastoralists is
changing in favour of the latter. For example, the percentage of non-Maasai in
2 Dietz (1987) grouped Turkana, Garissa, Isiolo, Mandera, Marsabit, Tana River and Wajir as
thé arid districts, who together make up some 45 per cent of Kenya's territory. The provinces of
Central, Nyanza and Western and of thé Kericho, Nakuru, Nandi, Trans Nzoia and Uasin Gishu
districts of thé Rift Valley Province made up thé group of humid districts, thé main suppliais of
thé inerely 17 per cent of Kenya's territory classified as 'humid'.
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Kaiiadtfand Narok districts bas increased from 31.4 and 33.5 for 1969 to 37.2
and 43fS by 1979, respectively (see section 4.3.2). After companng projected
tion totals witfa figures for maximum farm population, Senga
Kajiado, Kitui, Samburu, Turkana, Nakuru and Kencho would,c o n c u a , , , ,
by thetyear 2000, have populations too high for every family to earn an annual
Ksh, |;ÖQO/- in addition to subsistence from farming (see Senga et al.
1980:41')?
iâvation in Kenya's Semi-Arid Lands
Äost of the semi-arid districts small islands of population concentrations can
3SMi reflecting the scattered pockets of available good agncultural tod:
Ngong, Chyulu Hills, Nguruman and Loitokitok in Kajiado, Mnagei in West
Pokot Taita Hüls and Mbooni in Machakos, Kitui town in Kit«. Tugen Hills
and the Êldama Ravine in Baringo, the Coast région and islands of Lamu and
theioèhwest of Laikipia. Most of these régions are to be found m the higher
î&ides*or near swampy régions which allow some simple imgation. Figure
3 2,shpws the extent of cultivated area within Kenya.
'lt reveals that in addition to almost the entire high and medium-potential
zones which are already under cultivation, (rainfed) farming has also extended
beyond these agro-ecological zones into the semi-arid zone which is less smted
to cultivation. Por the 1972-1982 period, Epp and Kilmaver estimated an 8
percent increase of the cultivated area in Kitui District largely at the cost of the
rmrginal land zone of the district (see Kliest 1985:80). For Kenya as a whole,
the^FAO estimâtes indicate an expansion of thé cultivated area of some 4.8 per
cent between 1974 and 1981 (see Kliest 1985:101). This would mean that
Kenya's cultivated area is extending at a rate of some 0.5 per cent per year A
maior part of this increase is taking place in less suitable régions. As thé
production potential of thèse new areas is minimal, thé increase m agncultural
output from thé expansion of thé cultivated area alone will probably be less.
From Muchena's listing of soils présent in semi-and Kenya it can be
concluded that, in some parts, relatively favourable Huvisols, Cambisols,
Vertisols ("black-cotton"), Ferralsols and Nitosols are available. However, m
général, thé soils occurring in thé arid and semi-arid lands (ASAL) hâve
topsoUs with a low organic matter content which tends to form a strong surface
crust or cap under rain drop impact (see Muchena et al, 1988). This can
increase both thé run-off and thé erodibility of the soil.
Part of mis érosion stems from natura! causes, such as wind, water, coldand
heat Of more importance, however, is man-made érosion. To prépare the field
for planting of cereals, the farmers eut down trees and clear the land
completely of all weeds and grasses to secure every drop of water for the
cereal plants. In most cases land is ploughed too deep. Furthermore, taüow
periods are shortened and, because of the low moisture holding capacity ol the
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soils and the leaching of nutrients, abandoned farmlands in the ASAL do not
recover quickly and sometimes not at all. Irrigation sometimes leads to
salinization of the soil. Finally, high concentrations of people lead to the
destruction of trees in the near surrounding for building material and firewood.
The annual fuel-wood consumption of African cultivators is estimated to be l
m3 per person, which is some ten tunes as high as that for nomadic pastoralists
(see Lusigi & Glaser 1984:24), In most cases the cutting of trees takes place in
vulnérable water-catchment areas, increasing the risk of local soil érosion.
cullivation areas
high and medium potentia! land
boundafy semf and land
boundary and land
boundary very and land
Figure 3.2 Cultivation in Kenya's Semi-Arid Zone, 1979/80
Source- Kliest 1985 cf Epp and Kilmayer 1982
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Worldwide, O'Keefe (1983:302) estimated man-made érosion to be a factor 1.5
higher than natural érosion. Replacement of natura! végétation or grasses for
cereal cultivation will lead to an increase of thé washing away of tons of soil
as well as the loss of water through increased runoff.3 It is estimated that
under thé existing érosion rates thé life of soils in thé semi-arid areas of Kenya
is between 50 and 2000 years (see Muchena et al. 1988:25-7). Observation in
thé ASAL has revealed that thé cultivation of areas which should preferably be
used as grazing lands leads ultirnately to thé formation of gullies and badlands,
particularly in Machakos, Kitui, Kajiado, Baringo, Samburu, Turkana, Meru
and Marsabit (see Obara 1988:27 cf Brown 1963).
Possible measures to stop thèse négative effects are terracing, i.e. changing
the length of a slope; contour-stripping, i.e. wide strips with alternating crops
under rotation through which it is tried to prevent runoff and soil loss; water-
spreading and ley-farming whereby periods of arable cropping are followed by
a period of planting grass and légumes utilized for livestock production. This
latter practice, for example, is applied in Narok District whereby land under
wheat after 5-8 years is turned to grass again.
Other methods are applied to lower erop failure risk and to increase crop
yields. Water-harvesting methods in Machakos, Kitui and Turkana have been
applied using sand-made bunds and small ditehes to concentrate water for trees
and cereals (see Rutten 1985:125). Also, increasingly multi-purpose trees are
planted. Thèse are fastgrowing, drought-resistant, fruit-bearing, fuel-wood and
fodder-supplying trees which additionally fix nitrogen, add organic matter and
improve die soil. Spécial drought résistant crops, such as Katumani maize and
certain bean varieties, having a short growing season or high drought
résistance, have been introduced.4 Agro-forestry, combining thé growing of
trees and crops, is another method which tries to combine both objectives of
soil protection and crop production.
Nevertheless, as has been demonstrated in Machakos and Kitui by Wisner
(1978) and Kliest (1985), smallholders of thé marginal areas face high risks of
total crop failure, sometimes ultirnately resulting in famine. During the period
1950-1976 26 per cent of ail harvests in thé long rainy season failed in part
and 33 per cent failed completely in thé Kitui District. Eleven out of the 27
recorded years could be characterized as being sévère famine years (see Kliest
1985:82).
Soil érosion tests in Tanzania over a two-year period on SOm2 red sandy loam soil on a
pediment slope of 3.5 gradiënt concluded that, for ungrazed thicket, O tons of soil and 0.4 per cent
of rainfall were lost by water runoff. For grass these figures were O tons of soil and 1.9 per cent
runoff, white nullet (78.0 tons of soil/26.0 per cent runoff) and bare fallow (146.2 tons of soil/50.4
per cent runoff) showed a dramatic increase of érosion (see O'Keefe 1983:303).
4 According to Kliest (1985:76) early matunng bulrush millet, posho and foxtail millet and
early matunng sorghum should be the leading grain varieties instead of rnaize which is still widely
planted.
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Another problem resulting from the extension of cultivation in the semi-arid
areas is the growing tension between pastoralists and the invading
agriculturalists. The latter settie on the better watered dry season pastures and
push the former towards the drier parts of the area. While the total area
confiscated in this way may be small, its impact is much larger as it is a vital
link in the chain needed in tunes of drought stress for the survival and resting
of the lower potential areas. Sometimes settling is allowed for a temporary
period by the pastoralists, as in most régions land is held under trust and
cannot be sold. For the "invading" farmers this is a very insecure situation, as
they can, in principle, be moved out at any moment. In areas where land has
been turned into private ownership, for example the Ngong area of Kajiado
District, a process of selling out can be observed. In fact, a large part of the
Kenyan land problem has moved from the centre to the periphery where the
landless, migrant farmers and pastoralists, all belonging to the poor of Kenyan
society compete over the same scarce land resources. Often, this compétition
turns into a conflict whereby people are seriously wounded and sometimes
even killed (see chapters 5 and 7).s
The fact that group ranches are in a process of subdivision opens an
alternative for invading groups of cultivators to settie legally and securely with
a title deed. Some fear that, as a result of the exclusion of vital areas from the
pastures, the viabiliry of the pastoral sector, considered to be the most viable
option for the arid and semi-arid zones, will be undermined. This will force
pastoralists to search for alternatives to at least counterbalance the negative
effects of the loss of their grazing areas.
This reduced availability of land and livestock for an ever growing human
nomadic pastoral population lies, as stated in thé introduction and chapter 1, at
thé heart of our survey. Before dealing with the official Kenyan policy towards
thé arid and semi-arid areas let us consider in more detail the pastoral groups
of Kenya.
3.4 Livestock Production in Kenya's Arid and Semi-Arid
Lands
Kenya houses nine main pastoral peoples: Somali (383,000 people), Maasai
(241,500), Turkana (207,000), Pokot (170,000), Samburu (73,500), Borana
5 In thé Narok District particularly, fights between the Kipsigis and the Kisii against the
Maasai hâve continuée! for some décades causing sévère injuries and deaths abnost every year. In
Kajiado District thé Maasai clash rnainly with thé Karnba, thé Kikuyu and thé Chagga from
Tanzania. From thé Kalembwani and Rombo areas in Kajiado District in particular reports of
conflicts are repeatedly brought forward, Otherwise Kajiado District is relatively pcaceful.
Worldwide, most profound conflicts between groups of cultivators and Fulam pastoralists resulting
in large numbers of people killed are reported from Niger (see Volkskrant 08/11/91).
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(69,000), Onna (32,000), Gabbra (30,500) and Rendille (22,000).6 Except for
the Maasai and the Pokot, most of these nomadic pastoral groups inhabit the
arid areas of Kenya (see figure 3.3).
G A B B R A
(A4b)
Arro A*)atlç group
A4a East Cushitic (Somali oluswrt
b East Cushitic (Oroma cluster)
A4c EaslCushttic (Other)
IMilo Saharan group
N5a East Nilotic (Maasat cluster
M5b East Nitótic (Karlmoiong clustert
NS South Nilotlc
Figure 3.3 Pastoral Groups of Kenya
Source: adapted from Dyson-Hudson 1982
6 The mmibers présentée hère include all members of these ethmc groups disregarding their
actual occupation and place of résidence in 1979. As such the total number of group members
actually engaged in livestock keeping will he lower. The numbers presented here are restiicted to
Kenyan citizens. Somali, Pokot, Maasai and Gabbra also live in the neighbouring countries of
Somalia, Uganda, Tanzania and Ethiopia, respectively. The Turkana are closely related to the
Karimojong and the lie in Uganda. In times of stress these groups practice in and outmigration,
which can somewhat Wur the total population figures either positively or negatively. This
happened, for example in 1979, when rnany of the Turkana fled to Uganda to escape starvation
and hostile pastoral groups from the Sudan (see Kutten 1985).
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Table 3.2 summarises for each major nomadic pastoral group living in the arid
or semi-arid area the total number in Kenya for 1962, 1969, 1979 and the
estimated for 1989. The main district(s) which more or less function as the
home area for each group is also mentioned. Finally, the number of each group
living outside their main district(s) as per 1979 is given. The semi-arid districts
not mentioned in table 3.2 -Machakos, Kitui, Taita Taveta, Laikipia and Lamu-
are the home of agro-pastoral groups such as the Kamba, Taita, Taveta or of
hunter-gatherers like the Ndorobo in Laikipia and fishing people/agriculturalists
lüce the Bajun. Furthermore agro-pastoral groups can be found particularly in
Elgeyo-Marakwet, Kericho, Nandi and Uasin Gishu Districts.














































































'opuiauon (,'ensus isioz vol m; iyey vol l & iv,
1,228.5 1,743.0
vol l & n and uietz lysv
@ Estimated, using interceasal growth rates for 1969-1979, meaiung that in all probability the
numbers of Borana and Maasai will be overesumated wbjle those for Turkana will be
underestimated.
# Some 30,000 Maa-speaking Ndorobo, hunter-gatherers, registered themselves äs Maasai in
1979.
A At the tune of the 1979 census rnany Turkana had left the district looking for green pastures in
neighbouring districts and Uganda.
* Déclines followed by high growth rates for Borana and Gabbra are probably in the main due to
the unreliabihty of the coverage (undercounting) in the 1969 census and frequent boundary
crossings into Ethiopia and vice versa.
Table 3.2 clearly shows the rapid increase of most nomadic pastoral people
during the last decades. Nonetheless, part of this growth is due to
undercounting in former population censuses and incorporation of small related
groups to larger bodies of related peoples. Overall, the annual growth rate of
the nomadic pastoral population is thought to be between 2 and 3 percent
which is below the national average of 3.8 per cent. The increasing avaüability
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of médical facilities, better sanitary provision and famine relief are among the
main causes for the rise in the number of nomadic pastoralists.
In section 2.2.2 we showed that for Kenya the total number of livestock was
estimated by the FAO to be about 13 million cattle, 15 million sneep and goats
and 0.8 million camels by 1990. Slightly more than half óf the Kenyan catfle
and sheep can be found in the high potential areas and the more humid parts of
the medium potential rangelands. Goats (54 per cent) and camels (100 per
cent) stay rnainly in the arid or semi-arid zones (see also Jahnke 1982:236-39).
According to Bekure et al. (1987:23) the area of the Kenyan rangelands
(zones IV, V, VI and VII) is 88 per cent, which is sh'ghtly above the 83 per
cent estimate made by Dietz (see section 3.2). Bekure et al. made a division of
the Kenyan rangelands into two régions: the pastoral areas, i.e. south-east
(Kajiado and Narok), north-east (Mandera, Wajir, Garissa and most of Tana
River and Isiolo) and north-west (Turkana, Samburu and Marsabit) and the
mixed-farming areas, i.e. west (Baringo, West-Pokot, and Laikipia), east (Kitui,
Machakos, Mem, Embu and part of Isiolo) and coast (Taita, Kwale, Kilifi,
Lamu and part of Tana)). They concluded that by 1983 the three pastoral
régions, comprising 75 per cent of the total rangeland area, contained 27 per
cent of the human population and 69 per cent of rangeland livestock units.
It has been estimated by the Ministry of Livestock Development that for Kenya
as a whole some 50.31 million hectares were available for grazing in thé mid-
1970s. This amount was expected to décline to about 48.7 million hectares, a 3
per cent decrease, due to increasing cultivation and other land uses by 1990.
This loss of pastures reduces thé carrying capacity by 14 percent from almost
12 to about 10 million livestock units, because the withdrawal of land from
grazing is expected to affect mostly thé higher potential areas with a higher
carrying capacity. The actual réduction in livestock production is even thought
to be as high as some 20 per cent, because of the higher productivity of higher
potential areas (see MoLD 1980:11).
We would like to add that a loss of the small portions of high potential land
in the semi-arid areas would even undermine the viability of the livestock
System in its very essence. Although the land available for livestock keeping is
decreasing the demand is expected to rise. The FAO total Kenyan herd
estimate for 1975 was some 6.7 million Tropical Livestock Units while for
1990 this had almost doubled to 13.0 million Tropical Livestock Units.
Unfortunately, as livestock figures are provided by district and not by ethnie
group, it is necessary to concentrate on those districts populated almost
exclusively by pastoralists in order to be able to deduce a trend in livestock
numbers and, more importantly, of pastoral livestock wealth. For this we
analyzed ten arid and semi-arid districts inhabited primarily by the nine groups
of nomadic pastoralists mentioned above. Table 3.3 provides available
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livestock figures of cattle, camels, sheep and goats taken from aerial flights
frorn 1969 to 1988.
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1 Totais for 1985 include Turkana, Tana River, West Pokot, Kajiado, Narok and Baringo District
by a réduction trom 1988 flgures using livestock growth trends of the othsr districts.
When comparing these figures, it can be concluded that over the 1969-1988
period the total livestock numbers did not follow the near doubling of the
human population figures but remained instead more or less constant. Some of
thé major disasters in the mid and late 1970s and thé 1984 drought were
responsable for this and resulted in huge drops in thé number of animais in thé
arid and semi-arid areas of Kenya. The 1988 data indicate that some recovery
has occurred but has not reached thé 1969 level, except for small stock which
hâve fast reproduction and relatively low mortality rates. In général, a trend
can be seen in thé Kenyan rangelands of an ever increasing shoats/cattle ratio.
This ratio increased from 1.28 in 1969 to 2.35 in 1988. The abundance of
camels in the most arid areas of the country is also shown.
If livestock figures are combined with démographie data derived from thé
human population censuses of 1969 and 1979 the levels and trend in per capita
availability of livestock numbers can be calculated. For this we reduced the
total district population with ail ethnie groups not belonging to one of the nine
major pastoral populations as thé former are thought to be non or minor
livestock owning people. As a conséquence, we had to leave out those semi-
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arid districts having a (too large) component of agriculturalists.7 The outcome
of this exercise is provided in table 3.4.
Table 3.4 Average Availability of Livestock per Capita for the Pastoral

















































































































































source: authors compilation trom population census 1969 ano iy?y; IJietz lys /; table j.3'
1 Totals tot 1985 include Kajiado, West Pokot, Turkana and Tana River District through
extrapolation from 1988 using growth trend of the other districts. Figures for 1969 exclude
donkeys, wnich in genera! make up some 1-2 per cent of total TLUs only.
2 District pastoral population figures for 1979 have been estimated to be in Mandera: 95,194;
Gartssa: 107,208; Wajir: 64,883; Marsabit: 87,739; Isiolo: 37,529; Turkana: 139,441; Tana
River: 42,246; Samburu: 72,468; West Pokot: 141,387 and Kajiado: 95,425. Population figures
for 1977,1985 and 1988, using a 3 per cent average annual growth rate are based on this 1979
census estimated pastoral population and were derived using a 0.94, 1.19 and 1.3 multiplier,
respectively.
From table 3.4 it can be concluded that Kenyan pastoralists do not have a
special position but are part of the trend noted in OUT introductory words of a
diminishing livestock related base for making a living. In fact, if we take a 4
TLU per capita availability to be an absolute minimum level, it will be clear
that since the early 1970s, several Kenyan pastoral groups, notably Turkana,
Samburu, Somali and Pokot pastoralists are no longer able to sustain a purely
livestock-based existence. It should be noted, however, that the figures are
mainly presented to show a trend in overall livestock ownership and that one
should be careful in drawing too strict conclusions as far as minimum levais
It is présume»! that estimation of thé real average availability of livestock per capita will be
as correct as possible if thé non-pastoral group is very small. As a conséquence, unjustified
inclusion of livestock belonging to this group will be minimal and will be offset by incorrect
inclusion of ail members of thé mne major pastoralists group as being involved in livestock
keeping.
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are concerned. For example, livestock figures were collected using aerial
countings which, in général, are some 15 per cent below real numbers.
Moreover, we did not recalculate our human population in adult équivalents.
Both adjustments would probably raise thé TLU/Cap figures by some 30-35
per cent.
Also, we used the same TLU conversion rates for every species while
différences between for example thé small Maasai Zébu and large Boran cattle,
or thé small Turkana camel and thé larger Somali camel do exist. On the other
hand, as a resuit of crossbreeding, thé quality of thé pastoralists' herds, has
defïnitely increased in the last decades resulting in a higher milk/meat output
per animal. This should be taken into account when comparing livestock
numbers over time.
Finally, compétition from wildlife for grazing resources is often overlooked,
but should, in my opinion, be included in dealing with carrying capacity
estimations. The extent of the compétition for grazing for several arid and
semi-arid districts is shown by comparing livestock and wildlife TLU densities
as shown in table 3.5.
































































































































































The Maasai area (Narok and Kajiado districts) is inhabited by several wildlife
species like wildebeests, giraffes, zébras, gazelles, impalas, éléphants and thé
like. For example, in Kajiado District a mean of 3.1 TLU per km2 or 14.6 per
cent of thé total TLU figure for thé district, is made up by wild species. This
reduces thé availability of grazing and water resources for domestic animais.
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Besides being direct competitors for grazing and watering, wild animais kill
livestock, transmit diseuses to domesticated animais resulting in livestock
losses and thé avoidance of certain grazing pastures for some time of the year.
This latter aspect also covmts for the effect of tsetse infested areas. In the last
decades the setting apart of large areas in the arid and semi-arid areas for
national parks has also reduced the area actually available to livestock-keeping.
Lack of watering points in certain areas and agricultural activities further
diminish the range open for livestock-keeping.
With the loss of many traditional drought grazing reserves due to expanding
dry-land agriculture and the establishment of National Parks and Reserves as
well as Forest Reserves the drought risk for cattle production has considerably
increased. This, together with the increase in the human population, has
reduced the self-reliance in tenus of food production of the pastoral population,
especially during drought periods.
To counterbalance this trend national and international authorities and
researchers have proposed solutions in the commercialization of livestock
production in the arid and semi-arid zone (see section 3.5). Offtake from the
"traditional herd" is usually said to be as low as 9-10 per cent, attributable to
lack of interest by the herders. As Raikes (1981:97) points out this reluctance
'is at least in part due to low priées and poor organization of marketing'.
Aldington and Wilson (1968) found an overall average offtake rate of 13.3 per
cent in Kenya, ranging between 27.5 per cent in the commercial ranching area
and 7.5 per cent in the most arid pastoral areas (see Raikes 1981:116). On
average the marketed offtake within the "traditional herd" is estimated to be
around 12 per cent.
Cattle offtake figures provided by White and Meadows for Kajiado District
over the 1962-1978 period range between 10 and 38 per cent. Following the
major drought in 1960/1 offtake ratios dropped to a low of 10 per cent for
1962/3, while, at the height of the 1975/6 drought period it reached 38.4 per
cent (see Evangelou 1984:110). Patterns of offtake also vary among
households. Although "rieh" households in an absolute sense marketed most
animais "poor" households have higher offtake ratios. In addition to low
market priées and poor market organization, it seems clear that 'range
conditions and herd size set genera! levels of market involvement, but the
particular production circumstances which each pastoralist faces -and nis
perception of opportunities and costs- ultimately détermine the sale décision'
(see Evangelou 1984:111).
Schwarte studied these aspects for Northern Kenya, the breeding pool for
immature cattle to be fattened in the ranching areas, concluding that 'pastoral
livestock production in Northern Kenya is still subsistence oriented. Sales of
animais for slaughter or fattening do not guarantee a sufficient income during
dry seasons and drought years to stimulate a market-oriented livestock
production' (Schwartz 1981:63). Imposition of quarantine régulations makes
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traders reluctant to buy animais in large numbers at reasonable priées. This
means that many pastoralists hâve no choice of compensating for thé shortage
of milk in a dry season or year by purchasing of other foodstuffs even thotigh
they hâve sufficient animais ready for sale. As a conséquence they are
condemned to employing their traditional strategy of keeping large numbers of
female stock to guarantee a minimum milk supply throughout thé year. Despite
substantial inputs for water development and steadily increasing marketing
facilities for both immature and slaughter stock, stock sales from thé Northern
rangelands hâve more or less stagnated since thé mid sixties. The major reason
for tins are thé recurring drought periods which adjust thé supply of and the
demand for immature cattle.
3.5 Government Policy Towards thé Arid and Semi-Arid
Lands
As stated before, thé conservation of fauna is of major importance, not only
from an ethical point of view, but also because wildlife is one of the most
important attractions of thé Kenyan tourist industry. Since the late 1980s this
sector of thé Kenyan economy has become Kenya's main foreign currency
earner. Other économie contributions from thé arid and semi-arid areas, include
soda ash mining from Kajiado, commercial ranching from Laikipia mainly,
commercial arable farming like wheat from Narok and thé provision of cheap
labour from Machakos and Kitui. Before we tum to a detailed description of
Kajiado District and its socio-économie and physical characteristics let us
consider thé policy of thé Kenyan Government towards thé arid and semi-arid
areas.
In her analysis of poverty and the Kenyan land problem, Hunt explicitly
states that 'we shall not consider thé difficulties and opportunities that pertain
to raising incomes from pastoralism [because this] so far proved particularly
intractable' (Hunt 1985:162). She is rather pessimistic about thé future of
nomadic pastoralists, who are thought not to have enough land and catfle to
absorb their growing numbers, even if immigrant smallholders were to
withdraw from thé arid and semi-arid zones.
Many years earlier, thé British Colonial Government showed a remarkable
similar attitude as it was not interested in the development of the ASAL areas
either. Migot-Adholla (1981), Ngutter (1981), Raikes (1981), Wiggins (1985)
and Dietz (1987) have all reported on (post) colonial development policy
towards the rangeland areas in Kenya.8 The ever present and overlapping tone
in these reports is one of a genera! outcry conceming the neglect of the dry
A detailed analysis, with special référence to the Maasai area, is provided in chapters S and
6. Here we will just review the mam penods in the history of development policy in the arid and
semi-arid lands in short
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zones in Kenya. Nonetheless, since the beginning of the 1980s a change in this
policy to the betterment of the dry zones can be seen as Dietz (1987-64) has
observed.
With the exception of Somalia, Niger and Mauritania, pastoralists are
generally, minority communities in the new states of Africa. In Kenya, also,
pastoral societies are geographically, politically and economically peripheral for
an economie and social system dominated by agricultural groups. A century
earlier the pastoralists were, politically, economically and geographically, at the
centre of what became the Kenya of today. Droughts, diseases and famines
have undermined their power which has ultimately been reduced as a result of
the arrivai of the Europeans in the interior of the country. The colonists starled
a policy which favoured settler agricultural and ranching interests, at the cost
of the wellbeing of the pastoralists.
Early colonial policy towards the nomadic pastoralists was mainly
concemed with pacification, collection of taxes, discouragement of socio-
cultural traditions such as circumcision, the establishment of reserves and the
setting aside of large areas for ranching purposes. Besides semi-arid areas the
pastoralists, especially the Maasai and the Pokot, lost important humid lands.
Quarantine régulations prohibiting the legal movement of cattie and some years
later veterinary campaigns to reduce the incidence of disease in native
livestock were starled. In fact, both measures were designed primarily to
protect the European livestock economy (see Ngutter 1981:27).
Since the early 1930s, another factor, i.e. land conservation, was added to
the list of dry area policies. As a result of the veterinary improvements and,
according to the Administration, the pastoralists' wish to own as many animais
as possible, pressure on the available grazing resources had increased
considerably. Baringo, Maasailand and the Kamba areas (Kitui and Machakos)
in particular were thought to be heavily overpopulated and overstocked (see
Dietz 1987:53). Instead of opening up closed areas or allowing the herders to
move to those traditional areas confiscated but seldom used by the Europeans,
an attempt was made to reduce livestock numbers belonging to Africans.
Heavy taxation proved to be only parüy successful. By the late 1930s the
Kamba herdsmen of Machakos were even forced to seil part of their stock, a
practice that was stopped after a fierce protest that reached as far as the House
of Commons in London. Alternative destocking measures proposed included
the establishment of markets replacing the practice of itinérant traders as the
channels for stock export. However, the priées paid were much too low and
illegal trade flourished. During World War II the pastoralists "donated" huge
numbers of animais to support the war.
After the war interest in the "African areas" increased. Until this time
developments in water and éducation for the dry areas in particularly had been
minimal and in fact financed by the pastoral groups themselves via taxes.
Apart from a lack of development funds, shortage of technical staff also
fc
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undermined any substantial improvement in the dry régions. The "Ten-Year
Development Plan (1946-1955)" called for the total development of African
land, crops, livestock and water. This time finances where available as the
result of a post-war economie boom which strongly increased Government
revenue. The African Land Development Board (ALDEV), established in 1946,
concentrated its efforts on the semi-arid areas. In addition to water
development, new campaigns for stock limitations and ecological conservation
were initiated. The pastoralists Were still seen by the majority of civil servants
and visiting commissions as devastating the ecological balance in the dry
régions, The establishment of Game Reserves and National Parks which
restricted grazing use especially for Maasai, Borana, Somali and Kamba
pastoralists in the semi-arid areas soon after the war was recognized as being a
new blow to the herding societies of Kenya, but this did not weaken this
conservationist approach. Special African Livestock Marketing Boards were set
up to purchase stock from the dry areas, wilhout much success, however.
By the mid-1950s a more integrated approach was adopted. The
"Swynnerton Plan" initiated the intensification of the development of African
agriculture, including the semi-arid areas. These areas were "discovered" to be
able to provide a substantial contribution to the economy of Kenya. The
ALDEV-programme was integrated in the new plan and supported by an
increased pool of money mainly in the form of loans and staff. Grazing
schemes, establishing of boreholes and cattie dips, éducation in modern
husbandry practices, reseeding trials and pasture research were added to the
continuing effort of limiting the number of livestock. Still, it should be realized
that, in comparison to the more humid régions of Kenya, the pastoral régions
received only marginal attention and that most efforts with respect to range
management failed.
Moreover, rainfed agriculture and minor irrigation schemes supported by the
Government were starled in the bettór-watered areas of the dry régions
especially in the Machakos and Baringo districts, in response to overcrowding
in the fertile régions and stimulated through the introduction of newly
developed drought résistant crops. Most of these schemes, however, failed
unless a high priced commercial erop was established and market accessibility
assured. Irrigation schemes also starled to appear in the arid lands, though on a
minor scale. 'By 1961 only 1,500 families had been settled on some 6,388
acres in Embu, Baringo, Machakos, Elgeyo, Taita and Tana River districts'
(Migot-Adholla 1981:47).
Independence in 1963, heralded the breakdown of tribal boundaries and the
disbanding of a number of restrictive régulations towards the livestock sector
in the arid and semi-arid areas. A new and integrated approach was looked for.
'Ideas were formulated to organize a stratified beef industry. And areas would
raise calves. After that, ranches in the semi-arid areas would fatten the cattie.
In the vicinity of the market, in more humid surroundings, the fattening would
be finished, producing heavy-weight, high quality animais' (Dietz 1987:56). In
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practice, however, this was not a big success, except in some parts of
Maasailand and in Somali-area. Low beef priées have, in général, seemed to be
the major obstacle in developing the livestock sector in Kenya (see also section
2.2.2).
The country-wide drought of the early 1960s had resulted in increased
attention being paid to the ASAL areas. Reports of those days concerning the
semi-arid areas (e.g. Brown 1963, Lawrance et al. 1966) and for the Maasai
area particularly (Fallon 1962, Jacobs 1963) called for an institutionalised form
of territorial organization using traditional indigenous structures.
Company ranchos
Grazing blocke
'I'i'̂  National Parte St Game Reserves
1 ' 'l Unsurveyed range a
Group ranchea
IHm Commercial ranchea
1 j Arable areaa
Figure 3.4 Types of Ranching in Kenya
Source: Oxby 1981
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By the late 1960s, group ranches (established on trustland in the pastoral areas
with a title deed vested collectively in groups of some 30 to 450 pastoral
households being the traditional users of the land) were formed in the northern
fringe of Kajiado District and later also in parts of Narok (see Doherty 1979a),
Samburu (see Fumagalli 1978), Kwale, Pokot (see Livingstone 1975), Laikipia
and Baringo (see Wales et al. 1979). Other forms of ranching such as
commercial ranches (leased or owned on freehold basis, mainly in Laikipia,
Nakuru and Machakos), Company ranches (land leased for a collectively held
herd owned by a private Company chiefly found in Laikipia, Nakuru and
Machakos), co-operative ranches (run on profit Sharing arrangements primarily
in Taita-Taveta, Tana River, Kwale and Kilifi districts) and grazing blocks (in
north-eastern Kenya) were starled as well (see figure 3.4).
A major stimulus for these new developments came from the Kenya
Livestock Development Project (KLDP) initiated in 1969 to enhance the
development of livestock production in Kenya. The objectives were to increase
méat production, enhance employaient in the livestock sector, ensure
conservation etc. Funding for the project came from the World Bank (IBRD),
USAID (United States Agency for International Development), EDA
(International Development Association), SIDA (Sweden), CIDA (Canada) and
ODA (United Kingdom). A major aim was to implement strict grazing
management in combination with infrastructural developments like boreholes,
dips, firebreaks and waterdams. Loans were provided and were scheduled to be
repaid by the fattening of steers bought from the and régions and resold to the
Nairobi meat market at a profit. However, management problems and the
drought period in the beginning of the 1970s resulted in sévère problems for
the group ranch concept which, at least in Kajiado, had been initiated without
having had a firm and properly established sociological and ecological base
anyway.9 A second phase of the KLDP was started in 1974, though with less
enthusiasm and financial support. The fïrst two phases of the project affected
about 200 Kenyan beef ranches, out of a total of 450 to 500 in the country (see
Wales et al. 1979:3).
In 1976 a Marginal/Semi-Arid Lands Pre-investment Study team was
established. It had already been argued in 1972 by the International Labour
Office (ILO) that the dry régions should receive more Government attention in
order to develop the area and to co-ordinate activities such as like forestry,
wildlife, agriculture and livestock keeping where potential conflict could arise.
The droughts of 1971-73 and 1976 which resulted in sévère problems in the
(semi)-arid lands activated foreign donors and the Kenyan Government alike.
The latter acknowledged the fact that the neglect of the dry régions throughout
the colonial period had persisted during the 1960s and early 1970s (see RoK
1988:132). Expérimental integrated development projects were started in
Machakos, Kitui and Baringo districts. In 1979 the nationwide "Arid and Semi-
Chapter 7 desctibes in detail the history of group ranches in Kajiado District.
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Arid Lands Programme" was launched. It aimed at the improvement of the
welfare of the people in the ASAL by:
- developing productive potential and creating income-earning opportunities;
- providing basic needs services;
- conservating of resources;
- improving intégration of ASAL areas within the national economy.
Foreign donors fïnancially "adopted" an ASAL programme which mostiy
began in spécifie administrative régions. For example, Norway concentrated in
Turkana, Switzerland in Laikipia, thé Netherlands in West Pokot, thé USA in
Kitui, thé United Kingdom in Embu, Meru and Isiolo and Denmark in Taita
Tavela. International donors, like EEC and World Bank also provided funds for
ASAL programmes. By the end of the 1980s some 19 programmes were
operating or planned for in 22 districts. Most ASAL programmes operate over
a broad range of development activities stretching from road building, small
scale irrigation and livestock improvement to rural health, adult éducation and
support of women groups. In table 3.6 some détails are presented.
































































































* Norwegian aid was stopped in 1991 by thé Kenyan Government in reaction to continuous criticism
concerning Kenya's violation of human rights.
# Ofthis budget UNDP provided K£40,000/-.
@ Dutch assistance in Kiambu stopped in 1988, finances for operating expansés in 1988/89 were
provided by thé Kenyan Govemment The Elgeyo-Marakwet Programme was halted between 1988-
1990 due to management problems.
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According to Wiggins (1985:92) 'six years after thé detailed planning of the
first programme began, thé record looks patchy. [There is] too litfle technical
success, slow planning and lack of Community involvement in planning'. Lack
of support for thé drylands among thé politicians and technical difficulties of
raising dryland production do indeed seem to be thé major obstacles faced by
thé ASAL programmes.
A variation in operational approaches exists between programmes, even
those financed by the same donor. In some cases strong co-operation with thé
existing local administrative machinery is sought (e.g. in Kajiado), while in
others a new more independently operating device is created (e.g in Turkana).
In cases where local Government capacity is underutilized and well-suited thé
former approach might be most advantageous, However, in thé case of
difficulties, either managerial or political, it may be better to operate as
independently as possible from thé local apparatus (see van Klinken 1988:5).
Recentiy it has been tried to streamline thé huge heterogeneity of
programme activities and implementive approaches. A new Ministry of
Réclamation and Development of Arid, Semi-Arid and Wasteland was created
in 1989, replacing a spécial task force within thé Ministry of Planning and
Development. This will probably change thé présent structure whereby ASAL
Programmes are completely left on their own in formulating their policies and
stratégies. The second génération of ASAL programmes will have to learn
from thé mistakes of the past and expand their strength in flexibility. Every
effort to streamline thé programmes should learn from thé lessons learned of
the past.
Besidea thé appearance of thé ASAL Programmes, attention to thé dry areas
in Kenya has also increased within thé sectoral ministries. Dryland research
and development activities within thé Ministries of Agriculture, Livestock,
Water Development, Tourism and Wildlife, Natural Resources and Education
were expanded. Projects initiated by several Non-Governmental Organizations
(NGOs), especially those by missionaries, hâve also been very important. In
some dry districts their efforts hâve only recently become available to thé
people. The growing importance of the dry régions within the overall Kenyan
and international development policy is illustrated by table 3.7.'°
Not every ministry included information conceming thé spécifie areas of opération. This is
thé major reason for thé discrepancy between thé Kenyan total budget figure and that for ail
districts. In addition, not all funds are presented in thé Printed Development Estimâtes.
International donors sometinies use their own channels for financing. By contrast, not every
approved allocation will indeed be spent in thé district. For example, an analysis for Kajiado
| „ District of 41 projects (K£ 15,056,125) approved at thé national level for 1988/9 showed that only
29 of (hese projects (totalling K£ 752,867) actuajly appeared in thé Kajiado District Final
Development Budget Allocation of 1988/9. In addition, 15 new projects were presented will) a
total budget allocation of K£ 742,750. In other words, only some 5 per cent of thé originally
approved estimâtes for 1988/9 were actually implemented in that same year (see Rullen 1990:164).
It is nevertheless felt that thé results of thé analysis are interesting and eye-opening.
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Table 3.7 Approved District Development Budget Allocations 1986-89
District Approved Allocation Average Esümated Ksh. Compared
(in nün Ksh.) Allocation Population per to Rural :
1985/6 1986/7 1987/8 1988/9 (I9gfr.89) (x 1,000) ~"*"~ (Ksh.~
201)
Semi-Arid Districts 807 557 596 1013 743 3112 239 +
Kajiado 22 43 76 445 146 201 726 ++
TaitaTaveta 22 28 32 52 34 188 181
Lamu 40 61 48 41 48 64 750 ++ „;
Kitui 90 67 114 84 89 598 149
Machakos 340 114 122 125 175 1351 130
Baringo 181 150 114 165 152 253 601 ++
Samburu 35 19 18 28 25 91 275 + »
Laikipia 36 32 24 42 34 211 161 - ,
WestPokot 41 43 47 30 40 243 165
Arid Districts 485 297 241 366 347 1076 322 +
Garissa 27 20 17 26 23 201 114
Isiolo 11 30 69 94 51 56 911 , ++
Mandera 16 24 21 27 22 126 153
Marsabit 25 20 28 32 26 144 181 - :
Tana River 218 160 38 119 134 137 978 ++
Turkana 169 35 46 50 75 228 329 +
Wajir 18 6 22 17 16 184 87
Humid Districts
Central Province 531 439 470 701 535 3105 172
Western Province 267 185 270 358 270 2388 113
Nyanza Province 342 250 291 607 372 3279 113
Ritt Valley HigWands 868 717 901 1329 954 2803 340 +
Kenya Rural Districts 3938 2887 3128 5029 3745 18618 201
Urban Districts 979 912 812 909 909 1576 577 ++ !
Kenya Districts 4917 3799 3940 5961 4654 20194 230
Total Dev. Budget 8,187 10,74912,476 16,123 11,884 588
Source: 198V6 data trom Dietz 1987; 1986-89 author's calculations trom RoK 1981/, RoK. 198SbT
RoK 1989
Note: "Kenya Rural Districts" includes thé humid/arid districts of Narok, Elgeyo Marakwet, Embu, v
Meru, Kilifi and Kwale (est. average allocation: Ksh. 229/- per capita) (figures are rounded).11
Table 3.7 shows the per capita allocation of area-marked approved budget
estimâtes over the 1985-89 period. Most striking is the increase in the
approved development budget allocation for Kajiado District in the 1985-88
11 It should be noted that in some cases allocations for certain districts serve a régional or •;
even national interest, such as agricultural research Institutes or hydro-electrical power plants. This x
applies mainly to thé Urban Districts (especially Nairobi) and Rift Valley Highlands (especially
Nakuru and Uasin Gishu Districts). :
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' period. A rise from Ksh. 22 million to Ksh. 445 million means a 1 ,923 percent
s» growth. Compared to thé national average of 21 percent increase over the same
ï *• period an explanation of this is urgentiy required! This is found in part in that
j some huge programmes have been starled during this period like thé
^ «^ Kilimanjaro-Machakos (Noolturesh) water project.
, ^ This project does not only serve Kajiado, but also maybe primarily
^ Machakos District. In other words, in fact it is not a district-specific project. A
f total of over Ksh. 1,000 million has been allocated for this project that is to
f pipe water from the .Noolturesh spring at the foot of Mt. Kilimanjaro up to
fx Machakos district first and then back to Kajiado. Italy acts as a soft loan
\ „ créditer for financing this Investment. A total of almost Ksh. 270 million (i.e.
:N over 60 per cent) was allocated for the 1988/9 fmancial year. Another major
allocation during this year was for road improvement projects (Ngong-Isinya:
f Ksh. 50 million and Loitokitok-Emali: Ksh. 43 million). Still, even without
^s inclusion of these projects the district total has increased tremendously as
LX compared to the 1985/6 budget.
It seems that the "Economy of Affection", described by Goran Hyden
x x (1983:8), as 'a network of support, communications and interaction among
^ sttucturally defined groups connected by blood, kin, Community or other affini-
jx ties' has been at work during the 1986-89 period favouring the Maasai from
»x Kajiado District. In other words, the major reason for the increase in the
v Kajiado District development budget is political. The Vice-Président, Prof. G.
ï Saitoti, who is also the Minister for Finance, is the Member of Parliament for
;x Kajiado North. He has held the post of Finance Minister since 1983 and that of
u Vice-Président since 1989. Since hè took up a position in the Kenyan
j Government there has been a considérable increase in the allocation of funds
!N for his constituency, especially the Ngong area, for the ministries of Public
^ x Works, Health and Water Development. Instead of having a considérable
* number of development projects still pending at the end of the financial year
^ due to lack of money, equipment or manpower, the situation in Kajiado
District has now turned to one in which new non-scheduled projects are starled
^ because the workplan had been finished early. It will be no surprise that most
of these unplanned projects are situated in the Ngong area. It should also be
•\ realized that funds allocated in this way are not included in the Printed
1̂  Development Estimâtes.
The high score for Baringo District can also be included under the
"Economy of Affection" explanation as this is the home base of President Moi.
^ Roads, water, health and electricity are specifically cared for. Other well off
^ districts within the group of arid and semi-arid areas are Lamu (seulement
l~ schemes, hospita!), Isiolo (hospital), Tana River (irrigation scheme and
causeway), Samburu (food security project) and Turkana (ASAL). However, it
V should be noted that for these latter régions mainly grants by foreign donors




3.6 Summary and Conclusion
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In this chapter we have tried to place Kajiado District within the group of arid
and semi-arid lands in Kenya. In terms of aridity Kajiado District ranks llth.
Though having an estimated total of 94 per cent of its area in the arid and
semi-arid zone the district's overall carrying capacity is not unfavourable when
compared to other arid and semi-arid districts.
The 1979 population census revealed for Kajiado District's population a
rather low density in comparison to Kenya's semi-arid districts. lts population
growth from 1969 to 1979, however, was above the national average and even
every other agro-climatic région in Kenya (see table 3.1). In respect of its sex
ratio, being balanced suggesting a minimal importance of out- or in-migration
of (male) jobseekers, its position was more comparable with the arid than
semi-arid régions. In terms of school attendance and literacy levels Kajiado
District takes an intermediate position.
Livestock ownership per head of the Kajiado pastoral population is
relatively high. Figures presented seem to suggest, however, that this position
is slowly deteriorating. By 1969 an estimated 8.76 TLU were available for
Kajiado pastoralists as compared to a mean figure of 3.86 TLU per capita for
other pastoral peoples in Kenya. By 1988, these figures had dropped to 3.19
TLU/capita and 2.23 TLU/capita, respectively (see table 3.4). The district's
livestock density (18.1 TLU/km2 by 1988) is also higher than in most other dry
régions, though less pronounced as livestock ownership would suggest.
In addition, it should be realized that wildlife numbers in Kajiado District
are also top ranking. For 1988 3.1 wildlife TLU/km2, which is some 14.6 per
cent of the total 21.2 TLU/km2 density, was approximated. Only Narok district
had a higher overall livestock and wildlife density.
Finally, attention was paid to the development policies exercised in Kajiado
District by the Government and international (non-governmental) organizations.
From the situation of sheer neglect that prevailed for most of this Century a
remarkable change had occurred by the end of the 1960s (introduction of
ranching types). By the late 1970s the Kenyan dry régions became the focus of
(international) attention in order to improve the quality of life of their
inhabitants. Isolated and timebound policies geared at destocking, land
conservation and quarantine régulations were now replaced by an integrated
development approach. Under the umbrella of the "Arid and Semi-Arid Lands
Programme" development of productive potential, provision of basic needs
services, conservation of resources and intégration within the national economy
were promoted. Indeed, in terms of approved allocated funds these régions in
genera! had a favourable position for the 1985/6-1988/9 period. Some districts
in particular showed extremely favourable allocations which were partly
explained by foreign donor préférences or by the powerful position held by
district représentatives within the Kenyan government. In the following chapter
spécifie attention is paid to the features of Kajiado District.
T
CHAPTER 4
KAJIADO DISTRICT: THE EASTERN HOME OF THE
MAASAI
4.1 The Physical Environment and Natura! Resources
Kajiado District Stretches out just south of the equator from 1°10' to 3°10'
south and between 36°05' to 37°55' east. It is located in the southern part of
the country in the Rift Valley Province and is bordered by Tanzania to the
south-west, Taita-Taveta district to the south-east, Machakos district to the
north-east, Nairobi, Kiambu and Nakuru districts to the north and Narok
district to the west. Kajiado District comprises a total area of 22,106 km2
which is equivalent to some 3.5 per cent of Kenya's land surface. lts highest
point is at 2,761 m (Ol Doinyo Orok near Namanga) and the lowest point is
just under 500 m near Lake Magadi. Kajiado District can be divided into four
physiographic sectors (see figure 4.l):1
60 km
1—...J
Figure 4.1 Kajiado District Physiographic Zones
Source: Bekure et al. 1987
Soil classification units tefer to the exploratoiy soi! map of Kenya, 1980 as published by
the Kenya Sou Survey. Landforms aie also refeited to (e.g. A = Floodplains; B = Bottomlands; F
= Footslopes; H = Hills and minor scarps; L = Plateaus and high-level structural plains; Ls = Step-
faulted floor of the Rift Valley; Ps = sedimentary plains; Pn = Non-dissected erosional plains; R =
Volcanic footridges; Um = lower middle-level uplands; Up = Upland/high-level plain transitlonal
lands; Ux = Uplands undifferentiated ievels; Y = Piedmont plains (see Sombroek et al. 1982).
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1. the Rifi Valley in the west; this dépression covering some 7,000 km2 fonns
part of Africa's famous Gréât Rift Valley, a system of faulte containing a
chain of lakes and volcanic mountains running 5,600 km from the Red Sea
to Mozambique, along which East Africa is slowly drifting apart. In Kajiado
the Rift is some 50-60 km wide and it includes Lake Magadi, which has
substantial deposits of soda ash, and the extinct volcanos Mount Suswa and
Olorgesailie. Tertiary and Quaternary volcanics and patches of Quaternary
sédiments as well as a basement complex (precambrian rocks) in the south-
east are the geological features found.
The sous are predominantly stony, weil drained, calcareous loam
Cambisols (Lsl), with some patches of imperfectiy drained, clay Vertisols
(B4) in the bottom lands. In the south-western part, well drained, silty clay
loam Fluvisols (A2) are present. A ridge on the western side of the Ruft, the
Nguruman Escarpment, separates Kajiado District from neighbouring Narok
District. Originating from the Nguruman Escarpment, three main perennial
streams (Oloibortoto, Entasopia and Sampu) provide the possibility of
irrigation. These also feed the Euaso Ng'iro river, which starts from the
southern flank of the Mau Escarpment and drains much of Loita Hills in
Narok District. The river ends in the Engara Ng'iro swamp near Shompole,
at the Tanzanian border.
2. the upland Athi-Kapiti plains in the north; in the district this area of some
2,000 km2 consists mainly of open rolling land. Geologically, the Athi-
Kapiti plains dérive from Tertiary volcanics. The soils are extremely varied
though dominated by stony, imperfectiy drained, very deep, black clay
Vertisols (Lll) as well as other types of deep 'black-cotton' Vertisols and
Planosols (e.g, L14, L15, L26). It rises to the west, the highest peaks being
the Ngong hills. From Ngong hills the Mbagathi (or Embakasi) and Kiserian
streams drain eastwards towards the permanent Athl River.
3. the Central Braken Ground Hills; the south-eastern edge of the Athi-Kapiti
plains give way to a generally steeper east-falling slope of the precambrian
Basement System rocks. The area comprises some 4,400 km2. Numerous
gneiss and crystalline limestone hills extrade from the slope, the largest of
which is Ol Doinyo Orok (2,800 m) near Namanga. The eastward slopes are
much dissected and divided by water courses like the Selenkei and
Olkejuado rivers. However, none of these water courses hold surface water
throughout the year.
Soils developed on the Basement System rocks in the western footslopes
and piedmont plains are very well drained, very deep, dark reddish brown,
loose, sandy loam to firm, sandy clay Luvisols with luvic Arenosols (F13
and Y8). Well drained, shallow to deep, brown, sandy clay loam chromic
Luvisols and Cambisols exist on the lower-middle uplands of
undifferentiated Basement System rocks in the north (Um25). In the higher-
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level southern uplands the dominating soil type is an association of chromic
Luvisols with, on the lower slopes, imperfectiy drained, deep, black, firm,
clay, euttic Planosols (Up8). On the hills, stony, shallow, reddish-brown,
friable, sandy clay loam Regosols can be found. Pinally, a complex of
predominantly loamy to firm, cracking clay, calcaric Fïuvisols and chromic
Vertisols along the rivers (A12/A8).
4. the Amboseli plains in the south-east; the overall slope of this 6,300 km2
section is from north-west to south-east. The gently undulating plains in the
western hak0 are an extension of the Basement System of the Central Braken
Ground. In the southwest Quartenary sédimentation can be found near Lake
Amboseli, which is mostly dry. The eastern and southern part of the
Amboseli plains are of Quartenary volcanic origin. Towards the south they
are flanked by the snowcapped Mount Kilimanjaro, the highest (Pleistocene
volcanic) mountain in Africa (5,894 m) at the Tanzania-Kenya border. In
the north-east the more recent volcanic Chyulu Range forms the natura!
border with Machakos District.
Soils in the western part are mostly deep reddish-brown clay loarns
(Luvisols Pnl3, FY2). The eastern part has well drained, deep red-brown
silty clay loam though rather stony (R8). The northern area shows a
complex of chromic Luvisols and chromic Cambisols (Ux2, Ux8).
4.1.1 Rainfall, Evaporation and Températures
Rainfall is the single most important factor influencing agricultural activities,
whether erop or livestock production, in Kajiado District Norton-Griffiths
(1977:iii) has shown that annual rainfalls in Kajiado District are strongly
influenced by mountains, hills and the Rift Valley. High rainfalls occur around
the Ngong, Machakos and Chyulu Hills, the slopes of Mt. Kilimanjaro and the
western wall of the Rift Valley, with even isolated hills such as Namanga (Ol
Doinyo Orok) producing locally higher rainfall.
The rangelands of Kajiado District are characterised by lower rainfalls,
particularly around Lake Magadi, to the north of Kajiado Town, and in parts of
the Amboseli basin. This is either due to rainshadow effects from neighbouring
hills and mountains or, as in the Amboseli case, to divergent wind flows
between mountain ranges (i.e. Chyulu Hills and Mt. Kilimanjaro). Table 4.1
shows mean rainfall figures for a number of years recorded at some selected
stations in thé district. The high altitude stations of Ngong and Loitokitok also
show thé highest recorded average précipitation, whereas Magadi représenta thé
opposite situation. Another station in Magadi located at a high altitude of 1,859
m recorded over a period of 25 years a mean annual rainfall of 757 mm. In
Loitokitok, however, at an altitude of 1,845 m an average précipitation of 926
mm was recorded. This information is presented to illustrate thé importance of
élévation as well as to demonstrate thé local character of the rainfall pattern.
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Moreover, as Potter (1989:2-4) stresses, the historical rainfall data have been
collected at relatively few (62) and predominantly high altitude stations located
neat smal! townships and so are hardly représentative of the genera! situation
of the plains in Kajiado District Only nine gauges are situated in the rangeland
areas of Kajiado, which make up some 90 per cent of the District. Moreover,
these nine rangeland gauges are not représentative of the seasonally used
pastures (see Norton-Griffïths 1977:4).
Table 4.1 Mean Rainfall Recorded at some Selected Meterological Stations,
Kajiado District














































Source: ITVKJJA Norton-unttittis i9/y:2i; Kuui*
With the above points in mind, some genera! comments on the rainfall patterns
of Kajiado District can, however, be made. Three quite distinct types of
seasonal rainfall patterns are found in Kajiado District.
Type 1: centred around the Ngong Hills; heaviest rainfall occurs in April and
May.
Type 2: occurs around the Chyulu Hills and Mt. Kilimanjaro slopes; heaviest
rainfall in November-December
Type 3: found throughout the rangelands of Kajiado District; a small rainfall
peak in December and a single high peak in April.
Four seasons are distinguished in each of the above described types. The "short
rains" of November and December; an intermediate period in January,
February and March; the "long rains" in April and May; and a major dry
season lasting from June through to October.
Rainfall intensities are generally low in Kajiado District, ranging from 4.4
mm/h in the northern Athi-Kapiti's to 6.0 mm/h at Lake Magadi (see
UNDP/FAO 1978:43). It is estimated that some 20 per cent of the rain falls at
very high and potentially damaging intensities, only.2 Most of the rains fall at
Dunne (1977) bas demonstrated that the rates of runoff and érosion aie more strongly
delermined by rainfall intensities, hill slopes and soil characteristics than they are by the type and
cover of the végétation (see Norton-Griffiths 1977:17).
£
?
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night at an intensity that maximises infiltration and minimises runoff and
evaporation.
As with précipitation, températures in the district vary with altitude.
Average monthly températures vary between 30°C at Magadi and 16°C at
Loitokitok. The coolest months are July-August while the hottest months are
February and March. Average minimum températures for Magadi and
Loitokitok are 23°C and 10°C. Mean maximum températures for these
locations are 35°C and 21°C, respectively. Average annual potential
evaporation (Eo) ranges from about 1,700 mm in the Ngong and Loitokitok
areas to about 2,500 mm in the Magadi area. Figure 4.2 présents the mean













Figure 4.2 Kajiado District Mean Annual Rainfall and Evaporation
Source: Kajiado District Aüas 1990 (draft)
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4.1.2 The Vegetation of Kajiado District
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The close relationship between rainfall and primary production which is
prevalent in rangeland areas like those of Kajiado District has been stressed by
Norton-Griffiths (1977:4). The végétation of Kajiado District has been analyzed
by Mumiukha as part of the UNDP/FAO Wildlife Management Project (see
Mumiukha 1976).3 Table 4.2 is drawn from Ecosystems Ltd. (1982) which
used the Wildlife Management Project data to détermine the percentage
distribution of végétation catégories for each of the physiographic zones of
Kajiado District
Table 4.2 Kajiado District Vegetation
Physiographic Zone
Types as Proportion of Each









































































































source: Kcosystems 1982: 17
- Rift Valley
Rainfall in the area is very low (300-500 mm). This is reflected by the
végétation being lirnited to stunted thorn bushes and small patches of grass. In
the north of the Rift the dominant plants and grasses are Tarchonanthus
camphoratus and Themeda triandra. In the most southern parts, the dominant
shrubs and trees are Acacia species. Ecosystems Ltd. did not include the Euaso
Ng'iro swampy area which totals some 70 km2, and which is characterised by
extensive beds of Typha and Nymphae.
- Upland Athi River
The végétation is mainly grassland and wooded grassland. The mean annual
rainfall is between 500-800 mm with the highest figures recorded on the
Ngong hills. Themeda grassland sometimes bushed with the Acacia
More recently, Toubet (1983:106) presented a detailed description of the Amboseli Platos
végétation only.
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drepanolobium shrub is the most dominant végétation found in this sector.
Some small patches of forests can be found near Ololua, Embakasi and Ngong
on the northern edge of the Athi-Kapiti plains.
- Central Braken Grounds
The végétation is dominated by wood and bushland both mixed and separate,
with a wide range of trees and shrub species (predominanüy Acacia species).
Some parts have grassland or wooded/bushed grassland. The Central Broken
Grounds receive between 500 and 600 mm rainfall a year.
- Amboseli Plains
Vegetation of the Amboseli plains is dominated by bushland and by open
grassland (Acacia and Commiphora species mainly). Swampy areas can be
found mainly at the foot of the slopes of Mt. Kilirnanjaro, Rainfall varies
considerably with the northern half receiving some 500-700 mm annually,
while the middle southern and eastern parts receive less than 400 mm a year.
An exception must be made for the slopes of Mt. Kilimanjaro which receive
from 500 up to 800 mm annually.
l i grassland
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Figure 4.3 Kajiado District Vegetation
Source: simplified map fiom UNDP/FAO 1978:47
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4.1.3 Agro-climatic Zones and Carrying Capacity
As stated bef ore, out of 41 districts Kajiado District ranks eleventh in terras of
aridity (see table 3.6). Roughly speaking half of the district is in the semi-arid
zone, one third is arid and only 6-8 per cent have some reasonable potential for
cultivation. Most of this higher potential land is situated near Ngong and other
parts of the Athi Kapiti Plains, near Mt. Kilimanjaro, Nguruman, Namanga and
Meto. The Kenya Soils Survey has produced an agro-cliinatic zone map that
combines rainfall, evaporation and température characteristics for the
establishment of the area's suitability for agricultural purposes (see Sombroek






























Figure 4.4 Kajiado District Agro-Climatic Zones
Source: Kajiado District AÜas 1990 (draft)
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Table 4.3 provides an overview of the estimated availability of agro-climatic
zones for each of the physiographic sectors of Kajiado District.





































source. Bekure ét al iwsv
In chapter l the concepts of carrying and grazing capacity have been discussed.
For Kajiado District several authors have provided an estimation of the optimal
or maximum number of livestock and human population (e.g. Holland 1986,
Campbell 1979a, Ecosystems 1982, Bekure et al. 1987, MoLD 1988). The
percentage distribution of agro-climatic zones can be used to calculate a
potential livestock carrying capacity of the district by applying different
stocking rates for each and spécifie zone expressed in stock units per hectare
(SU/ha). Table 4.4 shows the outcome of this exercise.






















Source- Sombroek et al 198'A Bekure et al iy»v
Note- one Stock Unit (SU) is a 300 kg hveweight animal consuming 3,000 kg Dry Matter/year
The range in the (safe) stocking rate figures per zone expresses the variety of
the potential carrying capacity between thé dry and wet season. Local sou
conditions also influence thé carrying capacity. The outcome of this exercise
suggests that Kajiado District is able to support between some 465,555 to
1,584,425 Stock Units. For thé whole of Kajiado District this is équivalent to a
mean requirement of land per SU of 1.2 ha in the wet and 4.2 ha in thé dry
season.
The Ministry of Livestock Development in Kajiado District, however,
propagates an average stocking rate of 6 ha per SU as a safe one. Using this 6
ha figure thé Ministry of Livestock Development is of thé opinion that thé
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district's long tenn maximum carrying capacity is only 331,537 SU. This
means that, according to the 1988 Livestock Census which reported a total of
515,633 stock units, the district was thought to be overstocked by some 55 per
cent at that time. This actual average stocking rate of some 4 ha/SU is,
however, within the limits of the potential carrying capacity estimate of
Sombroek et al.. Support for the latter is provided by Bekure et al. who
concluded that for Olkarkar group ranch (10,000 ha) a long term carrying
capacity of 1.7 ha/Livestock Equivalents (LE) would be reasonable.4 For
Kajiado District in genera! they estimated stocking rates of 1.5 ha/TLU for the
wet and 4.2 ha/TLU for the dry season (see Bekure et al. 1987:161-3 and
section 8.2.2). As a resuit a rough estimate for the Kajiado District rangelands
would place the fluctuating potential carrying capacity at 465,700 for the dry
and 1,304,000 TLU for the wet season.
Besides the climatic conditions the aspect of mobility will also influence the
actual safe stocking rate. Potter, for example, showed the acceptability of a 2
ha/TLU stocking rate for the Athi plains under pastoral conditions, though he
considered 4 ha/TLU to be a safer stocking rate for a 100 ha enclosed farm in
the Athi Kapiti zone (see section 8.2.2 note 5). Croze et al. (1978:iii), who
studied the Athi-Kapiti plains during the 1975-76 drought period, reported that,
in général, the Athi-Kapiti ecosystem is not overstocked. Only during
prolonged drought periods does the nutriënt supply fall below demand, more
because of inhibited plant growth than of high herbivore density.
Other authors (e.g. Holland 1986, Campbell 1979a) - using different
classifications and varying distribution of ecozones as well as other maximum
(uniform) stocking rates - present lower potential stocking levels than
Sombroek, Potter or the ELCA team.5 For example, Campbell, taking into
account the seasonality aspect, estimated a maximum livestock carrying
capacity of 219,613 Standard Stock Units (SSU) for the dry and 544,991 SSU
For die ILCA survey a model was produced to détermine the development of hvestock
numbers and range condition for Olkarkar group ranch (10,000 ha in zone V) over a 30 years
period. It was found that, at a stocking rate of 1.7 ha/LE, the ranch would be seriously
overstocked for only 5 years while tor 22 years the ranch was under or correctly stocked. The 1.7
ha/LE ratio was the actual stocking rate found during 1981-3 (see Bekure et al. 1991:133). The
Ministry of Livestock Development, however, recommended a stocking rate of 7.0 ha/SU (5.7
ha/LE) for Olkarkar.
5 These auöiors mainly use the ecozone classification presented by Pratt & Gwyrme (1978).
Kajiado District is subdivided in Ecozone n (22,050 ha), in (13,900 ha), IV (783,072 ha) aad V
(1,390,578 ha). The required hectares per livestock unit by ecozone are 0.8, 1.6, 4.0 and 12.0,
respectively. The resulting maximum carrying capacity per zone is 24,699, 13,125, 186,000 and
105,900 livestock units making a total of 329,724 units for the whole of Kajiado District (see
Holland 1986:73), Unfortunately, confusion exists between the exact livestock equivalent ratios for
Pratt & Gwynne's livestock units. Holland speaks of "Standard Stock Units" (a 450 kg liveweight
steer) wbereas Pratt & Gwynne's stocking rate figures seem to refer to the 'Zébu Unit' of 300 kg.
It should also be noted that the district area used by Ecosystems (i.e. 1,956,000 ha) is different
from that used by Campbell and Holland (1,992,672 ha for zones IV and V only).
ft»,-
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for the rainy season (Campbell 1979a:6).6 Croze et al. (1978:2) states that
Pratt and Gwynne's carrying capacity estimate, the first district-wide
approximation ever for Kajiado District, emerged from a circular argument;
carrying capacities were assigned to zones rather than derived from first
principles, making the source and/or authority of data unclear. In other words,
the potential carrying capacity of Kajiado District is a complicated and much
debated phenomenon, and it is highly unlikely that there is one single number
of biomass which can be supported. In any case, the threshold used by the
Ministry of Livestock of 331,537 SU is, in my opinion, considered to be too
strict. Higher stocking rates are thought to be possible as theoretical and
empirical évidence provided by Potter, Croze et al. and Bekure et al. suggest.
Relating the actual stocking rates of Kajiado District, as presented in tables
3.4 and 3.5, to the potential carrying capacity shows that in genera! terms and
for most years the stocking rates seem to be within the safe range,
Nonetheless, in some years the dry season threshold leve! is exceeded by the
actual number of Hvestock present, especially when taking into account wildlife
densities (e.g. it was estimated that 521,400 TLU populated the district in
1969). To overcome these periods of stress several options are open; one can
move out of the rangelands into the higher zones or even leave the district.
Selling one's animais is another possibility. In the past all of these measures
have been practised indeed, although damage to livestock and pastures (i.e
losses in weight or even mortality and overgrazing) also occurred. Moreover,
loss of access to the high-potential zones and reduced mobility in the
rangelands would put further strain on these anti-drought or anti-disease
stratégies.
Starting out from the estimated maximum stocking rates, several researchers
(e.g. Campbell 1979a and 1986, Sindiga 1986, Holland 1986) tried to
détermine the potential human carrying capacity of Kajiado District under Ml
subsistence pastoralism. Performing this exercise implies the need to détermine
the variable of human (food) needs expressed in minimum livestock
requirements per head of the population.7
Sindiga estimated that an average Maasai household of 4.5 adult équivalents
would need 42 SU in the humid and 45 SU in the and to semi-arid zones of
Campbell recalculated Pratt & Gwynne's hectare requirements per livestock unit for each of
the ecological zones: zone IV wet season 2.5 ha - dry season 5.5 ha/livestock unit; zone V wet 6.0
- dry 18.0 ha/livestock unit. Like Holland, Campbell named these livestock units 'Standard Stock
Units' (i.e. the 450 kg liveweight steer). In other words, in terms of the 300 kg 'Zébu Unit' the
carrying capacity figures for both wet and dry seasons should be raised, roughly speaking, by 50
per cent (see Campbell 1979a:6 and Pratt & Gwynne 1978:43/279).
7 Considering the variability of needs and the hcterogeneity of the human population in terms
of âge and sex, it will be clear that this will additionally raise the uncertainty of reaching a correct
estimation of carrying capacity concepts. The following statements concerning potential human
carrying capacity should be considered with this restriction in miiid.
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the district to be able to meet its milk ration, eat méat and have some Ksh.
4,000 cash on an annual basis. He took into account a situation of unimproved
livestock and pastures (see Sindiga 1986:225).8
Further hè determined a land/household requirement for each agro-climatic
zone by relating (Sombroek's) carrying capacity ratios to nis average 42-45 SU
per household livestock requirement. The résultant figures for zones IV, V and
VI were 22.50-45.00 ha, 45.00-180.00 ha and 180.00-900.00 ha. Sindiga then
related the size of his sample of Kajiado District sublocation areas to an
estimated number of households residing there in order to détermine the
potential availability of land per household. For zone V sample sublocations hè
reached a surplus population of 54 per cent while for zone VI this figure was
as high as 89 per cent above his estimated potential carrying capacity.
It should be noted that Sindiga made this calculation using dry season
requirements only. Applying the land requirements for the wet season provides
a picture of underpopulation for the zone V sublocations of 46 per cent of its
potential. For zone VI sublocations the situation in the wet season would still
resuit in a situation of overpopulation of 47 per cent. However, in thèse
sublocations (i.e. Orok Kiteng and Kuku) many non-Maasai cultivators are
résident who inhabit thé better watered highlands and swampy locations of the
rangelands. In other words, thé estimated subsistence-oriented livestock
keeping population has probably been overestimated by Sindiga.
Holland estimated that Kajiado District rangelands (i.e. ecozones IV and V)
would be able to support only 84,903 human beings under subsistence
pastoralism conditions. He concluded that this number had already been
reached before 1979 when a total of 93,560 Maasai were counted in Kajiado
District (see Holland 1986:79).
Campbell (1979a:10) reached a figure of 92,931 people (or 76,561 adult
équivalents) as thé maximum human carrying capacity, during the dry season,
taking a 3.5 SSU/adult équivalent ratio. He estimated that this figure would be
exceeded by 1986. When taking into account an estimated loss of almost 14
per cent in thé dry season livestock capacity due to thé influx of non-Maasai
farmers into thé high-potential zones, a maximum population of 66,061 adult
équivalents (some 80,186 people) was estimated by Campbell. In his view the
demands of thé pastoral population would exceed thé capacity of land by 1980
rather than 1990. Campbell (1979a:13) concluded that in thé period 1980-2000
a crisis would develop in both thé pastoral and agricultural communities of
Kajiado District over access to resources - even if those communities were at a
subsistence level of livestock and land ownership.
Sindiga (1986:222) refers to Pratt & Gwynne's 'Zébu Unit' of 300 kg liveweigltt animal.
However, the standardisation factors used by Sindiga (0.65 for mature cattle, 0.45 for 1-3 years
old cattle, 0.2 for calves and 0.15 for shoats) are différent from thé ratios given by Pratt &
Gwynne and seem to be more in line with thé 'Livestock Units' used by Jaetzold & Schmidt
(1983:215) for Kenya.
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Box 4.1 Major (natural) disasters timetable 1890-1990
1891/92 sévère drought and major Rinderpest (Olodua) epidemie kilhng some 90 per cent
of Maasai stock. Epidémie smallpox (Entldiyat) outbreak by thé middle of 1892
causiiig large numbers of human viclims in selected areas of Maasailand (Olmeita
pee einosl Isirkon)
1897 outbreak of Contagious Bovine Pleura Pneumonia (Olklpief) in thé Ngong area
1898 failing rains and reappearance of rinderpest among caule of Naivasha Maasai
(lasted until mid-1900)
1909 East Coast Fever (Oliikatia) outbreak in thé southem Maasai reserve
1911/12 movement of nortlieni Maasai of thé Laikipia area towards thé southem Maasai
Reserve resulting in buge animal losses
1915/16 lack of rains leading to groups of Maasai wanting to return to thé northern
Reserve
1918 period of drought and livestock diseases (especially Rinderpest) resulting in heavy
losses of stock and conséquent raiding of neighbouring groups
1925-27 loss of stock following sévère drought and shortage of grass especially in thé
Magadi area. Gréât famine in Maasailand (Oltmeyu Loolonito)
1929 severest drought in thé whole of thé district in thé last thirty years rurther
exacerbated by locust infestations. In spite of quaranune régulations concessions
were granted to thé Maasai to water and graze their cattle outside thé district's
zone of that time. Some 50,000 cattle lost. Provision of famine relief in certain
areas
1933-35 gréât famine (Olomeyu Looloyik) due to drought and locust invasion, some 35 per
cent loss of livestock
1938/39 serious drought
1943-46 sévère drought and hopper infestations. Gréât famine (Eboot Enkurma Nanyolde).
Complète failure of 1944 harvest on Government run Wheatlands near Kitengela
1948-50 failure of rains, army worm outbreak and rinderpest epidemie (esp. in Kaputiei)
1951 PJenty of ram - flooding (Qlari Loonkariak)
1952 outbreak of Foot & Mouth (Obirobt) placing the whole of Kajiado District under
quarantine régulations
1953 ECF in south-eastern Kajiado District leading to losses of up to 75 per cent
1953-56 period of drought. Famine relief provided
1956 heavy losses due to ECF in the north-westem area of Kajiado District
1959 beginning of a sévère drought and CBPP outbreak
1960/61 extremely sévère drought with stock losses up to some 70 per cent Famine relief,
involving international organizations provided to some 40,000 Kajiado Maasai. It
took until 1965 for most drougbt victims to recover from this disaster (Eboot
Enkurtna Sikitot)
1963 Plenty of rain - flooding (Olari Ie Nteke). Food relief supplied by hélicoptère
1968 outbreak of rabies in an area north of Amboseli
1969 below average rainfall
1973-76 severest drought since 1961, 1976 especially was a bad year when an estimated
150,000 cattle as well as thousands of wild animais died. Outbreaks of rabies and
anthrax were reported in 1975 in the whole of south eastern Kajiado District.
Some 60,000 people (40 per cent of the district population) received famine relief
(maize meal) at the beigbt of the drought. Rainfed agricultural production failed
during most seasons in this period, except on the higher slopes of Mt.
Kilimanjaro and because of irrigated agriculture in the plains farmers were able to
produce a reasonable erop
1979/80 failing rains
1984 sévère drought and outbreak of ECF resulting in the loss of äbout half of
livestock
1985 devastated pastures due to outbreak of army wonns forcing herders to move to
neighbouring districts and Tanzania
1986 outbreak of CBPP, probably imported from Tanzania
1987 (local) invasion of wildebeests forcing herdsmen to search for other pastures
1988 favourable rains but outbreak of army worms in most of the district and
rinderpest in the Ngong area necessitating the closure of livestock markets
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4.2 Administrative and Political Units
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Administratively, Kajiado District is part of the Rift Valley Province and
divided into five divisions, i.e. Central, Ngong, Loitokitok, Magadi and
Mashuru. The latter division was installée! only in April 1989 after splitting the
Central Division into two parts. Because thé data available ail refers to thé pre-
1989 situation referral will be made in this book mostly to thé old
administrative set up.9 The four divisions are further subdivided into 21
locations and 54 sublocations (see table 4.5 and figure 4.5).
Table 4.5 Distribution of Locations and Sublocations by Division, 1988 (1989)
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The 'Provincial Administration' forms the backbone of this administrative
system through a hierarchy of Provincial and District Commissioners, District
Officers (division), Chiefs (locality) and Assistant Chiefs (sublocality). The
Provincial Administration is the main executive arm of the Central Government
operating under the direct supervision and authority of the Office of the
President. The other technical ministries (Agriculture, Livestock, Education,
Water, Health, Co-operatives, Wildlife) are also represented by their own
officers at various territorial levels. Kajiado Town (6,000 inhabitants) located
in Central Division is thé district's headquarters. Hère thé ministries are
primarily represented with some also having offices in thé Divisional
headquarters of Ngong, Loitokitok and Magadi.
Co-ordination of development efforts is sought through thé District
Development Committee (DDC), headed by thé District Commissioner (DC)
assisted by thé District Development Officer (DDO) and furthermore composée
of thé heads of ail ministries, représentatives of local authorities, local
members of parliament, chairmen of Divisional Development Committees,
officers of development-related parastatals and thé district KANU executive
officer (until recently KANU was the only Kenyan political party - see Rutten
1990:157-8).
The restructunng of administrative boundanes is an ongoing process (e g Magadi Division
was installed only by 1984) The number of locations and sublocations is also under review
^5'S
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Figure 4.5 Kajiado District Administrative Boundaries 1989
The DDC meets at least four times a year. Technical support for ils activities
is provided by thé District Executive Committee (DEC), which meets at least
once a month. Day to day co-ordination is taken care of by the office of the
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Alongside the DDC, DEC, DPU and the ministries, several special purpose
subcommittees operate in a spécifie field of development (e.g. the District
Agricultural Committee, District Education Board, District Land Control
Board). The Divisional Development Committee (DvDC) opérâtes at divisional
level.
The Locational Development Committee (LDC) and Sublocational
Development Committee (SLDC) ought to represent the grassroots-level
community and are responsible for the discussion of Community needs and the
initial identification of projects and activities to address those needs.
In addition, there are two local authorities in the district namely Olkejuado
County Council (OCC) whose area of jurisdiction coincides with that of the
district, except for the area covered by the second local authority namely the
Kajiado Urban Council. These administrative bodies are of a more poütical
nature as, apart from some nominations, most councillors are elected. Activities
performed are in the sphère of the charging of fees, running of livestock
holding grounds and market centres and housing development. However, due
to limited funds their impact is far less pronounced than that of the district
administration.
4.3 Kajiado District Human Population
4.3.1 Maasai Origin and Socio-Culture: Myths and Facts
In the opening pages of this book the map of the Maasai traditional territory
(i.e. before the arrivai of the European adventurers and settlers) was presented
(see figure 0.4). However, the Maasai have not always occupied this area.
Their geographical origin has been much debated. Related to this puzzle of the
Maasai's "place of birth" is the question of the Maasai's origin as a distinct
ethnie group. One stirring theory held by Merker, a German colonial officer
stationed in Tanganyika at the end of the 19th Century, stated that the Maasai
are probably one of the lost tribes of Israël. Merker postulated that famine as a
conséquence of overpopulation which outpaced the fertility of the soil, drove
individual 'semitic tribes' away from the Arabian Peninsula over a period of
thousands of years towards either Asia or into Africa (see Merker 1904:1).
This is a much contested and not convincing theory (see Mol 1980:4).
Archaeological excavations have revealed évidence of livestock
domestication in various parts of Maasailand beginning as early as the first
millennium BC. This is supported by both Greek and Chinese records referring
to milk-drinking pastoralists in the interior of East Africa as early as 130 B.C
and A.D. 838 of whom the Maasai may be descendants (see Jacobs 1975:410).
However, linguistic évidence and the oral traditions of the Maasai point to the
Nile Valley, somewhere in the Sudan-Uganda border area as the original birth-
place of the Maasai (see Mol 1980:4).
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Because of pressures building up in the area the group decided to move
southwards into the Rift Valley, probably around A.D. 1400. During their
migration they displaced, by-passed and absorbed several peoples (e.g. the
ntatua a southern-Nilotic speaking pastoral group) inhabiting the plains before
them. After a temporary résidence west of Lake Turkana in the Kerio Valley,
the Maasai reached the Serengeti Plains in northern Tanzania probably by the
17th Century. The Maasai have several stories about their origin and past, that
more or less accord with these assumptions (see box 4.2).
Box 4.2 Maasai Myths
Some of the Maasai myihs refer to the origin of life on eartb or more specificatly to the birth
of the Maasai as a pastoral people. Voshaar (1979:107) stresses that several versions exist,
which vary per section, farmly, individual, time and occasion. Stil], all of tbe stories have
similar aspects in common.
One story reveals how the Maasai obtained their cattle from Naiterukop (a kind of half-God
also called Maasinta "founder of the Maasai"). One day Naiterukop dropped a rope from
heaven and let catüe down which were then collected by the Maasai. The Maasai moved away
with all cattle leaving the Ndorobo empty-handed. From there the Ndorobo had to shoot wild
beasts for their food (see Hollis 1905:270-71).
One of the most famous myths is presented by Sankan (1971:67-69), He tells us how in the
beginning, all Maa-people found themselves in a low, dry land, suffering from famine and
drought. One day the people discovered green grass that had been dropped by a bird. Scouts
were sent to follow this bird, and look for fresh pastures. So they did. Upon reaching an
escaipment (Kerio) a bridge was built to let all the people and domesüc animais pass. When
half the people had reached the other side the bridge collapsed. Those who bad reached the rieh
pastures became the Maasai pastoralists, while those who failed became llmeek, toe non-Maasai
agriculturalists. Only a few groups, like the Somali, managed to later ascend the escarpment to
become non-Maasai pastoralists.
Hollis (1905:280-81) tells us how the Maasai, directed by Naiterukop from the area round
Mount Kenya further south reached a cave at Athi River. Some of the Maasai entered the cave
and travelled for ten days before they emerged again and settled in the vicinity of a salt-lake.
These people were said to be the Lutnbwa Maasai who, in appearance are similar to the
Maasai, but are agriculturalists.
Finally, the Maasai reached the hills of Ngong. They found a little orphan boy, Kidoing'oi
Iloibonok, sitting on top of the hill. He is said to have been dropped onto the Mountain of
Muya (Ngong Hills) by Naiterukop. The child was adopted and, after becoming a grown man
was found to possess extraordinary powers of prophecy, healing and Messing. He became the
first oloiboni, the first ritual expert of the Maasai (see Galaty 1982a:12 and Mol 1980:6).
Determining of who does and who does not belong to the group of Maasai is
less easy a task than one would expect it to be. From a linguistic point of view
it is a less complicated exercise. The people speaking NUotic languages (of the
Nilo-Saharan stock) are subdivided into River-Lake Nilotes, Highland Nilotes
and Plains Nilotes. The latter group includes three separate clusters: the Bari
cluster (e.g. Latuka of Sudan), the Itunga cluster (e.g, Teso of Kenya and
S-c?
130 Selling Wealth (o Buy Poverty
Uganda) and the Maa-speaking cluster (see- Voshaar 1979:15).'° The Pastoral
Maasai, Samburu, II Charnus (Njemps) and some groups of the 'Ndorobo' of
Kenya as well as the Baraguyu, II Arusha and Pastoral Maasai of Tanzania
belong to the Maa-speaking cluster. These groups all speak a certain dialect of
the Maa language and have much in common from a cultural point of view.11
All those speaking the language of 'Maa' could thus be called Maasai.12
However, it is possible from an ethnie point of view to distinguish between
the 'Maasai proper' (Pastoral Maasai) and 'Maasai-like' groups. Each of these
groups has its own set of social beliefs and practices as well as economie
organization. For example, the Ndorobo are hunter-gatherers and the II Arusha
and II Charnus are more oriented towards culdvation than the Maasai proper.
Samburu and Baraguyu are more close to the Maasai proper. The Maasai-like
are sometimes called 'Iloikop', 'Ilumbwa' or 'Ilkuafi' as against 'Ilmaasaï a
name used for the Maasai proper.13
According to Jacobs (1975:406-8) until the early 1960s the majority of the
Pastoral Maasai not only rejected the non-livestock based alternative modes of
subsistence available to them, but they possessed strong prohibitions against
the eating of agricultural and other non-pastoral foods. Their diet is.said to
Another distinction is often made between Western (= River-Lake), Southern (= Highland)
and Eastem (= Plains) Nilotic speaking groups. In Kenya, the Western Nilotes are represented by
the Luo near Lake Victoria. The southern Nilotic-speaking Kalenjin (i.e. Pokot, Kipsigis, Nandi,
Tugen, Elgeyo, Marakwet, Sabaot) mainly occupy the intermediate zone between highlands and
plains of the Rift Valley. The Eastern Nilotic are represented by the Turkana, Teso, Maasai,
Samburu, II Charnus and 'Ndorobo' (see Kaplan 1984:92). It should be noted, however, (hat
cultural différences between group of NiloUc people can be quite profound. For example, the
Nilotic Luo, with their egalitarian society and mixed economy of agriculture and animai
husbandry, resemble their Bamu-speaking neighbours Kisii more closely than some of the other
Nilotic groups (see Gulliver 1969b:36).
According to Jacobs (1975:411) the Maasai split from the Sambaru probably some
thousands years ago. Sim (1980:12) concluded that both groups are able to widerstand each though
younger générations face more difficulties since both groups were separated from each other by
the colonial authorities at the beginning of Uns Century. Gulliver (1969a-224) reports that the II
Aiusha was founded in about 1830 as a settled and recognizable group when a few small groups
of Maa-speaking people came to settle on the lower edge of the forested, south-westem slopes of
Mt. Meru in what is now northem Tanzania. These setüers were refugees from Maasai intemecine
wars of the early nineteenth Century. Rigby (1985:53) places the séparation of the Baraguyu at the
late 18th and early 19th century from the same mutually hostile relations.
According to Galaty (1982a:4) the word Maa sterns from a characteristically polite
utterance used by Maasai people as an introduction for a statement. Other explanations are that
Maa-sai means "I will not beg" or that Maasai stems from "isaen" a term for thé beads, This last
explanation is probably not correct (see Mol 1978:99).
The use of the name 'Iloikop' still is object of discussions. The Samburu, for example,
name the Maasai proper also 'Ilolkop' (see Galaty 1982a:9). Apparently use of this term dépends
on the relative position the user takes. In genera! 'Iloikop' seems to be used to refer to the 'other
Maasai' or even 'the enemy' (see Mol 1978:99, Galaty 1982a:9, Voshaar 1979:25-7).
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have been based solely on milk, méat and blood and some naturally growing
fruits. It is said that this is slowly changing and that except for pig méat maybe
the Maasai diet is quite varied nowadays and includes cereals, vegetables and
even chicken. Still, évidence exists that, especially in times of stress, Maasai
did eat agricultural foods either traded for or even grown by themselves (see
Lawren 1968:578).
By 1979, of 241,395 Kenyan Maasai the majority resided in Narok (48.9 per
cent) and Kajiado District (38.8 per cent). Kenyan Maasai were projected to
number some 350,000 persons by 1989. Kenyan Maa-speakers totalled 329,766
in 1979 and were estimated to rise to some 455,100 people by 1989. Including
Tanzanians our total estimate is approximately 742,900 Maa-speakers for 1989.





































































































source: Population Census W», 1962, ly&y, lyvy; Jacobs iy/5; Huntingforo 1953; uminoe
1984; Peberdy 1969; Sindiga 1986; Sandford 1919; Ârhem 1985
Note: The 1948 census underestimates the Afncan population probably by as much as 30 per cent
(see Ominde 1984:35). The 1962 census is based on samples. Jacobs 1975 estimate is based on the
Tanganyika 1958 census and the Kenya 1969 census, adjusted and brought up to date by a 2 per
cent annual increase for the Kenyan Maa-speakers and the Tanzanian Maasai and a 2.5 per cent
increase for the Arusha and Baraguyu. The Tanzanian census does not provide information on
ethnie groups. Figures provided are thé best guestimates and are district-based.
For ail Kenyan Maasai the average annual growth figure for thé 1969-79
period was 4.6 as compared with 3.8 per cent for thé total Kenyan population.
This is in strong contrast with generally accepted human population increases
of 2.0-2.5 per cent for pastoral groups (see Campbell 1979a:5 - giving a figure
of 2.2 per cent for Kajiado Maasai). Several causes could hâve contributed to
this high intercensal growth figure. Besides improved health facilities thé main
reason, in my opinion, can be found in thé status of thé 1969 figure.
This is thought to be an underestimate as thé Kenyan Maasai number for
1969 (154,906) was just slightly above thé 1962 figure of 154,079 people.
Other factors thought to have affected the high 1969-79 intercensal growth rate
are thé improved recording at the time of the 1979 census; Ndorobo being
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recorded as Maasai in 1979 as opposed to 1969 (explaining the sudden drop of
Ndorobo in the 1979 census, see table 4.6 and note 16); (increased)
assimilation of non-Maasai women by way of maniage (especially Kikuyu
women); non-Maasai (especially Chagga and Sonjo from Tanzania) and
Tanzanian Maasai pretending to be Kenyan Maasai in order to legalize their
résidence.
Another issue blurring the définition of Maasai-like and Maasai-proper
people stems from the fact that the latter are further subdivided in so-caUed il'
oshon (sing, ol-osho meaning 'plateau') (see figure 4.6 and box 4.3). The clan
(olgilata pi. ilgilat) and age-group System (olporror) also need some












Figure 4.6 Kajiado Maasai ll-oshon
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Box 4.3 Il-oshon (Maasai Sections)
The pastoral Maasai il-oshon, sometimes called tribes, sub-tribes or sections, number fourteen to
date. In addition, some authors include the Samburu as a distinct ol-osho. The original meaning of
the word ol-osho is 'plateau'. Iniüally, in order to dlstinguish between aie various 'plateaus', the
inhabitants of such a plateau were given a spécifie name. Gradually the word acquired the
extended meaning it bas today, whereby it refers to an independent group of people, having their
own name, spécifie territory with well-defined boundaries, peculiarities of dress, beadwork,
speech, housing, célébration of ceremonies and even having tbeir own defence force {see Mol
1978:100). Some of the il-oshon, are numerous, others fairly smail in numbers. The Kisonfco-
Maasai seem to be the overall largest group and the Moitanik the smallesi. To date, the following
sections are distinguislied:
Table 4.7 Maasai il-oshon











arouad Lake Magadi (SW Kajiado) 14,988
from Athi-River to Chyulu (N Kajiado) 16,041
around Namanga (S Kajiado) 14,486
from Suswa-Ngong downwards (NW Kajiado) 15,636
around Enkorika (Central Kajiado) 5,601
Amboseli and Rombo area (SE Kajiado) 42,781
surrounding Kajiado Town (C Kajiado) 5,492







around Loita Hills (SE Narok)
Lemek area (Central Narok)
near Cis-Mara, Mau (NE Narok)
around Kilgoris (W-NW Narok)
Shartuka, Masarura (SW Narok)






from Lake Natron to Mt. Kilimanjaro soutflwards
west of Mt. Kilimanjaro
Serengeti south of Lake Natron
west of Lake Natron
west of the Loita and Lake Natron
Source: Mol 19/8:99; vosnaar 1979:295
In addition to these il-oshon, mention should be made of some of the Maasai sections that are
extinct. Among the best known are the Iltaarromodoon, Ilosekelai, Iloogolala and the llaikipiak.
These groups have been rooted out by other Maasai during the Iloikop wars of the 19th Century.
Most of these groups either joined Ndorobo groups or other Maasai sections. For example, it is
said that survivors of the llaikipiak joined the Purko and Uasinkishu Maasai (see Mol 1978:99).
CLANS
Maasai society is also subdivided along the lines of clans and sub-clans (molettes). The first
division is in two major moieties: Orok Kiteng and Odo Mongi. Bach of these is further
subdivided into seven major clans (Ilmakesan, Ilmolelian, Iltaarrosero, Ilukumai, Ilaiser, Umamasita
and Daitayiok). Theoretically, every sub-clan can be represented in every ol-osho. Membership of a
certain clan is determined by birth into the father's clan. A Maasai does not marry within bis own
sub-clan (see Voshaar 1979:53; Mol 1978:43).
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Box 4.4 Age-Group System
The age-group System (olporror) of Maasai society is an important aspect of Maasai society. In
the Maasai literature several descriptions of the age-group System exist, all having their own
slightly different interprétations. Indeed, the details and various names of age-groups and age-
sets are rather confusmg (see Mol 1978:17 who provides an overview of these various
interprétations drawn from Hollis, Fosbrooke, Jacobs and Sankan). In the words of Voshaar
(1979:58) the age-group System: 'intégrâtes Maasai society more than all the other structures
mentióned so far. (...) It is a system of rehgious thought and practice expressed in rites and
ceremonies. (...) It is a system of political organization, of bonding and intimate friendships. It is
a system that secures unity and well-beuig in the land of Maa.'
Generally speaking an age-group refers to a gronp of peers that, as a génération, are some
seven years ahead or behind the following or previous age-group. During the span of time an
age-group will be promoted into a new age-grade by way of ceremonies from 'boyhood' via
'warriorhood' (etnutrano) to 'elderhood'. These accompanying ceremonies are circumcision
(emurata), eunoto and olng'esher, respectively. In genera! there are six âge-grades:
Maasai Age-Set Chronology
Iltalala 1881-1905
1. early boyhood appr. 1-7 years Iluyioki 1791-1811 Iltuaü II 1896-1917
2. later boyhood appr. 7-15 Ilmeinshan 1806-1826 Iltareto 1911-1929
3. junior olmurrani appr. 15-22 Ilkidotu 1821-1841 Ilterito 1926-1948
4. senior olmmrani appr. 22-30 Iltuati l 1836-1856 Ilnyangusi H 1942-1959
5. junior elder appr. 30-45 Ilnyangusi I 1851-1871 Iseuri 1955-1978
6. senior elder appr. 45+ Ilaimer 1866-1886 Ilkiseeyia 1970-1990
As shown in this hst the group of junior elders totals a penod of 15 years. This is the result of
the coming together of two age-groups combining to become one âge-set (olajf). An âge-set is a
génération some fifteen years removed from the former and latter âge-sets. It should be noted
that the 7 and 15 years periods are variable as is the actual age of the age-mates belonging to a
certain age-group or age-set. Often one can find a person belonging to a younger age-group
which is older than a member of an older age-group. This is the result of the fact that one (i.e.
mostly the father of the boy) is somehow free to choose to which age-group hè wants to belong,
Each newbom age-group is given a name that mostly differs for each U-oshon (only the final
elders age set have a uniform name all over (Kenyan and Tanzanian) Maasailand. Formation of a
new age-group starts when the one above the one in formation feels the latter has grown large
enough, This is reported to the members of the group above them, who are considered to be the
protectors of the new group. They will actually close the recruitment for the new group. Once
the group is formed the création of a completely new group will start. This time the mtermediate
age-group (i.e. the youngest but one) will be recruiting their boys. In other words, a system of
rotation exists, whereby alternating groups are linked to each other.
Periods of recruitment and circumcision take up some three to four years. After another three to
four years after closing the circumcision there is a second group of boys who will start their
period of circumcision. This means that there are so called right hand and left hand age-groups.
Only at the time of olng'esher will these two age-groups form one single age set (plaji) (see for
more details of the age-group system and related ceremonies the description by Voshaar
1979:58-97).
According to the age-group there are several taboos on the use of food and social behaviour.
For example, traditionally the warriors left their parents home to live together in one single large
camp called manyata (pi: imanyat). They were not allowed to drink milk and the eating of meat
in the présence of women was prohibited. Only after the olng'esher ceremony were these taboos
iifted and the newbom (junior) elders were allowed to marry. Nowadays, the emurraiw stage still
exists but is restricted in duraüon and résidence as the Kenyan Government no longer allows the
building of imanyat. The warriors (ilmurran -sing, olmurrarü) having lost their task as defenders
are stimulated to go to school instead. To this end a Maasai traditional leaders meeting at Sultan
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4.3.2 Population-Numbers and Structure
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The 1979 population census provides the most up to date information
concerning the Kajiado District population size, distribution, composition by
age-group and ethnie variance.14 A total of 149,005 people were counted for
the Kajiado District in 1979 whereas there had been 85,903 inhabitants in
1969. This is the equivalent of an annual growth rate of 5.66 per cent for this
period. Recent projections for 1989 estimate a total district population of some
250,000-260,000 people, rising to some 400,000-450,000 by the end of this
Century (see table 4.8).















































































source: KDAR 1927, myrropulation Census 19B2T lyoy, 19/y; uvingstone li>S6;
1983:128; Ecosystems 1982:39; TARDA 1984; DSPP nd:33
* author's projections based on 1969-79 growth trend. The group of "others" includes especiaUy
Luo, Luhya and Somali.
As highlighted by table 4.8, Kajiado District is also populated by several non-
Maasai groups of which the Kikuyu and the Kamba (both Bantu ethnie groups)
are the most numerous. The districts recognized as being traditional Kikuyu
areas are Nyandarua, Nyeri, Muranga, Kirinyaga and Kiambu situated to the
north of Kajiado District in Central Province. The Kamba can mainly be found
in the Machakos and Kitui districts to the east of the Kikuyu country and
Unfortunately the latest 1989 census expenenced some logistic difficulties. A proposed
renewed attempt was not conducted. Sample studies made 6 montas later, however, suggested that
overall the 1989 Census was reasonably correct. For Kajiado an estimate of 259,000 people is
rumoured. Still, official figures are not yet available. This means that OUT analysis of population
numbers and other démographie characteristics is hindered and at best offers projections based
only on assumptions however careful calculated. Note that these projections do not take into
account an expected rise in mortality due to AIDS, and an increase in immigration as a result of
group ranch subdivision (see chapter 7).
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north-east of Kajiado District in Eastern Province (see figure 2.1). By 1979, the
Kikuyu (3,202,821) and the Kamba (1,725,569) ranked at first and fourth
position, representing 20.9 and 11.3 per cent of the Kenyan population, with
the Maasai totalling only 1.6 per cent. Compared to the 1969 situation
(2,201,632 Kikuyu and 1,197,712 Kamba) the annual growth rate of the
nationwide increase in Kikuyu and Kamba was 3.82 and 3.74 per cent,
respectively.
The absolute and relative importance of this group of non-Maasai in Kajiado
District has increased tremendously since the 1960s (see figure 4.7). The
average annual growth figure for the whole of Kajiado District was 5.7 per
cent for the 1969-79 intercensal period. The net growth in the number of
Kajiado Maasai for this timespan amounted to 34,599 people (4.7 per
cent/year) and the number of non-Maasai more than doubled with a rise of
28,503 persons (7.6 per cent/year).15 These non-Maasai mainly setüe in the









Figure 4.7 Kajiado District Population Growth and Ethnie Composition 1927-79
According to the 1979 population census from the 120,166 Kenyans bom in
the Kajiado District a total of 109,635 people still resided in the district. In
other words, 10,531 had migrated away, either temporarily or permanently to
It is thought that the actual growth of the Maasai population is not as high as 4.7 per cent
Campbell estimated this to be 22 per cent. This probably means that the 1969 figure of the
number of Maasai is an underestimate (see Campbell 1981b 55).
! l.
Chapter 4: Kajiado District: the Eastern Home of the Maasai 137
other districts. As the total enumerated population was 149,005 immigration
must have totalled 39,370 people. Unfortunately, these figures do not
discriminate as to ethnicity. However, even if we consider the outmigrants to
be only Maasai this figure is rather low. It is thought that Kajiado District,
unlike some other districts in Kenya, has contributed minimally to the labour
market in the country (see DSPP nd:131). Dietz (1986a:23) estimated for
Kajiado District a zero percentage of male labour migration for 1969 as well as
1979. In my opinion, if outmigration occurs, it will mainly be for temporary
reasons like éducation or rebuilding one's herd by looking for a job as a
watchman in Nairobi (as happened again en masse after thé 1973-76 drought).
Another group of outmigrants will be those Maasai joining thé army and those
moving to neighbouring Narok district.
Comparing thé 1979 figures with those of 1969 does not show a fast
growing increase in outmigration as a proportion of those born in the area. Van
Doorne (1980:176) presented data showing that out of 68,850 Kajiado born
Kenyans, 3,647 or 5.3 per cent no longer were living there by 1969. With the
Kenyan mean outmigration figure at 16.6 per cent the Kajiado figure was the
lowest for the 24 districts analyzed. The destination of thé group of
outmigrants was Nairobi (20.1 per cent), other Rift Valley Province districts
(46.2 per cent), Central Province (19.3 per cent), Eastern Province (5.6 per
cent), Coast Province (4.8 per cent), Nyanza Province (2.9 per cent) and
Western Province (0.8 per cent) (see Holland 1988:26 cf Rempel 1974:50-51).
Ominde (1984:74) has provided data for thé group of 1,686 people who
migrated from Kajiado District to other Rift Valley districts. This confirms our
idea of thé importance of Narok District as an important target for Kajiado
outmigrants as 937 people or 55.6 per cent of the intraprovincial migration was
directed to Narok District. Other important receiving districts were Nakuru
(19.8 per cent), Turkana (6.7 per cent) and Uasin Gishu (6.0 per cent). Narok
(32.5 per cent) and Nakuru (21.4 per cent) were also the most important Rift
valley districts with respect to thé birthplace of this spécifie group of Kajiado
District immigrants, totalling 1,516 people by 1969.
By 1979 the percentage of outmigrants from Kajiado District had increased
to 8.8 per cent. The effects of thé 1976 drought period will certainly be one of
thé major causes for this nse. Holland (1986:113) also concluded that thé 1979
percentage of 12.3 per cent of all Maasai living outside Kajiado and Narok
districts (not necessarily because of migration) is not unusually high. In
addition hè pointed out the lack of data concerning the occupation and
éducation of Maasai living in other districts. In a more recent article, however,
hè was rather outspoken after relating the 1979 figure of 12.3 per cent with the
1969 figure of Maasai staying outside the two districts (8.2 per cent). Holland
(1988:29) states that this seems to indicate dramatic migratory movements of
the Maasai. However, we would like to point to the problem of the Ndorobo- \«l
M
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Maasai switch, especially in Laikipia, referred to earlier.16 Furthermore, lack
of detailed information does not allow for an analysis of the destination of the
group of Kajiado District leavers.17
Several sources expect that for the Kajiado District over the next decades there
will be continuous immigration into the district on a substantial scale, raising
population densities and leaving little land under-utilised (see e.g Ecosystems
1982:40). The Kajiado District Development Plan for 1989-93 foresees even
faster rates of immigration because of group ranch subdivision and an
increasing number of Nairobi city workers moving towards the nearby small
towns of Ngong and Central Divisions.






































Divisional population figures are presented in table 4.9. The average population
density for Kajiado District in 1979 was 7.6 persons/km2 as compared to 4.4
p/km2 in 1969. Within Kajiado, the availability of high-potential land is also
reflected in that Ngong Division is the most densely populated, with 13.4
p/km2 (and even as high as 212 p/km2 in Ngong location), followed by
Loitokitok (7.5 p/km2), Central (6.0 p/km2) and Magadi (5.0 p/km2). This is
rather low as compared to its neighbouring (high-potential) districts of Kiambu
(280 p/km2), Nakuru (90 p/km2), Machakos (72 p/km2), Narok (13 p/km2) and
Taita-Taveta (8 p/km2) (see Statistical Abstract 1988).
fa 1969, Ndorobo were mainly in Nakuru (10,636 persons) and Laikipia (7,315 persons)
districts. By 1979 these figures were 3,979 and 181, respectively. By contrast the number of
Maasai changed from 3,892 to 4340 in Nakuru and ftom 1,125 to 10,116 ui Laikipia (see RoK
1970a; RoK/CBS 1981).
Assuming that most outmigrants will be Maasai some conclusions can be drawn ftom
analyzing the number of Maasai residing outside Kajiado and Narok districts. Figures do not allow
for separating Narok from Kajiado Maasai. In 1979 Maasai were counted in Nairobi (3,425),
Central (1,850), Western (2,132), Coast (1,509), Eastern (854), Nyanza (442), North Eastern (57)
and the Rift Valley Province (excluding Narok and Kajiado) (19,475 especially Laikipia (10,116),
Nakuru (4,540), Tranz Nzoia (2,185) and Uasin Gishu (1,349) districts. As compared to the 1969
figures the relatively largest increases occurred in Nairobi ('69: 970), Coast Province ('69: 439
Mombasa-effect?), Eastern Province ('69: 258) and the Rift Valley district of Laikipia ('69: 1,125
Ndorobo effect?).
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For the year 2010 densities for Kajiado District are expected to rise to 19
persons/km2. Projections for neighbouring districts are: Narok (35 p/km2),
Machakos (194 p/km2), Nakuru (243 p/km2) and Kiambu (755 p/km2) (see
Ecosystems 1982:39).
Table 4.10 shows us the structure of the Kajiado District population and its
pyramid-like shape, having a very young population. Indeed for 1979 the group
of 0-19 year of age made up 89,240 people or 59.9 per cent of the Kajiado
District population. Their number is expected to have risen to 160,199 people
or 63.1 per cent by 1989.
The 5-14 years age-cohort totalled 44,132 by 1979 and is expected to rise to
76,732 by 1989. The active population cohort (15-59 years of age) is projected
to have changed from 68,800 to 111,885 by 1989. The group of retired people
above 60 years of age is predicted to grow only modestly from 6,560 to
probably 7,990 Kajiado District inhabitants. This means that major efforts must
be devoted to provision of schooling facilities and employment opportunities.




































































































































source: KOK/UB» lysi; KOK/UJS
4.3.3 Education
The 1979 census revealed that in Kajiado District 62 per cent of the 5-75+ age
group had never attended school. For men this figure was 54 per cent and for
women even as high as 70 per cent. This situation placed Kajiado in the group
• sa
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of Kenyan districts having the lowest rates of literacy (21-39 per cent).18
By the end of the 1980s enrolment rates in primary (65 per cent) and even
more in secondary school (18 per cent) are still rather low. School attendance
by girls is particularly poor. Approximately 57 per cent of the girls as against
some 74 per cent of the boys in the district were attending a primary school by
the end of the 1980s. In the past this ratio had been even more distorted (see
table 4.11).
Table 4.11 The Expansion of Primary Education in Kajiado District 1927-88























































Source:" Beecher et al. W9; KDAK 1927,194«, ia>V. 1969, 1974; Uorharn 19VV: JJsniwam et al!'
1988; Seitah nd; RoK/MEO 1988
* excluding two missionary schools with an unknown number of pupils located in Ngong.
Table 4.11 also shows that over the years school attendance has increased. It is
important to realize, however, that higher rates of school attendance among
groups of non-Maasai are partly responsible for this development. In the past
most schools were located in the small towns and rural centres, where the
Maasai were outnumbered by non-Maasai. For example, out of the 6,363
people making up the 1962 Kajiado District 'urban' population only 510 were
Maasai (see RoK 1966:170-74). Secondly, an unknown number of the Kajiado
young people (Maasai and non-Maasai from Ngong in particular) are attending
schools in Nairobi (see Seitah nd:4).
After independence, éducation became the responsibility of the local County
Council which included taking over the staffing and equipping of mission-run
schools as well as several non-African primary schools which existed in the
townships (see Gorham 1977:11). From 1970 onwards éducation in Kajiado
District was handed over to the Central Government. By 1987, of a total
number of 145 primary schools in the district 127 (88 per cent) were run by
churches, while only 17 schools belonged to the District Education Board and
Neighbouring districts are in group l mainly (Kiambu, Taita 60-68 per cent literacy),
group 2 (Machakos 50-59 per cent), group 3 (Nakuru 40-49 per cent), group 4 (Narok 21-39 per
cent) (see Abduba 1988:13). By the early 1980s about 28.8 per cent of the Kikuyu spoke English,
23.4 per cent of the Karriba, while only 2.0 per cent of the Maasai (see DN 18/11/81).
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one to the Magadi Soda Company.19
A Presidential Decree at the end of 1973 to make the first four years of
primaiy éducation free increased total primary enrolment rates by 50 per cent
(see Gorham 1977:24). The result was sévère overcrowding in the schools and
a lack of trained, and sometimes motivated, teachers. This last problem is
becoming even more urgent at the present time. By 1983 the district had 620
trained and 283 untrained teachers in the primary schools, resulting in a
pupil/teacher ratio of 34. By 1988 the number of teachers has risen to 1,194 of
which 692 were trained and 502 untrained teachers. This is a decrease in the
relative number of Irained teachers front 69 to 58 per cent over the 1983-88
period. The pupil/teacher ratio dropped to 31 (see KDDP 1988:239).
Education in Kajiado District also suffers from a high percentage of drop-
outs. In times of drought or after the raising of school fees the Maasai children
often leave school. In Maasai society there is also much résistance to (female)
éducation for a number of reasons: housework has to be done, parents fear
corrupting influences including prostitution when girls stay far away at an
(urban) boarding school and marriage which occurs at young age (13-15 year).
So, it is particularly girls who are among the group of unfinished
schoolleavers.20 Those at school do not seldom lack basic writing materials,
text books, tables and chairs (see Eshiwani et al. 1988:30).
Table 4.12 Kajiado District KCPE Score 1985-89





























aource: Esniwani et al. lyxif.'lo; otafl3ar<rzy/f2«y
* higher score due to introduction of a new subject (max score now 700 points instead of 600).
In the light of the above pictured situation it will be litüe wonder that Kajiado
District primary school performance rate in the national examinations over the
years has been disappointingly low. Kajiado standard eight pupils scored far
below the national average in the Kenya Certificate of Primary Education tests,
with Maasai pupils' results below those of non-Maasai. The highest position
Church sponsorship is usually small. The majority of the school income is realised from
the parents harambee contribution (see Seitah nd:5).
20 In 1988 Kajiado District there were 135 nursery (pre-primary) schools having 6,675 pupils
(3389 boys and 3,086 girls). This illustrâtes the higher participation rates of girls at a young age.
In chapter 6 more attention will be paid to factors infiuencing schooi attendance in Kajiado
District.
«A-
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out of 45 éducation districts was reached in 1981 (place 30). By 1989, there
seemed to be a widening gap between Kajiado and other districts (see table
4.12). As a conséquence, the number of Kajiado (Maasai) students allowed to
continue for (Government) secondary schools is minimal.
In 1965 the first secondary school was opened in Kajiado District. By 1980
twelve had been established rising to 21 secondary schools, mosüy in Ngong
Division, by 1988 (see table 4.13). These secondary schools are either run by
the Government (8), harambee (6), private (5) or a church (l).21 In earlier
days every Kajiado District secondary Student had to leave for another part of
the country. This practice still occurs. It should be realized that in Ngong most
of the students in private secondary schools are from outside the district. It is
estimated that some 30 per cent of secondary school pupils are Maasai.
Table 4.13 Kajiado District Secondary Schools, 1987

















Kajiado District 21 3,768 18
Source: KDDF 1»88:'.Ö7
* excluding number of students for one of the nine Ngong schools.
Mention should also be made of four Youth Polytechnics present in Kajiado
District (Isinya, Oltiasika, Entasopia and Meto). These are all run by the
Presbyterian Church of East Africa (PCEA). In 1988 seventeen courses (in the
fïelds of carpentry, weiding, agriculture, veterinary care, etc.) were offered for
181 students, 90 per cent being non-Maasai.
Whereas by the late 1970s the literacy rate of the Kajiado population from
the age of five was estimated to be some 38 per cent, the percentage of literate
adults in the district is thought to be as low as 12 per cent (see KDDP
1988:45). In an attempt to raise these low standards adult éducation classes are
available, given by 99 teachers (mostiy part-timers). Churches are also very
active in this respect. Training concentrâtes mainly on Kiswahili, mathematics
and agricultural issues. Attendance, however, is rather low (1,204 women and
514 men in 1987) and increasingly falling as compared to 1980 (1,751 women
and 1,432 men). As Abduba (1988:11) shows this trend is nationwide (404,709
in 1980 to 158,887 in 1987), and probably caused by a weakening impact of
the 1979 newly created adult éducation campaign. Also higher enrôlaient by
Harambee is the Swahili word for 'let us unité'. The idea, propagated by Kenya's first
president Mzee Kenyatta, is that people themselves take the initiative and collect funds for a
school, dispensary and the like (see Maas 1986:21-22).
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women is a uniform picture. Approximately 66 per cent of the students are
Maasai (see Kantai 1989b:17). Kantai's study also revealed that besides the
problems mentioned above for primary schools, adult éducation suffers from
(old) men not liking to be taught by younger (female) teachers and from the
absence of ilmurran during ceremonies.22
4.3.4 Health Sector
Major diseases affecting the Kajiado District human population are said to be
respiratory diseases (27.1 per cent of sicknesses), malaria (26.1 per cent),
diarrhoea (7.1 per cent), skin diseases (6.6 per cent) and eye-infections (5.3 per
cent) (see KDDP 1988:221). These figures refer to the 1986 number of
reported diseases. Kajiado District figures provided by the Nomadic Health
Unit of the African Médical and Research Foundation (AMREF) for 1988
show a similar picture, with acute upper respiratory infections (11,221 recorded
treatments), eye disorders (520 cases) and skin diseases (scabies 482, ascariasis
256) prevailing (see AMREF 1989:59-66). In addition, AMREF mentioned
malnutrition (516 cases) as an important condition but recorded less malaria
(164 cases only as against 56,920 for 1986). This is due to the fact that both
'diseases' have a highly seasonal occurrence.
Food habits, like the drinking of unboiled milk or the eating of poorly
cooked food and poor sanitation and hygiëne are said to be responsible for a
number of the diseases mentioned above (i.e. especially eye and skin diseases
as well as worms and brucellosis). It is estimated that only some 35 per cent of
Kajiado District households have access to clean water and only 25 per cent
have latrines (see KDDP 1988:221).
4.4 Economy, Employment and Land Use Patteros
The economy of Kajiado District is, in spite of the fast increasing importance
of (irrigated) cultivation, still dominated by the livestock sector. In terms of
people involved as well as land occupied pastoralism and ranching form the
core of the district's economy.
The Kajiado District Development Plan 1989-93 estimated that in 1987
about 81 per cent of the population derived its livelihood from livestock
production, with about 67 per cent of the total District labour force being
involved (see table 4.14). The commercial and cultivation sector in particular
were expected to grow fast in the 1987-1993 period. Let us briefly introducé
the main economie sectors of Kajiado District as they exist today.
Especially in the Loitokitok area ilmurran are said to flood the classes willing to leam
Kiswahili and mathematics mainly because of their involvemem in the trade of livestock (see
Kantai 1989b:8).
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Table 4.14 Kajiado District Labour Force
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Note: "Rest of Wage employment" is a residual after subtracting public sector employaient from
aggregate data. Pastoralists are also calculated on a residual basis! Self-employmeiU and unpaid
family labour is based on licenses issued by the District Trade Office, The Kajiado Urban Council,
and the Olkejuado County Council. Note that the 1993 total labour force figure does not match
with the sum of 130,027 workers.
4.4.1 The Livestock Sector
Livestock keeping is the economie backbone of the district. In the past the
prédominant System was one of a nomadic pastoralism whereby the people and
their herds spent within grazing distance of permanent water areas during the
dry season, while spreading out during the wet season to take advantage of
pastures that were otherwise unavailable. Since the early 1960s the mobiüty of
human beings has become less as people are increasingly settling more
permanently either freely or by being forced to due to the loss of dry season
pastures.
In the foregoing pages some information concerning the livestock sector of
Kajiado District has already been provided (see section 3.4). For example, table
3,3 and 3.4 gave numbers of the district's livestock as well as human pastoral
population for 1969, 1977 and 1988. By way of aerial counts it was estirnated
that by 1988 a total of 475,800 cattle and 639,000 shoats (i.e. 395,900 TLU)
roamed Kajiado District. Thèse were appraised to be in the hands of some
124,100 pastoralists, meaning an average livestock ownership of 3.19
TLU/capita.
The latest livestock census conducted in Kajiado District by early 1988
reached a total of 633,338 catüe, 500,430 sheep, 466,505 goats, 17,304
donkeys, 19 camels, 82,251 chickens, 2,143 pigs, 2,245 rabbits and 1,157
beehives. This is equivalent to a total livestock population of 515,633 SU.
Table 4.15 provides an overview of livestock numbers and thé stocking rate on
a divisional level. In terms of stock units (SU), it is clear that cattle are the
most important, making up to 73.2 per cent of the Kajiado District livestock
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population. Sheep and goats exist in more or less equal numbers.23








































































37,430 78,781 63,351 2,355 0
(6%) (16%) (14%) (14%) (0%)
756 O O 5
(1%) (0%) (0%) (0.2%)
Kajiado District 633,338 500,430 466,505 17309
2,210,600 ha
Source: MoLli 1988:51-54
19 82,257 2,245 2,145 1,957
The information presented in table 4.16 also highlights the différences between
divisions with Ngong and Magadi Division representing two extremes. The
former has a much more diversified livestock population than the latter
reflecting agro-climatic as well as sociological différences as the large présence
of non-Maasai in Ngong Division is mainly responsible for the bulk of poultry,
pigs, rabbits and beehives found here. Likewise dairy cattle can mainly be
observed in the Ngong and Loitokitok Division and some parts of Central
Division (see KDDP 1988-.98).24 The animais reared for commercial milk
production, besides a few pure exotic breeds like Friesians, are mainly cross
breeds of Sahiwals with the indigenous small East African Zebus. The latter
still make up some 60 per cent of the Maasai herds (see KDDP 1988:98).
In genera! the high percentage of female cattle represent a doublé purpose
characteristic of nomadic pastoralism geared at subsistence and selfsufficiency:
milk production for domestic consumption and a high rate of reproduction.
23 In the past, however, the importance of smallstock was said to have been minimal. Only a
few households kept smallstock. With the exception of the Loitokitok Division, maybe, the
importance of sheep and goats has increased significantly over the last decades. Smallstock is
mainly used for home slaughter.
24 At present the marketing of milk is constrained by a lack of marketing infrastructure.
There are only two milk co-operatives in the district (Ngong and Kajiado Town). Also a lack of
storage and cooling equipment is a setback. Direct miik deü'very trom producers to consumera is
mainly undertaken near small centres dominated by non-Maasai.
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Table 4.16 Kajiado District Livestock Units, 1988
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Cattle Sheep Goats Donkeys
Figure 4.8 Distribution of Stock Units by Division and Type of Animal
Source MoLD 1988
Comparing the average 58.5 percentage of mature female cattle in thé Kajiado
District herds with figures of the past seems to suggest that thé rate of
commercialization by way of a meat-oriented livestock production is still
modest (see table 4.17). In thé latter case the percentage of steers for fattening
in the producer's herd is very high.
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The marketing of livestock is an important mechanism for thé Maasai
pastoralists acquiring cash which, in turn, is used to buy goods and services
ranging from food, clothing, médication and schooling to thé purchase of
(upgraded) breeding stock and livestock production inputs (e.g. acaracides, sait,
veterinary drugs). Outbreaks of diseases or periods of drought will force thé
pastoralists to seil. Shortly after a period of distress, herders need to rebuild
their herds and flocks and are not willing to market their animais. As a result
pastoral livestock offtake rates fluctuate widely over time. Official livestock
offtake figures for Kajiado District are présentée in table 4.18.

































































In section 3.4 référence has already been made to "normal" traditional herd
offtake figures of 10 per cent as compared to some 25 per cent for commercial
ranchers White and Meadows estimated normal Maasai cattle offtake rates of
17 per cent during thé 1960s and 1970s, showing extrêmes of up to 38.3 per
cent (249,866 cattle) and as low as 10.0 per cent (20,955) for thé 1975/76
drought and 1962/63 post-drought periods. ILCA found livestock net offtake
figures of 9-14 per cent. Commercial selling comprised some 64-75 per cent.
Other, often neglected, grounds for extracting animais from one's herd were
exchange (5-12 per cent), gifts (12 per cent) and home slaughter (12 per cent)
(see Bekure et al. 1987:315). Kajiado District's livestock marketing System
functions by a chain of intermediate selling places, stock traders and livestock
trekkers.25
Unfortunately, as highlighted in box 4.5, thé livestock marketing
infrastructure in Kajiado District is poorly developed. Evangelou (1984:9),
however, estimated that two-thirds of the beef, mutton and goat méat
consumed in Nairobi cornes from Maasailand (i.e Narok and Kajiado District).
25 As menuoned in section 34 range conditions and an increase in cash demand were found
to be major déterminants for cattle sales Not surpnsiflgly then that poor households are
charactenzed by higher offtake rates than are wealthy families
148 Selling Wealth to Buy Poverty
Box 4.5 Kajiado District Livestock Markets
Within Kajiado District livestock is markctcd at 13 centres scattered over tbe district, though a high
can be found in the north western part of the district in the Ngong région (Emali,
Kajiado, Kibiko, Kisamis, Kiscrian, Kitengela, Mbirikani, Mile 46, Namanga,
and Rombo). Ongata Rongai, situated along the Nairobi-Mombasa road bordering
(on a weekly base) the most important market of Kajiado District. It bas two
and over 20 butcheries.
s Psurvey conductcd by AS AL at the end of 1988 in 10 operative livestock markets revealed that
ffter correcting for différences in marketing days approximately 1,078 head of cattle were officially
aatjketed in these centres per week. Of these 56 per cent were steers, 13 per cent bulls, 25 per cent
fëmale cattle and 6 per cent calves.
"Livestock priées differ per market centre (the closer to the final buyer the higher), (season of the)
.year, and différences per animais in tenns of sex, type and physical appearance. In genera! healthy,
exoüc, mature bulls or productive females will be most expensive, while old, sick, weak and local
ïlebu. will go for very low priées. Average market priées for slaughter stock were Ksh. 2,1551-, Ksh.
"- and Ksh. 2.129/- for steers, bulls and females. Calves for rearing were bought at Ksh. 971/-.
Small stock sales totalled some 755 a week. Kiserian and Namanga are the most important small
stock markets. Mean buying priées were Ksh. 298A, 273/-, 314/- and 319/- for a male goat (62 per
gênor fëmale goat (17 per cent), male sneep (16 per cent) and fëmale sheep (5 per cent),
respeclively.
-The operating days of the Kajiado District livestock markets vary from one to six days a week.
Sometimes, as a result of outbreaks of disease market centres are closed for an unknown period
altogether. Two types of markets can be disünguished: intermediate or terminate. In the fust market
thgjrjimals after being sold (large stock mosüy) are transported live to other markets. In the latter
jjiase^ thé animais are finally slaughtered in a nearby slaughterhouse. The meat is either consumed
toÇally or transferred to other places (Nairobi mostly). The market centres in Kajiado District act as
3 kind of chain through which roughly speaking, livestock is transported from the inner parts of the
district towards the local, Nairobi or Mombasa consumer, to Macnakos District or to local
pastoralists for rearing purposes. The main buyers are local butchers, livestock rearers and traders
(Kamba, Kikuyu mostly as well as some Maasai and Luo). Three main types of livestock traders
can be disnnguished:
l#a"first group of livestock traders buys to order for butchers or restaurants in Nairobi or other
ions.
a second group acts as middleman between the initial seller and the ulümate buyer. They buy at
'* '": bom or intermediate market (e.g. Emali) and seil at a higher priée at a terminate market
located near the final destination (e.g. Ongata Rongai located near Nairobi). Between the original
j|!w«ia and the final buyer an animal may have changed hands 2-6 times. This change of
- ownership in most cases takes place outside the official market channel simply along the
: trekking routes.
~*=a~ihird group of livestock traders represent« those people involved in spéculation. They buy and
" dl in the same centre a few days later. In this way they try to make a small profit.
„^ f centres are also visited by people willing to buy hvestock for improving and rebuilding their
own herd or for rearing purposes. Calves, young steers and emaciated females are used in this latter
respect, when after fattening they are sold to fetcb a higher priée. Emali market is the leading
centre for purcbasing rearing animais in the district.
"»£-«• transport is the main method of getting animais to market Though cheaper than motorized
it is time-consuming and reduces the animal's weigbt and as a conséquence ils priée.
m routes are more or less fixed. After payment of a trekking fee permits are issued by
Kajiado County Council allowing transpon of the animais along Üie route. In order to avoid this
animais are illegally moved by night someümes. In genera! these trekkers, Maasai mainly,
charge a certain priée (e.g. up to Ksh. 700/- for the Namanga-Nairobi route lasting 3 days).
costs have to be paid for slaughtering, totalling some Ksh. 60/- to Ksh. 75/- for large
Ksh. 20/- to Ksh. 30/- for small stock at the time of late 1988. In other words traders bave to
*ïbsts involving transport, fees and buying priées in relation to their revenues composed of the
priées of the animal as well as the selling of the skin, head, hoofs and intestines. Meat
per kg were Ksh. 27/- or Ksh. 28/- for large stock and Ksh. 28/- to Ksh. 30/- for
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It should be realized that actual offtake estimâtes for Kajiado District are hard
to détermine because of a not insignificant number of cattle illegally imported
from Tanzanian Maasailand,26 It would seem reasonable to conclude that
overall Maasai herd offtake rates are not as low as often suggested.
The Ministry of Livestock Development estimated that about 58 per cent of all
hides and skins in 1988 had been smuggled from Tanzania (see table 4.19). In
chapter 2 we saw that the export of hides and skins was the most important
revenue earner of the Kenyan livestock sector (Ksh. 271.7 million for 1989).
Kajiado hide & skin traders earned over Ksh. 25.2 million in 1989 (see
MoLD/AR 1989:10). Average hide priées ranged from Ksh. 20/- to 40/- per kg
depending on the quality. Small stock skins sold at between Ksh. 10/- and 40/-
a pièce.

































aource: KJJur 1988:109; MoLUTAR 1989:8
Mention should also be made of the production and marketing of milk.
Commercial dairy cattle are to be found mainly in small Stretches of high
potential areas of Ngong and Loitokitok Division. Otherwise the majority of
the cows are local less productive Zebu. The Kajiado Ministry of Livestock
Department estimated a total production of 99 million Utres of milk for 1988,
of which only some 2 million litres were officially marketed. In other words, a
mean daily production of some 271,000 litres by 264,609 cows suggests an
average of one litre per adult fëmale head of cattle. Actual daily production
will be somewhat higher as the period of lactation is approximately 300 days.
Production during the wet season will be higher than in the dry season. Maasai
management also influences milk availability for human consumption by
regulating the time calves are allowed to suckle.
Commercial milk production of some importance is currently concentrated
in the high-potential zones of the district. Near urban centres like Kajiado
Town, Namanga, Bissel and the like some ranchers also seil to the local
population or to a co-operative. In the rest of the district surplus production is
26,Caule smuggling from Tanzania mainly follows the Namanga-Bissel or Meto-Bissel stock
routes finally ending in Emali or the Nairobi neighbouring markets of Ongata Rongai, Kibiko and
Dagoretti. Aiusha or Kisonko Maasai from Tanzania act as partners for their Kenyan counterparts.
Major setbacks for local producers are the importation of diseases, and low(er) Hvestock priées.
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restricted to the wet season mainly and still subsistence oriented. A major
factor hindering commercial milk production is the lack of a good marketing
system and the absence of an adequate number of milk coolers.27
Finally, in 1988 some 2.54 million eggs, 17,612 chickens and 10 tons of
honey were officially sold. While eggs and honey sales almost doubled as
comparée to 1984 the sale of chickens has decreased from some 30,000. Again
most of this produce resulted from Ngong and to a lesser extent Loitokitok
Division.
With regard to livestock production and the land tenure system Kajiado District
faces a very turbulent phase. Group ranches formed from the 1960s onwards in
most parts of the district are now in a process of subdivision. This will resuit
in an enormous increase in the number and land covered by individually
owned ranches. Before subdivision small individual holdings already existed,
especially in the Ngong and Loitokitok Divisions, as a result of land
consolidation and the selling out to non-Maasai. Large individual ranches
mosfly owned by Maasai covering between 300 to 800 ha can be found
concentrated along both sides of the Namanga - Kajiado main road; near
Konza; north of Poka (subdivided) group ranch; east of Elang'ata Wuas group
ranch; near Kimana; north of Olkiramatian group ranch; west of Kitengela and
otherwise in small pockets scattered all over the district (see figure 4.9).
4.4.2 The Agricultural Sector
Though Kajiado District's economy is dominated by livestock production, the
importance of cultivation in terms of land occupation and, even more
profoundly, by the number of producers involved is increasing rapidly.
The Kajiado District 1988 Farm Census counted a total of 7,846 farming
households (59,700 people) holding a total area of some 46,841 ha. It should
be noted, however, that some farmers, Maasai mainly, mentioned large chunks
of land owned, with only a small part being arable or cultivated. The actual
area under cultivation was therefore 13,823 ha (0.7 per cent of district surface)
with only some 34,444 ha (1.7 per cent) considered arable (see table 4.20).
In section 4.1 we concluded that Kajiado District's agricultural potential is
Limited. This is more due to the unfavourable rainfall/temperature situation and
physical impediments such as steep slopes, extreme rockiness, salinity and
sodicity than to actual soil fertility.
According to the Kajiado District Mimstry of Livestock Development 1989 annual report
two daiiy co-operative societies are operative in the district (i.e. Oloolaiser in Ngong and
Olkejuado in Kajiado Town. A ihird one called Kule was formed in Kitengela in 1989. Like
Oloolaiser it received a new milk cooler of 1,200 litres capacity. In total 891,235 litres of milk
were delivered to the dairy co-operaüves (Ngong mainly: 809,049 litres) as compared to 489,322
litres for 1988. Milk was either sold locally or to the KCC or used to make cheese (see MoLD/AR
1989:11) (see also section 10.5.3).
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Table 4.20 Kajiado District Farmer' Household Size Related to Possessed,








































































source: autnors dérivation based on raw data Kajiado Uistnct farm Census 19s»
Note: HS= household size; LH= Land holding; LA= Land arable; LC= Land culivated.
According to Ecosystems (1982:9) a maximum of 4 per cent of the district's
surface is located in agro-climatic zone IV having soils with an unimpeded
high-fertility. Some 13 per cent of these good soils are located in zone V. For
médium-fertile soils these figures are 2 and 14 per cent, respectively. In other
words, at best some 33 per cent of the district's surface has some potential for
agriculture, though with a variable need for increasing soil fertility or provision
of water. This suggests that by 1990 the total cultivated area is still a fraction
of its potential.
For 1980, Campbell (1979a:7) estimated a total Kajiado District farming
population of 31,779 people and 4,965 farms covering 17,378 ha. His
prédictions for the year 2000, based on a 3.3 per cent growth rate, were 60,834
people, 9,505 farms and 33,268 ha cultivated. With regard to the number of
farmers at least Campbell's prédictions are probably conservative, especially
considering the fact that the 1988 Farm Census did not cover some newly
opened farming zones. Table 4.21 présents the variation in size of landholdings
for each of Kajiado District's divisions, the area considered arable and the
actually cultivated territory.
Over 53 per cent of all farmers cultivated a total tract of land of less than
one hectare. As expected, the irrigating farmers cultivated small plots. An
exception should be made for the Magadi région, however, where land
holdings show a less biased distribution. When taking into account the
ethnicity of the farmers a pattern émerges of Maasai landowners having large
plots, while non-Maasai were over-represented in the 0-1 ha plots (see note
table 4.21).
This présence and continuing influx of non-Maasai into Kajiado District
made Ecosystems (1982) postulate a much faster growth of the cultivated area
in the district. Indeed of all farming households only some 27 per cent are of
Maasai origin. Kikuyu cultivators make up almost half of all Kajiado District
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Table 4.22 Ethnicity and Tenurial Status Kajiado District Farmers (% of all)

























Total 61.0 36.2 0.8 2.0 100.0
Source: auuiors dérivation oasea on raw data Kajiaao Uistnctrarm Lensus Ivss
Note: figures have been adjusted for non-response and unknown categones.
Land tenure airangements show that in majority land is owned (61.0 per cent)
or rented (36.2 per cent).28 The favourable position of Maasai farmers and to
a lesser extent of Kikuyu cultivators is also shown.
Différences also exist among the group of cultivators in objectives of
production. Table 4.23 clarifies that overall subsistence production, either
solely or in combination with a market-orientation, prevails in the district. A
mere 7.8 per cent of the farmers, Maasai mainly, claimed to practise
commercial cultivation without producing for their own subsistence.
The non-Maasai cultivators can mainly be found in the high-potential areas
of Ngong and Loitokitok divisions. Kikuyu farmers, in particular, dominate
these régions. In the most lucrative, irrigated régions of Loitokitok and Magadi
Division, the Maasai are still the most important ethnie group present (see also
section 7.5.1 for more details). Table 4.24 also Highlights the variation in the
object of production over the divisions. Irrespective of the ethnicity of the
farmer, production in Ngong and Central divisions is geared at subsistence
level.
The Loitokitok and Magadi areas are populated by cultivators interested also in
additional commercial agriculture. In total the Kajiado District 1988 Farm
Census counted 55 different erop types cultivated by Kajiado farmers. Maize
and beans are the most important crops grown. Farmers practising rainfed
agriculture restrict themselves to these crops either in pure or in intercropped
stands. The Census revealed that at least in one out of three seasons
(April/May 1987, November/December 1987 and April/May 1988) 79 and 78
per cent of all Kajiado District farmers grew maize and beans, respectively.
This was followed by tomatoes (14 per cent), irish potatoes (11 per cent),
onions (9 per cent) and bananas (4 per cent).
Shatecropping ("Kampum") is the most dominant land tenure arrangement in the Namelok
irrigated scheme. In genera! the Maasai landlord provides land, water, seeds, Chemicals and
fertilizer, wlnle the sharecropper contnbutes his labour for irrigation, maintenance, weeding,
spraying and guarding. Both are involved in harvesong and marketing. After selling of the produce
thé revenue is divided equally after subtraction of the input costs.
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Table 4.25 shows thé estimated production and consumption of major crops by
Kajiado District setüed agriculturalists. In ternis of district needs these farmers
(excluding those households that practised some additional cultivation in
addition to livestock keeping) were even able to produce surpluses over total
district demands in 1987 with thé exception of potatoes. The total surplus of
agricultural production was estimated at K£ 1,200,560 (see KDDP 1988:51).
As with différences in thé objecte of production and the f armer's ethnicity thé
divisions show spécifie characteristics with regard to crops cultivated. It is the
Loitokitok area in particular where approximately 80 per cent of food crops are
produced. Least involved in crop production is Central Division, although
cultivation of crops (maize, beans, tomatoes) in this division is on thé increase.
However, Central Division farmers often face crop failure while, for thé same
season Ngong, Loitokitok and Magadi claim success (see MoA/AR 1985:17).
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In the irrigated areas in particular horticultural crops (e.g tomatoes, onions),
"Asian vegetables" (e.g okra, chillies) and fruits (e.g melons, mangos, oranges)
are grown in addition to maize and beans. In Ngong tomato growing is more
important than in Loitokitok, where the cultivation of onions and Asian
vegetables is concentrated. Magadi Division is famous for ils mangos, oranges
and other fruits.
The growing of industrial crops such as coffee, pyrethrum and cotton has
followed a pattern of rise and décline throughout the years. Overall, production
was on a modest scale due to quota régulations, low profitability and a lack of
processing facilities. Pyrethrum is an exclusively Ngong grown erop. Cotton is
mainly grown in Rombo and Kimana and some in Nguruman. As a result of
the rise of onion cultivation cotton farming has decreased. Coffee was uprooted
in the late 1970s in Ngong leaving Loitokitok as the most important coffee
farming location.
Table 4.26 summarises particulars of the Kajiado District's most important
irrigation schemes. With the exception of Nguruman all of these schemes are
located in Loitokitok Division. It should be noted that the acreages presented
are official figures which are lower than the totals found in the 1988 Farm
Census survey. In contrast, the latter survey counted less farmers. In any case,
Loitokitok Division has the 3rd highest concentration of irrigation activities, in
terms of hectares cropped as well as in terms of number of plot-holders within
Kenya after Mwea Division (5,818 ha) in Kirinyaga District and Bura Division
(2,454 ha) in Tana River District (see Statistical Abstract 1990:112).
Water sources for irrigation are springs or connected rivers. A System of
main and srnall trenches leads, by way of gravity, to individual plots which are
either flat or filled with small ridges. Temporary weirs of timber, stones or
mud are applied to regulate thé flooding of thé fields. Irrigation of a plot takes
about 2-4 hours every 7-16 days. Irrigation in Loitokitok was starled as an
autonomous process. In contrast to other irrigation schemes (e.g. Bura) no
fînancial subsidies have ever been received from the Government. Lacking on-
river water storage facilities irrigation is directly dépendant on spring yields.
In genera! there is a 30 per cent variation in water yield, which could
increase with progressive dégradation of water catchment areas. Irrigation in
Nguruman is said to have a huge potential. lts area has increased from 6 ha in
the 1960s to approximately 175 ha by 1987. Potential areas for the extension
of irrigated agriculture are said to be Kitengela in Central Division, Euaso
Kedong' in Ngong Division and Inkisanchani, Illasit/Olkaria and Elang'ata -
Enkima/Oloorika in Loitokitok Division (see MoA/AR 1987:22).
According to Kimani (1988:5/23) 90 per cent of the Loitokitok produce is
%ought to be destined for Mombasa some 300-400 km away, while the
(fesion accounts for 70 per cent of the turn-over of the Mombasa wholesale
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Asian vegetables, mainly grown in Rombo, are destined for the export market
"(e.g. EEC countries). A major problem for the farmers are high transport costs
from poorly maintained roads in thé district and high rents for thé
tting of boxes supplied by thé Mombasa-based brokers.29 A drop in market
frequentiy leads to a loss to the farmer, especially for tomatoes. Nearby
tairobi is the most important market for the Ngong farmers.
Other Economie Activities
*Beside livestock and cultivation exploitation of minéral resources and tourism
aie the most important activities in thé district, both from an économie as from
a land use point of view (see figure 4.9).
Most obvious in this respect is the Magadi Soda Company which, in 1911,
wasfgranted a 99 year lease concession in thé Magadi Division of some 900
Kin2 comprising the waters of Lake Magadi and its surroundings. The Magadi
Soda Company is Kenya's oldest chemical industrial concern and one of its
largest.30 Lake Magadi contains a virtually inexhaustible supply of crude
soda.31 Soda ash (sodium carbonate) is mainly used for thé production of
glass. Other applications are in thé manufacturing of soap, oil refïning and thé
paper industry.
At the time of Independence thé Magadi Soda Company produced some
140,000 tons of soda ash a year and contributed £ 1.5 million annually to
The Loitokitok-Emali road is the worst main road I have seen in the whole of Kenya. It
• tôokjône burnpy and dusty hout to do a mere 15 km. Recenüy, road improvement has started
whichscoutd possibly increase the profitability of horticultural production in the Loitokitok
, Division. In 1987, ASAL-Kajiado Programme supported Öie start of the 'Loitokitok Horticultural
Parmèîs Association' with a Ksh. 50.000/- gram. However, suspicion among members of the co-
«peradve resulted in the collapse of the LHFA. Brokers moved in again to continue their
explopig practices. In 1991, ASAL promised to help revive the co-operative by putting up a
••'buyujfshed and through the provision of carpentry tools for tomato-box production (see Kajiado
Focu|il991a:7). Both improvements could possibly result in the extension of the irrigated area.
d0 initially the flrst Magadi Company went bankrupt in 1923, due to the effects of World
War-T as well as to compétition from manufacturers in Europe. By 1926 the Company becarne part
Of 4| Imperia! Chemical Industries Ltd (ICI) today's most important British industrial Company.
Recépty, ICI decided to seil its soda activities to Penrice-Australia for 90 million British pounds
. (see Volkskrant 28/06/91).
1 Lake Magadi is a natura! wonder. It is located in the lowest dépression of the Rift Valley
and is continuously fed by innumerable hot springs with water contaimng two per cent sodium
carbonate and bicarbonate, one per cent sait, and a small proportion of sodium fluoride. High
;tenceratures of up to 40°C and low relative humidity of 25-40% results in an evaporation of 7-8
^ö'mes as high as the annual rainfall. As a result crystals have formed a mort-like mass called Irona
',0f 20 km long and 2-3 km wide, which is so thick that one can easily drive a car over it. The
trona is scrapped and the crude material transported to a manufacturing plant where mainly soda
àsh and sait are produced. Because the lake bas no outlet the increase is far in excess of the
, amounts being removed.
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Kenya's export earnings. Independence, however, eut off its considérable soda
ash exports to South Africa and production feil significantly.32 By the early
1970s, annual production had recovered to 160,000 tons. Over 90 per cent of
production is exported mainly to the Far East (i.e. over 60 per cent is
transported to countries like Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines).
By the early 1980s, production feil to some 147,000 tons of soda ash of
which only 27,000 tons were exported. The Company operated at a loss until
the mid-1980s when an all time record production of 237,650 tons was reached
of which 229,000 tons valued at Ksh. 283 million were exported. This was
equivalent to 1.5 per cent of Kenya's total export earnings. In 1989 207,000
tons were exported valued at Ksh. 442 million equivalent to 2.2 per cent of
Kenya's total export value.
Locally, the Magadi Soda Company provides a source of employaient to
some 700 workers (mainly non-Maasai), both permanent and temporary, by thé
late 1980s. Thèse are settled in flatbuildings erected by thé Company. The
Company has also taken care of its own hospital, school, water provision,
railway, tarmac road, sports facilities, and the like. In addition to local
employment spin-off effects have been created for the Mombasa Port, Kenya
Raüways and local glass industries mainly.
Since the mid-1970s Government officials regularly voiced Kenya's
willingness to acquire a majority share within the Company. Due to a lack of
funds this has never materialized. The Magadi Soda Company pays royalties to
Central Government (Ksh. 20 million by 1981) leaving the local council empty
handed. To offset this situation the OCC repeatedly proposed the introduction
of an annual levy of Ksh. 10/- per acre owned.
Another important mining industry of Kajiado District is the quarring of
marble and limestone. The oldest and most important firm in the district is the
Kenya Marble Quarries (KMQ) located south-west of Kajiado Town along the
Magadi railway. Besides its traditional use for decorating buildings, marble is
used in the shoe, chemical and steel industry, in a variety of products such as
rubber soles, insecticides, paints and stockfeeds.
Another important location where limestone is found is the Kibini quarry in
south Kaputiei which has been exploited for the production of cement by the
Portland Cement Company. The latter's processing factory is located at Athi
River, bordering Kajiado District. The largest marble producing Company of
Kenya and shoe and leather companies using raw materials which come mainly
32 Perhaps the re-opening of South Africa to Kenyan produce will significantly increase
Magadi's export possibihties. By the early 1980s plans had already been presented to doublé the
plant's production capacity to some 500,000 tons annually. In fact Magadi and the USA
(Wyoming) are the only two producers of natural soda ash in the world. By 1989, the world
market for soda ash was in an equihbrium This situation has recently changed as Botswana also
entered this market (Sua Pan-Soda Ash Botswana: 300,000 tons of soda ash and 650,000 tons of
sait is expected to be produced per year). The effect of this is yet to be seen. Compétition from
aluminium, paper and plastics in case of packing material also influences potential exports.
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frora Kajiado District are also located in Athi River. Exports of marble and
estone are mainly to neighbouring countries and the Near East.
»Qther minerais found in greater or lesser quantities in Kajiado District are
jséiatomite, feldspar, wollastonite, garnet, gaylussite, quartzite, meerschaum,
_«ïsand and gypsum. Exploitation of the latter, which is used in the manufacturing
•Af cement, mainly occurs in the Embolioi ranch to the north of Kajiado Town.
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Figure 4.9 Kajiado District Land Use
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As stated before the tourist industry is of major importance for the Kenyan
economy. The tourist industry in Kajiado District is largely the result of the
abundance of wildlife. Most revenue is earned by the Amboseli National Park
which covers some 400 km2 and is served by six lodges and three campsites.
Visitors to Amboseli averaged some 150,000 annually in the period 1984-88 as
compared to a mean number of 85,000 visitors for 1974-78. The number of
tourists in this group of visitors (i.e. excluding local résidents) was
approximately 64 per cent. Amboseli National Park is now Kenya's most
important park. Of all tourists visiting Kenya between 1974-78, not less than
19 per cent of them visited Amboseli. Assuming a similar percentage of
visitors to be tourists we estimated that in the mid-1980s 20 per cent of the
tourists had paid a visit to Amboseli. In fmancial terms it has been estimated
that in 1976 Kajiado District contributed some Ksh. 69 million to the Ksh.
1,288 million earnings from tourism (see UNDP/FAO 1978:10 and Olang
1983:75) (see also section 7.5.2). Nationwide a total of Ksh. 7,000 million has
been earned from tourism by 1989 (see DN 30/11/89). Another tourist
attraction is the Olorgesailie prehistorie site.
Finally, référence should be made to some small scale commercial and
manufacturing activities. The number of licensed businesses increased sharply
from 1,020 in 1983 to 2,264 by 1987. A majority of these trade licenses are
granted out to owners of retailshops (65 per cent), hotels (18 per cent), bars
and restaurants (5 per cent) and butehers (4 per cent). The commercial sector
of Kajiado District's economy is also dominated by non-Maasai.
Lack of capital, insufficient institutional support, poor business skills and an
inadequate infrastructure are said to be among the major constraints inhibiting
faster growth in the manufacturing sector (see KDDP 1988:160-1). At the
moment Kitengela (bordering Athi River), Ngong, Ongata Rongai and Kajiado
Town have the largest concentration of small and medium industries. There are
also open air/HO kali artisans spread throughout the numerous trading centres
in the district. Carpentry, vehicle repair work and tailoring are among the most
important activities in this respect.
4.5 Infrastructure
4.5.1 Urban Areas and the Transport Network
The whole of Kajiado District has a very low Ie vel of urbanization. In 1969
only 3.9 per cent of the total district's population was urbanized and this had
increased to 9.5 per cent by 1979. This significant increase was mainly caused
by the growth of the centres in the Ngong area, due to their proximity to
Nairobi. The rate of urbanization was nevertheless below the 1979 national
average of 15 per cent. Of the 39,402 people living in the urban centres of the
district most were in Ngong (5,564), Kajiado Town (4,896), Magadi (3461),
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Loitokitok (2,877) and Namanga (2,803). Estimâtes for 1988 were 5,795,













Figure 4.10 Kajiado District Topographie Map
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Post offices and téléphone services are only available in these towns. Most of
the towns mentioned, besides having an administrative fonction as divisional
headquarters, serve as market centres. By the late 1980s three commercial
banks were operating in Kajiado, Loitokitok and Ngong towns. The first one
had not starled before 1979. Other fast growing centres or those expected to do
so in thé near future are lUasit (2,221 people), Kitengela (2,080), Sultan
Hamud (1,523), Isinya (472), Bissel (389), Kiserian and Mashuru.
The transport network in thé district is dominated by roads in thé north-
south axis connected to thé main Nairobi-Mombasa road. The main road within
thé district is thé Namanga-Athi River road. This and thé Ngong-Magadi road
are both tarmacked and of good quality. The roads in Loitokitok division to
Amboseli National Park and thé Loitokitok-Emali road are in poor condition,
though thé latter is being upgraded now. Other roads in Kajiado District are
poorly maintained and this trustâtes and sometimes even prohibits transport in
thé rainy season. The Nairobi-Mombasa raiiway line can be found following
thé motor-highway along Kajiado District's northern border. It is linked to thé
Magadi-Konza line used for transportation of soda ash.
4,5.2 Water Facilities
A major problem in Kajiado District is thé provision of water. In thé larger
areas of the district streams are virtually non-existent. Alternative sources such
as wells and springs mostly dry up in thé dry season. Eastern Ngong and
north-eastern Central Division form the best aquifers in the district The rest of
Ngong, Magadi and eastern Loitokitok have poor groundwater potential.
As from 1927 imtil April 1988 a total of 387 boreholes had been sunk in the
district of which only 139 (36 per cent) are still operative (see Mwangi
1990:115). The average depth at which borehole water was struck is 80 m, but
water at depths of over 250 m was also found (see Ecosystems 1982:13).
Ngong Division especially has a large number of boreholes. The owners are
the Ministry of Water Development (54), other Departments (37), the Kajiado
County Council (37), institutions like schools, companies, hotels (49),
individuals (150) and group ranches (43). Costs involved in drilling and
equipping a borehole are very high (some Ksh. 1.5 million). Sometimes
funding has been obtained from NGOs and international donor agencies.
Government maintained water supplies are to be found in Kajiado, Ngong,
Loitokitok, Namanga, Ongata Rongai, Kiserian, Hlasit and Bissel. AU but
Namanga are unable to meet the demand. A major water provision project
(National Noolturesh Water Project) was starled officially in late September
1987. Italian grants and soft loans for studies and construction totalling Ksh.
948 million were provided to develop the 262 km pipeline project bringing
water from the Noolturesh springs located at the foot of Mt. Kilimanjaro to
Machakos District (Machakos Town and Athi River Town) and back to
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Kajiado Town,33
Technical consultants have warned that the Noolturesh supply will, however,
not be enough for the growing demands of the three towns. Extra sources
should be developed near these towns and the pipeline could be used mainly to
serve the rangelands with a supplementary function for the urban areas. At the
present time the local Maasai will hardly profit if at all from this mega-project.
4,5.3 Electricity and Other Sources of Energy
The Kajiado District infrastructure is poorly developed. Single-phased
electricity reached Kajiado Town only in July 1972. Por industrialization,
however, three-phased power is needed. Confronted with entrepreneurs willing
to invest but not able to do so because of the poor power and water
infrastructure, the County Council repeatedly urged Central Government to
raise standards in these respects. These requests were honoured only by the late
1980s when attempts also began to bring electricity to other towns (e.g.
Loitokitok).
Firewood and charcoal are still the main sources of energy used (over 93
per cent). Wood fuel for cooking and heating is mainly used in thé rural areas,
while charcoal is more used in thé urban régions. Paraffin is mainly used for
lighting and petrol and diesel for stationary engines (e.g. for borehole pumps).
Solar and wind energy are also used occasionally for this purpose. Gas (LPG)
is sometimes used for cooking. Biogas is unknown so far. The demand for all
of these energy forms is expected to rise significantly in thé years to corne.
4.5.4 Social Infrastructure
In the foregoing we have already given some information in respect of
éducation and health facilities. For this reason we will now focus attention on
other welfare related issues. Efforts to raise people's standards of living are
promoted by associations such as women-groups, self-help groups and co-
opérative societies either with or without assistance from churches or (foreign)
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO's).
In Kajiado District the number of women's groups increased from 206 and
11,479 members in 1983 to 388 groups with a total membership of 12,755
(some 20 per cent of the women above 15 years of age) by the end of 1988. A '
survey among 58 Loitokitok women's groups revealed that 93 per cent were
engaged to a greater or lesser extent in agriculture (e.g. farming, stock rearing,
poultry and pig keeping), 60 per cent in some kind of business (e.g. dealing in
Tlie général layout follows thé existing railway pipeline constructed in 1956. The main
principle is to convey water by gravity over a distance of 126 km to a pumping station situated 55
km north west of Sultan Hamud. A second pumping station will raise water sufflciently for it to
gravitate to thé terminal réservoirs (see Mwangi nd:l).
hides & skins, handicrafts, shop keeping, land buying) and only 7 per cent in
home improvement. Approximately half of thèse groups received some
Government assistance.
The growth in thé number of co-operatives was likewise spectacular. From
32 in 1984 they numbered 65 by 1987. Membership rosé from 5,017 to 8,080.
The co-operative movement is most strongly represented in thé marketing
sector of livestock and agricultural products. Savings and crédit societies are
also important. According to thé Kajiado authorities co-operatives in Kajiado
District face major problems as a resuit of a lack of adéquate and suitable
business premises, insufficient capital and thé poor éducation of managers and
members (see KDDP 1988:128).
Self-help or harambee groups are said to hâve increased albeit slowly in thé
district. The idea is that people themselves collect sufficient money and/or
labour for thé construction of a school, dispensary or whatever they feel is
needed in their own location. Often thé Government will pick up such an
initiative and support thé group. Unfortunately misuse of funds and political
manoeuvrings sometimes interfère, frustrating progress and levels of
participation.
Outside help for thé Kajiado District population has been provided in almost
ail fields of development. Church involvement in thé provision of éducation
and most of ail health facilities has already been referred to. A distinction can
be made in organizations actually working in thé area or those who only
provide funds. An organization like AMREF (better known as thé "Flying
Doctors") reçoives funds for its Kajiado activities from all over the world (e.g.
thé USA, Ireland, thé UK, Germany, thé Netherlands) either from national
Governments or from private organizations. In 1968, for instance, Oxfam
financed thé building of the Oltepesi airstrip.
Other major NGO's working in thé district are ICROSS, World Vision
International and churches like thé African Inland Church (AIC), thé
Presbyterian Church of East Africa (PCEA), thé Catholic Diocèse of Ngong
and thé Church of thé Province of Kenya (CPK). The latter opérâtes thé
Maasai Rural Training Centre in Isinya and 6 others in thé district. Thèse are
involved in livestock improvement, irrigated agriculture, literacy campaigns
and thé like. In addition, thé Anglican CPK constructed a waterdam and also
runs four youth polytechnics. The Catholic church is mosüy involved in
éducation in awareness and also the running of a model-farm, a tree nursery
and home for the disabled. Other well-known projects are World Vision's
"Child Survival Project" that between 1982 and 1991 aimed at improving
nutrition, increasing irnmunization, controlling diseases and farnily planning
(see DN 23/09/88). The AIC is mainly involved in sponsoring children and in
the «reatment of disabled young people. Finally, mention should be made of the
"Maasai Action for Self Improvement" project (MASI) starled in 1969 by the
PCEA (Oxfam, USA, Britain and the Netherlands sponsored) near Oloseos.
This project concentrated on the water supply, igloo-like houses, crops and
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i Sometimes direct grants are provided by the national govenunents of other
eountries, as in the case of the Loitokitok hospital and secondary school that
J, -j^j» &Ä in the early 1970s using funds from Austria and the Netherlands,
.* ja^efcfively. The Japanese assisted the Ministry of Water Development and the
; Jfortó Bank provided loans for the Kenya Livestock Development Project
jIjP-ÖP*. l%9-82). The Netherlands provide finances for the Arid and Semi-
s\J"\âirti tands programme (ASAL) started in 1987.
, fNJÉktbe,Mowing chapter we will focus on the late 19th Century arrivai of die
- iSaeans . in the heart of Maasailand. Special attention will be paid to the
by the British colonizers concerning the use and ownership of
he tune of Independence.
CHAPTER 5
PRE-INDEPENDENCE HISTORY OF LAND USE AND
LAND POLICY IN KAJIADO DISTRICT
5.1 Introduction
The following historical account deals with four major periods. Two criteria
have been décisive for arriving at this division; the statutory status of Kenya as
well as Government development policies practised. Attention will be
foremostly directed towards the trends in the use and ownership rights of land
and the land use policy of the Colonial Government in the Maasai area.
FirsUy, we will look at the pre-colonial period until 1895, the year that the
British Government established the East Africa Protectorate, an area more or
less congruent with present-day Kenya east of the Rift Valley. This section
describes the early Maasai history and the arrivai of the Europeans in
Maasailand.
Secondly, we will review the period 1896-1919. We will consider the two
important Maasai Treaties of 1904 and 1911 in detail and the resulting
establishment of the Maasai Reserve which included the present day Kajiado
and Narok Districts. This period is of eminent importance for the
understanding of Kenyan Maasailand and its present-day people. The first part
of this period was one of enormous turbulence while, since the end of World
War I, the Maasai became more and more peripheral in the social and
economie development of Kenya as the Colony officiaüy became in 1920.
Thirdly, we will consider the period 1920-1945 during which the pressure
from outside to enter the Maasai Reserve increased rapidly. During this period
the Kenya Land Commission of 1934 reviewed the Maasai requirements for
land.
Fourthly, we will consider the Kajiado District during the period 1946 to
1963, the year that Kenya gained Independence. This period was dominated by
the increasing concentration of Colonial Government on economie development
in the Maasai area. Efforts were mainly directed towards the introduction of
grazing schemes and the destocking of the pastures. We will also give special
attention to the influx of non-Maasai and the increasing importance of other
forms of land use.
5.2 Pré-Colonial - 1895: The Rise and Fall of Maasai Power
and the Arrivai of the Europeans
Several authors, early travellers, missionaries, anthropologists, historians and
geographers, have contributed to descriptions of the early history of the Maasai
(e.g., Thomson, Krapf, Fosbrooke, Jacobs, Mol, Berntsen, Sorrenson, Tignor
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and Waller). They inform us that little has been known of the Maasai until the
arrivai of the British. Egyptians, Persians, Chinese, Arabs and Portuguese had
established themselves in present-day Kenya from even before our modern era,
but their arrivai was restricted only to the coastal area. Untill the end of the
18th Century the coastal strip and the interior were virtually separate areas.
Maps of Africa dating from the beginning of the 19th Century still leave a big
blank space for the interior of East Africa. Difficulties in solving the puzzle of
Maasai history are exacerbated because the Maasai themselves are said to have
no 'special interest in, nor particularly expert knowledge about, their past'
(Jacobs 1975:22).
In Chapter 4 we already indicated at some of the mythological stories about
their origin and their move southward from the Nile valley in the Uganda-
Sudan borderzone into the Rift Valley probably by 1400 A.D. More detailed
and accurate accounts are available for the early 19th Century. During this
period the Maa speaking people began a period of successive wars among
themselves. The relatively peaceful pastoral Maasai on the one hand and on the
other hand the more aggressive agro-pastoral Maasai (lloikop), who are said to
have starled these wars, clashed over livestock and land, and fought for their
very existence. The first war began around 1810 on the Uasin Gishu plateau,
located in the north of Maasai territory. Two more 'lloikop Wars' were fought
in 1862 and 1873 in the central Mau area and on the Laikipia plateau
respectively. In all of these the pastoral Maasai defeated the lloikop Maasai.
Survivors of the latter group fled towards other neighbouring ethnie groups like
the Nandi and Kipsigis or were absorbed by the former.
Natural disasters started to undermine Maasai power by the early 1880s.
Contagions Bovine Pleuro-Pneumonia, a cattle disease, spread from the north
and lingered for several years. The Maasai lost many head of cattle and
accordingly had difficulties controlling their pastures. The areas incorporated
into pastoral Maasailand after the successful 'lloikop Wars' could no longer be
controlled because of the disparity in manpower between the pastoral Maasai
and the neighbouring groups. 'Kamba, Kikuyu and Kalenjin raiders were
already making inroads into Maasailand (...) encroaching on Maasai grazing
areas. Further to the north west, the Suk [Pokot] and Turkana were pressing
inwards' (Waller 1976:532).
Through the trade caravans, in the hands of Arab and Swahili raerchants,
news from the interior reached the coast. Spurred on by the increased demand
for ivory in the Zanzibar market, these people had pushed into the interior as
early as the 1840s. They had taken over from local groups like the Kamba,
Digo and Segeju (see Berntsen 1979:112). Trade caravans returned with slaves,
ivory and with stories from the interior especially about the ferocity of the
Maasai. Several authors stressed (e.g. von Hohnel, Jacobs) that this 'myth' was
purposely spread by the Arab and Swahili traders in trying to prevent the
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Europeans from taking over their monopoly.1 The 'myth' was further
strengthened by early European observer« who attributed acts of violence
committed by the lloikop Maasai as far as the coastal area, to the pastoral
Maasai,
While the Maasai expansion and hegemony came under the attack of
neighbouring groups, important developments occurred in Europe which were
soon to influence Africa's history as never before. France and Germany began
to catch up with Gréât Britain's industrialisation by the end of the 1870s. An
economie dépression during the beginning of the 1870s had started a period of
economie nationalisai and protectionism. To secure the supply of raw materials
and to open new export markets, the struggle for overseas territory began. This
grasping for colonies occurred under the motto of 'who gets there first'.
In East Africa, Germany and Great Britain were the main competitors. By
the beginning of the 1880s the struggle for the interior started. In the wake of a
few missionaries, adventurers and explorers sent by German and British
Geographical Societies, tried to reach Lake Victoria. Fischer, a German
botanist, managed to reach Lake Naivasha by 1882.2 The first European to
travel through the whole of Maasailand was a young Scottish geologist, Joseph
Thomson, in 1883/84.
In 1891 the Impérial British East Africa Company (IBEAC), founded by a
Scottish shipowner, Sir William Mackinnon 5 years before, obtained
permission from the Sultan of Zanzibar to have a monopoly of trade and other
privileges in the interior of East Africa. The Company was mainly interested in
the exploitation of the fertile and wet area of Uganda and not so much in the
less attractive tract of land stretching from the coast towards Uganda and on
which the feared Maasai and Kamba moved. However, the Company turned out
to be a failure from the start. British capitalists were the most reluctant to
invest in East Africa. The hope of discovering minerais soon dwindled and the
existing trade in ivory was still firmly in the hands of the coastal Swahilis and
Arabs. The unattractiveness of the area was affirmed by the beginning of the
1890s.
Barely recovered from the natural disasters of the 1880s, the Maasai suffered
severely when the Great Rinderpest Epidemie, a hitherto unknown disease in
Sub-Saharan Africa, swept through the whole of East Africa from Ethiopia
The British had already established a post in Mombasa by 1823 and on Zanzibar in 1877.
2 The German missionary Rebmann had opened a station among the Chagga near Mt.
Kilimanjaro as early as 1848. Until the beginning of the 1880s no European had travelled beyond
this point.
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downwards to South Africa, reaching Maasailand by 1891.' It overwhelmed
the Maasai by its rapidity and virulence. Waller reports that the Keekonyokie,
Dalalekutuk and Loita sections lost their herds within only a week to two
months. 'By the end of 1891, most of the cattle were dead or dying and the
Maasai themselves were facing famine' (Waller 1988:77).
This event not only killed most cattle but also triggered off the first and
only war between the pastoral Maasai.4 The War of Morijo, named after the
area of battle soutli of the Loita Hills, was started in 1891 by the Loita Maasai
who raided their Kaputiei and Matapato brothers in order to restore their herds
which had suffered most during the Rinderpest Epidemie. This struggle for
survival will probably also have contributed to the 'myth' of the Maasai being
a very brutal and warlike people. The precarious situation was exacerbated
because of a sévère drought in that same year. Famine was wide-spread and
made people vulnérable to a smallpox epidemie which, in 1892, resulted in the
deaths of thousands. A missionary passing through the area of today's Nairobi
wrote that 'Hundreds of skeletons of Maasai were lying about in all directions.
Deserted kraals were dotted about here and there and around them skins,
broken calabashes and household Utensils' (Tucker cf Mol 1980:7). It is
estimated that nearly all the cattle and over half of the pastoral Maasai died as
a result of this accumulation of disasters (see Leys 1973:111).
Maasai society faced economie and social collapse. Waller describes three
survival stratégies adopted by those Maasai who had been lucky to escape
death; hunting and cultivating as practised by the Maasai in the Loitokitok
area; regrouping and raiding neighbouring il-oshon for livestock as undertaken,
for example, by the Purko and the Ildamat and, thirdly; seeking refuge among
neighbouring agricultural peoples. 'Many Maasai from all sections were
absorbed in this way into Kikuyu, Meru, Arusha, Taveta and Chagga
communities. Often they were used as extra labour in cultivation and herding.
(...) A variant of this strategy was the transference of children as sureties or
debt pawns in return for food' (Waller 1976:534).
The arrivai of missionaries had opened another possibility for shelter which
attracted many Maasai refugees. Matapato and Kaputiei Maasai used another
new option by asking for the protection of the IBEA Company's post at Fort
3 Rinderpest had entered the African continent as early as 1840 through cattle brought into
Egypt as well as in the course of the Nile expédition of 1884-85 (see Mol 1980:7). However, the
dévastation that really affected almost all of Afnca began in Ethiopia due to infected cattle
probably iraported from India through the Italian controlled Red Sea port of Massawa some time
during 1887 (see Pankhurst & Johnson 1988:48/64).
4 Minor clashes have always occurred between pastoral Maasai sections rnainly over the
issues of land and water and are still going on, e.g. between the Kaputiei and Kisonko Maasai in
the Selenkei area of Kajiado District.
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Smith (located just south of Nairobi) in December 1893.5 The Company had
established several of these posts to control their trade routes in the area. The
British Government had granted the Company permission to organise the
administration of the interior of this part of East Africa. The Maasai-Company
alliance turned out to be advantageous for both sides. The latter saw its troops
considerably strengthened, whilst was at the same time being relieved of the
Potential problem of conflict and danger that the Maasai were thought to
embody. The Maasai also gained from this arrangement as they obtained
security as well as the possibility of regenerating their herds. Maasai warriors,
used by the British during punitive expéditions on other ethnie groups like thé
Kikuyu, Nandi and Kamba, were rewarded with one third to one half of the
loot. This alliance continued until 1905.
Also, in another way some of the Maasai gained some advantage from the
co-operation with British officials. Mbatiany, the Maasai oloïboni (ritual
expert), had died in 1890 leaving his succession in dispute between his two
sons Sendeu and Olonana. The two brothers were divided among two rivalling
il-oshon, each giving their ritual blessings and organizational support. The
British misinterpreted the oloiboni's powers. Politica! power among the Maasai
rests with the elders. Instead, Olonana was regarded as the hereditary chief and
given support accordingly in order to gain control over all of the Maasai.
By 1893 it became clear that the British Investors' lack of confidence in the
IBEA Company had been justified. The Company was not able to balance the
costs of keeping control and the difficult and time consuming transportation
from the coast into the interior. The British Government decided to buy out the
IBEA Company. The major driving force behind Britain's eagerness to
establish its power in this région originated from its strategie location, not so
much from economie reasons. 'British interest in East Africa was part of a
global strategy designed to protect British interests in India' (Robinson 1968 cf
Harbeson 1973:7). According to this strategy, control of Egypt was necessary
to maintain access to the Suez canal. Control of Egypt, under threat of France,
in turn justified control of Uganda because the Nile headwaters were situated
there. 'It was thèse considérations more than hopes of commercial gain, that
led Lord Salisbury to partition East Africa with Germany in the agreements of
1886 and 1890, and Lord Roseberry to establish the Uganda Protectorate in
April 1894 and the East Africa Protectorate in June 1895' (Sorrenson 1968:9).
The British-German agreement resulted in drawing a line with a ruler from the
eastern portion of Lake Victoria to the village of Vanga on the coast. The
negotiators broke the line at the base contour of Kilimanjaro and squiggled
round it to give the disputed mountain to Kaiser Wilhelm II as a birthday
present (see Amin 1987:35). Thus Mt. Kilimanjaro was annexed to Tanganyika
5 Fort Smith was closed in 1899 and transferred to the heart of Kikuyu land and renamed
Fon Hall.
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which was under German influence while the area north of the boundary was
given to Wilhelm's aunt, the Empress Victoria of England. The boundary
between the protectorates of Uganda and East Africa was drawn along the Rift
Valley (see figure 5.1).
Chapter 5: Pre-Independence History of Land Use and Land Policy 173
Figure 5.1: Map of East Africa Protectorate 1895
Source: Kajiado District Atlas 1990 (draft)
On June 30th, 1895, the Administration of the area was nanded over from the
Company to the Protectorate authorities. Sir Arthur Hardinge, British Consul
General in Zanzibar became the first Commissioner of the East Africa
Protectorate. The African Protectorate Department of the Foreign Office was
given the task of keeping control over the new Protectorate. Thus by the end of
the 19th century the Maasai people found their original homeland divided
between three different administrations.
53 1895 - 1919: The Early Colonial Period, the Arrivai of
the White Settlers and the Loss of Maasai Pastures
5.3.1 Introduction
The opening of the East Africa Protectorate gained great impetus from the
British Government's décision to construct the "Uganda Railway" running from
Mombasa to Lake Victoria. In fact, the continuing politica! crisis in the Nile
Valley was the main reason for building the almost 1,000 km long railway.
Labourers from India were recruited. The construction starled in 1896, was
finished in December 1901, and cost some £ 5,550,000 to the British taxpayer
and the African population of the Protectorate. To recover some of the costs
the Government decided to lease land within the l mile zone on both sides of
the railway.
Commissioner Eliot, who had replaced Hardinge in early 1901, actively
tried to interest more setüers in coming to the new Protectorate by making
large areas of land available. Because the response from Europe was very
meagre hè turned to South Africa.6 There hè succeeded in attracting people to
move northwards towards the new Protectorate. Most of them were colonists or
adventurers looking for new opportunities after the ending of the Anglo-Boer
war.
The British Government also actively tried to interest possible settlers in the
Protectorate. Jewish refugees from Eastern Europe were offered land in the
East Africa Protectorate. Eliot, not well pleased with this move on the part of
his superiors in London, offered them land on the Uasin Gishu plateau, home
of the Uasinkishu Maasai, far away from the railway. The Jews produced a
package of extensive wishes and requirements after they had sent a délégation
to the Protectorate to investigate Eliot's offer. On the other hand, the early
settlers, headed by Lord Delamere, a fine British aristocrat, formed an 'anti-
zionist immigration committee'. The "problem" solved itself when the Zionist
Congress of August 1903 decided to reject the East African proposai and
instead opted for the establishment of an autonomous Jewish state in Palestine.
5.3.2 The First Maasai Move of 1904: Création of a Northern and
Southern Maasai Reserve
During the early years of the Protectorate the land issue remained the most
important topic of debate. 'The big question was how much land should be
made available to any individual setüer and on what terms (length of lease,
etc). The London officials hoped to prevent land spéculation such as has been
6 The failure of several missions to explore for minerais, the lack of an internai market and
the inaccessibiUty of the area before the construction of the railway line were the major reasons
for the lack of interest from Europe.
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experienced in other areas of white seulement' (Zwanenberg & King 1975:37).
The local administration, however, was first and foremost m a hurry to attract
as many white settlers as possible. This called for a "settlerfriendly" land
policy and législation. The first législative régulations concerning land had
been issued in 1897 offering "certificates of occupation" with a renewable
twenty one years term. This, however, prohibited the buying and selling of
land. Pressure from the settlers supported by the local administration on the
Foreign Office demanding freehold titles continued. Eliot, by using his power
as the Commissioner, tried to amend the régulations in favour of the settlers.
He became more and more convinced of the economie potential which the
temperate zone of the Protectorate offered. In his view the highlands should
become a "White man's Country".
In 1902, "The First Crown Lands Ordinance" allowed the local
administration to issue settlers with ninety nine year leases and the possibility
of selling land up to 1,000 acres per lot. Bigger portions were also obtainable,
- but only after consultation with the Foreign Office. The Ordinance proclaimed
that all public land (i.e. unoccupied land) was Crown land which, for the time
.being, was subject to the control of His Majesty by virtue of any Treaty,
Convention or Agreement. However, the décision as to whether land was
~ vacant or not was in the hands of the Commissioner and his subordinates. In
practice this meant a déniai of traditionally established African rights in land.
This was the result of a lack of understanding of African législation concerning
land and the unwillingness to hinder settlers. 'The priées of land were
exceedingly low. A homestead of 640 acres cost an average Rs. 2 per acre, or
£ 80, and this could be paid over 16 years. A pastoral lease of 5,000 acres,
with a rental of l/2d. per acre, cost the lessee £10 8s. 4d. per annum. In the
•tm.QK remote areas, land was granted free' (Sorrenson 1968:143).
7
Settlers were allowed to go out and look for attractive holdings themselves.
~ No attempt was made to separate land available to settlers from that required
%by Africans. The settlers showed no interest in land that Africans themselves
„»had avoided. They knew that African occupation was a sign of good land and
~ made their sélection accordingly. The area north of Nairobi, occupied by the
agricultural Kikuyu was particularly attractive to the settlers. 'Between 1903
^and 1906 approximately 60,000 acres of Kikuyu territory in the Kiambu-
Limuru district were alienated to settlers' (Sorrenson 1968:180). As a form of
compensation the Rs. 2 per acre had to be paid to the Kikuyu landowner
instead of to the local administration. Of course this was a sévère
undervaluation of the land "bought".
Moreover, the 1902 Ordinance prevented the selling of land to non-
„Europeans (i.e. Asians and Africans). In fact this meant a policy of racial
ségrégation. Most settlers must have feit quite at home. To encourage this
feeling Eliot went on (mis)using his power by amending the 1902 Ordinance.
7 16 anna (d) = l Rupee (Rs ) and 15 Rupees = £1
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In July 1903 hè drew up rules for the lease of pastoral land up to 10,000 acres
at a rent of l anna (ld ) per acre. He also wanted to raise the maximum area
that could be sold without référence to the Foreign Office. His fight for the
interests of the settlers began to show fruit. In 1902 there were approximately
thirty Europeans living around Nairobi. By 1903 the influx of settlers had
increased considerably. In that year 117 Europeans (mainly from South Africa)
had applied for land and the following year this figure rose to 300. The offer
of a freehold grant of 10,000 acres to two South Africans in return for the
enlistment of South African settlers will also have helped to increase the rise in
immigrants. This deal, however, was made without the consent of the Foreign
Office. Some large concessions had been granted in the Rift Valley, with the
approval of the Foreign Office, to some rieh British aristocrats. Lord Delamere
had obtained 100,000 acres on a 99 year lease; Grogan and Lingham had a 50
year lease of 120,000 acres of the Eldama Ravine Forest and the East Africa
Syndicale, formed by South African and British entrepreneurs, obtained a lease
of 400 square miles of pasture land in the Naivasha area, north of Nairobi, in
the heart of the Maasai country.
It became clear that the Kikuyu and the Maasai -who were a nomadic
people and still recovering from the late 19th Century disasters- were under
threat. 'Applications for those areas which were not continuously occupied by
the Masai were accordingly made by the Europeans, and the attention of the
Government was drawn to the question of how far the country could, with
safety and justice, be opened to white seulement, without thereby encroaching
on the native grazing rights' (Sandford 1919:20). Considérable discussion took
place between Eliot and his sub-commissioners residing in the areas involved.
The former was of the opinion that although the Maasai had the right to
inhabit particular districts they had no right to monopolize these areas. He
favoured a policy of intégration by inducing them to seule in small villages
among Europeans. He was of the opinion that a process of civilization and
employaient as cattle guards for the superior Europeans would be to the
advantage of both the economy and the Maasai. This last statement, concerning
the positive effects for the Maasai, was questioned by his sub-ordinates Bagge,
Jackson and Hobley, who preferred to divide the Rift Valley pastures and set
apart a reserve for the Maasai where settlers could not interfère.
Jackson, sub-commissioner for the Naivasha Province, on leave in Gréât
Britain, told thé Foreign Office that although Eliot had convinced thé Maasai
that no more applications would be considered after thé 400 square miles grant
to thé East Africa Syndicale, more than 75 percent of the grazing areas in thé
Rift Valley had been applied for by thé settlers. When asked for an explanation
Eliot replied in a secret and confidential letter stating: 'No doubt on platforms
and in reports we déclare we have no intention of depriving natives of their
lands, but this has never prevented us from taking whatever land we want (...)
I have no désire to protect Masaidom. It is a beastly, bloody system, founded
on raiding and immorality, disastrous to both the Masai and their neighbours.
176 Setting Wealth to Buy Poverty
The sooner it disappears and is unknown, except in books of anthropology, the
better' (Sorrenson 1968:76). Eliot had to resign.
His successor, Sir Donald Stewart, decided that the Maasai had to be
"given" an area of their own. Two reserves should be set aside for them. These
reserves were planned outside the Rift Valley: the Laikipia plateau (12,350
km2) in the north and another reserve south of Ngong and the railway (11,250
km2). In fact the Maasai were presented with the most inferior cigars from
jheir own cigar box, as both areas were traditional Maasai pastures, while this
.offer also meant the loss of their best pastures near Naivasha.
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The ' White Highlands'
Masai boundanes,1904
Extontion to northarn Masal Reserve 1906
Probable extent of Masai lands about 1890
Uganda Railway
Figure 5,2: The Northern and Southern Maasai Reserve by 1906
Source: based on Hollis 1905; Sandfoid 1919; Morgan 1972
On the 9th of August 1904 Stewart and his officials met the Maasai leaders in
Naivasha. A treaty was signed between the two groups. It was agreed that the
Purko, Loita, Keekonyokie, Ildamat and Loitatok Maasai would move to
Laikipia. The Kaputiei, Matapato, Loodokilani and Sikkari il-oshon were
confined to an area south of the railway and Ngong, between Suswa to the
west and Ol Doinyo Orok (near Namanga) to the east (see figure 5.2). This
area was not of much interest to the settlers and had formerly been set aside as
a Game Reserve. The Government agreed to fulfil a few conditions set by the
Maasai. They would provide a road betwçen the two reserves (approximately
400 km) and set aside a 5 square miles area in the Kinangop area, an
important place for Maasai ceremonies. Finally, it was stated that this
agreement would be enduring 'so long as the Masai as a race shall exist, and
that European or other settlers shall not be allowed to take up land in the
Settlements'.
The Maasai who had moved northwards, soon came to find that the water
supply and grazing potential of the Northern Reserve was totally inadequate to
meet the demands of their herds. Immigration and the natural increase in
numbers of animais required more land. As a resuit two extensions in a
southward direction had to be made within a two year period. Accordingly,
some settlers had to move and, together with an extra grant, were compensated
with land elsewhere. The total area of the two new Maasai Reserves comprised
approximately 24,000 km2 as compared to the pré-colonial Kenya Maasai
territory of some 55,000 km2; a réduction of almost 60 per cent.
While the call for a third extension was made in 1908, another idea of moving
all the Maasai from the Northern Reserve gained importance. It was not so
much the welfare of the Maasai as the still unsatisfîed hunger for territory on
the side of the growing number of settlers that was the driving force bebind
this latter proposai.
In April 1905 the Administration of the East Africa Protectorate had been
handed over from the Foreign Office to the Colonial Office (C.O.). The C.O.
installed the traditional machinery of a "Crown Colony" Government. The
Commissioner was designated as the Governor. Executive and Legislative
Councils and a Land Board were established. Delamere was one of the settlers'
représentatives in these newly introduced bodies. In fact the unofficial
relationship which had always existed before between the Government and the
settlers now became institutionalized. The C.O. saw as its major task to control
the land issue. Spéculation as had taken place in Australia and other colonies
had to be avoided.
The 1902 Lands Ordinance was amended by the C.O. with the introduction
of a land tax, anti-dummying régulations and the raise of rents. The settlers
protested strongly about these adjustments. But they need not have worried as
the local Government did not enforce the new rules. Moreover, the System for
land application could easily be abused by speculators or anyone else who
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wished to acquire more than the maximum area of land allowed Por exatnple,
Lord Delamere, who had several tunes demanded a liberal pohcy concenung
the transfer of land, had accumulated another 61,161 acres by 1906. It was
clear that the official C.O. policy of preventing the accumulation of land for
spéculation had failed.
Another important change in the land policy in the Protectorate was the
acceptance of reserves set aside for the African population. Traders,
adventurers and/or speculators should be prevented from entering districts not
yet under administrative control by the British.8 The Government could
déclare such a reserve a closed district, only to be entered if one was in
possession of a special pass. After the establishment of administrative stations,
a certain area could be reopened and, when needed, land set aside for
interested European settlers. The Maasai Reserves were among the first areas
to be declared "Closed Districts" by 1906. The size of the reserves were not to
provide for more than the existing population. This would, it was hoped, secure
the provision of labour towards the white settler areas and the diversification of
the local économies. The headquarters of the Protectorate were transferred from
Mombasa via Machakos (1904) to Nairobi by 1907, that being the central
supply station of the railway. It became the capital of the country and centre
for further colonization.
5.3.3 The Second Maasai Move of 1911-12: Création of a Single
Extended Southern Maasai Reserve
By 1909 it was estimated that approximately 4,000 square miles of land had
been alienated with a maximum of another 4,000 square miles being left for
future settlement.9 The continuons influx of new settlers called for the rapid
opening of these "unsettled" areas.
In Jamiary 1909 Sadler, who had replaced Stewart, met Olonana to propose
the removal of the Northern Maasai towards an extended Southern Reserve. To
Sadler's surprise Olonana was not unwilling to accept the proposai if certain
conditions were met. 'No European in the country imagined for a moment that
the Masai on Laikipia wished to leave it. The area, though small, is a fine
pièce of country as there is in Kenya, with rieh soil and perennial streams,
vastly superior in every way to the country south of the Rift Valley' (Leys
1924 repr. 1973:120). It is said that the oloibom's motives for accepting the
withdrawal from the north was to restore his authority over all the Maasai
which, due to the division, was waning. The connection between the two
Tutkana Distnct in the far most notth western corner of the Kenya Colony and Protectorate
was the last area to be placed under administrative control only by 1926
At «s maximum the "White Highlands" set apart for the Europeans would comprise
31,000,000 ha comprising 400,000 ha of agncultural land, the remaining area being forest or
pastures (see Somus 1986 143)
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reserves was often eut off as a result of quarantine régulations for cattle.
Suitability surveys conceming the area west of Suswa, i.e. the Loita plains
towards the Mara river, were made. This area was traditionally occupied by a
few il-oshon of the Maasai and by that time partly occupied by European
settlers. It was concluded that the availability of water was inadequate. A plan
for irrigating the plains was produced but never implemented. The superior
potential of the Laikipia plateau was also known to the settlers. Seven of them
had been offered land in that area bef ore the 1904 agreement was signed. All
but two, Lord Delamere and his brother-in-law Cole, had accepted the granting
of land, including a 50 percent increase, elsewhere. Stewart's prophecy that
jealous eyes would probably one day start looking at the Northern Reserve was
fulfïüed within five years.
Because of the fact that most governors had failed, wittingly or unwittingly,
to implement the C.O. policy, Girouard was chosen to take over from Sadler.
Girouard had the name of being loyal, tough and trustworthy. However, by
June 1909 hè had offered settlers land on the Laikipia plateau without
informing the C.O.. After a few months in the Protectorate Girouard had
already made up his mind. He needed the settlers for economie development,
so he defended their fïght over the land régulations. However, the removal of
the Maasai from Laikipia could not be done openly. So, the Colonial
Government made it look as if the removal of the Maasai from the Laikipia
area was solely the result of the wish of Olonana and his people.
In August 1909, the Purko Maasai (still) living in the Southern Reserve wanted
to proceed to Kinangop for their E-unoto ceremony. Because of East Coast
Fever they were forbidden to take their cattle with them as they would have to
pass through the lands occupied by Europeans. Olonana told the Northern
Maasai to proceed from Kinangop to the Southern Reserve in order to hold the
ceremony at Ngong. He also reaffïrmed his wish for the regrouping of all
Maasai in the proposed extended Southern Reserve. Of course Girouard was
quite willing to assist Olonana in this respect. By February 1910 the consent of
the two chiefs of the Northern Maasai, Masikonde and Ole Gilisho, was
obtained. Everything seemed to be going well.
The big trek southward was starled in April 1910 without the consent of the
C.O.. However, one month before, the C.O. had received a confidential letter
from a subordinate official from the Protectorate, stating that Girouard and the
settlers were in the process of mistreating the Maasai by trying to remove them
from Laikipia under the cover of an E-unoto ceremony. When the C.O. came
to hear of the start of the move, Girouard was told to suspend it. The 1904
Treaty did not allow for such action unless all the Maasai agreed to withdraw
from it voluntarily and sign a new agreement. The CO. mainly feared
réactions in the House of Gommons.
In May 1910 a provisional agreement was made between the Government
and the Maasai reaffirming the proposai of regrouping the Maasai in an
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extended Southern Reserve To the west of the Southern Reserve an area of
approximately 14,600 km2 was to be added in return for the loss of the
Nojthern reserve. By this time, however, Legalishu made U clear that this new
reserve was not large enough for all the Maasai. 'In 1904 there were estimated
tojjw a total of 50,000 cattie and 1,500,000 sheep held by the Maasai of the
Riffe Valley and of the stretch between Nairobi and the German frontier; within
just six years, the catüe had increased (...) to a total of 130,000, and the sheep
jj^risen to a figure of 2,250,000 (King 1971 a: 122-23). A survey confïrmed
©je. Gilisho's view and also pointed out the lack of water and the danger of
catüe raids by the neighbouring Kipsigis. The matter was left to rest until April
1JM-1> when new negotiations started.
- i-Olonana had died in March 1911. One of his last statements had been that
the (Laikipia) Maasai had to obey the Government and should move with their
cjtüV to the Loita Plains in the south. Girouard used this argument for an
exploitation concerning the "change of opinion" among the Laikipia Maasai
with regard to the removal from the Northern Reserve. Another violation of the
thrth, as Ole Gilisho has only agreed to leave Laikipia under the threat of
exportation and imprisonment in Europe.
fhe Second Maasai Treaty was signed in April 1911 and approved in May by
the C.O.. On signing the agreement Girouard "added" the traditional Maasai
area between the Namanga Hills and the Kilimanjaro, comprising of
approximately 8,000 km2. In June 1911 a new move was started from the
"'iforthern Reserve through the Rift Valley towards the Loita area. By
September it had become clear that the trek had faikd due to the outbreak of
îteavy rains. The roads became impassable. Many people and animais suffered
in$ decided to return to the Rift Valley. Moreover, it had become clear to the
-fast groups of Maasai who were able to make the journey, that the size of their
, n^w area was not large enough to allow all of them to come. Also thé local
officers came to believe that they had greatly underestimated the number of
~ slock possessed by the Northern Maasai. For Girouard the only solution was to
àîd another large area, the "Trans Mara area" located west of the Mara River
arûï comprising approximately 2,300 km2, to the Southern Reserve, which he
aÜ his officers presented as the "promised land".10 Finally by May 1912,
i|jüle Girouard was on leave, the C.O. instructed that a third attempt should be
made to bring the remaining Maasai from the north down to the extended
Southern Reserve. The chiefs offered no opposition and the Maasai, broken up
into small groups, were sent on their way.
-» However, by the end of June 1912, Ole Gilisho and several other Maasai
chiefs made a last attempt to stop the move by bringing the case to Court.
0 In fact this area was alteady inhabited by the Sma Maasat In latter years two more
Maasai il-oshon, the Uasuikishu and Moitamk, moved into this area Unul the 1930s they had
nwved around near Lake Banngo and in parts of Jtoth Nyanza (see Waller 1984 257)
\l
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They were supported in their fight by a British lawyer, A. Morrison, and
probably also by Norman Leys, a médical officer. The Colonial Administration
used all kinds of intimidation and frustrating practices to press Morrison and
the Maasai to stop the case. Leys, for his part, was transferred to Nyasaland.
The Maasai lost the case on the grounds that they were not British subjects and
owed no allegiance to the Crown. The Treaty of 1904, being an agreement
between two sovereign states, was not recognised by any British Court. The
Maasai had their responsibilities; paying of taxes, living in peace and order
under British Law but they apparenüy had no rights.
By April 1913 the move was complete. Approximately 10,000 Maasai,
200,000 head of catüe and 550,000 sheep had been moved since June 1912
(see Sandford 1919:36). The Maasai in the British Protectorate numbered in
total approximately 40,000 people. Sk Girouard was not able to witness what
hè had so long fought for as, like Eliot, he had to resign over a case related to
the Maasai. His continuons and downright déniai to the C.O. of the granting of
land to Europeans on the Laikipia Plateau was found to be totally untrue. The
Governor in whom so much faith and trust had been placed, had turned against
his superiors. This lack of loyalty and obédience rather than the much vaunted
principles of fairplay, protection of native rights and the prohibition of land
spéculation was the driving force behind the C.O.'s indignation.
In fact, by this time, the C.O. no longer wanted to propagate a policy which
would support the création of a colony of small settlers only. Faith in
economie development was put in large-scale ranchers, planters and companies.
The rapidly growing influx of mainly British settlers in 1912 had resulted in a
boom in land values and transfers of land. The speculators took their profits.
Farms in the "White Highlands" which had cost 6d. per acre in 1908 were sold
for 10 shillings per acre in 1912 and even £1 per acre in 1914; a forty-fold
price rise. The clamour for the opening up of new districts grew. The African
people, especially the Kikuyu living in Limuru and Kiambu, were pushed
towards their own reserves.
The C.O. wanted to deal with the land issue once and for all. The number
of amendments to the 1902 Crown Lands Ordinance had created a situation of
confusion. It was time to put things straight and clear in a new Ordinance. This
task was put in the hands of the new Governor Belfield. Within three years hè
had produced the 1915 Crown Lands Ordinance. This new législation was a
victory for the settlers and the local Government officials who supported it;
leases were extended from 99 to 999 years with rentals being extremely low;
restrictions on the accumulation of land were withdrawn, while the transfer of
land to Asians and Africans was still prohibited.11 The 1915 Ordinance also
11 'When in 1912 some Masai wanted to purchase European farms on the Kinangop plateau,
and offered large sums of money for them, they were told that the govemment would not allow
them or any other Masai to purchase land outside the reserves' (Sorrenson 1968 224)
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«xtended thé définition of Crownlands to 'ail lands occupied by thé native
Jribes of thé Protectorate and ail lands reserved for thé use of any members of
--'jay,native tribes' (Sorrenson 1968:223). By thé end of 1915, 5,275,121 acres
\ot 21,348 km2 of land, an area as big as présent day Kajiado District, had been
, ^npqaired $>n behalf of about one thousand white settiers (see figure 5,2). The
* distribution of this vast area, located mainly in thé Highlands and the Rif t
• .--SifatJey, was very uneven. A small number of British aristocrats and companies
owne4 approximately 20 percent of this land.
tte Maasai had bitter feelings towards their removal from thé Northern
Iffàzing pastures. They felt betrayed by thé British to whom they had always
Shown their loyalty. Although thé extended Southern Reserve totalled over
36$OOJon2 thé Maasai had, among all the African groups of the Protectorate,
' tost Ihe most land. Moreover, they had lost their best areas. Due to the Second
,T*ea|ffthey were restricted to a reserve which prohibited their access to their
bestjttaditional grazing areas. 'The Maasai reserve, clearly created economie
kfctdsjüp for the people, primarily by depriving them of their old dry-weather
frazing area' (Tignor 1976:91)
Ojie week after the Second Maasai Treaty was signed, a lease of land,
which had been granted before -during the time of the old Southern Reserve of
1904- was renewed and handed over to the newly formed Magadi Soda
Company for the exploitation of soda ash. The Company obtained a large
concession for a lease of 99 years over the waters and surrounding areas of
Lake Magadi (790 km2) and the northern part of Lake Natron (46 km2). It
aUowed them to exploit and transport all soda ash and other minéral deposits
and precious stones they found. The Company constructed a railway (148 km)
from the Lake to Konza where it joined the main line to the port of Mombasa.
Land along the line (1/4 mile on both sides, totalling some 120 km2) and a
, 1,000 acre site (Kajiado), to be used as a seulement, were also set aside for the
Company. As compensation for the total area leased to the Magadi Soda
Company, partly watered and measuring approximately 900 km2, the Maasai
Reserve was extended in August 1914 by some 965 km2 from Kikelelwa (near
Kilimanjaro) towards Rombo.
Finally adjustments were made along the north-western corner of the Maasai
Reserve, near the Mau Narok région, enlarging it by some 580 km2. The result
of these modifications was a Maasai Reserve District as gazetted in 1918 and
comprising of almost 38,000 km2. As compared with the former Northern and
Southern Reserves of 1906 (24,000 km2), the total area officially allocated to
the Maasai had increased by some 60 per cent. However, as stated before, the
quality of the "new" pastures was not equal to the former grazing areas
belonging to the Maasai and which had been lost to the European selders.
By 1914, World War I had appeared virtually in the heart of Maasailand,
«stressing the international character of this battle which involved the African
'
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population and the Maasai m particular Dunng the War the Colonial
Administration passed a conscription Ordinance in order to recruit Africans to
assist the British in their struggle with the Germans. In contrast with their
involvement during the punitive expéditions against other ethnie groups, this
time, Maasai interest was very low. Efforts to forcefully recruit tlmurran were
withdrawn the moment the British feared a genera! uprising among the Maasai.
The Maasai had lost all confidence in the British, their former allies. They
preferred to be left alone.
However, after completion of the move to the Southern Reserve, the
Government tried to introducé an administrative structure as was present in
other reserves of the Protectorate. This task was put onto the shoulders of Mr.
Hemsted who, by August 1912, was appointed Officer-in-Charge of the Maasai
Reserve. To strengthen the grip of the Protectorate Administration on the
Maasai the Reserve was divided into two districts by June 1913. Narok District
on the west and Ngong District on the east side of the Euaso Ng'iro River, the
boundary situated in a north-south direction from the Mau range towards the
Anglo-German border.
"Paramount Chief ' Seggie, who had taken over from Olonana, was not as
co-operative as his father. In 1918 the British abolished the rare phenomenon
that they had created themselves. Hailey reports
'Following the abolition of the post of Paramount Chief in 1918, the
Government endeavoured to find agencies for local administration in the
promotion of three institutions, a Central Masai Council, a series of 14
Native Councils each representing a different tribal Section, and
Headmen, created as far as possible on the model of the location
Headmen found elsewhere in the Colony. The Central Masai Council at
Ngong was composed of the présidents of the Native Councils and was
to meet twice a year. The 14 Native Councils were designed to take the
place of the informal Council of Elders. (...) They were recognized as
tribunals exercising powers under the Native Tribunal Rules of 1913, and
were moreover given the position occupied by Collective Headmen under
the native Authority Ordinance then in force (No, 22 of 1912). The
members of these Councils consisted of the recognized Counsellors
(L'aigwanak) of the different Age Grades in the divisions, with a few of
the more influential Elders and Moran added' (Hailey 1957:171).
The new administrative structure was based on the typical British method of
indirect rule as practised among many other colonized peoples.
-s» i
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1.4 1920 - 1945: Kenya Colony and the Maasai; Alien Influx
•—"*- and Land Grievances
5.4.1 Introduction
IB 1920 the East Africa Protectorate was renamed the Kenya Colony and
Protectorate.12 Ex-serviceman had setüed in the new colony a year before,
raising the number of Europeans to approximately 10,000 (see Low and Smith
1976:567). They were outnumbered by some 3.8 million Africans and 25,000
Mans. The latter especially tried to challenge the position of the Europeans.
Their main grievance was the ban on the possibility of acquiring land by
Mans in the "White Highlands". They were only allowed to buy land in
towns, the coastal area and less favourable areas.
In 1919, E. Northey, the new Governor, had made it clear that European
interest should be paramount throughout the Protectorate. The influence of the
settlers, now with a reduced South African character, was very high. Settlers
were represented in the Land Board, Legislative Council and Executive
Council and were often even consulted before the introduction of new bills
thus giving them the opportunity of suggesting modifications. The white
settlers had always made it clear that they were striving for self-government.
For a start, they wanted an elected majority, outnumbering Government
officials, in the Kenya Legislative Council. In the beginning of the 1920« the
African population joined the Asian's complaints against white dominance. The
Kikuyu, Kamba and Luo organized themselves in political associations, like the
East African Association and the Kikuyu Central Association. Some educated
Maasai, mainly living in Nairobi, joined these political groups as early as 1921
(seeKingl971a:126).
The years following World War I had severely worsened the situation for
the African population. A famine in 1919, movement restrictions through the
introduction of a registration card hearing finger-prints for male Africans
(kipande), higher taxation, a cot in wages due to the economie dépression of
the early 1920s had deteriorated the African standard of üving. Those groups
-such as the Kikuyu, Luhya, Luo and Kamba, who were the most integrated
into the setüer economy, suffered and starled to protest openly.
By 1923, after negotiations took place between Europeans and Indians in
London, the C.O. published a White Paper which denied responsible
government to the settlers. This time it was stated that Kenya primarily was an
African territory and the interests of the African population should be
paramount. The idea of self-government, as had been given that same year to
the Southern Rhodesian settlers, never materialized in Kenya. On the other
Along the coast a small stnp of land remained a Protectorate as it was obtained from the
Sultan of Zanzibar on a lease The Colony and Protectorate were, however, governed by one
Legislative Council
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hand, the paramount déclaration turned out to be mere words to stop the
European and Indian row as no real improvement for the African population
was carried through. For example, the land policy was left unchanged and
Africans, in contrast to Asians and Arabs, were given no seat in the Legislative
or Executive Councils, Instead, a European missionary was nominated to the
Legislative Council in 1924 to represent African interests. A formal
proclamation by the Colonial Government of a "Dual Policy" stating that
agricultural development had to be nourished in European and African areas
alike was of not much real value either.
In the following years the British sent a huge number of commissions to
analyze the situation of the new Colony regarding land, labour, economie
performance and potential. The Ormsby-Gore (1925) and Hilton-Young (1929)
Commissions both stressed the marginal and fragile African position. It was
urged that they officially proclaim the reserves as soon as possible to secure
African rights. Alhough the 1915 Crown Lands Ordinance had given the
Governor the power to create reserves, this was donc only for most ethnie
groups by 1926. However, a clause in the 1915 Ordinance gave authority to
the Governor to extract reserve land 'no longer required by the natives' for
sale or lease. Accordingly, a feeling of insecurity still remained among thé
African population.
In 1928 an attempt was made to streamline land policy in thé Colony by thé
introduction of thé Native Lands Trust Bill which declared that lands in thé
reserves should be held in a trust exercised by the Governor. The Bill was
turned into thé Native Lands Trust Ordinance of 1930 stating that non-natives
could only obtain leases or one year licences for lands in thé reserves if they
were not occupied or required by the Africans.13 A Central Trust Board and
Local Land Boards were instalïed as thé administrative bodies exercising
control over land issues. They could object to a lease or licence, although thé
Secretary of State had the power to overrule them.
In trying to expand the volume of Kenya's export, bans on the growing of
cash crops by Africans were lifted in the late 1930s. At the same time it was
recognized that the problem of land érosion was becoming more serious. This
was partly related to the problem of land shortage which became increasingly
acute year by year. Land alienated by the settlers amounted to 12,200 square
miles or 5.5 per cent of the total land area. With regard to good arable land the
European settiers occupied 18 per cent of the total 41,630 square miles. It is
estimated that between 1920 and 1948 available agricultural land (with 30" rain
per annum) decreased from 14 acres to just over 5 acres per head of the
13 According to Tignor the number of European occupiers in 1929 was merely 2,035 and the
total amount of land they culuvated was only 635,590 acres Nonetheless, the European farmers
owned 5,000,648 acres Some of this land was grazed, bat a considérable proportion was put to no
effective use- a fact commemed upon frequently by land hungry Afncan farmers and pastorahsts
(see Tignor 1976 25).
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African population living in those areas (see Zwanenberg & King 1975:29).
Subdivision and fragmentation of holdings into smaller and smaller units was
Ihe result.
5.4.2 Kajiado District Administrative Changes
|f09 ADMINISTRATIVE BOUNDARIES KAJIADO DISTRICT 1918 ADMINISTRATIVE BOUNDARIES • KAJIADO DISTRICT^ Sj
^™~" f M,I...„. MAlWuRWA/ !" ' ï KS^KIHjmu / Natura "7 ' 7*. î s \^ ^
Provincial Boundary V SÇYlDiË
District Bcurxlary
Kallado Dlslrlct Today
J924 ADMINISTRATIVE BOUNDARIES - KAJIADO DISTRICT 1929 ADMINISTRATIVE BOUNDARIES KAJIADO DISTRICTS
4933 ADMINISTRATIVE BOUNDARIES - KAJIADO DISTRICT 1961 ADMINISTRATIVE BOUNDARIES KAJIADO DISTRICT^ ;




»Figure 53 Administrative Boundaries 1909 - 1961
Source Kajiado District Atlas (1990 dtaft)
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Figure 5.3 provides an overview of the renaming and adjustment of boundary
lines of the Maasai Reserve. In 1924, for instance, the Maasai Reserve was
renamed Maasai Province. The total area compnses approximately 39,000 km2
when including minor adjustments made since the création of the Maasai
Reserve District. In 1926, the interdistrict boundary between Kajiado and
Narok District was, at its northern part, shifted to the east and the Ngong
Headquarters transferred to Kajiado Township. The Central Maasai Council
and the 14 Native Councils gave place in 1930 to two Local Native Councils,
at Narok and Kajiado.
Following the recommendations of the Carter Commission, which reviewed
all land issues of the Kenya Colony in 1932, the Maasai Province was renamed
by proclamation No. 109 in 1933 as the Maasai Extra Provincial District. Ils
area totalled 39,291 km2. Kajiado District amounted to almost 22,000 km2.
Other recommendations of thé Carter Commission resulted in thé proclamation
of the new land législation by way of the Native Lands Trust Ordinance 1938
and thé Kenya (Native Areas) Order in Council 1939. The Crown Lands
(Amendment) Ordinance, 1938, defined thé varions catégories of land: l)
'Native' instead of 'Crown' land in the case of the original reserves, 2)
Temporary Native Reserves and 3) Native Leasehold Areas (see Sorrenson
1965:689). In 1942, Magadi Company's houses at Kajiado Township were
purchased by thé Government for £3,500. This Consolidated thé position of
Kajiado as a Government Station.
5.4.3 Infiltration by Other Croups into thé Maasai Reserve
In a quantitative sensé thé Maasai had lost more land than any other group as a
result of the arrivai of the Europeans. These other groups, however, suffered
most from being restricted in a Reserve that was too small, the Kikuyu in
particular. They lost high quality land to the Europeans and their area was
densely populated. The practice of selling land between each other had also
worsened this situation. Wealthy and influential Kikuyu could, by a variety of
means, accumulate land at the expense of the poor, debtors and tenants.
The shortage of land stimulated the Kikuyu to look for alternatives such as
squatting on the land of Europeans or moving into other Reserves. In Kajiado
District, thé Kikuyu looked hungrily at thé slopes of thé Ngong Hills, thé Ol
Doinyo Orok near Namanga and Mt. Kilimanjaro, being thé areas suitable for
cultivation. However, a spécial permit was needed to enter thé Maasai Reserve.
A Kikuyu who wanted to start cultivating for himself was refused an entry
permit. 'In view of thé général desirability of discouraging such émigration of
Kikuyu natives, thé policy has been adopted in thé Masai Reserve of
prosecuting ail Kikuyu living in that reserve who cannot claim by long
résidence or circumcision rights to hâve become Masai, and of returning them
to their own reserve' (Sandford 1919:55).
The Maasai and Kikuyu had been neighbours for a long time, engaging in
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trade during good and bad times. Moreover, many Kikuyu women had married
Maasai men especially those from their closest neighbours the Kaputiei and
Dalalekutuk. Sometimes Kikuyu relatives were able to follow these wives into
Maasailand, forming small Kikuyu colonies. 'Cultivation in the Ngong area,
which had begun with the seulement of destitute Maasai at the end of the
nineteenth Century (Low, 1965), expanded as increasing numbers of Maasai
married Kikuyu women who cleared small plots and as relatives of these
women moved into the area to farm' (Campbell 1981a:218). Besides the
possibility of kinship, the Kikuyu tried to find Maasai who were willing to
employ them as cultivators. If employed, non-Maasai Africans could not be
refused being in the Maasai Reserve.
Besides the shortage of land other reasons could be responsible for the
immigration of Kikuyu into the Maasai area Towards the end of the World
War I quite a number of Kikuyu fied into the Masai Reserve, trying to avoid
recruitment as porters for the Carrier Corps. These emigrants, attempting to
escape enrolment, signed agreements to work as servants for Indians, Somali
and Maasai. 'By 1928 the pénétration pacifique of Kikuyu into the Mau area
of the Masai Reserve had assumed such significant proportions that the Masai
Local Native Council passed a resolution forbidding Kikuyu to cultivate land
outside the townships of Narok and Ngong' (Sorrenson 1967:38). 'The attitude
of the Masai to this problem is not easy to understand or explain. As a tribe
they have been emphatic in refusing to agrée to impenetration but as
individuals they have welcomed the Kikuyu' (MJJRMD 1936-December:6/7).
In one case, however, the Maasai and the Kikuyu agreed as a group to the
exchange of some land. Ndeiya, an area of approximately 75 square miles
located to the west of Ngong and south of the Kiambu District, was the only
area within the recognized tribal boundaries which was not settled in 1930 (see
Bullock 1978:3). It is said that originally Ndeiya belonged to the Dorobo. Later
the Maasai obtained it but in turn handed part of it over to a group of Kikuyu
as a gift. On June 5th 1929, elders of both groups agreed that, in return for
grazing rights in western Ndeiya, the Maasai would offer an area in eastern
Ndeiya near Kibiko. This exchange of grazing was a temporary measure and
renewable annually. However, as large numbers of Kikuyu were evicted from
European farms and other Reserves, pressure was rapidly building in the
Kikuyu Reserve by the end of the 1920s. Ndeiya, with ils marginal
environment and being less populated than other parts of their Reserve
'became a dumping ground for thousands of the displaced and dispossessed'
(Bullock 1978:34). These people not only brought their livestock with them,
but they also wanted to cultivate. The question of Kikuyu cultivation in the
Ndeiya région would remain in the centre of discussion within and between the
Local Native Councils of both Kikuyu and Maasai. However, permitted or not,
by June 1932 already 400 families were cultivating land and had erected
fences. By January 1933 the Central Trust Board consented to the setting apart
of the area as a grazing area.
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Another zone of influx was the area around Loitokitok on the slopes of Mount
Kilimanjaro Loitokitok was occupied in 1921 as an administrative station.
Kamba labourers employed to build the post came from Campi ya Sunba. This
camp had been established by Hobley in early 1900 and was located 65 km
south of Simba near the Chyulu Hills. It was used by scouts of the Game
Department. The Kamba labourers starled some cultivation around Loitokitok.
'Certain advantages accrued to the Akamba and Masai for the area occupied
was good agricultural land but useless for stock, owing to "fly". The clearing
of the bush would have led eventually to the extermination of the "fly'"(KDAR
1930:6). However, the Machakos District Administration wanted to evict all
Kamba back to their own Reserve although the Maasai District Commissioner
had positively welcomed Kamba cultivation. In January 1930, without the
knowledge of the DC Kajiado, all but a few Kamba left to harvest were
returned by the Machakos Administration. In correspondence with other
officers responsible the DC Kajiado proposed to offer a lease to the Kamba if
they would return and continue cultivating.
While this discussion was still going on the Kamba had already returned by
March 1931. The DC Machakos (Mr. Silvester) wanted to remove them again,
this time they announced it in due time. The DC Kajiado (Mr. Storrs Fox) and
the PC Maasai Province (Mr. Butler) took the side of the Kamba in Campi ya
Simba pointing to the advantages resulting from their présence in the Maasai
Province: development of agriculture, payaient of rent to the Kajiado Local
Native Council, fly infested area cleared and the supply of labour for Kajiado
District Despite these arguments the DC Machakos insisted and in July 1931
all the Kamba were sent away from Campi ya Simba and Campi ya Mwarabu
(Rombo). In a last effort the PC Maasai Province suggested that the DC
Machakos was allowed to collect hut tax among the Kamba living in the lease
area in Kajiado District. Again this offer was not accepted and by March 1932
all the Kamba seemed to have moved away towards Taveta east of Kajiado
District.
Some cultivation, however, was practised in the south-east corner of Kajiado
District thanks to the Chagga from Tanganyika who employed a similar
strategy as the Kikuyu in the north-west. '(...) by the 1930s individual Maasai
were owning plots which were cultivated either by their Chagga wives or by
Chagga labourers hired by the Maasai. A major incentive to cultivation was the
frequent failure of the rains which led to losses of livestock and encouraged
the Maasai to seek alternative sources of subsistence' (Campbell 1981a:218).
Although the Carter Commission had established the boundaries of the
Reserves for every group in Kenya the influx of Kikuyu, Kamba and Chagga
in the Maasai area continued in the late 1930s and became a major point of
concern for the Maasai. The Administration, however, endured their doublé
feelings concerning this immigration as shown before in case of the Kamba of
Campi ya Simba.
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~fii a letter dated June 27th 1934, the DC Kajiado invited the DC Machakos
to send the Kamba to Campi ya Simba on condition of payment of Sh. 12/- per
yea^per holding to the Kajiado Local Native Council. A second prerequisite
waSfflte construction of a road from the Camp towards the main road between
Simba and Loitokitok. When the Kamba from the Game Department situated
ui alother location (Esoit Pus near the Noolturesh River) turned out to be a
soürfe of conflict with the Maasai (over shamba trespass) and of corruption
(ill||al tax collection) this enthusiasm for inviting more Kamba quickly
diminished.
.. Troubles in the north-west corner of Kajiado District between the Maasai
andÏKikuyu immigrants also persisted. The droughts of 1933 and 1934 resulted
in high stock mortality in Ndeiya and among the Maasai. Stock thefts and
inter-tribal conflict increased and, the following year, the Maasai cancelled the
exc|ange agreement. The main grievance of the Maasai was the continually
gtowing number of Kikuyu coming to Ndeiya, building huts and making
.shambas in an area which had been set aside only for grazing. Rising
population pressure in the Kikuyu Reserve was responsible for this
development, due to a steady return of Kikuyu from other parts of Kenya and
fee growing imbalance of land ownership amongst them. Wealthy Kikuyu,
administrators and teachers, bought the land from the less fortunate and less
educated members of the community. By the beginning of the 1930s they had
also started to show interest in the Ndeiya area.
In October 1935 a group of 117 Kikuyu families from the Ndeiya area in
the Ngong région were ordered to go 'home'. Only those who had stayed in
Ngong Township or who were employed by the Maasai and in possession of a
permit were allowed to stay. 'The Kajiado Local Native Council has expressed
an opinion that Kikuyu natives should not be allowed to come into any
division of the Kajiado District unless they first obtain a permit from the Chief
of that division, which hè should only give after consultation with his elders'
(KNA DC/Kaj/2/3/14). The willingness on the side of the Maasai to keep some
JKikuyu in the Reserve was pardy to support the Colonial Government in
relieving the congestion in the Kiambu District.14 Maasai leaders, once more,
offered the Government a large area of the Chyulu Hills, between the Kiboko
River and Campi ya Simba and Campi ya Marabu (near Noolturesh river) for
^occupation by the Kikuyu provided that the Mile Zone and the Chyulu
Triangle would be added to the Maasai Reserve. This was not accepted by the
Government.
The removal of Kikuyu families from the Maasai Reserve, however, was
called off at the instigation of the DC Kiambu and the Provincial
Commissioner Central Province. In November 1936 the OiC Maasai (Mr.
Approximately 50,000 people ftom this district dispossessed of their lands by the
Government, couid find no place in the Kikuyu Reserve They were living in townships, as
squatters on European land or were attempüng to get some land in other Reserves
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Fazan) announced a new System for the Ndeiya exchange allowing the Kikuyu
herds to continue grazing in the area loaned to them on the condition that they
returned to their own Reserve every night. Individual Kikuyu living in the
Ngong Division of the Maasai Province for longer than twelve years could
obtain free permits. Others could obtain a temporary occupation licence if the
consent of the chief and elders was obtained. It seems that this arrangement
was partly the product of the British Administration as Fazan ends his letter
stating 'It must be understood that this arrangement is subject to altération if
my successor does not approve of it. The object is, on the one hand, to put a
stop to the continued and growing encroachment by Kikuyu into Masai without
authority, and, on the other hand, to give a reasonable security to those who
obtain permits' (KNA/DC/Ngong/1/1/22-12/11/1936). Non-Maasai infiltration
nevertheless continued and, in 1937, after complaints by Mr. Cowie, a settler
in the Ngong area concerning the Kikuyu and the Somali entering the
Mbagathi River area, around 35 Kikuyu were immediately prosecuted and
removed from this part of the Maasai Reserve.15
Infiltrators started looking for alternative locations in Kajiado District.
'Kikuyu were found to have come in and settled in the high ground on the top
of Oldonyo Orok at Namanga. These were removed and returned to Kiambu.
The modus operandi is for the Kikuyu to get himself signed on by a Masai as
labourer at 3/- per month. Some 70 acres of virgin forest has been destroyed
by this method. In April an Akamba village was found near Kiu. (...) It had got
a footing through a bastard Masai-Akamba' (KDAR 1939:12).
5.4.4 Evidence and Memoranda Presented to the Carter Land
Commission
In October 1930, the first Maasai political organization, the Maasai
Association, was formed. lts leaders were recruited from among the educated
Maasai, mainly from Narok and Nairobi. Most of them had been trained by
missionaries in or outside Maasailand. They had revolved against their former
teachers, who had attempted to stop certain Maasai practices like traditional
dress, ornaments and, especially, circumcision. In 1929 the AIM church at
Siyiabei (Narok District) lost almost all its members over this. However, 'land
and white men in genera! taking things from them' were the main reasons for
the closing of Maasai ranks (see King 1971a:130).
The drought of 1929, called the "Famine of the Hides", had made clear once
again to the Maasai that their Reserve was lacking the quality and quantity of
15 As early as 1900 twelve Somali and their families were allowed to take up résidence on
the north bank of the Mbagaüu nver as a reward for service with the Uganda Rifles in the
preceding decades This area, called the Nairobi Commonage, was later to become the Nairobi
National Park Following thé Kenya Land Commission's recommendations (he Somali were
allowed to stay in the Park during the lifeüme of the head of each farmly after which they would
have to leave (see Ecosystems 1982 65/6)
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the pastures they had previously possessed. Maasai from this poliücal party
were responsible for the writing of a memorandum concerning Maasai land
grievances présentée to the Kenya Land Commission, chaired by Sir Morris
Carter.
A - B Eastem Mau Forest exchange (22 sq. m - 20.7 sq. m.);
C - D Kinangop Circumcision area exchange (69 sq. m - 11 sq. m.);
E Two settler owned farms the Maasai wanted to purchase in order to get an extra mile of the
river. The pnce asked was far in excess of the value and negotiations were dropped;
F - O Ndeiya exchange (10 sq. m. - 16 5 sq m.) F leased by Kikuyu to Maasai and G vice versa;
H Colvile exchange (230 acres) adjusting of the boundary to ease acces to the river for Maasai
Uvestock.
I - J Fertile agriculture! land (I) of some 8 sq. miles within the Maasai Reserve had been leased to
a group of Kdtuyu for some years. The group was evicted by thé Colonial Government in thé
late 1920s. It was proposed before thé Carter Commission by Europeans to exchange this for
a pièce of unalineated Crown land of some 69 sq. miles to thé south of Lake Naivasha;
K Good agncultural land vacated by thé Maasai except in periods of sévère drought (69 sq m.).
Figure 5.4 Maasai Land Claims and Areas of Exchange
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In April 1932, the Carter Land Commission was appointed on the request of a
British Parliamentary Cornmittee. 'It was required to examine African
grievances and recommend thé best way to settle them; to study existing
African requirements in land and consider what land could be set aside to
satisfy them on a tribal or individual basis; to consider the working of the
Native Lands Trust Ordinance of 1930; and, on thé European side to define thé
Highlands, within which persons of European descent are to hâve a privileged
position' (Sorrenson 1965:687). In short, historica! rights to and future needs
for land had to be investigated in order to solve thé Kenyan land problem once
and forall. In Kajiado District the following areas had been the most offen in
dispute over the years:
- the One Mile Zone between Athi River Town and Sultan Hamud south of
the Uganda Railway (140 km2),
- the Chyulu Triangle, covering an area of approximately 480 km2 stretching
from Sultan Hamud towards the Kiboko River near the Chyulu Range,
- the 1/4 Mile Zone flanking the Magadi Railway on both sides. An area of
approximately 100 km2.
In total an area of 720 km2, almost as large as the Magadi Concession, was in
dispute. Furthermore the Commission had to consider some proposed
exchanges of land, including the Kinangop area, between the Maasai and the
Kikuyu and some European farmers (see figure 5.4).
In October 1932, the Carter Commission starled its enquiries and hearings with
the Maasai, Government officials and other informants. The Maasai presented a
memorandum pointing out once more that they had lost their best grazing areas
and that the present Reserve failed to fulfil their needs (especially in the Narok
District) due to the influx of Maasai from the north, the région's semi-arid
character, the présence of tsetse fly and the lack of watering points. 'We, as a
tribe who were once the overlords of all other tribes in these territories, are
assigned a part of the country which is decidedly inferior to and worse than
almost all other native reserves' (KLC 1934:1224).
In their memorandum the Maasai frequently quoted the Hilton Young
Commission Report with respect to the insecurity of their landownership;
'It may be said that effective safeguards against possible detriment to
native interests can be created if it is provided that native land cannot be
sold but only leased for a limited period during which the natives are not
likely to require it, and that native représentatives must be consulted
before anything is done. (...) once the boundaries of 'native reserves'
have been fixed nothing which might be regarded as handing over to
non-natives the beneficia! use of any substantial areas of land within
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these boundaries ought to be permitted, at least, until the natives
iithemselves have obtained such a standard of éducation and civilization
t«they can be regarded as realiy competent to give a représentative and
fljSsponsible expression of public opinion' (KLC 1934:1227/8).
ïc i%t
Farfherrnore, the Maasai asked for the removal of the artificial boundary
dfefiding the Kenya and Tanganyika Maasai and to join the latter in an
ejgiended area of the Kenya Colony. Finally, they requested the handing back
oftthe Laikipia area as parts of it were still available to or occupied by other
ethnie groups like the Samburu. In fact the Maasai were indirectly attacked as
wïsll supported by Mr. Deck, the Maasai Provincial Commissioner, when in a
memorandum provided for the Carter Commission he stated that in genera!
, : J?
'The principle of reserving certain areas for native occupation is
fûnassailable. (...) Land, which is acquired compulsory in a native reserve
should be leased to landless natives (...) The rental should go as
compensation to thé Local Native Council funds. The Crown should also
be empowered to acquire land already alienated to Europeans. Extensive
areas alienated as farms years ago have never been utilized beneficially;
and it has become apparent that rauch of the land is of inferior quality, or
«so short of water, that no European can make a living on it' (KLC
? 1934:1264).
Nevertheless, by 1932 the Laikipia région and the international boundary with
Tanganyika were no longer a topic of debate for the Land Commission. The
land claims named above were the only issues allowed to be discussed:
A. One Mile Zone and Chyulu Triangle
With regard to these areas the Maasai stressed before the Carter Commission
the importance of these zones for their livestock economy as they were the
only pièces of land in the vicinity with a few streams and springs to which
they had recourse during the dry season.16
By the late 1920s, a Sub-Committee of the Executive Council had already
advised the Colonial Government concerning the land claims made by the
Maasai. This commission, however, could not reach an unanimous point of
view as the Provincial Commissioner, Mr. S. Deck, applied in a minority
report for the inclusion of the One Mile Zone and Chyulu Triangle. Major C.
rfJuxton, the District Commissioner Kajiado and who had worked in Narok
In the south of the Maasai Province access to other watering points had become more
difficult. Due to an amended démarcation of the international Kenya-Tanganyika boundary in
1926, the Meto and Namanga areas were reduced by some 15 square miles including about a
dozen springs and wells. To relieve some of the difficulties during the dry seasons the "Kenya
Maasai" were granted some concessions which only lasted till 1933.
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District before, had given évidence before the Sub-Committee but had not been
able to change the minds of the other members. According to Buxton the
Maasai had been using the Mile Zone since time immémorial. This use had
continued after the proclamation of the Maasai Reserve except for 1917, 1918
and 1927 when they were removed from the area by the British but allowed to
return after Maasai protest.
Officially, however, the Mile Zone and the Chyulu Triangle were not
included as belonging to the Maasai Reserve in the 1911 Treaty. The omission
of the Triangle seems to have been an error as in 1916 Governor Belfield
approved altération of the boundary to include the Triangle. Later, by Gazette
notice, the Triangle was again excluded from the reserve, probably to be set
apart for soldier settlement. Buxton also stressed that alternative water facilities
would not compensate the Maasai for the loss of the two zones and that in
other Reserves the One Mile Zone near the railway had been abandoned.
Finally hè criticised all those 'anti-Maasai' officers who point to the large area
available to the Maasai by stating that Maasai pastoralists lost many animais
during 1929, in spite of having been given some extra grazing concessions. Of
course these officers stated that the Maasai Reserve was overstocked and if the
Maasai were to be given more land the problem would repeat itself within a
short period of time.
In May 1930 the Executive Council decided that the Maasai had no claim
for extension of their reserve by the addition of the Mile Zone. The Chyulu
Triangle, however, could be included if the Native Lands Trust Board were to
agrée. In April 1931 this Board also declined, pointing to the large area
occupied by the Maasai as compared to other groups. The Central Board's only
concession was that the Maasai could 'be allowed to continue to occupy the
areas by grant of a lease or licence, renewable annually, until such time as
adequate alternative grazing and water facilities be made available by boring or
otherwise' (KLC 1934:1188/89). Buxton was fighting a losing battle. 'The
policy of the government toward pastoralists was totally opposed to any
extension of their land' (Spencer 1983:130).
The Kenya Land Commission took notice of the above information and
heard some more Government officials and settlers. The latter stressed the
importance of the One Mile Zone as a means of controlling quarantine
régulations. Moreover, Mr. Deck had tempered his demand for the inclusion of
the zones by stating that land taken from the Maasai for the settlement of the
Kikuyu should be compensated for by land from the Mile Zone and Chyulu
Triangle.
B. Railway 1/4 Mile Zone
In October 1926, at the official gazetting of the Reserve boundaries, the 1/4
Mile Zone on both sides along the centre line of the Magadi Railway was
excluded from the Maasai Reserve. The Sub-Committee of the Executive
Council advised the re-inclusion of this zone and this was approved by the
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C. Exchanges
Four major exchanges were discussed; the Mau Forest Exchange (14,000
acres), the Kinangop Circumcision area exchange (19,241 acres in the Kedong
Valley given to the Maasai for 6,529 acres), the Ndeiya Exchange (4,740
acres) and the Farm No. 410/1 (Colvile) Exchange (230 acres). AH of them are
located in the northern part of the Maasai Province between the Mau région of
Narok District and the Kiserian area of the Kajiado District (see figure 5.4).
5.4.5 Conclusions and Reconunendations of the Carter Land Commission
The final report of the Kenya Land Commission with référence to the Maasai
area, starled with a genera! remark concerning the Maasai need for land. In
fact a real examination of this topic had hardly taken place. Maasai needs were
mainly dealt with by comparing the Maasai population density of 3 persons per
square mile with the population density in the Kikuyu Reserve (283/square
mile) and the Kavirondo/Luo area (145/square mile).
This led the Carter Commission to criticise the fact that not only Europeans,
but even other African groups were precluded from obtaining land in the
Maasai Reserve on any reasonable security, unless the Maasai themselves
would agrée.
'When we turn from the interests of the Masai and consider the interests
of other tribes, it is clear that the permanent entail of a vast area of land
for the benefit of a tribe which makes very little use of it and, left to
itself, would certainly not be able to keep it, must appear unjust,
especially when one, at least, of the neighbouring tribes is living in a
state which borders on congestion. Nobody wishes to deprive the Masai
of their land, but justification might arise for requiring them to lease
unused portions of it to other tribes or to individual natives' (Carter
1934:7).
It is clear that the Maasai sympathizer Buxton had got nowhere. The view held
by the Kikuyu officers was virtually accepted in füll. The Commission foresaw
an interuption in progress, and even a reversai, for die Maasai if they were to
remain in isolation. Large areas of valuable agricultural land would remain
unused for the benefit of poor quality livestock during only certain short
periods of the year. With regard to the spécifie land claims the Carter
Commission advised as follows:
- The One Mile Zone and Chyulu Triangle were not included in the
Agreement Boundaries of 1911 and thus cannot be claimed by the Maasai.
However, if the Maasai desired, they should be given, at a reasonable rent
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an annual lease, until equivalent watering facilities would be available
withm the Masai Reserve. The Chyulu Triangle could be added to the
Reserve if the Maasai would cède some of their good agricultural land to
other agricultural communities.
- The 1/4 Mile Zone was included in the Reserve.
- With référence to the exchanges of land discussed above, the Carter
Commission approved the proposais and conditions agreed upon by the
parties involved. However, the Commission advised regularizing the Ndeiya
exchange by a formal lease as 'the Kikuyu are getting more and better land
than they are giving up' (KLC 1934:min.709).
The Kenya Land Commission Report was, with regard to the main proposais,
accepted by the Government. The leasing of land to other tribes, however, was
not approved until the New Land Ordinance, which was to replace the 1915
Ordinance and 1930 Native Lands Trust Ordinance, would come into füll
force.
5.5 1946 • 1963: Late Colonial Period; Grazing Scheines,
Infiltration, Emergency and Independence
5.5.1 The African Land Crisis
The growth of the economy which had begun after the ending of World War
u, brought with it a sharp, direct, and growing conflict with African (mainly
Kikuyu) squatters in the Rift Valley who were now seen as a block, standing
in the way of the expansion of modern agriculture, that is, white farm
expansion. 'The White Highlands, which had previously served the function of
helping to relieve population pressure in Central Province, now began to send
people back into the Central Province Reserves, thus further exacerbating land
pressure and social tension' (Gordon 1979:102). At the end of the War
approximately 90,000 ex-soldiers or conscript servicemen of die King's African
Rifles had already raised the number of jobless and/or landless Africans.
The economie crisis in the African Reserves was perceived by the colonial
regime as a crisis concerning African land.
Firstly, it was decided that, from a légal point of view the best way to
handle this was by a strengthening of the Community control over land in the
African Reserves to protect the weak against the strong.
Secondly, the Government started 'a program of soil conservation intended
eventually to increase the output in those areas. Since the alternative to
increased productivity could only be the expansion of the African Areas - the
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most obvious area of expansion being the Highlands - it was politically as well
as economically important for soil conservation to succeed' (Gordon,
1979:103).
In 1945 a new agency, thé African Seulement Board, was created to deal
with this problem. The Board consisted of the Chief Native commissioner and
directors of agriculture and veterinary services. Besides acting as a financial
corporation the Board had mainly an advisory, monitoring and evaluating
fonction. The actual opérations were carried out by Departnients, especially at
Provincial level. Although its initial focus was settlement of Africans returning
from the War or those removed from the White Highlands, the ecological
component gained more and more attention. Several adjustments in the Board's
name -African Land Utilization and Settlement (ALUS 1947) and Aftican Land
Development Board (ALDEV 1953)- were made to illustrate this shift of
concern. 'In the range country of Kenya between 1945 and 1962 the African
Land Development Board was involved in constnicting 1,020 seasonal dams,
332 permanent dams, 308 sub-surface dams, 38 rock catchments, 40 masonry
weirs; it installed 72 piping schemes, protected 54 springs, drilled 44 boreholes
and over 200 wells and hand drilled boreholes' (Peberdy 1969:175). Besides
this scheine others were initiated which (also) operated in the African Reserves
(see chapter 6).
Not just the (forced) migration of Africans but also the natural growth of
the population augmented the problems in the small African Reserves. By 1945
Kenya had a population of approximately 5.2 million people of which
approximately 5 million were Africans. Between the censuses of 1948 and
1962 the number of Africans increased from 5,251,120 to 8,365,942. They far
outnumbered the European and Asian population which by 1948 amounted to
29,660 and 97,687 respectively, rising to 55,759 and 176,613 in 1962. This
population increase resulted in an African labour surplus which triggered off
mral-urban migration, especially towards Nairobi. Once a small resting camp
for the IBEAC, Nairobi had grown from a population of some 11,500 in 1906
to 65,000 by 1938. Within 10 more years this number had almost doubled. By
1948 64,397 Africans, 41,810 Asians, 10,830 Europeans and 1,939 others,
totalling 118,976, inhabited the capital city of Kenya. In 1962 this figure had
risen to 266,794, being 156,246 Africans, 86,453 Asians, 21,477 Europeans
and 2,618 others.17
In spite of their overwhelming majority it was 1944 befor the first
nominated African member appeared in the Legislative Council. By 1952
17 The 1962 figure bas in later years been modifiée to 343,500 inhabitants, because the 1962
census restricted the Nairobi population to those people living in the city proper. For 1969 the new
1963 municipal district boundary, including the peri-urban area, was used. The percentage of
Africans living in Nairobi (proper) compared to the total African population amounted to 1.2 per
cent in 1948 and 1.9 per cent in 1962. For Europeans these figures were 36.5 and 38.5 per cent
respectively. Asians ranked first conceming the rate of urbanisation with 42.8 per cent in 1948 and
48.9 per cent in 1962.
Chapter 5: Pre-Independence History of Land Use and Land Policy 199
African représentation had increased to 8 members (or 15 per cent).18
However, as real (economie) improvements were not occurring and were
repeatedly slowed down by the European community, a radicalization of
African, mainly Kikuyu, politics occurred. This eventually escalated towards an
armed struggle between the so-called Mau Mau movement and the Colonial
Government.19 In October 1952 a state of Emergency was déclarée, which
lasted till June 1959. The Mau Mau did not spread to the rest of the territory,
except for among the Embu and Meru and to some extent the Kamba, although
the présence of troops and the enforcement of emergency measures certainly
affected the overall politica! climate. 'The casualties among government forces,
given as something less than 1,000 killed, were far outnumbered by those of
their opponents, estimated at more than 11,000 - to which must be added the
grim figure of more than 1,000 exécutions: but it is believed that the civilian
victims of the latter numbered not much less than 2,000' (Bennett & Smith
1976:132).
Disunity among the settlers on how to respond to African grievances weakened
their position. London was able to gain more influence. This time the Colonial
Administration, through Governor Ph. Mitchell and E. Baring, who succeeded
him in 1952, was less recalcitrant as had been bef ore. Several visite were paid
by British Members of Parliament and Advisory Commissions, resulting in a
whole series of reform documents produced in the mid-1950s.
Among the most influential were the Report of the East African Royal
Commission 1953-1955 conceming the Government's policies in Kenya and
the Plan to Intensif y the Development of African Agriculture in Kenya of 1954
by the assistant directer for Agriculture R.J.M. Swynnerton. The former helped
to pave the way for the latter, but its writing must mainly be seen as a reaction
to the Mau Mau uprising and the problem of land in the densely populated
Central Province.
Initially the plan was only intended to be implemented in the Kikuyu
Reserve but it was subsequently widened to include all Native Land Units in
the other provinces of Kenya. Swynnerton stated that 'In genera! it may be said
that any land naturally suited to settlement has already been occupied, often
18 In total 54 seats were available on the Legislative Council. European members amounted
to 14 elected officials and 7 nominated officials or 39 per cent In reality more Europeans were
present as another 16 places were open for 8 Government officials and 8 nominated persons from
outside the public sector. The remaining 11 places were divided between 8 Asians and 3 Arabs.
The Executive Council of 1952 consisted of the Governor plus 12 members; 8 Government
officials, 2 nominated Europeans, l nominated Asian and, for the first time, l nominated African.
19 The Mau Mau uprising was a complex historica! event which bas several possible
explanations and which is still being studied by historians. The movement can be seen as
everything from "nationalistic freedom fighters" towards "anti-christ tnbal barbarians". See for an
analysis of these different opinions the works of Buijtenhuis (1973) and Fiirley (1972).
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very densely. There are certain exceptions, e.g. in Masai, Mau-Narok and
Trans Mara, not fully or agriculturally occupied for politica! reasons. Of the
remainder of the colony three-quarters is semi-arid and, except in limited areas,
occupied by pastoral tribes' (Swynnerton 1955:7). In the Plan the African lands
were divided into four catégories, each having its own characteristics and
needing a special approach:
1. high-potential areas suited for mixed farming, specializing in high-yielding
cash crops and livestock;
2. medium-potential régions on which to intensify cultivation or which could
be brought into new production by irrigation;
semi-arid pastoral areas, 'which can never be developed intensively but in
which some food requirements should normally be grown and from which,
given adequate outlets for surplus stock, control of stock numbers, a
planned grid of water supplies and sound grazing management, may be
derived a constant and valuable flow of livestock and their products;
without such control, large sums of money can be expended with no
economie benefit whatsoever' (Swynnerton 1955:7);
4. special areas and projects like eroded lands, horticultural development
schemes, tsetse réclamation schemes, afforestation schemes.
The British Government eventually provided £16 million for this Five-Year
programme of land consolidation and registration. The idea of communal land
ownership had been dropped unofficially as early as 1950 by the Department
of Agriculture. Neither the Land Bank nor the commercial banks were
interested in lending money to African farmers without individual security
provided by way of a land tiüe. Traditional land tenure had to be removed as it
was considered as blocking the way towards the intensification of African
agriculture. In future, the création of a landless class was predicted, but
considered to be a normal step in the évolution of a country. Together with a
lifting of the ban on the growth of cash crops by African farmers, provision of
security of tenure, technical assistance, water improvement, agricultural
éducation, credit and marketing facilities, the income and standards of living of
the people should be raised, while at the same time a substantial increase in the
resources and economy of the Colony would take place.
It was then that the semi-arid régions were "discovered" to be a potential
asset to Kenya's economy. 'The bulk of the 6,000,000 cattie in Kenya lie in
the pastoral areas, in the main semi-arid. If the value of the bulk of the
necessary annual take-off of 650,000 head can be raised from £2 to £10-£15
apiece, that gives some idea of the potential value of stock in these areas'
(Swynnerton 1955:62). To improve the productivité of the semi-arid pastoral
areas five measures had to be taken:
Chapter 5: Pre-Independence History of Land Use and Land Policy 201
1. limitation of the number of livestock to the carrying capacity of the land
2. provision of regulär outlets for the absorption of all excess stock
3. construction of an adequate system of permanent water supplies.
4. maintenance of the grazing areas at a productive level
5. eradication of tsetse
Activities and finances of ALDEV were integrated into the Swynnerton Plan.
The main concern remained the limitation of stock numbers, as it was thought
that without this no satisfactory development could be achieved. Disease
control had the lowest priority, marketing and grazing management the highest.
Field abattoirs, Grazing Schemes based on groups using a certain borehole,
création of schoolfarms to teach the children modern practices of husbandry,
and pasrure research were the major means initiated to reach the above
mentioned objectives.
Although the Swynnerton Plan mentioned the high potential value of the
pastoral areas, all in all only marginal attention was given to these areas as
compared with the other more fertile areas on which the main and strongest
opposition to the British Colonial Government was to be found. A commission
was formed to inquire 'to what extent the pastoral tribes, wealthy in stock,
should finance the préservation and development of their lands on a controlled
basis, remembering that capital development will offen be out of proportion to
the economie value of the land' (Swynnerton 1955:33). Money invested in
Grazing Schemes should be recoverable, so for the semi-arid areas loans were
preferred above grants some of which were nevertheless provided.
Within about six years the Swynnerton Plan had become a reality. In the
Central Province the programme had been successful within this short period
because extraordinary conditions existed then as a result of the Emergency:
'the rural population had been forcibly grouped in newly established villages as
a défense measure and this facilitated the reallocation of land in Consolidated
holdings in the surrounding rural areas' (Memon 1981:76). 'By mid-1962
nearly 300,000 farms had been consohdated and enclosed, covering some 2.4
million acres, and amounting to approximately 51 per cent of the high potential
land in the African areas' (McWilliam 1976:264). The expanding small-holding
cash-crop economy produced mainly for the domestic market.
5.5.2 Administrative Changes and Boundary Adjustments
After the war the head of the Administration in Kajiado District regained the
status of District Commissioner which had been lost as a war time economy in
1942. Additionally the administration over the Ngong area was transferred to
Kajiado. In 1948 section councils were formed for each section, mainly acting
as advisory bodies for matters concerning them. That same year the Joint Local
Native Councils of Narok and Kajiado were replaced by the Maasai Council.
From 1951 to 1955 this council was given law-making and fmancial powers
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and the Local Native Councils of each district simply turned into committees.
'The members have been drawn more or less equally from Kajiado and Narok
Districts and it is hoped that the more progressive Kajiado element will be able
to influence their less amenable brothers from Narok' (KDAR 1951:11).
Together with the Kamba of Kitui and Machakos District the two Maasai
Districts formed the new Southern Province in 1953. During the latter half of
the 1950s the Kajiado African District Council, which had replaced the Masai
African District Council by 1956, administered the district in co-operation with
the Provincial administration. The latter had expanded its staffing power a year
before through the opening of a new substation at Loitokitok and the posting
of a District Officer and a Livestock Officer. In fact, until the beginning of the
1950s, the Maasai had hardly come across a technical officer in the interior of
the district. The start of the Ten Year Development Plan and the Swynnerton
Plan changea tins situation.
According to the District Comnüssioner P. Low, who took over from A.
Simpson in 1956, the new Kajiado African District Council was extremely land
conscious. They had every reason to be. Not only the interna! land use
developments such as grazing schemes, individual ranches and game
conservation parks, but also the Kajiado District boundary were still under
debate. During the drought of 1949, Loitokitok Maasai in the Oltilal région
were given permission by the Kenya National Parks Trustees to graze across
the Tsavo national park boundary up to Olarammi Hill. According to the local
Maasai, this had been the boundary originally pointed out to them in the mid
1930s, but later, when gazetted, it had been pushed back. When the newly
Southern Province Boundaries were gazetted in 1953, an error had been made
with regard to the démarcation of the "Oltilal-Njugini" area. Adjustments made
in 1954, agreed upon by both parties, were overruled by the Minister of Forest
Development, Game and Fisheries the following year, which meant that the
Maasai were officially illegally watering their catüe at the Njugini river during
the latter half of the 1950s.
Finally, in 1960 the Oltilal and Njugini exchange was settled positively for
the Maasai. An area of approximately 500 km2 located south of Rombo was
added to Kajiado District in exchange for an area of similar size towards the
north east of Rombo. In 1961 the lower western boundary of Kajiado District
was slightly pushed to the west, running more or less parallel at a maximum of
10 kilomètres with the Euaso Ng'iro river.20
That same year the Lancaster House Conference was held to discuss the
handing over of colonial power to the African population. The Maasai,
however, became worried as they feared that the old Maasai Treaties would be
dissolved the moment a free and independent Kenya became reality. The
Since 1954, Kajiado District was already administering this part of thé Narok Loodokilam
section.
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Maasai Districts were still governed as closed areas and prohibited other
African groups free entry. It was feared that this would change as soon as the
Maasai became part of an independent Kenya. African Delegates from Nyanza
and Nyeri, both densely populated areas, had protested as early as 1959 against
the closed status of the Maasai districts and had called for the intégration of
the land and all the ethnie groups in Kenya. 'It was wrong to talk in terms of
Masailand. "it is African land, Kenya land'" (EAS 05/09/59). Their appeal was
not successful as it was by the late 1960s before the status of closed district
was withdrawn.
The 1960-1 disaster together with the threat of increasing settlement by
outsiders which was very relevant in the Ngong area, resulted in the création of
the Kaputiei Development Committee in 1960. lts main initiators were the
young educated Kaputiei of the junior elder and senior warrior age groups.
According to Hedlund the Kaputiei elders had agreed to its formation and to it
functioning as a spokesman for the efforts to secure the right to land in the
future and the prevention of further foreign intrusion (see Hedlund 1979:30).
To strengthen their politically weak position, Kenyan and Tanganyikan
Maasai formed their own political body called the Masai United Front.21 They
even thought of proclaiming their own independence, defended by the British
army with Arusha becoming the capital city. With the support of a catholic
priest this idea got as far as the United Nations. However, when British
support failed, the request for independence was in vain. A claim for
£5,800,000, to be paid by the British as compensation for the use of
Maasailand since 1904 was also rejected. Referring to the anxiety of the
Maasai people that neighbours living in areas with a large shortage of land
would cast covetous eyes on Maasai land Sir Patrick Renison, Governor at the
time, said 'This is inevitably so and cannot be altered until your land becomes
so well-developed and intensively ranched that it becomes obvious to all that
there is no room for others to enter and farm it' (EAS 30/07/60).
A Regional Boundaries Commission was installed in July 1962 to divide
Kenya into six Administrative Regions and a Nairobi area whilst granting to
the wishes of people in any locality to be included in any particular Region.
The Kamba and the Maasai both stressed their unwillingness to continue their
Southern Province alliance. Thinking that the Regional Boundaries
Commission was a new Carter Commission to deal with land disputes, both
groups made additional claims for land. The Kamba even demanded large parts
21 In fact this party was the revival of the "Gtoup of Educated Maasai" which had existed
between 1948 and 1955. lts tnembeis were recruited from among the junior elders of the Ddento
age-group, almost all of them working for the Government and was, besides being a place for
discussing important issues to do with development, active in trying to find suitable jobs for
Maasai school-leavers (see Jacobs 1963:73/4).
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of Kajiado District as far as Magadi. The Maasai restricted themselves to the
Nairobi National Park and the Chyulu Hills.
However, the Lancaster House Agreement precluded any change in the
Maasai Treaty area affecting the Kamba-Maasai boundary. KANU, headed by
the first president of the Republic of Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta, expressed the
view that the present provincial boundaries should be retained and simply
renamed régions. 'Regionalism will promote tribalism and result in chaos. (...)
There should be freedom of movement in the Kenya of the future and the
people should not be insulated by tribes' (RBC 1962:45). The Masai United
Front was incorporated into the Kenya African Democratie Union (KADU), a
political party containing mainly the smaller ethnie groups of Kenya as
opposed to the Kenya African National Union representing the influential
Kikuyu, Luo and Kamba. KADU proposed the création of one big Rift Valley
Province which would enclude the Maasai, Kalenjin, Samburu, Turkana, Pokot
and other mainly semi-nomadic groups. This proposai was honoured by the
Commission.
The Maasai politicians then starled to combat each other; first the former
secretary and founder of the MUF, John Keen, joined the Kikuyu and Luo
dominated KANU, which led the former chairman of the MUF, Stanley
Oloitipitip, to start a campaign among Maasai leaders to déclare a vote of no-
confidence in Keen. The rivalry between these two men was to dominate
Maasai politics for the next two decades to come.
5.5.3 The Introduction of Grazing Scheines and Individual Ranches
In the opinion of the British Administration, traditional grazing control had
been inadequate and become even more difficult to implement with the
abolition of section boundaries which allowed free grazing for the Maasai
throughout the whole of Maasailand as had been decided by the Joint Local
Native Councils in June 1946. This décision conflicted with the British aim to
implement a grazing control plan for each section by restricting the movement
of stock from one section to another so as to enforce an economie limit within
the boundaries of each section. So far the Maasai had only agreed to allow a
spécifie number of animais in the vicinity of a borehole. If this number was
exceeded the borehole would be closed in order to give the area a "rest". A
request by the Officer in Charge of Maasailand in 1947 to reintroduce the
section boundaries was not honoured. Nevertheless, in 1948, the Kaputiei
attempted to exclude the Maasai of other sections from grazing in their area.22
Even the "right" and "left hand" of Keekonyokie ilmurran quarrelled over the
grazing rights in their own section. It should be noted, however, that even in
22
In July 1949 U was suggested to the Purko and Ildamat elders that they should leave
Kajiado and join the main bodies of their Sections in Narok District. This suggestion was sttongly
opposed and the idea was subsequently dropped (see KDAR 1949:4).
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1948 with a sévère lack of rain, Mr. Colvile, a prominent rancher, after touring
the district had reported that 'littie or no harm had been done to the land by
overstocking' (KDAR 1948:15).
The semi-drought conditions of 1948 continued into 1949 killing a huge
number of animais. Tension between several sections grew over the rights to
use certain grazing areas. The Matapato versus the Dalalekutuk and the
Loitokitok-Kisonko versus the Kaputiei clashed over Nailumbe (in Mashuru)
and Eselenkei, respectively. Despite opposition from the Loitokitok-Kisonko an
agreement was reached in principle to reintroduce the section boundaries.
However, in spite of intensive propaganda by the British Administration, they
were never implemented. Throughout the first half of the 1950s, co-operation
between different il-oshon was excellent. Even the Dalalekutuk and the
Matapato settled their quarrel over the Nailumbe area in 1955 after 6 years of
disagreement.23 The above average rainfall of the 1950s, particularly of 1951,
1954 and 1957, resulted in an abundance of grass and water all over the
district and must have reduced tension between several sections.
The Maasai did co-operate with the Colonial Administration by accepting
more comprehensive grazing control measures. 'The adoption of Rules to
control grazing and water is probably the most progressive step that this
council has yet taken. It shows clearly that the Kajiado Masai are at last
beginning to appreciate that the time has corne to révise their ideas on catüe
farming and land management' (KDAR 1950:10). To guide this process it was
decided to opt for a phased programme. Pirstiy, a sélection was to be made of
a limited number of stockowners who were allowed to water their catüe at
each borehole. A maximum of 2,000 catüe were permitted around one
borehole. Borehole permits were issued to stockowners selected by their
section councils. Secondly 'with the number of stock using the boreholes
limited and with the owners paying for the privilege of use by subscribing to a
renewals fund, each area served by a borehole should, with guidance and
control, eventually become a form of ranch unit' (KDAR 1952:1). A few years
earlier the Maasai had already agreed to a ranching experiment.
A. The Konza Grazing Experiment
In November 1948 the Wheatiands near Kitengela were given up. The British
proposed to transform the area and the adjoining pastures of up to 40 square
miles to become a grazing control experiment by the African Land Use and
Seulement Board (ALUS). The Maasai rejected this but, with reluctance,
agreed to set apart another (waterless) area of 36 square miles near Konza. The
23 By 1956 an old dispute between the Kaputiei and Kisonko sections had revived. The
former feared the expansion of the latter into their tertitory, the area of Mokotani, and they wanted
a boundary. This was agreed upon by both sections in December 1957. A similar situation arose
between the Loodokilani and the Keekonyokie. Nevertheless, by 1960 relations between parties
were fairly good again.
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British considered this an important victory as they had been trying to
implement a form of grazing control for a long time.
In 1949, the pilot Konza grazing scheme fïnally went ahead with 1£
(selected) families entering the scheme, bringing along approximately 1,285
head of cattle who had been in quarantine for some time. The 36 square miles
area, completely fenced, was divided into 4 paddocks of 9 square miles each.
Two boreholes were installed and a cattle dip and a manager and a veterinary
assistant were posted to Konza. According to the DC's Annual Report the
scheme proved to be an unqualified success in a year which had brought
drought and rinderpest to Kajiado District. 'Within a few miles of the fence
cattle were dying in hundreds of disease and starvation and the Masai were
going without mUk whilst inside the scheme the cattle remained sleet and fit
and their milk yield increased. This was quickly appreciated by the Masai and
munerous applications were received to enter Konza' (KDAR 1949:16). The
only problem seemed to be the maintenance of the 24 mile perimeter fence
which had been broken into several tunes by game (especially zebra and larger
buck). Again, 1950 was a year with only a minimum of rainfall. This and the
success of Konza had led the Kaputiei to make a request for a second ranch at
Ilpolosat adjacent to the Konza scheme. Also, the Kaputiei were the first to
accept a Grazing Control scheme, although they still had some doubts. It was
stated that: 'The real stumbling block to the rapid development of the scheme
is that the Kaputei are well aware that if their country is divided into ranch
units each holding only 2500 head of cattle, there will corne a time when a
large number of surplus stock will be left with nowhere to go. This of course,
is perfectly true and is another illustration of the need for destocking' (KDAR
1950:13).
The abundant rains of 1951 led to a sudden transformation of the district
into a land of plenty. This made the Maasai less réceptive towards propaganda
concerning the planned development of their land based on the réduction of
stock and controlled ranching. Moreover, it had become clear that the better
condition of the Konza stock in a favourable year had only been due to
dipping. Grazing management which included fencing and other cosdy
measures or restrictions did not therefore seem to be as necessary as had been
propagated. The Konza experiment started to show the first signs of
disagreement between the Maasai participants and the Official Staff. According
to the latter, 300 head of cattle had to be sold to keep the stock down to l
head to 15 acres. The Konza elders were willing to effect this réduction
immediately but not by selling but by passing the animais through to friends
and relatives living in other parts of the district. 'Such an agreement would,
however, mean further overstocking in an already overstocked district and is
not therefore acceptable, particularly to A.L.U.S. who insist that one of the
primary objects of the scheme was the disposai by sale of surplus cattie. This,
however, was certainly not made clear at the commencement of the scheme in
1949 and was never made a condition of entry into the scheme' (KDAR
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1951:13). In fact, there would never have been a Konza Grazing Scheme, as
the Administration fully realized, if this condition had been mentioned.
Finally, an arrangement was accepted by which the Konza members agreed
to dispose of as many cattle as they themselves deemed fit at every bi-monthly
auction at Mashuru, The problems experienced by the Konza also appeared in
other parts of the district where the number of cattle using the boreholes
exceeded the 2,000 head agreed upon in 1951. To keep a better eye on the
number of cattle belonging to Konza participants and to keep other cattle out a
branding opération was started in July 1952. At the end of the year the Masai
African District Council took over the management of the scheme. Between
1947 and 1952, the Konza Grazing Demonstration Scheme had cost the
ALDEV programme £13,076 (see GoK/MAAHWR 1962:71).
By late 1952 a drought had hit the whole of the district and it continued into
1953 and resulted in the death of a considérable proportion of the Maasai
stock. This expérience affected a change in the ultimate objective of the
Kajiado development plan which had originally envisaged the division of the
district into ranch units. 'Further investigation has shown that whereas this
may, in conjunction with heavy stock réduction, be feasible in the Kaputei
Section south of the Mombasa railway line, a large area of the district is, by
reason of climatic and geological conditions, unsuitable for a static form of
ranching' (KDAR 1953:1). The 50 per cent cattle cull for the Kaputiei section
which had been considered necessary by the Administration, was, of course,
unacceptable to the Maasai. Moreover, even if the Maasai had been willing to
seil such a large number of animais this would not have been possible. This
was illustrated in 1954 when thé Konza Scheme résidents correctly stated that
the proposed selling of the scheme's surplus of 300 cattle (or 15 per cent) was
not possible due to thé lack of sales facilities. Konza started to loose its glow
of success. The Administration even thought of transforming thé Scheme into a
sectional beef fattening ranch. Because of the original, libéral "User
Agreement", éviction of the résidents would not have been easy, although the
acceptance of the Masai Land Usage By-Laws were thought to give the
necessary backing for such drastic and dramatic action. Nonetheless, 4 families
decided to leave the Scheme. As a solution the Development Committee and
the Résidents reached an agreement in 1955 that further participation in the
scheme would depend on the following of closely defined rules, the most
important of which being the sale of the annual natura! stock increase.
Some improvements were made in 1956 such as the branding of animais
ensuring individual identification, the construction of a dam and the removal of
plains game off the ranch. However, the old problem of stock disposai
continued. By the end of 1957 the number of cattle on the ranch had passed
the permitted ceiling and by 1958 the number of cattle had increased to 2,419
(see GoK/MAAHWR 1962:73). Matters became worse due to a drought in
1959. Three participants decided to withdraw rather than to submit to stock
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limitation. Three new résidents were selected who accepted the Konza rules.
Some 400 surplus cattle were disposed of. Three Sahiwal bulls were purchased
and each stockowner selected heifers which were put to the bulls. This new
start was only to last for a short period. In 1960 the rains failed. Grazing was
non-existent in many areas and cattle were dying in large numbers. Matters
became worse in 1961, leaving the Konza grazing area barren ground.
By mid-1961 all résidents had left the Scheme and the area was closed for
grazing. The Konza Ranch was not to open again. The initial idea of dividing
the area into 4 individual ranches of 2,000 acres each and setting aside the
remaining 14,000 acres as a beef enterprise to be operated by the Kaputiei
Section Council was dropped and the Scheme was subdivided into 8 individual
ranches of varied sizes in 1964.
B. Section Grazing Schemas
Although the Konza Scheme failed in the end in the more than 10 years of its
existence it had been an important factor in encouraging Maasai interest in
modern methods of husbandry and range management such as dipping,
inoculation, dam construction, etc. It also showed the disadvantages of
permanent seulement such as the high opération and maintenance costs and the
possible risks of overgrazing. All in all, it will certainly have stimulated other
initiatives in the field of grazing management.
Most important of these were the Grazing Schemes developed in Kajiado
District. Grazing schemes were established with funds released through the
African Land Development Programme (ALDEV). 'More than £43,000 [of the
£800,000 available for the whole of Kenya] has been spent in the Kajiado
district on grazing scheme development since 1947, much of which has been
raised by the Masai through self-tax levies' (Fallon 1962:22).
The "Masai African District Council (Grazing Control) By-Laws, 1955"
conferred broad powers upon the Livestock Officer in charge of a scheme,
including: 1) détermination ofthose approved to graze livestock in the scheme;
2) the number of animais each is to be allowed to graze; 3) the area to be
grazed (see Fallon 1962:25). These rules allowed the levying of fines up to Sh.
1,000 and/or 6 months imprisonment. However, when setting up the Scheme it
was agreed that co-operation should be on a voluntary basis and should be
without recourse to the imposition of grazing fées for individual cattle. As with
Konza, the alternative would have been to have had no scheme at all.
The fürst scheme was established in the Kisonko area located in the eastern
part of Kajiado District in 1954 and included three traditional clan areas
making a total of 1,300,000 acres (5,265 km2). £25,000 was set aside by
ALDEV of which £10,000 was a loan. Grazing principles were based on the
traditional use of the area which was then extended by means of strict grazing
controls enforced on a clan basis by Grazing Committees. For this the
committees made detailed plans for the use of several areas as soon as the wet
season started. The main aim of this scheme was the lengthening of the time in
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which wet weather grazing areas could be used by staying as long as possible
in the dry weather zone Tanks and dams were constructed, a Livestock Officer
installed to supervise grazing management and new roads were opened up in
the section area. In trying to reduce the already overstocked area a special
stock market was established in Illasit to provide a destocking outlet 'From the
start of the scheme the II Kisongo agreed to pay for the récurrent costs
including the loan repayments by imposing a special annual rate of sh. 101-
payable by each taxpayer' (GoK/MAAHWR 1962:75).
The prolongea drought of 1956 was a difficult challenge to the Grazing
Committees. Areas which it had been agreed should be rested for a year or
even longer had, in the end, to be reopened to grazing owing to force of
circumstances and public opinion. It was proposed to give the 18 Grazing
Elders powers under section 13 of the Masai Land Usage By-Laws to take
cases of orders before the African Court in the hope that they would become
more fully aware of their responsibilities. However, the Administration fully
realized that 'owing to the vagaries of the rains it cannot be expected that an
even pattern for grazing control will ever be achieved in II Kisongo' (KDAR
1957:16). This was proved in 1959 when any controls had to be abandoned as
cattle based on the scheme had to go far afleid in search of grazing even
trespassing into Taveta, Tsavo and Tanganyika.
Other Schemes started in the 1950s were the Matapato Grazing Scheme
(1957, 880,000 acres, £4,956 grant) and the Loodokilani Sectional Scheme
(1959, 1,920,000 acres, £3,639 grant). Both schemes had a bad start due to
drought and to a lack of officials. The Maasai raised money through the sale of
cattle for water improvement works.
In 1959 a Land Usage Committee was formed in the African District Council
to enquire into the problem of overstocking into and the care of land. By 1960
all Maasai sections had applied for better water supply schemes such as rock
catchments, dams and sub-surface dams. Government officials, however,
combined their possible approval of such schemes with the requirement of
grazing control. Nonetheless, it should be realized that:
'(...) much of the incentive for these new schemes was politica! in nature.
Sensing the winds of change that would sweep independent African
governments into power in a few years time (...) most of the schemes
initiated in Maasailand during the 1950s were hastily conceived, poorly
designed, improperly implemented, and, above all, essentially planned for
rather with them. There generally was no provision in the plans for
innovations in human organizations to accompany thé introduction of
new technology and grazing techniques. (...) And not surprisingly,
virtually all of these schemes failed within a few years' (Jacobs
1980:294).
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Indeed by the end of 1961, the Kisonko Scheme had been suspended and was
never re-activated. Among the positive achievements made the building of 22
dams and tanks, the construction of a trench from the Noolturesh River near
Loitokitok and the opening of a cattle export market to Tanganyika via niasit
which even attracted stock owners from outside the scheme should be
mentioned. The Matapato and Loodokilani were only able to construct 11 and
14 dams, respectively.
In addition to the huge Section Grazing Scheines some school farms were
established at Maasai boarding schools in Loitokitok (150 acres), Bissel (1,000
acres), Mashuru (1,000 acres) and Kajiado (acreage unknown). This
programme was starled in 1949 with the objective of teaching the studente
animal husbandry, range management and to supply schools with meat, milk
and other food products. Funds for boreholes at each of these places were
provided by the African Land Utilization and Settiement Board.
C. Individual Rauches
Finally, mention should be made of the first individual ranches which began
appearing in Kajiado District in 1954. The Reverend Daudi Mokinyo, a
progressively minded Maasai who had been working with the Ngong
Veterinary Station, got permission from the Loodokilani section to start his
own individual ranch, keeping cattle on modern lines under the strict
supervision of the Veterinary Department. Permission was granted because of a
recommendation by the Kajiado Development Committee. The 4,000 acre
ranch, named Oloisur, was located approximately 10 kilomètres south of
Toroka Station on the Magadi branch railway, A loan of £1,000 was obtained
to install a borehole and a handpump and for the acquisition of an improved
buil from the Ngong Livestock Improvement Centre. However, water could not
be found by boring on the Oloisur ranch and, in 1956, an alternative ranch of
2,000 acres was offered, named Asembokeke, by the Loodokilani Section
Council in the upper reaches of the Toroka river.
In spite of this difficult start another application by Mr. Oladaru ole
Kordede for an individual ranch of 800 acres in the neighbourhood of Kajiado
Township was supported by the African District Council in December 1956. In
1957, the Dalalekutuk section set aside twelve square miles of land near
Kajiado for ranching by progressive Maasai, primarily from that section.
However, the terms of entry, including the saîe of stock to produce 50 per cent
of the initial capital required for water restricted the number of applicants to
only two. Meanwhile Reverend Daudi Mokinyo succeeded in finding water on
his new ranch. He bought six more breeding animais from Ngong and put up a
thorn barricade round the perimeter.
By 1959 interest in individual ranching, especially in the Kajiado and
Dalalekutuk area, had increased. The District Commissioner recorded that:
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there is an interest in improved stock and therefore an interest in
individual ranches. Whilst this is an ideal to be aimed at and an
inévitable development, a note of warning must be struck to avoid
ranches being sought for purely as a means of land grabbing. (...) There
is the danger that whilst some Masai genuinely wish to establish an
individual ranch and improve their stock, others merely wish to jump on
the bandwagon and grab land as a spéculation. This is a very real danger
and some time must be given to planning future ranch siting and
development and to the choosing of progressive, sensible people as
ranchers' (KDAR 1959:1/19).
Two thousand acres were the maximum allowed for every individual ranch. By
1960 it was even concluded that 'There will obviously have to be some re-
planning with regard to ranches. Few of the applicants have the désire or the
capital to make any serious attempt to ranch' (KDAR 1960:20).
Whatever the main reason for purchasing an individual ranch, one needed to
be wealthy person to develop it. It was necessary to have an area with good
grazing, trees and water, to fence it properiy and put something back into the
soil. It was estimated that at least £10,000 (or the sale of approximately 1,000
cattle) per ranch would be required to make anything of the ranches near
Kajiado. Nonetheless, by 1960, grazing schemes, individual ranchers and non
incorporated Maasai were suffering alike from the sévère drought. Although
the Reverend Daudi Mokinyo's ranch was praised for loosing only 5 cattle out
of 200 during the drought of 1960 and for selling some 12 gallons of milk a
day at Sh. 2/80 a gallon, hè had sévère diffïculties in meeting his loan
repayments at a rent of 6.5 per cent per annum. Fallon writes:
'I am unable to see how the setüers can meet high interest rate - short
term loan requirements. (...) There appears to be little likelihood of
success for the ranching program unless long term loans with low interest
rates (2 to 3 per cent per annum) can be made available for necessary
ranch and farm developments and livestock purchases (...) Individual
ownership or control should be encouraged. It must be remembered,
however, that individual ownership alone can not guarantee proper land
use' (Fallon 1962:28).
The Annual Report 1960 reveals how Reverend Mokinyo was able to meet the
terms of his loan. 'The Rev Daudi Mokinyo has not made much progress but
he is making a living though hè tends to depend on charcoal burning and sale
of zebra skins to make ends meet. The former is to be discouraged if hè does
not replace each tree eut down. He also wishes to open a butchery in Kajiado
and a shop on his ranch' (KDAR 1960:21). These difficulties did not stop
other, mostiy young and educated, Kaputiei Maasai from obtaining individual
ranches.
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Initially it was the Kaputiei Development Committee who proposed
registering the Kaputiei area under one title deed m possession of the Kaputiei
section. This idea was not accepted by the authorities as it would not stimulate
commercial changes. It seems as if the Kaputiei région in genera! and the high-
potential Ngong area in particular were thought to be suitable for commercial
ranching purposes needing the prerequisite of individual or coopérative forms
of land tenure. Advice given by various researchers such as Jacobs, Heady and
Fallon in the early 1960s, however, pointed to the risk of subdivision leading
to unviable small units. But in the high-potential Ngong area the phenomenon
of individual landownership expanded rapidly. A programme of land
consolidation, enabling the division of the area into individual ranches, was set
up in the Ngong area in 1961. This development, though opposed by the
elders, was favoured by the young and educated Kaputiei and backed by the
Kajiado County Council.
Several authors (Hedlund 1971 and 1979, Muranja 1973/74, Peron 1984)
have mentioned a number of reasons for the acceptance and growth of
individual landownership in the Kaputiei région: the formation of a buffer of
individual ranches at the fringes of the Maasai area to stop the illégal intrusion;
the strong position of young influential Kaputiei politicians who created a
political clientèle by handing out title deeds to supporters and who tried to
reduce the social and economie dominance exerted in daily life by the elders;
the wish to setde down and start commercial enterprises as shown by
neighbouring groups; the group of Kikuyu-Maasai, who had been
accommodating their landless brothers from Kikuyu land, also strongly
supported the land consolidation programme.
By 1963 approximately 24 individual ranches existed, located in all parts of
the District, like Sultan Hamud, Loitokitok, Kajiado and Oltepesi. Some were
selling cattle to obtain money for a borehole, for a water pump or to pay for a
dam and wireless sets made their appearance.
5.5.4 Other Land Use Developments in Kajiado District
A. Infiltration and Cultivation by Other African Groups
Although the semi-arid pastures were, in the eyes of the Administration,
heavily overstocked which resulted in sévère érosion of certain places, the most
serious situation existed in the semi-arid areas used for cultivation. In the two
Kikuyu settlements of Kor Kor and Oltesika on Namanga mountain, the
ecological balance was threatened due to the cutting down of trees on too steep
slopes or too near to the riverbed.
The effect of cultivation practised in a marginal area had been shown before
in Ndeiya, Kiambu District. As a resuit of the transfer of the Kikuyu back to
the Central Reserve and with many of them settling in Ndeiya, the agricultural
situation had deteriorated rapidly. The soil became hopelessly ruined, despite a
total ban on cultivation. Although Ndeiya was meant to be for the poor and
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landless, well-off Kikuyu were able to obtain a considérable portion of land in
this région and this further exacerbated pressure on the land. Apparently,
according to a statement made by the District Commissioner of Kiambu
District, despite the fact that this situation was, in essence, a settler-created
problem, the difficulty should be solved by another African group. '(•••) there
are many who find it hard to credit that there are insuperable difficulties in the
adjustment of a treaty made many years ago with a tribe occupying an
enormous area of country who show little signs of advancement whilst
adjoining them is a progressive and virile tribe confined within an area of 380
square miles which cannot possibly support it' (Postwar Development Plan,
Kiambu District, 12 January, 1945 PC/CP 8/9/4 cf Bullock 1978:71).
Definitely, this is a clear référence to the land belonging to the Maasai. The
Kikuyu did not bother about the treaty or agreements made with the Maasai
and again started trespassing in the Kibiko région, building huts and
cultivating. In 1946 this was stopped and they were expelled from the région.
In the following years the influx of aliens into Kajiado District remained a
point of concern. After checking approximately one quarter of the infiltrated
Ngong area 51 Kikuyu were counted who had settled in the area within a
period of two years. In an effort to control the ever increasing infiltration of
aliens into the district a special Committee of the Kajiado Local Native
Council was installed in August 1949 to examine individual applications and to
check on the credentials of recent arrivais. The policy was that each
prospective immigrant had to be approved by a Section Committee and by the
Local Native Council before hè could be permitted to réside in the District.
The population census of 1948 gave a total of 28,234 inhabitants in Kajiado
District: 25,748 Maasai and 2,486 non-Maasai. The majority of these 'aliens',
however, were employed by the Magadi Soda Company, KMQ, the Railway
Company and the Government.
In addition to Namanga and Kibiko other high potential areas of Kajiado
District, especially the Chyulu and Loitokitok Hills, were threatened by the
cutting of trees on too steep slopes. Initially the Maasai disagreed with
implementing strict rules but by 1949, another year with semi-drought
conditions, some strict measures were introduced. A start was made with soil
conservation measures -the terracing of steep slopes, the prohibition of
cultivation near river beds- and an order issued prohibiting the cutting of trees
in forest areas near Chyulu, Namanga, Ngong and Loitokitok. A survey team
of the African Land Utilization and Seulement Board demarcated several
forested areas in Kajiado District.
To provide a legislative framework, the newly established Maasai Council,
which had replaced the former Joint Local Native Councils in 1951, decided to
adopt extremely comprehensive recommendations, produced by a special
committee of the Council, governing the problem of cultivation and land tenure
in the Maasai districts. In 1951 the Maasai Council passed these
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recommendations as the Land Usage By-Laws empowering section councils to
control the spread of cultivation in their areas. 'It has been obvious for some
years that législation of this sort was urgenüy required in Masailand in order to
protect the interests of the cattle owners froni the graduai encroachment of the
relatively few agriculturalists. Section Councils may now lay down definite
boundaries between cultivation and grazing and may prohibit the extension of
existing shambas or the establishment of new ones' (KDAR 1951:12).
This and the Local Native Council Immigration Committee resulted in the
réduction of agricultural activity in Kajiado District, especially near Loitokitok
and Namanga, by 1952. At Rombo the number of shambas dwindled from 15
to 3 and at Kor Kor only 5 were left. The major driving force behind the
setback in farming was the result of the Emergency measures. The total area
under cultivation around Ngong was reduced by at least 10 per cent due to the
éviction of 14 Kikuyu families who had been connected with the Mau Mau.
Kikuyu who had settled in Tanganyika were also transferred back to Central
Province. 'There has been a considérable movement northwards through the
district of Kikuyu either expelled from Tanganyika in which case they have
travelled escorted, or intimidated into leaving. The most spectacular exodus
was in January when over a thousand Forest squatters from Rongai arrived in
Loitokitok one day (...). A few managed to remain hidden in the forest on the
inter-territorial border and these were eventually unearthed and rounded up in
November' (KDAR 1953:2).
During the Emergency, the only possible way to enter Kajiado District was
by acceptance of the Maasai Committee or by the acquisition of a special pass
for résidence in the district issued by the local authorities. Nonetheless, in a
letter from the District Officer Ngong addressed to the Provincial
Commissioner Southern Province, 6th June 1954, it was concluded that 'The
area is fast becoming "defacto" a Kikuyu reserve. The Masai must consider
who are allowed to bring aliens into the area. The term "accepted by the
Masai" is far too loosely interpreted' (KNA PC/Ngong/1/1/16 26/06/54). That
year a total of 416 Kikuyu were counted in Ngong Town and its surrounding
area alone. Only 82 Kikuyu had been born or were resident since 1930 in the
area.
Having small shambas of 1.5 acres each, the total area under cultivation
would have been approximately 180 acres. This source of agricultural produce
rather than a possible sympathy of the Maasai towards the Mau Mau
movement will have contributed to the willingness of the Maasai to allow the
Kikuyu to remain in the district. Except for in the Ngong area with its mixed
Kikuyu/Maasai population, the Mau Mau did not flourish in Kajiado District.
According to the District Annual Report of 1954 Maasai apathy to the
activities of the Mau Mau movement changed abruptly, in a negative way,
when a Mau Mau gang was stopped near Mile 46, one of its members being a
Maasai/Kikuyu from Matapato. 'At a large meeting of Chiefs and Elders, a
demand was made for the instant removal of the agricultural settlements on the
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top of the forest covered Namanga Mountain. (...) By the end of June the old
established villages of Oltesika and Kor Kor had been razed to the ground, the
crops destroyed and the inhabitants moved' (KDAR 1954:3). The Kikuyu and
half Kikuyu cultivators were removed to Narok. It should be noted, however,
that the resettiement of Kikuyu from Oltesika (towards an area to be placed
under irrigation north of Namanga) was an old plan anyway. Moreover, Kor
Kor had almost ceased to be a place for cultivation. In 1956 a limited number
of Maasai received permission to start cultivating again, but the scheme was
closed down the following year.
For the Loitokitok area more successful developments were reported in the
1950s with people starting irrigated cultivation. River and local spring water
was diverted to irrigated plots by making use of trenches.
At Kimana and Tikondo, just north of Loitokitok, a few mosdy stockless
Maasai had taken to arable farming. Use was made of the Noolturesh river and
the Tikondo spring to irrigate the plots. Information about irrigation was
provided by those from Taveta who had been working on an irrigation project
initiated during the 1940s with the aim of feeding Italian prisoners of war (see
Kimani 1988:Appendix IIIB). Other irrigation activities were reported to have
started in the 1950s at Sinnet, north of Kimana, and Rombo (Campi ya
Mwuruba). Two Maasai, of mixed Chagga origin having had agricultural
expérience from Indians in raising Asian vegetables, were said to have been
the main promotors of irrigated cultivation. The very good rains of 1957
brought in more Chagga labourers into the Loitokitok area expanding the area
under cultivation.
During 1954 a total of 83 Kikuyu, some infiltrators from Tanganyika and
others accepted over the years by the Maasai were detained under delegated
Detention Orders. In spite of the removal of part of the Kikuyu population
from Kajiado District the total number of non-Maasai in the Ngong area alone
had risen to 3,253 in 1954 as compared to 2,486 non-Maasai for the whole of
the district by 1948. In order to enlarge control over this group of people the
area was declared a Passbook Area in 1955. Moreover, village units were
established under the close supervision of a District Officer in order to prevent
Mau Mau gangs from neighbouring Kiambu district seeking sanctuary in the
Ngong area. That year 90 more Maasai/Kikuyu were arrested and detained. By
1956 conditions had returned to normal. As for the Kikuyu villages, however,
the Government intended them to be a permanent feature of the post-
Emergency set-up. A start was made with laying out planned holdings and
allocating 67 one acre plots to non-Maasai farmers.
In 1957 it was recorded that the Kikuyu continued to come into Kajiado
District without légal documents and despite the imposition of heavy fines.
When, by 1959, the Emergency was ended, administrative action had to be
undertaken to control the huge influx of Kikuyu into the Ngong area in
particular.
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In 1960 1,200 acres were surveyed and distributed to twenty selected
Maasai farmers. Pressure had arisen among the Kaputiei to start land
consolidation along the line of individual ownership (see above). This
development was wannly welcomed by the Kikuyu, who 'had learned through
expérience that once land is Consolidated and land tiües issued it was possible
to carry out land transactions through the instituted Land Boards' (Muranja
1973/74:58). Supported by a £3,000 grant from ALDEV land consolidation
began in Ngong in August 1961. In the same year Ngong was gazetted under
the Land Registration (Special Areas) Ordinance. This measure was taken to
prevent people from outside the area coming to claim land. The 1962
population census of Kajiado District showed 53,219 Maasai and 15,192 non-
Maasai of which 6,233 were Kikuyu, most of them living in the Ngong région.
In the Nguruman area a large number of alien squatters who had destroyed
several hundred large trees were removed and the area was declared closed for
cultivation by 1960. In fact, throughout the 1950s, other protected areas like
the forested areas of Ngong, Namanga, Loitokitok and Chyulu also suffered
from the practice of charcoal burning and forest clearing.
B. Wildlife and the Création of Game Reserves and Nairobi National Park
Besides the increasing area of land under cultivation, another form of land use
gained importance at the cost of Maasai freedom of movement.
The Southern Game Reserve, declared shortly after the establishment of
British Rule and being the earliest effort at conservation in Maasailand, was
mainly intended to protect wildlife from hunting.24 The Maasai were not
restricted in their movements in any direction. This freedom was threatened as
early as 1933 when the Game Warden of Kenya had recommended that the
Nairobi Commonage be made a National Park. The Kenya Land Commission
approved the idea although the realization of this plan was postponed due to
the outbreak of the Second World War and the establishment of a military
camp in the Commonage area. 'With the rising publicity regarding East
African wildlife and the strong conservation lobby, particularly after the
Second World War, more protection was sought for the rights of game in
Maasai areas. The solution was to create game reserves and national parks, and
the government was empowered to alienate resources to that end by the
National Parks Ordinance of 1945' (Kituyi 1990:46).
By December 1946 Nairobi National Park (117 km2) was officially
proclaimed and the Maasai totally lost access to it. In 1947 the 3,260 km2
Amboseli National Reserve was created, the boundaries being arbitrary and not
prohibiting Maasai movement. In later years Ngong National Reserve
(1949/512 km2) was gazetted, while West Chyulu (1961/373 km2) and
24
It has been reported, however, that settlers and visitots openly shot game on Ihe Athi
Kapiti Plains in an area located soulh west of Nairobi called the Nairobi Commonage (see
Ecosystems 1982:65).
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Kitengela (1965/530 km2) became Game Conservation Areas where hunting
was prohibited.25 West Tsavo, though located outside Kajiado District and
providing important traditional dry season water sources and pastures, had
already been declared a National Park in 1948.
The Southern Game Reserve, enclosing a large part of Kajiado District, was
degazetted in July 1952 and turned into a Controlled Area in which shooting
was allowed by special permit. The reason behind this move was the abundant
amount of wildlife in the area, which was damaging grazing and cultivation. In
addition and as a resuit of hunting parties paying fées, it provided some
resources for the African District Council.
The Loitokitok Maasai saw an increasing number of visitors spending their
once in a lifetime safari at the Amboseli area, one of the sections' best
permanent water points and dry season grazing pastures. They feared the loss
of this area. From a very early stage hopes were expressed by the Amboseli
National Reserve administrators that the Maasai could be moved away from
the Ol Tukai swamps of the Amboseli area. To this end it was realized that an
alternative water source had to be provided by the authorities.26 In 1958 a
first agreement was reached whereby the Maasai agreed to restrict human
beings and cattie numbers from 20,000 to 7,000 head of cattle only. To
compensât« the Maasai alternative water supplies consisting of four boreholes
and two cattle troughs were provided away from the principal game areas. By
1959 Governor Baring had to assure the worried Maasai that the land at Ol
Tukai was theirs and would not be taken from them (see KDAR 1959:4).
Besides the financial benefit resulting from controlled hunting, it was
thought that the shooting of game would take away one of the Maasai's main
arguments against the réduction of their herds. The Maasai had lived with
game and tolerated it for many years. Nevertheless, Maasai livestock must
compete with wildlife for range resources, predators attacked their herds and
flocks and diseases were spread by game preventing good grazing areas being
used or direcüy causing the death of many animais. For example, cattle
contract the malignant catarrh virus when they graze pastures on which
wildebeests have calved, it being the foetal remains that transmit the virus. In
1957 official losses of cattle due to game was placed at some 500. The Ngong
and Loitokitok cultivated areas also suffered from damage done by game.
In 1961 the administration of Amboseli was handed over to the Kajiado
County Council. It was hoped that local responsibility would create greater
sympathy for the reserve. Soon afterwards the Kajiado Council negotiated with
25 Ngong National Reserve no longer existe. Kitengela Game Conservation Area was never
declared officially although it had appeared on several maps since the mid-1960s. Both areas
overlap each other at their northem fringes (see Ecosystems 1982:67; UNDP/FAO 1978:106).
26 In 1958 25 shallow boreholes were drilled outside Ol Tukai swamp and two small dams
built resulting in a genera! rise in the swamp water level (see Ecosystems 1982:60).
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the Maasai of Amboseli to set aside a 78 km2 stock-free area which would
protect the council's wildlife assets (see Western I982a:304). Amboseli
National Reserve was renamed Masai Amboseli Game Reserve.
5.6 Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter we have considered the history of land use and land policy in
Kenya and of Kajiado District in particular since the end of the 19th Century
until the time of Kenya's Independence in 1963.
We starled our journey in the 1880s with the arrivai of the British and
German colonizers scrambling for the interior of this, until then unknown, part
of Africa. The Europeans found an African population facing a very harsh
time; rinderpest, smallpox and inter as well as intra-tribal wars had devastated
the economy of the people. The Maasai pastoralists in particular had suffered
tremendously and lost an estimated 90 per cent of all their livestock and half
of their human population.
The Europeans were thus able to take control over the area relatively easily.
In 1895 the group of Maasai was split into two halves after the création of the
East Africa Protectorate and Tanganyika ruled by the British and Germans,
respectively. The former were not so much interested in this newly created
territory itself but more for its strategie position vis-à-vis Egypt and Uganda.
For this purpose the British Government decided to construct the "Uganda
Raüway" Connecting the port of Mombasa at the Indian Océan with Lake
Victoria. To recover part of the high cost involved and to further develop the
area it was tried to interest settlers in coming to the new Protectorate by
offering large grants of land up to 1,000 acres per lot initially on 99 year
leases at extremely low priées. Settlers, free to look for attractive holdings on
their own, violated African land rights in every respect. As non-Europeans
were prevented from buying land the high-potential areas north of Nairobi
became known as the "White Highlands".
By 1903 leases of pastoral land could also be obtained. Some large
concessions of pasture land in the Naivasha area, north of Nairobi, in the heart
of Maasailand were obtained by British settlers. It was decided that the Maasai
should be "given" an area of their own. In fact, two reserves were set aside for
the Maasai outside the Rift Valley: the Laikipia plateau in the north and
another reserve south of Ngong and the railway. In fact, the Maasai were
simply deprived of their best pastures near Naivasha as both reserves were
traditional Maasai pastures. A treaty was signed in 1904 (stated to endure "as
long as the Maasai as a race would exist") whereby some sections of the
Maasai agreed to move to the northern reserve, while others remained in the
south. The new Maasai reserves (totalling some 24,000 km2) comprised only
some 35-40 per cent of their former territory.
The Maasai, once feared by the British, had become their allies in the
f
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following years to the benefit of both groups. However, the Maasai started to
feel rather uncomfortable about this pact when the northern Maasai Reserve
turned out to be inadequate and other promises made by the British did not
materialize. Renewed calls by settlers to take away more pasture land from the
Maasai created suspicion. In April 1911 the Second Maasai Treaty was signed
which required the removal of the Maasai from the northern reserve and a
regrouping in an extended southern reserve. This exercise took two years to
complete. After minor modifications made in the following years the Maasai
Reserve District was gazetted in 1918 and comprised of almost 38,000 km2.
In 1920 the Kenya Colony and Protectorate was proclaimed. More settlers
now moved in. The British sent a huge number of commissions to analyze the
situation of the new Colony regarding land, labour, economie performance and
Potential. One of the main results was the création of African Reserves, which
should prevent land grabbing by settlers in the African occupied areas. In 1924
the Maasai Reserve was fïrst renamed Maasai Province and in 1933 renamed
yet again as Maasai Extra provincial District following the recommendations of
the Kenya (Carter) Land Commission which reviewed all land issues of the
Kenya Colony in 1932.
In the Maasai area the One Mile Zone south of the Uganda Railway, the
Chyulu Triangle and the 1/4 Mile Zone flanking the Magadi railway branch on
boa sides, together totalling an area of some 720 km2, were in dispute. Four
major exchanges of land were also discussed. In addition, the Maasai requested
the removal of the artificial boundary dividing the Kenya and Tanganyika
Maasai and the return of the Laikipia area. These last matters, however, were
not considered at all by the Carter Commission. Concerning the other issues
the commission advised to rent the One Mile Zone and Chyulu Triangle to the
Maasai until equivalent watering facilities found in these areas were provided
elsewhere. Only if good agricultural land within the Maasai territory were
handed over to non-Maasai agriculturalists could the Chyulu Triangle be added
to the Maasai Reserve. The 1/4 Mile Zone was included unconditionally. The
commission reacted positively to these exchanges.
Though the African groups may have profited somehow from these
arrangements it was noted by the late 1930s that the settlers who comprised
less than 0.2 per cent of the total estimated population, owned 5.5 per cent of
the total and 18 per cent of Kenya's best agricultural land area. This was the
real cause for the economie crisis in the African Reserves. Forced migration
from European-owned farms back to these reserves added to the natura! growth
in these small territories. The authorities, however, mainly pointed out the legal
and the afore mentioned poor ecological condition of the African Reserves.
Programmes were started for dealing with soil conservation, and water
availability improvement. Real economie improvements did not occur.
Ultimately, some groups of the African population took up armed struggle
against the Colonial Government.
More visits were made by British Commissions to deal with the situation.
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Most influential was the "Swynnerton Plan" of 1954 which was intended to
mtensify the development of African agriculture and included a major
programme of land consolidation in the high-potential régions.
Marginal measures for improving the semi-arid pastoral areas were also
introduced. Marketing and grazing management in order to achieve a
destocking of these areas was the main concern. The Maasai, who had joined
the Kamba of Kitui and Machakos District in a new Southern Province in
1953, had already been co-operating with the Colonial Administration in
accepting more comprehensive grazing control measures for some time. By
1949 the Konza grazing experiment had starled. Sectional Grazing Scheines
followed in the mid and late-1950s in the Kisonko, Matapato and Loodokilani
areas.
Individual ranches also starled to appear in Kajiado District during this time.
Interest increased rapidly as large tracts of land of up to 2,000 acres could be
obtained. Sévère difficulties in developing these ranches existed as large
amounts of capital were needed to invest in water development and the like.
High interest rates placed a heavy bürden on those who attempted. Most
ranchers' motives for acquiring an individual ranch, however, were questioned
by the authorities. By 1963 some 24 individual ranches existed in Kajiado
District.
Besides keeping livestock, cultivation and herds of wildlife also claimed access
to land in the Maasai régions. Cultivation concentrated mainly in the high-
potential zones and was practised predominantly by non-Maasai. During this
Century the intension of these agricultural practices was foremost correlated to
the infiltration by non-Maasai into the better-watered areas of Kajiado District
and the need for the Maasai to engage in this activity (e.g. after a major
drought). Once in a while the infiltrators were chased away from the district,
as happened specifically during the time of the Emergency after the éviction of
Kikuyu thought to be the driving force behind the Mau Mau movement.
Special land Usage By-Laws empowered section councils to control the spread
of cultivation in their localities. In earlier decades, however, the Government's
attitude towards non-Maasai entering the district had been ambiguous. In fact,
the Maasai too profited from the présence of non-Maasai labour in cultivating
minor plots under leasehold arrangements. Once non-Maasai concentrations
became too numerous and starled to interfère with access to dry season grazing
areas or if they destroyed the Maasai forests these cultivators were removed.
Access to land for the Maasai was also lost due to the proclamation of
Nairobi National Park. Otherwise gazetted game reserves did not interfère with
Maasai livestock movements so much. Only the Loitokitok Maasai saw an
increasing number of tourists coming to the Amboseli area which resulted in
the excavation of the Ol Tukai swamps. In the next chapter, we will
concentrate on economie developments as they occurred in Kajiado District
from the arrivai of the British until the time of Independence.
CHAPTER 6
PRE-INDEPENDENCE fflSTORY OF THE ECONOMY AND
OF DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN KAJIADO DISTRICT
6.1 The Maasai Ëconomy and Early Colonial Economie
Development Policy in Kenyan Maasailand: 1895 -1919
In section 5.2 we described how the economy of the Maasai collapsed at the
end of the 19th Century due to drought and diseases. The Maasai subsistence
economy was turned into a struggle for survival. Among the stratégies used
were seeking refuge among neighbouring African Groups or British (Fort
Smilh), hunting and cultivation, raiding of cattie even between different Maasai
il-oshon or, in co-operation with the Impérial British East Africa Company,
during punitive expéditions against other African groups. By the first decade of
the 20th cenlury Ihe Maasai had more or less overcome this dark period in
their history and once again were able to rely on nomadic pastoralism as the
main stay of their economy.
Commissioner Eliot had welcomed the change from pastoralism to sedentary
agriculture as practised by the Kaputiei and Kisonko Maasai in the fertile areas
of Ngong and Loitokitok, respectively.
'The policy of the Government in dealing with the native tribes in the
East African Protectorate has been to develop their agricultural instincts
and industry and to discourage tendencies towards pastoralism. This
policy has been pursued with success among the Kavirondo, Kikuyu and
other tribes who, when encounlered by Ihe administration, were under the
necessity of engaging in agriculture and has been introduced with fair
resulls into the system of such pastoral tribes as the Nandi and Lumbwa
[Kipsigis]' (Sandford 1919:55).
However, according to Maasai ideals, cultivation is a sign of 'degeneration',
usually a result of the loss of cattie. 'The Masai near Nairobi were either half
Kikuyu or had Kikuyu wives; it was probably their wives responsible for the
cultivation. With the adoption of a Masai Reserves policy, any trend towards
agriculture was reversed' (Sorrenson 1968:277).' And because the Maasai
herds increased rapidly during the first decade of the 20th Century, the impetus
to continue farming dwindled.
In fact, the major concern of the Colonial Administration was to provide all
1 The late Jomo Kenyatta, the fitst president of independent Kenya and a Kikuyu himself,
reported that the rôle of intermamage between Maasai and Kikuyu people was an important form
of peace-making. An aunt of Kenyatta was marned to Semteu the betrayed brother of Olonana
(see Kenyatta 1965:202)
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possible means of stimulating the European settler economy. According to
Zwanenberg and King (1975:95) approximately 20 percent had gone in for
herding and dairy farming. 'Pedigree bulls were imported from England and
crossed with African cattle. The crossing of European and African catüe
resulted in a breed that was hardier and more résistant to disease, but that was
by no means immune' (Spencer 1983:114). In spite of the free treatment of
infected animais the European owners lost huge numbers. This was believed to
be the result of the contact between their herds and those of surrounding
pastoralists. Several measures were taken to prevent the mixing of African
cattle with those of the European setüers; quarantine rules were issued under
the Catüe Diseases Ordinance of 1902, an ambitieus programme of fencing,
designed to create a barrier between European farms and the reserves was
starled in 1907 and a quarantine board, composed of settlers and members of
the administrative staff, was established in 1909 to advise the Veterinary
Service.
Until World War I the Veterinary Department showed little activity in the
African areas.2 The protection of the settlers' livestock industry not only
prohibited the introduction among the Maasai of European bulls for breeding
but also denied them their traditional form of sélective breeding.3 'Boran bulls
had always been selected with great care to produce animais adapted to dry
conditions. The supply of such bulls came from Samburu and Somalia; with
their fixed Reserve boundaries and the European-settled lands forming a block
to the north, the Maasai were completely eut off from new Boran stock'
(Zwanenberg & King 1975:94).
In fact, the Colonial "development policy" among African pastoralists was
mainly directed at the "pacification" of the population and to maintaining law
and order. The British were especially concerned about the raiding propensities
of the Maasai ilmurran and ceased to use them in their punitive expéditions in
order not to strengthen the Maasai penchant for engaging in raids. Due to their
raiding activities, military-like organization and the difficulty in controlling the
Maasai warriors they were considered to be a significant element in the
blocking of colonial change. Mr. R.W. Hemsted, Officer-in-Charge Maasai
Reserve since 1912, attempted to break the organization and power of the
ilmurran. The Stock Theft Ordinance of 1913 gave him the instrument for
levying heavy fines (up to ten times thé value of the livestock stolen) on a
•* Until 1912 efforts by the setüers to make a profit out of temperate farming as export
commodities -wheat, wool, méat and dairy products- had failed, despite all the support obtained
from thé Administration. By 1914, it was clear that tropical plantation agriculture -coffee, sisal,
cotton- was showing the most promising returns. By the beginning of the 1920s this starled to
show fruit.
3 Iroiiically, the settlers were in need of African catüe to start their farms. Animais,
confiscated in punitive expéditions during the period of 'pacification', were sold at private
auctions to settlers.
Chapter 6: Pre-Independence History of the Economy and of Development Policy 223
family, a section or even the whole tribe. 'In 1913, for example, a moran raid
against the Lumbwa, the Kavirondo, and Africans in German East Africa
resulted in a fine of 500 head of cattle on 4 villages. The next year a
communal fine of 250 head of cattle was imposed for a further raid into
German East Africa' (Tignor 1976:75).
The fines were used to create a special Maasai Fund (the Maasai Suspense
Account) by which small projects, initiated by the British and not the Maasai,
could be financed. In spite of these fines and other measures like the
abandonment of certain ceremonies and the shortening of the period of
warriorhood, the Maasai ilmurran' opposition was not broken. In contrast with
other African groups they only sent a few recruits to assist the British in their
fight against the Germans in World War I. The major contribution of the
Maasai was by the provision to the Army of 'an estimated 30,000 cattle and
300,000 sheep, which although supposed to have been given voluntarily were
no doubt provided under considérable pressure' (Tignor 1976:78/9).4
Despite the generosity of the Maasai, Belfield wanted to halt "the pernicious
pastoral proclivities" of the pastoral tribes and to encourage peasant agriculture
as a first step towards "civilized" forms of land tenure and usage. Apart from
preventing the extension of reserves he did nothing. The Magadi Soda
Company, however, obtained füll assistance from the Administration. Although
the area surrounding Lake Magadi was one of the worst parts in the Reserve,
the impact of this concession was noticed in other parts of Kenya Maasailand.
In 1913, the Maasai came to know of the granting of permission to the Magadi
Soda Company to extract water from the Ngong Hills and other sources of
water within the area along the Magadi railway. Although the Company, on
order of the Administration, made some long troughs as compensation, access
for the Maasai to some of the permanent springs was lost. The Company
constructed a pipeline from Ngong Hills to Kajiado Town then, following the
railway, towards the lake. By 1915 the exportation of raw soda starled,
followed in 1919 by the production of soda ash.
The loss of dry season grazing areas was feit in 1915 and 1916 when, due to a
lack of rains, the Maasai had to be allowed to use both Crown and private
land. Early 1915 'a determined attempt was made to return to Laikipia in
défiance of Government orders. Indian troops were sent, but Legalishu [Ole
Gilisho] and other elders persuaded the wanderers to return without the use of
force' (Leys 1924, repr. 1973:131).
Towards the end of World War I, Hemsted formulated some reform
programmes. These were part of the 1917-1919 First Development Plan for the
African Reserves, which had the objective of raising the productiveness of
these areas.
4 Spencer even states that 'Hemsted told the Economie Commission that the Maasai had
parted with around one hundred thousand cattle durmg the war years' (Spencer 1983:137).
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'Hemsted estimated that, as owners of not less than 600,000 cattle, 2
million sheep, and 10,000 donkeys, valued at approximately Rs 150
million, the Maasai were among the riebest people in the world. Their
beasts enjoyed a minimum natura! increase of 15 percent per annum, but,
as the reserve was fully stocked, they were unable to benefit from this
productivity' (Spencer 1983:120).
In order to avoid waste the Maasai Reserve should be turned into a big ranch
disposing of at least 50,000 head of cattle per year. Because it was recognized
that the Maasai had no incentive to seil their animais for cash, as their wants
were minimal, Hemsted proposed to improve taxation by thé introduction of a
poil tax of Rs. 30 per person per annum.5 Half of the revenue (approximately
£50,000) should be used for developments projects in thé Maasai Reserve.
'Hemsted was trying to balance thé governmenf s désire for additional
revenue, and thé Maasai's ability to pay, with his désire that thé Maasai
should benefit from European rule. In the past, hè feit, the administration
had donc very little for them: "Beyond safeguarding thé lives and
property of thé Natives, it cannot be said that thé State does much to
bestow thé ordinary blessings of civilisation and responsible Government
Although thé Reserve comprises 14,000 square miles of territory, no
Doctor, Veterinary Officer, or educational facilities exist, and beyond
some spasmodic and not very successful efforts to conserve water in
earth work dams, we do nothing to change the country for thé better, to
improve thé stock or to prevent disease. It has in fact been said that
disease is welcome as it serves to impede thé increase of stock, but
surely our policy should be to make use of the surplus stock instead of
allowing it to die'"(Spencer 1983:120/1).
Belfields' successor, Mr. E. Northey, was more convinced of the need to assist
thé pastoral Maasai and accepted Hemsted's proposais. But thé impetus to do
so was mainly because thé Maasai had starled raids into Tanganyika to
compensais cattle losses due to disease and drought of 1918. Northey feared
for thé security and thé cattle of thé settlers localed close to thé Maasai
borders. By improving thé Maasai Reserve, thé Maasai could be concentraled
into smaller areas, enabling easier control. Hemsted's économie initiatives
centred mainly around thé livestock sector. In Narok a creamery was set up for
the production of ghee; a special selected herd of 2,000 animais was brought
together trying to improve thé local breeds; a veterinary officer and veterinary
bacteriologist were appointed for thé Reserve; some minor irrigation work was
undertaken; trading centres established, etc. Hemsted also wanted to open a
In 1901 a hut tax had been introduced but it was difflcult to implement in thé Maasai
setting.
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Government school at Narok, and hè pressured elders to send children to
school. The school at Narok was opened in 1919.
The collection of tax, however, remained a major problem and thé market
for livestock, be it for méat or live animais, was too small. To absorb thé
remainder it was necessary to build a canning factory. In 1919 Northey called
for tenders. He offered a location near Sultan Hamud, which would be able to
obtain animais from thé Maasai and Kamba areas. No firms were, however,
interested as thé Government demanded thé right to fix a minimum priée,
while it refused to guarantee a minimum supply of animais to thé factory. As a
resuit of widespread diseases and insufficient staff thé Government was
reluctant to sign an agreement that could resuit in forced cattle sales.
To check the spread of diseases, quarantine régulations had been imposed as
early as 1917, which prohibited the legal movement of cattle from the Maasai
Reserve to settled areas. Nonetheless, in the immédiate postwar period demand
from European farmers for African cattle was high. Approximately 1,500 new
settlers had anived, most of them ex-soldiers. It was estimated that, in the
coming years, some 500,000 cattie would be needed while only 30,000 a year
could be provided due to an inadequate number of quarantine stations between
the African Reserves and the White Highlands. The "Quarantine Policy" failed
and by 1919 white-owned farms were facing more frequent outbreaks of
diseases among their cattle. Combating diseases within the African Reserves
would be the best solution. However, the Veterinary Staff in the Colony
consisted of only 16 people in 1919 and it was not able to do so.
The majority of the Maasai reacted to the new developments mainly by
ignoring them. Native tribunals, local native councils and local chiefs had been
introduced but without much success. Some open résistance was shown
towards the evangelical and educational efforts of the missionaries. At the end
of the 19th century Protestants and Catholics had entered the interior of the
Protectorate in the wake of the IBEAC. In 1901 the Africa Inland Mission
(AIM) established ils main headquarters at Kijabe, located approximately 40
km south east of Nairobi. In dividing their sphères of influence the AIM
"obtained" the Maasai area. John Stauffacher was appointed by the AIM to
work with the Maasai in 1903. By preaching the gospel combined with a little
éducation his major ahn was to make as many couverts as possible. These
seeds were sown, however, in semi-arid sou. Presumably the lack of support,
or rather missionary assistance provided to the Colonial Government during the
time of the Maasai moves, will also have contributed to this less than réceptive
attitude.6
6 No missionary had opposed the removal of the Maasai from their traditional grazing
grounds. Moreover, during the tin» of the Court Case to fight the Second Treaty the African
Mand Mission, an American evangelical society which had been given a monopoly over the
Maasai area, prohibited the attendance of a literate Maasai pupil to be a witness for the Maasai
case (see Sorrenson 1968:266).
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62 Economie Activities and Development Policy in Kajiado
District: 1920 - 1945
6.2.1 Introduction
Economie problems in Kenya at the beginning of the 1920s were the result of
a collapse of export-commodity priées. 'Kenya coffee, which had been fetching
about £150 a ton in London in the early months of 1920, was worth only about
£60 a year later. Sisal feil from a peak of £96 to £12. 10s. a ton. The worst
disaster of all, however, was suffered by those who were growing, or had been
preparing to grow, flax. (...) Unlike those of coffee and sisal, the price of flax
never again recovered suffïciently to make export from Kenya practicable'
(Wrigley 1965:234/5).
The situation was worsened by a monetary issue. The value of the East
African rupee currency increased from Is. 4d. to 2s. lOd. at the beginning of
the 1920s. Hence goods sold by Kenyan producers in London, priced in
shillings, were making less than half the number of rupees than before. The
debts owed by ahnost all farmers to Nairobi financiers, however, remained to
be paid back in rupees. By March 1920 the rupee was fixed at 2s., followed
shortly afterwards by a change to the sterling currency. Settlers and the
Government alike were facing a financial crisis. The growing of maize, the
revival of coffee and sisal priées as well as the imposition of duties to protect
the local market for wheat and dairy products -mainly for the European urban
population-, helped the setüers to overcome these difficult years, though at
high cost It will be clear that it was primarily political forces rather than
economie ones which were responsible for the protection and support given to
the European producers.
The latter half of the 1920s saw a booming Kenyan economy which also
enabled the Colonial Government, supported by British loans, to increase
expenditure on public works. Mombasa harbour and the road and railway
network were improved. Things went smoothly for the settlers. 'The average
output of coffee in the years 1920-2 was 3,500 tons, and that of sisal 5,300
tons. In 1927-9 the figures were 7,900 and 15,200 tons' (Wrigley 1965:242).
At the end of the 1920s these two products were responsible for more than half
of the total value of Kenya's domestic exports, other important items being
maize (12.5 per cent), hides and skins (11 per cent), and sodium carbonate
from Magadi, still the only significant minéral product (8.5 per cent). Despite
the déclaration of the dual policy, coffee and sisal were grown by the settler
Community exçlusively as Africans were forbidden from growing them.
The beginning of the 1930s heralded a décline in the settlers fortune due to
a combination of drought and a collapse in the world commodity markets.
Most of the small-scale farmers incurred heavy debts to the banks. 'Twenty
percent or about four hundred of these farmers gave up altogether and
abandoned their farms. But for aid amounting to nearly £1,000,000 which was
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pumped into white agriculture through the agencies of the colonial government,
it is quite probable that white seulement would not have survived'
(Zwanenberg & King 1975.39).
The African population, especially those employed as labourers on European
farms, suffered similarly if not more. Wages were reduced from Sh. 14/- to Sh.
8/- a month. From 1935 onwards the importance of maize on the European
farms declined and that of dairy farming, the mining of gold and the growing
of two new crops, pyrethrum and tea, increased. Not until the late 1930s, when
trying to expand the volume of Kenya's export, were bans on the growing of
cash crops by Africans lifted. The above gives a picture of the Kenyan
economy of those days. Let us now turn to the situation in Kajiado District.
6.2.2 Economie Activities and Development Efforts in Kajiado District;
1920-45
In the early 1920s ahnost every Pastoral Reserve was placed under quarantine.
For the European setüers this had a negative as well as a positive effect.
Firsüy, their need for African cattle for breeding, slaughter or draught
purposes was hard to meet. To overcome this deficiency it was decided to
build nine more quarantine stations to speed the flow of African cattle to
European ranchers and, by the end of 1921, demand for African cattle by
European farmers had been chiefly fulfilled and dropped considerably.
Secondly, the quarantine restrictions were a banier for Africans willing to
seil their animais on the domestic market, resulting in a high price for
slaughter cattle, which was at the advantage of the European producers.
'Africans were even restricted from buying or selling cattle at official auctions
in order to stop the price dropping too far and to protect European sales'
(Zwanenberg & King 1975:97).
This is just one example of the conséquences of the Colonial Government's
policy which favoured the European settlers at the cost of the African
population. The former were thought to be the best and only motor for pushing
the Kenyan economy ahead. Whenever development efforts were headed in the
African areas they should not interfère with the (economie) wellbeing of the
settler community. Moreover, finance for these developments was, in most
cases, provided for by the African population themselves. This section will
examine the impact of this policy, with special considération of its effects on
the Maasai pastoralists of Kajiado District. Attention will also be paid to the
district's economy as it developed during the 1920-45 period.
In 1941 oloibom Seggie ole Lonana died, ending a period of influential
iloibonok. A new wind would start to blow through Maasailand. In 1944
District Commissioner E.H. Windley brought forward a more tolerant opinion
than Commissioner Eliot who had dealt with Seggie's father about 40 years
before:
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'The next decade with the expanding possibilities of the Post-War years
should lead to a gréât change in the development of Masailand and the
outlook of its people and if thereafter there are any grounds left for
regarding them as decadent anthropological exhibits I am inclined to
think the fault will lie in the Administration from which they have a right
to expect the necessary stimulus and guidance. Hence the urge to
progress should in time grow stronger within the tribe itself and the fact
that they are governed by the conservatism common to most pastoral
tribes may well be of value to their development in the long run by
regulating their assimilation of our culture to a digestible rate and thé
rejection of spurious éléments' (KDAR 1944:2).
It was the Maasai themselves who had to pay for thé modernization urged
upon them by thé Government. Assimilation, guidance and stimulus, without
financial obligations were thé best that could be hoped for from thé Colonial
Government in thé interwar period.
The newly installed Kajiado Local Native Council was the main
administrative body responsible for development ventures in Kajiado District in
this period. Colonial Government exercised law and order leaving development
efforts to thé Kajiado Local Native Council. Thèse attempts centred mainly
towards water development and éducation. Revenue, amounting to Sh. 27,7307-
in 1932, was mainly obtained from landrents (Sh. 15,040/-), grazing fées (Sh.
5,6547-) and royalties (Sh. 3,5127-). Expenditure (Sh. 31,5077- for 1932) was
spent mostly on thé Kajiado and Loitokitok schools (Sh. 13,9277-) and water
supply: borehole maintenance mainly (Sh. 14,66l/-). In spite of this déficit they
still had a positive balance of Sh. 1,500/- by 1933 which had accumulated to £
10,444 by thé end of 1944.
The lack of a real improvement was brought forward in thé early 1930s by
thé District Commissioner of Kajiado District, who stated that 'a comparison
between the state of the district in 1926 and that in 1931 makes it abundantly
clear that there has been little or no progress in a forward direction in the
period. The Maasai (...) have no real désire for anything more. AU they want is
to be left alone' (KDAR 1931:3). It was thought that the Maasai only
remembered the restrictions put on them and forgot about all the "benefits
received".
A highly sensitive issue was the taxation laid upon the Maasai. In 1923 this
had been raised to Sh. 20/- in contrast with Sh. 12/- paid by other African
groups due to their supposed greater wealth. By 1927 Sh. 94,300/- out of a
total revenue of Sh. 119,4057- for Kajiado District was received by the hut &
poll tax placed upon the Maasai. However, by the beginning of the 1930s it
was recognized that the Maasai had sévère difficulties in meeting their tax
payments. Revenue collected by the Government in 1932 totalled Sh. 137,6017-
(excluding Ngong), hut & poll tax (Sh. 119,3607-) and fines (Sh. 6,2587-) being
the main sources. Government expenditure was Sh. 23,0427- of which Sh.
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17.039/- was used for the salaries of chiefs, headmen and tribal police as well
as transport and travelling costs. By 1944 Government revenue stood at Sh.
99,1607- and expenditure at Sh. 28,3807-. So, we may conclude that in all the
Maasai made a heavy contribution to the national economy whilst they
received the least benefit.
Moreover, most measures initiated by the Colonial Government in the name
of law and order triggered off bad feelings as these not seldom interfered with
Maasai social customs and pastoral economie practices. For example, during
the 1920s much effort was put into the continuing struggle to discipline the
ilmurran. In 1921 consent was given to a forcible abolition of the emurrano
system.
'The goal of Hemsted's program was to limit the military capabilities of the
junior waniors; this was to be done by disarming them, hastening the E-
Unoto ceremony, at which time they settled down and became senior
warriors, and disbanding warrior manyattas, where, according to Hemsted,
young men lived free from the control of elders and conceived their plans of
raiding and opposing government policies. It was part and parcel of a larger
plan to strengthen the authority of the elders, who, unlike the warriors
showed a willingness to assist the government in transforming Maasai
society' (Tignor 1976:80).
As an alternative ilmurran were trained as tribal police, recruited (with less
success) for the King's African Rifles, employed on Public Works like dam
and road making. Besides, sports events were organized for the ilmurran to
compete against their peers in other il-oshon. The co-operative attitude by the
elders was not seldom forced by way of heavy stock fines laid upon the total
section. The Purko, for example, had to pay a collective fine of 10,000 head of
catfle in 1922, because young warriors had stolen cattle and killed some
people. They also tried to stop the Government forcibly recruiting children for
the Narok school.
In 1932 the Kajiado Local Native Council passed an wû-emuirano
resolution in a final attempt to discipline the young warriors. Stock theft was
still a major problem for the Administration as well as the Maasai elders who
were forced to pay thé collective punishment fines. Among the measures taken
were the breaking up of imanyat, the shortening of the warrior period and the
shaving off of hair.
Finally, among thé causes responsible for the less than enthusiastic Maasai
attitude towards British development efforts will have been the measures
(forced destocking) taken against their neighbouring pastoralists of the Kamba
ethnie group. The Maasai, however, did not suffer from this measure despite
the wish of Lord Delamere that they do so.
In thé following section economie performance and development efforts
with respect to the Kajiado District between 1920 and 1945 will be discussed.
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1. Livestock economy and development poticy
In the beginning of the 1920s almost all Reserves and the settled areas suffered
from livestock diseases. The entire Maasai Reserve was infected with
rinderpest. The growth of the herds during the previous decade turned into a
gradually décline of the cattle population. Veterinary officers from Uganda,
Tanganyika and Kenya together formulated a three year programme of
inoculation to eradicate the diseases. Financial problems prohibited the
implementation of their intention. Moreover, there was a serious disagreement
within the Administration concerning economie development policy for the
African Reserves.
Montgomery (veterinary advisor to the East African governments) with
some support from the Native Affairs Department and the Colonial Office was
opposed by Mr. A. Hohn (Director of Agriculture), Governor Northey and the
setüers. As the need for African cattle had dropped by 1922 it was decided to
continue the quarantine policy. Montgomery and several administrative officers
who experienced a décline in tax incomes because the African population was
no longer able to seil their animais, had favoured the abolition of this policy.
'By the end of 1922, the price of African breeding stock had fallen from a
peak of ninety-to-one-hundred shillings to thirty-to-forty shillings' (Spencer
1983:138). The only concession done by Holm es was the transfer of three
Veterinary Officers and nine stock inspectors towards the African Reserves.
Robert Coryndon, the new Governor, supported this initiative as it was in
line with the newly proclaimed "Dual Policy" of developing European and
African agriculture each in its own area. Nevertheless, despite a special budget
of £10,374 set aside by the Veterinary Department, the African catüe-owners
themselves also had to contribute to the cost of rinderpest injections. The
officers in the Maasai area also had to be self-supporting. Montgomery
continued his fight for a comprehensive approach to livestock development in
the African Reserves including the eradication of disease, the lifting of
quarantine and the establishment of a meat-canning factory to deal with the
huge numbers of cattle saved by his schemes. At a rate of ten shillings per 100
pounds live weight African cattle would be very well able to compete on the
world market where priées were two to four times higher. The revenue of these
sales could be used for the improvement of the African herds and the
conservation of the pastures.
Again, the meat-canning factory turned out to be a problem. Private firms
were not interested and the Colonial Office was not interested in subsidising
the experiment He favoured a policy directed at increased sales of ghee and
hides.7
7 Montgomery's view was also known as the 'ranching proposition' as opposed to the 'dairy
proposition* favoured by others In this last group some vetennary officials were also included
Holms' proposition was a meagre variation of the latter
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'Montgomery's failure to find money for a factory from either private
enterprise or from the government was of central importance to thé
failure of his larger scheme to eradicate cattle disease and build up
African herds. The opposition of Hohn effectively carried thé day
through thé important debates of 1923 and 1924 on thé future of herds.
Holm argued that no foreseeable return from thé cattle sales, or from thé
sale of their products, could possibly justify such huge expenditure'
(Spencer 1983:128).
In Kajiado District Holm's position effected some assistance offered in this
respect by the beginning of 1925 resulting in 6 daines operating by 1926
realising a net return of Sh. 9.000/- rising to 11 daines operating by 1927
making a profit of Sh. 35.412/- from thé sale of 27,360 Ibs of ghee. Finance
came from loans provided by thé Maasai themselves. In 1928 thé number of
operating daines had risen to 17 producing 19,476 Ibs resulting in a réduction
of thé net income to Sh. 31.917/- despite a rise in thé price of ghee from 55 to
66 shilling per tin of 36 Ibs. In 1929 Kajiado District was hit by a sévère
drought. 'The cattle of ail sections were mixed up in thé search of such grazing
as remained and gradually concentrated on Ngong until even that rieh
pasturage was exhausted. In certain areas famine relief had to be provided'
(KDAR 1929:2). The production of ghee dropped to a figure of 1,566 Ibs,
fetching Sh. 2,444/- only. By 1930 thé production had collapsed completely
and ail daines were closed in 1932.
In contrast the trade in hides in 1929 was considérable. Between 100,000
and 120,000 hides must have passed through Kajiado and other stations.
Average priées ranged between Sh. 15/- in 1927 to Sh. 12/- in 1933. In later
years attempts to control thé hide trade engendered strong protest from mosüy
Indian traders. 'Under thé Masai Hides & Skin Rules and the marketing of
native produce rules no sundried hides may be exported from thé district and
no shadedried hide may be exported except by permit after inspection' (KDAR
1939:42). Hide exports came to a standstill by the beginning of the 1940s.
Experiments were starled to improve the hide and skin drying. By 1944 an
officiai figure estimated thé number of prepared and exported hide and skins to
be only about 1,000.
As noted by Montgomery, thé trade in livestock was of more importance for
the Maasai pastoralists. According to thé Kajiado Annual Report there was a
considérable trade in slaughter stock in 1927 to Ngong and Nairobi. About 500
oxen were slaughtered in Kajiado itself, mainly (80 per cent) for transportation
to Magadi (see KDAR 1927:6/7). As thèse outlets were insufficient to meet
Maasai supply, it was decided by 1928 to organize auctions in areas bordering
other African Reserves as inter-tribal trade would not interfère with thé
European cattle trade. By 1929, however, auctions of stock were disappointing.
'Over 500 head were brought to Kajiado in June of which 200 head were sold
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for 9781/- [MR: Sh. 49/- ph]. At Loitokitok only 130 head were sold out of
about 450, the price averaging 37/- a beast. A number of Moshi and Arusha
buyers [from Tanganyika] with between 30.000/- and 50.000/- attended the
Namanga auction which had to be abandoned altogether on account of
quarantine difficulties' (KDAR 1929:5).
These quarantine régulations were once again under much debate as they
interfered with grazing management of the pastoralists. During the drought of
1929, for example, concessions had to be granted to the Kisonko Maasai to
water at the Namanga river and to the Maasai from Kajiado to water at
Rombo, in the mile zone and Simba and across the Mbagathi river.
Nonetheless, the acceptance of compulsory quarantine régulations was made a
prerequisite by the Veterinary Officer posted in the district in 1929, to start a
scheme of inoculation as welcomed by the Maasai.8 An incident by which a
Maasai was killed by the police resulted in a temporary freezing of the
arrangement.
During 1930 rinderpest spread to Loitokitok and the Maasai elders
expressed themselves ready to accept any treatment ordered by the
Government. However, the Veterinary Officer had been withdrawn by January
1930 and only by 1931 was a campaign starled to eradicate rinderpest as well
as bovine pleuro-pneumonia. This initiative caused the Kajiado District
Commissioner to state that:
'We can now look forward to some term being set to the cattle
quarantine from which the Masai have so long suffered. It is true that the
Masai are an unprogressive tribe, but they have hitherto been debarred
from economie progress by being forbidden to seil their produce, which
consists chiefly of slaughter oxen, this bas inevitably resulted in over-
stocking which has only been mitigated by periodic droughts in which
large numbers of cattle hâve died of starvation' (KDAR 1931:6).
Only thé stock traders, mostly Somali, were able to fetch a good trade owing
to thé glut of cattle on thé market and thé low priées which they realised.9
Fortunately, some compétition became possible by 1932 when thé Veterinary
Department opened thé Southern end of thé District since it was believed to be
free of Rinderpest. The Loitokitok area was declared free from Rinderpest and
Contagious Bovine Pleuro Pneumonia by Proclamation No. 52 of 5th July
In thé mid-1920s thé Maasai had already expressed a désire to hâve their cattle double-
inoculated against rinderpest and were prepared to seil some of their animais to pay for thé
treatment (see Spencer 1983:119).
9 In 1931 thé priées per head dropped from about Sh. 30/- in Apnl to less than Sh. 20/- in
November. By 1932 cattle were selling for sh. lg/- per head. The 1928 exports from thé Maasai
Reserve amounted to over £95,000. In 1932, thé sum had fallen to £40,000. The trade in hides
was minimal, owing to thé poor priées.
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1933. This freed the opening of another outlet, besides Ngong, for cattle in the
district. Via Loitokitok cattle was transported to Tanganyika. Priées offered at
this market were slightly better.10
Nonetheless, at the beginning of the 1930s the Maasai were thought to be
'richer in stock than at any other time since the advent of British
Administration' (KDAR 1931:3). The average wealth per household of five,
based on the official esumate, was estimated to be 74 cattle, 85 sheep or goats
and 18 donkeys, but was, in all probabüity, considerably more.11 Moreover,
the Maasai despite being considered "useless and unproductive" reached a
comparatively high per capita export figure of about £2 in 1928 (see James
1939:59).
By 1933 things had worsened again. Kajiado District suffered from a drought
which became a disaster by 1934. Rainfall figures were 16.73 and 10.66 inches
respectively as opposed to 29.01 inches in 1930. Estimâtes state that the cattle
population of 300,000 head had substantially declined by approximately
100,000 due to the drought which continued even into 1935. This must have
placed a heavy bürden on the Maasai. Local Administration, however, was of
the opinion that 'The periodic disappearance of old and weak animais kept to
swell the numbers of the herds and the importance of their owners is a blessing
without which existence in the Masai Reserve would long ago have become
impossible' (KDAR 1933:1/2). To speed up destocking the Government bought
a 1,000 head of so-called scrab cattle (Sh. II- per beast) for producing manure
and other byproducts at the Nairobi Municipal plant. The need for destocking
was a much debated issue at the Local Native Council.
The Maasai rejected the Government's view that they kept too many
animais. They criticized the réduction of their grazing area and especially the
loss of dry season pastures. Instead they proposed a water programme which
would support individuals or small groups finance small water schemes such as
dams. By the beginning of the 1930s water development mainly restricted itself
to the maintenance of the 6 boreholes available in the District. On the request
of the Administration the Maasai gave an area at Kajiado on which to start a
small supervised expérimental depot to illustrate to the Maasai some of the
methods of improved husbandry taught at the Ngong training school and which
10 In 1932,11,168 head of cattle were exported to Nairobi from Ngong for slaughter and 358
head to the Kikuyu reserve for slaughter. 196 head of cattle and 22 sheep were slaughtered by
Kajiado Butchers. 1,813 head of sheep and goats passed through Ngong for export. As a result of
two sales organized by the Government 648 head of catüe were exported to Tanganyika via
Loitokitok.
" For 1930 the official number of catüe in the total Maasai Reserve, available for a total
Maasai population of 48,381 people, was set at 720,000 catüe, 820,450 sheep and goats and
171,800 donkeys. An actual account made by the veterinary department in the Kajiado District
placed the total figure for catüe to be over one million (see Carter 1934:min. 658).
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could be capable of gênerai application. Neither proposai was implemented.
Before the Carter Land Commission the Maasai repeated their grievances
concerning the loss of (dry grazing) pastures (see for a detailed account section
5.4.4). The northern boundary of the Maasai Reserve 'was so drawn as to
exclude the most valuable water supplies, which are included in the land
alienated to Europeans' (James 1939:60). Conservation of the more low-lying
wet season pastures became increasingly hampered. The Maasai were forced
'to overwerk the more arid southern reserve, resulting in loss of végétation,
soil érosion, and overall décline in grazing. In the twentieth century the reserve
became progressively less able to support its livestock' (Tignor 1976:38). 'The
extent to which soil érosion has proceeded in the Reserve has doubtiess been
in part due to overstocking, but the Pim Report considers that "the vast
numbers of game are probably even more responsible than the Masai stock". It
is clear that the claims of the région to be both a Game Reserve and a Reserve
for the Masai are incompatible' (James 1939:61).12 In 1934 a report was
published on the Maasai Reserve which stated that, of the total area of 10
million acres, more than 4 million were useless due to the lack of water and/or
the présence of tsetse fly, East Coast Fever, etc.
Besides these fundamental statements concerning the quality of their land,
the Maasai also reminded the Carter Land Commission of the drop in priées
offered for their catde, smallstock, hides and ghee.13 Furthermore, they stated
that views expressed by Government officials concerning their customary diet
of meat, milk and blood and their dislike of agriculture were outdated. 'There
are the circumstances the force of which compel us to submit to your
Committee that an area suitable for agriculture should now be added to our
reserve which should be sufficient not only for our present requirements but
also for our expansion for thé future increase of population' (KLC 1934:1226).
Of course, this was a futile request.
The Administration continued its intention to destock thé pastoral areas in
order to prevent érosion. 'The numbers of livestock sold officially after thé end
of thé drought of 1935 up to the beginning of the Second World War remained
low however, at about 2000 per annum, partly due to thé fact that thé Somali
traders offered better priées' (Campbell 1981a:217). Officiai priées had risen to
Sh. 38/- per head by 1936. Sales to thé Kikuyu area, through thé Dagoretti
market, were in the hands of the Somali traders.
This interfered with thé Government's wish to find a large enough supply
Even before thé Maasai were moved into their présent home, thé greater part of the
Reserve was gazetted a Game Reserve. It was the Chief Game area of East Africa. In Kajiado
District the first tourist rest camps were opened in Kajiado Town and Namanga by 1932. Game in
thé District was in such abundance that in 1941 1,600 Witdebeests and 160 zebra had to be shot.
13 Priées for slaughter cattle had dropped ftom Sh. 55/- to Sh. 16/- a head. Priées for sheep
had fallen ftom Sh. 6l- to Sh. 3/-. Priées for hides had dropped from Sh. 30/- per frasila (36 Ibs)
to Sh. 6V- and for ghee from Sh. 60/- to Sh. 20/- per frasila. (see KLC 1934:1225).
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for a meat-canning factory which had been started by a British commercial
firm called Liebig's Ltd. in 1937 near Athi River.14 Supplies were arranged
with a govemment guarantee for a minimum number of animais every year at
a fixed priée. 'The factory would create a market for thé pastoral peoples to
seil their animais, thus destocking could be enforced and thé European stock
industry would be protected as thé priée offered by thé factory for thé beasts
would be well below thé priée demanded by European stockowners'
(Zwanenberg & King 1975:100). The factory had cost £120,000 and needed an
input of about 30,000 animais in order to break even and this was guaranteed
by thé Government.
Furthermore, it was agreed that thé Government would allow thé import of
cattle from Tanganyika and Uganda, that they would provide a free-of-charge-
veterinary services as may be required for meat inspection and meat export,
exempt thé Company from paying any cess or levy for thé slaughtering of
stock, and would not support another factory engaged in thé production of
canned méats or extract. Liebig's obligations were mainly restricted to thé
payment of a yearly rental of Sh. 500/- for a lease of 10,000 acres of land in
Kajiado District to be used as a holding ground and an annual rent of Sh. 40/-
only to be paid for thé factory's location and its direct surroundings comprising
almost 11,000 acres (see KNA DC/Kaj/2/3/15 1936).15
Stock routes were created in order to enable thé transportation of cattle from
thé main stock-holding areas of Kajiado, Narok and Kitui to supply thé factory
at Athi River.
'Liebig began buying opérations from thé latter half of 1937 "without any
success at all", as the priées they offered were very low. The highest
price they offered was 15 Shs for a full-grown animal, while they were
offering 2 or 3 shillings for a goat or sheep. The priées outside the Liebig
market at this time were in the région of 60 to 100 shillings for a bullock
down to 10 shillings for a goat. Liebig had clearly hoped to take the Ml
advantage of the semi-monopoly they had been offered by the colonial
government' (Zwanenberg & King 1975:101).
As a solution the Kamba région, considered to be severely eroded due to
overstocking, was compulsorily destocked. Approximately 20,000 cattle were
14 Liebig's Extract of Meat Company Limited was a British public Company, incorporated in
London in 1865, which developed the production of meat extract and of canned and frozen meat
in Argentina, Paraguay, South West Africa, Rhodesia, Sudan, Tanzania, Nigeria, Botswana,
Uganda and Kenya as well as other manufacturing or selling opérations in many other countries of
the world (see Carlisle & Randag 1970:229).
15 Spencer States that the Govemment also paid a subsidy of £3,000 per year (see Spencer
1983:132).
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branded and purchased at very low priées.16 This brutal action, however,
ended in political protest from the Kamba and was stopped by the interférence
of the British parliament in 1938.
By 1939, some success in increasing Government control of the livestock
trade in Kajiado District was obtained with the change to markets as opposed
to itinérant traders as the channels for stock export. There had been a lot of
smuggling especially to the Machakos District. From now on grazing fees had
to be paid for catüe offered at the market. Most Somali traders left Kajiado
district and went to Tanganyika. The veterinary department was mainly
involved in establishing a stock route from Tanganyika to Liebig's Ltd. at Athi
River. A stock inspecter was stationed at Kajiado. Thousands of stock came
through this route and checks were needed on the spread of disease. However,
prices in Ngong were higher than those offered at other locations like Kajiado
Town which were consequenüy bypassed. The same occurred, but in the
reverse direction, in Loitokitok where all animais offered by Kenya Maasai
went to Tanganyika as prices offered by traders from the Kilimanjaro région
were prohibitive for Liebig.
With the outbreak of World War H, Europe had advanced into another war.
This time the Maasai were not part of it directly as Tanganyika was no longer
a German Colony. However, with the entry of Italy into the war military
activity in Kenya near its eastern border with Somalia increased. As during
World War I, the Maasai donated cattle and money to the Central War Fund,
the British Red Cross and other special War Funds. And to further assist food
production the Maasai agreed, for the duration of World War II, to the
ploughing of approximately 1,000 acres near Kitengela to plant wheat. In later
years the area was extended to 15,000 acres (fenced).
Of more importance was the arrangement made between the Maasai from
Kajiado as well as Narok and the Meat Control Board to provide
approximately 2,000 head of animais per month to meet the increased demand
for méat.17 Alternating between the two Maasai Districts animais were
provided at fixed locations (Kajiado, Loitokitok, Mashuru and Bissel) and on
fixed dates. Prices were fixed (Sh. 28/- to Sh. 46/-) depending on the live
weight, grade and year of sale with cash being paid on the spot.18
'(...) prices paid may be regarded as adequate to the African producer
In 1926 Governor Origg had announced the Crop Production and Livestock Ordinance,
which could be used to regulate the number and type of catüe in every African Reserve.
Besides this supply the Maasai officially exported about 700 head of cattle to the Kikuyu
areas (especially Kiambu) every year and provided approximately 800 head of catüe for (officiai)
local slaughter at Kajiado Town, the Magadi Soda Company and KMQ.
Ut grade: 10 cents/lb live weight; 2nd grade: 7 cents; 3rd grade: 4 cents.
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although it seems that even after carrying all the expenses of the Meat
Control Board (which also buys European Farmers' cattle) the profits
made by them from the sale of the Native Catüe have been very large. It
is fairly arguable that a proportion of these profits should be refunded to
be spent on bénéficiai development in Masailand' (KDAR 1941:2).















































source: compilea trom KUAKs 1941-1945
At each of the locations the various il-oshon produced their quota for sale.
Table 6.1 summarises the quantity of catüe sold at the Kajiado auctions for the
Meat Control Board.19 Shop owners were encouraged to seil their goods at
these sales, médical assistance was provided, tax collected and administrative
affairs settled. It should be clear that the arrangement made whilst said to be
voluntary was in essence imposed upon the Maasai by the Administration.
Cattle were collected by elders who were assisted by Tribal Police at the
buying centres. This continued until 1943 when the Maasai suffered from a
serious drought which lasted until 1946. Since other pastoral areas were having
difficulties in meeting their quotas during these years of drought and because
of the distances involved, the Maasai were even compelled to raise theirs. At
the same time the Maasai had to slaughter a considérable number of their stock
for home consumption due to shortages of milk and Wood. Alternative food
items were scarce. 'Mixed meal has been in short supply and none was
supplied from the Kenya Control until September when 200 bags were
received' (KDAR 1943:2). The monthly allocation of mixed meal never
exceeded 500 bags, which was approximately 2 kg per head of the population
per month. To make things worse widespread hopper infestations occurred on a
large scale in March, April and May of 1944.
As well as the total number of 59,364 head of catüe supplied to the Meat
Control Board, the Maasai from Kajiado District donated £3,252 to several
British War Funds. This support was highly appreciated by the Administration
as can be seen from the following statement made by DC Windley in 1944:
In 1941, 560 head of these catüe were purchased for supply to Liebig's at Liebig's prices.
The Meat Control Board also starled to purchase small stock from the Loodokilani, but after the
first batch of 332 this was stopped as the quality was not considered good enough (see KDAR
1941).
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'The Masai rank as a backward tribe in Kenya but I have been led in my
expérience to believe that they possess a natural intelligence and
character which if properly gmded and consistently handled should lead
them to play a useful part in the synthesis of tribal life in Kenya both as
a factor for stability in political development and in the economie sphère
as ranchers of cattie for the meat market. The impetus and inspiration
must come from us and we cannot afford the neglect evident in long
periods in the past' (KDAR 1944:2).
The other party in need of meat, Liebig's Ltd., had also been able to get
assistance from the Maasai. In 1940 Maasai from Tanganyika had agreed to
seil 6,000 head of cattie to Liebigs per annum, one third of the proceeds was
to be donated to the War Fund, one third to be lent free of interest towards war
expenditure and one third for their own development. This number soon
increased and by 1941 approximately 8,000 animais were passing through to
Liebig almost every month. By the end of the year 67,000 head of cattie had
been obtained from Tanganyika. The Veterinary Department assisted, as agreed
in 1936, in the supervision of dips in Namanga and Kajiado and by giving
free (anthrax) inoculations to cattie from Tanganyika destined for Athi River.
Despite all these measures Liebig's cattie suffered heavy losses at times. In
1941 approximately 11,000 animais died. This was a threat to the animais of
the Kenya Maasai as Liebig's cattie had infected many kilomètres of good
grazing. Liebig had to stop buying from Tanganyika temporarily by the end of
1944 due to the drought resulting in the closure of the Stock Route.
As well as the building of crashes, experiments in crossbreeding by
importing two Indian Kankrij bulls and two Sahiwal crossbreeds and
experiments in haymaking, the Veterinary Department was especially active
with respect to the eradication of disease in the District.20 This was warmly
welcomed by the Maasai. 'Many more inoculations could have been given if
the staff and vaccine had been available' (KDAR 1945:4). The campaigns were
mainly directed against Rinderpest, Pleuro Pneumonia, Black Quarter and
Anthrax. The total of animais inoculated in 1942 against these diseases
numbered to 65,600, 80,000, 33,750 and 1,300, respectively.
The 1943 rinderpest campaign was carried out in combination with a cattie
census which was the first reliable one in years. It calculated the total number
of cattie, including calves, at 360,000. The inoculation figures showed a
prevalence of 68 per cent for female catüe in Maasai herds of those days.
Table 6.2 shows the resuit by section.
Most efforts were süll on a hmited scale and faced great difficulties 'Experiments in
Haymaking were carned out after the Long Rains but they were somewhat hmited with «nskilled
staff and oxen and breakages in the machinery. The penod between the end of the rain and the
drying off of the grass seemed to be very short It is probably unlikely that the Masai will take to
using it for many years or that an adequate supply could be made without tractors' (KDAR
1941 6)
l
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By late 1925, the Government asked A.D. Lewis, the directer of irrigation for
South Africa, to advise on irrigation prospects in the Kamba and Maasai
Reserves. By improving the water supply it was hoped to raise the carrying
capacity of the area, in order to prevent érosion due to overstocking. Lewis,
however, stated that it was doubtful if large sums of money should be spent to
improve the availability of water in the African Reserves, 'especially in view
of the fact that there are considérable and growing demands for the labour of
the natives in various other directions in the country' (Lewis cf Spencer
1983:130). This argument would apply to the Kamba but not so much to the
Maasai. Moreover, in 1927 the District Commissioner reported that the number
of cattie in the Kajiado District had been stable over the last 10 years because
there was not enough food and water in the dry season to support an increase.
In 1928 the Council voted £2,000 for the building of pipelines and the boring
of water holes intended to open up 30,000 acres of arid land.
By 1929 water-boring opérations were at last begun in the Simba area with
funds provided by the Government. During this year the Ngong pipeline and
Surei water agreement were signed. The Maasai were entitled to merely 18,000
gallons of water per day between Ngong and Cairn hill and 2,000 gallons at
Toroka. A 6,000 gallon tank had been constructed at Cairn hill before the end
of 1929. Sites at Olooloitikoishi and Engirigiri were selected for another two
troughs and tanks, where similar quantities would be delivered daily.
Water improvement was mainly restricted to the provision of wells and
storage tanks along the Tanganyika stock route and at the auction locations.
Finance was provided by the Government out of the Stock Route Water
Supplies fund with assistance from Tanganyika. With money earned by the
Matapato for the digging of a trench from the Namanga river two boreholes
were drilled one of which met with success. The building of an earth dam near
Oloyiangalani and a well near Isinya were fmanced by the Kajiado Local
Native Council. In fact until the end of the 1930s this body was the main
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supplier of money for development projects.
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3. Education
Opposition towards éducation delayed the opening of the Government African
School in Kajiado until 1927. By the end of 1928 the school had 96 pupils
who were receiving an éducation in Swahili, carpentry and thé dairy industry.
Maasai éducation was to be instrumental in providing a commercial alternative
to nomadic pastoralism within their own Reserve. As soon as the ability to
read and write had been reached formal éducation was reduced to 5 hours a
week (see King 1970:215). In August 1929 another primary school was started
in Loitokitok. By 1930 the number of educated Maasai in Kajiado District was
estimated to be approximately 40. Other young Maasai were sent for training
at the Ngong Veterinary Training Depot whose curriculum was said by the
District Commissioner to be 'unrelated to the conditions in the Masai Reserve
and of little, if any, benefit to the Masai except as a général démonstration of
the value of native stock' (KDAR 1929:11). In fact, this curriculum suffered
the same difficulties as the "formal" schools. According to King the 'basic
obstacle to success of these early ventures in student commercialism is
precisely that the school was preparing its charges to enter a modern sector
that did not exist within the reserve, and discouraging them by the elementary
Standard of their général éducation from seeking work outside the reserve'
(King 1970:216). Failure to reap a harvest from the school gardens most years
meant that the schools were perceived as being a waste of time whilst at the
same time the Maasai risked losing their traditions.
This fear had even more validity with regard to missionary éducation. The
African Inland Mission, an American non-denominational organization, was not
much interested in éducation except for the teaching of the catechism.
Moreover, a struggle was fought over female circumcision, African dancing,
dress and other Maasai customs, resulting in the temporary abandonment of the
AIM school at Siyabei, Narok District. By 1932 the AIM opened a branch at
Illasit (near Loitokitok), where they obtained a plot of 40 acres rent free for a
period of 5 years. That same year the monopoly for the Maasai area was
broken by tue entrance of the Roman Catholic Mission and the Church
Missionary Society (CMS). They both opened an out-school in Kajiado Town.
The Government introduced a quota system obliging every section to submit
a minimum number of Maasai (boys) for without this quota there might have
been almost no schools at all. Those interested in schooling had mosüy been
influenced from the outside by missionaries or Kikuyu mothers for instance.
Other boys were characterized as coming from poor families, or being the least
favoured at home. In this, however, the Maasai did not react much different
from other African groups twenty years earlier towards a new development
which had yet to prove itself. With a lack of jobs it was no surprise that
students left school the moment they were circumcised and became ilmurran.
By the end of 1944 new out-schools had been established at Namanga,
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Mashuru and Bissel, followed in 1945 by Oloyiangalani. Total enrolment in the
district was 158 pupils.
4. Health
At Loitokitok and Illasit (Mission) small dispensaties had been built and in
1944 the first grant of £800 was received from the Government for the
improvement of hospital accommodation at Kajiado. By 1941 enough facilities
had been erected and paid for by the Local Native Council to allow the
qualification "small hospital".
5. Infrastructure
Mention should be made of the widening of the Athi River-Namanga road in
1940 and the construction of houses and bridges by Italian prisoners of war.
Also other feeder routes were improved during this period.
6. CuUlvation
Agriculture in the 1920s was still confined to those whose poverty drove them
to cultivation. In the Ngong area partially de-tribalized members and Maasai
wives of Kikuyu origin had shown some interest in cultivating the pastures
vacated because of the prevalence of East Coast Fever. By the beginning of the
1930s, their number was estimated to be some 300 and their catüe about 2,000,
Wealthy pastoralists employed Kikuyu to cultivate for them. In the Loitokitok
area cultivation had increased due to the 1929 drought and to the example
made by pupils of the Loitokitok school. Hère, expérimental agriculture was
also adopted by well-off Maasai. Despite all this in 1931 it was estimated that
less than 1,000 acres of the total Maasai Reserve were under cultivation.
During the 1930s and 1940s cultivation in Kajiado District remained an
activity chiefly undertaken by outsiders. Kikuyu and Chagga continued their
illegal trespass into the district. Both groups were employed by Maasai
interested in agriculture. During the war the Government established
Wheatlands near Kitengela. In 1943, having been fortunate with the rains,
4,000 bags were reaped from 1,180 acres, but the next year the rains failed and
not even the seed was recovered. Increased agricultural activity in various parts
of the Loitokitok area by 1943 was thought to be thé resuit of the shortage of
maizemeal in the shops (see KDAR 1944:8).
7. Mining
The minéral sector saw a considérable increase in its productivity. By 1930
44,340 tons of soda ash and 1,800 tons of lime were exported from the district.
Besides the exploitation of soda ash and lime great quantities of sand and fuel
(wood) were taken from the mile zone between Athi River and Sultan Hamud
as well as other locations in the district, The Magadi Soda Company and the
Kenya Marble Quarries were the main providers of wage labour. By 1927 the
former's management was in the hands of a small group of approximately 25
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Europeans assisted by 80 Indians. The labour force of 960 Africans was
dominated by Luo (350) and Kamba (250) A top salary for a "native" was Sh.
3/- a day, the average being £1 a month. The KMQ employed some 140
people. Less than 100 Maasai were employed in wage labour, mainly by the
Government as chiefs, headmen, tribal police or interpreters.
In Kajiado District the Magadi Soda Company had also suffered from the
early 1930s world-wide economie dépression. In 1931, it was about to close
but was saved by an order received in December of that year. Their labour
force dropped to an average of only 463. The number of KMQ-employees feil
to 109. By 1933 these figures had fallen even further to 396 and 64,
respectively. Still, by starting the production of common sait and bath salts the
total production of the Magadi Soda Company had recovered to 37,172 lons.
As a result of World War n Europe faced sévère shortages and Magadi was
called to step up production. Sales more than doubled during the war years. By
1944 the Company was employing almost 1,500 people, mosüy Kamba (700)
and Luo/Luhya (550). KMQ was less successful with only 80 employees.
8. Trade
Other non-Maasai (mostly Indians and Somali) had established themselves in
the trading centres, which had shown a rapid growth by the middle of the
1920s. Excluding Ngong the number of trade centres had risen from 9
comprising 27 shops in 1926 to 15 centres and 51 shops by 1930. Besides
exporting livestock products (hides and ghee) from the district, these traders
provided Household Utensils and foodstuffs for the growing number of non-
Maasai. Moreover, the Maasai also used part of their income from the sale of
animais, hides and ghee to buy maize from these shops especially during the
dry season when milk was short. 'No doubt women and children eat most of it,
but it certainly seems that the Masai menfolk are also taking to it and have
abandoned or rather modified their traditional diet of meat, milk and blood.
They do not like porridge or 'ugi' but meal bread they seem to eat freely and a
very rough calculation of the meal imported suggests the Masai now consume
some 2 Ibs of meal a week per adult besides their traditional food' (KDAR
1927:7). The Indian shopkeepers also suffered from the early 1930s crisis.
Kamba, Kikuyu, Luo and Luhya had lost their jobs at the Magadi Soda
Company or KMQ. By 1933 the number of Kajiado District trading centres
and shops, excluding Ngong, had declined to 10 and 29, respectively.21
The Administration tned to stop this development by reducing plot tents to Sh 16/- per
month in trading centres and Sh 20/- a month in townships of Kajiado and Ngong, the former rate
having been Sh 24/- in both townships and trading centres In companson the Machakos rental
was Sb 12/-only.
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6.3 Economie Activities and Development Policy in Kajiado
District: 1946 -1963
6.3.1 Introduction
In the Post World War n period Great Britain's economie power starled to
décline, especially due to the compétition from the United States of America
and Japan. During the War, British Colonies such as Kenya had supported the
war effort by supplying food. Post-war British colonial policy was based on
this same principle of economie opportunities available in the colonies which
could be used to regain a strong position for Great Britain's economy. British
manufacturers were encouraged to invest in overseas British colonial territory.
The policy of economie laissez-faire embedded within the self-sufficiency of
the colonies was transformed into a more planned economie and development
oriented approach. The 1945 Colonial Development and Welfare Act obliged
the governments of colonial territories to draw up ten year development plans.
In Kenya a Development Committee of settlers and Government officials
produced the "Ten Year Plan 1946-1955". Besides having a major agricultural
component, the plan also covered other aspects of development such as social
services and communications. It was not the several Departments but a special
agency, the Development and Reconstruction Authority (DARA), which was
entrusted with the Implementation of the Ten Year-Plan. Nevertheless, the
Provincial Administration underwent a modification in scope and volume.
Before the War its main tasks had mainly included collecting tax, and
maintaining law and order. After the War a policy of "development" was
adopted. The number of administrative posts increased, chiefly by extending
the numbers of technical advisors. Economie expansion was mainly directed at
the development of the European agricultural sector. European setders had
been highly involved in the management of the economy during the war,
greatly strengthening their position in practice.
'As members of the Agricultural Production and Seulement Boards, they
had contributed largely to the great boost in agricultural output. Their
hold on the reserved 'White Highlands' seemed unchallengeable, and in
the three years following the end of the war some 8,000 white
immigrants came out to join them, actively encouraged by the British
Government' (Bennett & Smith 1976:112).
In the wake of this development, agricultural processing and construction
industries starled to flourish. Multi-national firms also appeared on the scène
and soon overwhelmed local capital. As a resuit of the War and the good
priées for its products (mainly coffee and tea) on the world markets in the
period thereafter, Kenya's fmancial position was healthy. Very substantial
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funds could be expended to finance the Development Plan. The 'original
expenditure allocation of £17.5 million was increased progressively to over £40
million. £29 million had actually been spent by the time the plan was
terminated at the end of 1953, after eight years' (McWilliam 1976:282).22
Total Kenyan public expenditure had risen from £9.8 million in 1946 to £29
million in 1953. Over that same period total revenue had increased from £12.3
million to £29.6 million, respectively (see Low & Smith 1976:599).
In chapter 5 we have considered the post war development policy in the
African areas which had mainly been directed towards the conservation of the
soil and the consolidation of land. In addition, other schemes were initiated in
the African Reserves such as the Agricultural Research and Investigation
Scheme, the Livestock Improvement Scheme and Tsetse Survey and Control
Scheme, all part of the 1946-1955 Development Plan under the control of
DARA. This lasted until 1953 when, due to rapid economie change, the Ten-
Year Plan was replaced by a pattern of three year development programmes.
In contrast, the Emergency had a negative effect on the marketing of livestock
from the semi-arid areas in the meat markets of Nyanza and Central Province;
Kikuyu traders were banned from auctions, priées offered by the Government
were far too low and distribution arrangements were poor. Official trade was
limited but it is known that considérable illegal trade developed during these
years as the priées offered in Central Province were much higher. In the
following sections we will look more closely at the development activities
initiated in Kajiado District in the post-war period upto Independence in 1963.
6.3.2 Late Colonial Economie Development Policy and Activities in
Kajiado District, 1946-1963
We have seen how, in the pre-1946 period, Colonial Government development
policy in Kajiado District and, to some extent missionary involvement as well,
was characterized by a package of mainly restrictive measures affecting the
economie as well as the cultural way of life of the Maasai people. Among
these were restrictions for controlling stock movements by the imposition of
quarantine régulations, the pacification of the pastoral people by abandoning
"murranhood" in order to stop stock thefts and keep law and order, heavy
taxation which was only partly reinvested - daines for ghee production, hide
improvement, minor irrigation and drilling of a few boreholes, veterinary
assistance through building of a few dips and inoculation campaigns, thé
2 'Some 20 per cent of DARA's total resources was accounted for by special fonds that had
been built up dunng Oie wat and were then transferred for development. Thèse balances were
largely used up by 1954; meanwhile thé govemment was able to make important contributions
from ils current revenue surpluses, which in turn accounted for some 27 per cent of Ihe
programme' (McWilham 1976:285).
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establishment of a canning factory, cattie auctions for inter-tribal trade, thé
establishment of some infrastructural, educational and health facilities - and thé
Government's persistent efforts to destock thé Maasai grazing areas and
attempts to stop thé "conservative and damaging pastoral practices". In most
cases thèse efforts were only half-hearted and not successful. Part of this can
be explained by the wish of most of the members of the Colonial Government
to protect thé European selders. There was no priority given to developing any
of thé African areas, besides imposition of the restrictions mentioned above.
There was a lack of development funds and technical staff.
Whenever thé Maasai themselves demanded new initiatives as was the case
in thé agriculture proposai submitted to thé Carter Land Commission and water
development, veterinary assistance or higher livestock priées, they often
received either a négative response or they were forced into conditional
arrangements which were unfavourable to them.
On thé other hand the Maasai assisted the British during both World Wars
by providing gifts to thé Central War Fund and more importantly the selling of
large numbers of cattie to the Meat Control Board -which had allowed the
latter to make huge profits- and giving permission to plant wheat near
Kitengela. Some Government officials had noticed this. They (e.g Norman
Leys and District Commissioners Windley and Buxton) realised that in most
cases the Maasai had been loyal to the Colonial Government but that they had
been rewarded by the loss of their best grazing areas, the prohibition of selling
and improving their produce, mainly catüe, due to the quarantine restrictions
resulting in the over-stocking of an already game-abundant district, leading to
sévère diffïculties in times of drought. No wonder the Maasai eventually
wanted to be left alone and at times adopted an attitude of nonchalance or even
passive résistance.
Funds from DARA, ALDEV and the Swynnerton Plan did reach Kajiado
District to some extent as we have seen before. The (Colonial) Provincial
Administration over the years had continued to keep expenditure at
approximately half of the revenue collected in Kajiado District but by 1953
this situation had changed. Although income from revenues increased between
1949 to 1953 from Sh. 158.423/- to Sh. 196,458/-, expenditure increased
sharply from Sh. 81,065/- to Sh. 249.153/-. This growth was mainly the resuit
of a doubling of personnel émoluments due to Emergency measures in addition
to the development funds provided by DARA and ALDEV as part of the Ten
Year Development Plan 1946-1955.
In addition, local finance provided by the Local Native Council and its
successors the Masai African District Council and the Kajiado African District
Council, was also of major importance whenever a project was expanded.
Among the main sources of revenue were royalties for sand, wood, limestone
and the like. Other sources of revenue for the Local Councils were fées and
fines, Government grants and the Local Native Council rate of Sh. 4/-. In latter
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years this taxation, collected in addition to the Government native poll tax, was
raised to Sh. 20/- realising some £7,500 annually. The Maasai continued to be
the highest taxed group in Kenya.23 Expenditure, especially for water
development, éducation, médical and infrastructural purposes, through the
Kajiado African District Council averaged approximately Sh. 300,000/- per
year by the late 1950s.
Mention should also be made of the increased rôle of missionaries in
Kajiado District. The AM monopoly was definitely broken by the end of the
1950s. The African Anglican Church took over the CMS plot in Kajiado by
1951 and a church was opened by their Reverend Daudi Mokinyo in 1953. The
Catholic Mill Hill Mission was granted a plot for a church and school in
Kajiado Town by 1960 and another plot was obtained in Rombo by 1962.
Their main area of activity, however, was Ngong where the Prefecture
Apostolic was established in 1959.
Besides preaching Christianity these groups were also active in the sphères
of health care, éducation and water development This forced the AIM to take
their educational efforts more seriously and resulted in the opening of the AIM
girls' school in Kajiado Town in 1959. The Isinya Maasai Rural Training
Centre sponsored by the National Christian Council of Kenya and the Anglican
Diocese of Nairobi was started in 1961 (see Schlueter & Schlueter 1975:4). In
fact by the beginning of the 1960s there was a scramble for areas of influence
by Catholics and Protestants alike. However, éducation did not prove to be an
effective way to make contact with the Maasai as they were not very
interested. Hence, it has been argued by Voshaar, once a missionary himself,
that early missionary development activities should 'not [be] seen as
"missionary means" to conversion, but as a Christian contribution towards thé
amélioration of life' (Voshaar 1979:275). In any case the AIM had not made
Christianity a populär religion among thé Maasai. Traditional Maasai religion
remained their mainstay.
Let us turn to a review of the major economie development efforts and thé
state of the Kajiado District economy as thèse developed since World War II
until Independence in 1963. We hâve already dealt with the cultivation and
tourism sectors concerning thé use of land in Kajiado District and will
therefore only deal with them hère in brief.
1. Livestock economy and development policy
After World War II, as shown above, colonial économie development policy
tumed ils attention with more vigour to thé African areas without any major
change in ils overall conception of conservative pastoralists ail of whom they
believed wished to overstock their pastures at thé cost of severely eroded
plains. In Kajiado District, in addition to the Grazing Schemes, the
Government tried to destock thé area by introducting an organized outlet for
' Native poil tax was raised from Sh 17/- m 1949 to Sh 2l/- by 1960
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Maasai catüe. It was intended to continue thé bi-monthly auctions that had
obtained during the war
Initially, Kajiado, Bissel and Mashuru were thé three major locations for thé
officiai cattle auctions. Once in a while Loitokitok (Illasit) and Mile 46 were
also included. In latter years other markets such as Merueshi and Namanga
were opened. The Athi River factory of Liebig's Ltd., on a more regulär basis,
and the Magadi Soda Company, through an agent, were the main official
buyers outside thé auction circuit. Finally, two ouüets, Ngong and Illasit, could
be used to market and export cattle from Kajiado District. The latter had a
cattle dip and became a légal outlet by as late as July 1955.
At thé end of World War II the Maasai said that they were not able to
continue providing as many animais as they had done during the war years.
Nevertheless, in 1946, they offered a considérable number. Partty in response
to higher priées a total of 8,274 head were sold. This almost reached thé
reduced, but still compulsory, quota of 8,600 for 1946. The résistance to
selling at public auctions will have parüy corne from the high off take ratios
during the war years and the drought conditions which had reduced the Maasai
herds of Kajiado District to a minimum level of an estimated 335,000 head of
cattle. Nonetheless, at the same time 'it was evident that considérable numbers
of bullocks were being illegally exported to the Kikuyu and Nairobi and to the
Chagga country where priées up to twice and three times as great as those
given by the Livestock Control were obtainable' (KDAR 1946:10). Up until
the mid-1950s 'unofficial sales were estimated at about doublé the official
sales and unofficial priées were about twenty percent higher than the official
priées' (Campbell 1981a:222).24
Table 6.3 shows the amount of livestock sold and the average price paid at the
official catüe auctions held in Kajiado District between 1947 and 1960.
Although the data are incomplete and should be handled with great care, the
principle events of the livestock marketing business in Kajiado District during
the late 1940s, and the 1950s are reflected. Reliable data were not available for
Ngong as it often included sales from Narok District. This and the resale of
cattle bought at the Kajiado District auctions has been taken into account in the
total official livestock trade for Kajiado District.
In 1947, compulsory sales were replaced by voluntary auctions resulting in a
huge réduction in the number of animais offered. Despite a further increase in
the average price from Sh. 567- to Sh. 121/- by the end of the year, only 1,292
head of cattle were voluntarily sold at these auctions. Another 1,632 had been
produced in January as part of the 1946 compulsory quotas.
24 The compétition from Nairobi and Central Province was also feit by the Magadi Soda
Company as the Loodokilani no longer wanted to provide the Company with their animais as done
under the compulsory arrangements dunng wartime Pnces offered by the Company were far too
low to purchase enough cattle
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The increase in cattle priées could not stop black-market trade. An increasing
number of Maasai, mainly with some Kikuyu blood, became itinérant traders
replacing the Somali who had been banned from these practices in the district.
In trying to stop the illegal trade an Order was promulgated that stated that
the new Meat Marketing Board was the sole official buyer and exporter of
slaughter stock in the district. Other traders had to obtain permission from the
Board, before starting their business. These traders had to introducé an element
of compétition, but all stock purchased by them had to be resold to the Meat
Marketing Board over scales with varying priées for distinct qualities at Athi
River. This turned out to be un-profitable for most of the individual traders.
Later in the year, after a request from the Maasai to allow outside traders to
join the auctions, priées reached a peak making sales to the Meat Marketing
Board and Liebig unprofitable. Most catüe were purchased by local traders.
However, they were not allowed to export these animais from the district,
despite a request from the District Commissioners of Central Province to relax
this prohibition. The Veterinary Department stated that private trading between
Maasai and other districts could not be allowed due to the incidence of pleuro-
pneumonia in Maasai catüe.
In 1948 Kikuyu traders from Kiambu were allowed to attend the auction
sales. After testing for pleuro-pneumonia at Ngong, the animais purchased
could be transported out of the district. At three sales in April,
August/September and November, 3,350 head of cattle were offered of which
3,204 were sold. Over the year priées dropped from Sh. 1027- to Sh. 767- due
to the lack of grazing as a result of poor rains and an invasion of army worms
which devoured most of the grass over half the district. The Meat Marketing
Board, using the weight and grade System, purchased 2,152 head at these
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auctions; Kikuyu traders bought 435; local traders 308; Sayed Orner & Bros, a
Company mainly acting as a buying agent for thé Magadi Soda Company,
obtained 309 head of cattle. At Loitokitok Chagga buyers from Tanganyika
purchased sorne 316 animais. Liebig's Ltd. did not buy at the auctions but was
able to purchase 3,708 head of cattle at their factory at Athi River offering an
average priée of Sh. 8l/- slightly below the annual average of Sh. 86/- per
head of cattle. In total thé Maasai sold 7,228 animais for Sh. 627.070/- at thèse
official markets in 1948.
The following year a rinderpest epidemie prohibited the holding of sales
during a long period of thé year, owing to thé Veterinary Department ban on
thé export of cattle from thé district. Nevertheless, four auctions could be held
at which 2,025 cattle were sold at an average priée of Sh. 79/-. The principal
buyers were Somali, Kikuyu and other African traders who purchased a total of
1,291 head. The Meat Marketing Board was unable to compete with thé priées
offered by thèse traders and purchased only 606 head of somewhat inferior
cattle. 'The sale of cattle direct to Liebig's at Athi River continued to be
extremely populär and the Masai were very sorry to see the Company close
down in September. During thé period 1-1-1949 to 5-9-1949 a total of 4,913
head were sold to Liebig's at an average price of Shs 85/73' (KDAR 1949:18).
Another 400 head of cattle were sold at cattle auctions held in Ngong.
A goat and sheep market was starled in Ngong in October 1949. During the
last two months of the year a total of 3,127 goats and sheep were sold. The
total number of stock sold officially in the district during 1949 was therefore
7,892 head of cattle and 3,127 sheep and goats. The Local Native Council
received a total cess of only £605 from thèse sales. Cattle directly sold to
Liebig' Ltd. äs all catüe distributed illegally to Kikuyu and Chagga buyers
were not levied. Had they been this would have provided an increase of
approximately 400 per cent in cess revenues.
In 1950 thé Kenya Meat Commission (KMC) was established. It replaced the
Meat Marketing Board and also took over the Liebig's Ltd. factory at Athi
River. It was hoped that an expanding outlet could be established for the
disposai of stock from the African pastoral areas. However, being a strictly
commercial enterprise, the KMC applied a differential pricing policy. It sought
to create a great margin between producer and consumer priées in order to
offset its large capital and overhead costs. The outcome was a réduction of
priées offered to African livestock producers.
In 1950 the KMC bought only 750 head of cattie in Kajiado District. By
1951 this had dropped to only 76 head. The remaining official sales were
purchased mainly by Somali, Kikuyu and Maasai traders offering much higher
priées. For instance, while the KMC offered an average priée of Sh. 94/- per
head of cattle, thé Chagga buyers at Illasit paid an average price of Sh. 2167-.
Moreover, thé lack of sufficient outlets resulted in large numbers of cattle
being sold illegally to Kikuyu and Chagga buyers. Maasai traders acted as
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nuddlemen by visiting the potential seller at home, saving the latter the trouble
of trekking their animais to an authonsed sale centre This guaranteed a
continuous flow of livestock, whereas official sales were very often cancelled
due to the outbreak of livestock diseases. In 1952, for example, Kikuyu and
Chagga official traders were no longer allowed to attend the auctions from
August onwards as a result of Foot & Mouth disease. This meant a loss in
compétition and a sévère drop in the average price of cattle. African livestock
marketing facilities in Kenya had been neglected for many years in favour of
the development of European marketing facilities.
This lack of interest from the KMC caused much frustration among the
Maasai and other African people. To overcome this, the African Livestock
Marketing Organization (ALMO) was set up in mid-1952 to purchase stock
directly from Africans, to encourage local cattle sales, particularly for local
consumption and to employ licensed traders, under controls, to buy in the more
remote districts' (see Swynnerton 1955:31) Initially ALMO succeeded in
obtaining a reasonable share of approximately 30 to 40 percent of the official
auction sales. However, by 1956 their share had dropped to only some 10 per
cent. 'ALMO proved no more successful than had been KMC in competing
with private traders in the African areas. Two livestock marketing systems
emerged, with private traders purchasing African stock on-the-hoof, and KMC
buying the stock of Europeans at controlled priées, paying producers on a
quality and dressed-weight basis' (Evangelou 1984:44).
A drought which had hit the district hard in 1953, increased the need for
markets. Constant propaganda to the Maasai that they should destock their area
was not matohed with deeds at the time that it was the most vital to act. This
made the illegal trade even more populär among Maasai as far away as Narok.
Even Kamba sent their cattle to Illasit Approximately 4,000 head of cattle
followed this Tanganyika route, By 1954 the figure was estimated to be at least
6,000.
Throughout the 1950s the compétition from individual traders, légal or
illegal, was too strong for the KMC.
'The price paid for Masai cattle by the monopolistic Kenya Méat
Commission is still in the order of one-half of what is generally paid for
comparable Masai cattle in Tanganyika. (...) there has flourished for years
now an illegal market trade across the border, to which many Kajiado
Administrators have deliberately turned a blind eye because it is an
important source from which Masai can secure monies to pay their poll
tax, as well as relief overstocking, in the absence of adequate or fair
marketing conditions in their district' (Jacobs 1963:71),
Nonetheless, to canalise and control at least part of this illegal trade Hlasit was
made an official outlet by July 1955. Moreover, cess income for the Kajiado
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District Council was an important source to finance several development
projects. Sales were held weekly and the average priées paid were Sh. 195/- in
comparison to Sh. 127/- being the average official auction price paid for cattle.
'Estimating the number sold ülegally to Chagga in the first 6 months of the
year at 3,500 and a similar number sold throughout the year along the border
from Loitokitok to Shombole, we get a total of 19,876 which is within sight of
the 1956 target of 25,000' (KDAR 1955:16). To relieve pressure on Illasit,
Namanga was made a third outlet.
In the latter half of the 1950s total cattle sales from Kajiado District were
estimated to be approximately 50,000 head of cattie per year. Only 1959
showed a drop to 30,000 total cattle sales due to the closure of the sale yards
during the first months of the year because of F&M and Pleuro Pneumonia
quarantine régulations. At the official sale yards, including Kisamis from 1959
onwards, only some 14,000 animais were marketed. This seriously affected the
finances of the African District and Section Councils who derived much of
their revenue from auction fees of Sh. II- per animal sold.
But worse was still to come. In 1960 the rains failed totally resulting in the
most sévère drought in the previous 25 years. 'By roadsides in all parts of the
District can be seen skeletons of dead beasts and recently a complaint was
received from a farmer at Sultan Hamud asking that the carcases should be
buried as there were so many [that] even the hyena, jackals and vultures were
not able to eat [them] fast enough' (KDAR 1960:14/5). Various estimâtes
concerning the number of cattle deaths range from 300,000 (Fallon 1962) to
400,000 (Jacobs 1980) or 65-80 per cent of the pre-drought herd size. Famine
was widespread. 'More than six million pounds of posho and over one half
million pounds of dried milk, as well as edible oil, meat powder, vitamins and
other foods were distributed to Kajiado Masai free of charge during the 16-
month period from February l, 1961 to June l, 1962' (Fallon 1962:9). Other
districts in Kenya were also suffering from the drought. In total an estimated
450,000 people, of whom 38,000 Kajiado Maasai, received food aid.
Cattle sales were cancelled in most areas for three quarters of the year
because of the still prevalent diseases mentioned above as well as outbreaks of
malignant catarrh and localized trypanosomiasis. Tax collections were poor
and, as a result, many development schemes had to be postponed. Because
Tanganyika also suffered from drought conditions the market to dispose of
livestock was rather limited. Alternatives were sought without success, in the
Kikuyu région. According to Fallon the Maasai were also to be blamed. 'The
Masai had waited too long. Litüe demand existed for animais in a starved
condition. At the Namanga sale only 2 buyers appeared although the sale had
been publicized days in advance. They bought less than 25 animais at an
average price of shs 60/= each from the more than 300 offered' (Fallon
1962:3).
On the other hand Jacobs, at the time conducting his research among
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'the Kenya Méat Commission was paying on the average of Sh. 30/- for
premortal Masai beasts (of which Sh. 20/- could be recovered from the
sale of their hides alone), but only accepting about one hundred beasts
per month at the Athi River Factory because they were not equipped to
handle more. Yet I was told, in no special confidence, by a well-known
employee and buyer for Tanganyika Packers in Arusha, that a request
from them for permission to buy cattle in Kajiado District at this time, at
approximately Sh. 90/- to Sh. 120/- per beast, was refused - allegedly on
the grounds that Tanganyika Packers would flood the world market with
Masai tinned beef at a time when the Kenya Méat Commission was first
attempting to expand into this market. It was also said that Masai of
Kajiado would have profited by an estimated £500,000 at this time if
permission to buy had been given' (Jacobs 1963:72).
Indeed, if we take into account the inadequate official marketing facilities
and/or priées in combination with the prohibition from importing high quality
Boran stock to improve the Maasai herds, which was only relaxed in 1961, it
is a rather onesided if not inaccurate statement to suggest that the "enormous"
quantity and "poor" quality of Maasai cattle should be considered to be
primarily responsible for the 1960/61 disaster.
The KMC was mainly interested in first grade cattle from the European
areas for fresh méat production as, until 1958 when the canning plant at Athi
River was opened, it was not able to deal with tinned méat as the Tanganyika
Packers Ltd. were able to already for a long time. 'Masai have been restricted
from selling cattle on a truly compétitive open-market and, like keen
businessmen everywhere, the only reason which has prevented them from
selling more cattle than indeed they do has been the lack of what they consider
fair priées' (Jacobs 1963:70).
Heavy rains finally came by November 1961 and the land once again
became a vivid green. By mid 1962 the number of destinâtes had dropped to
some 10,000 people. Food-for-Work projects were initiated such as the
repairing of roads and dams and the clearing of bush. But it was not until 1965
that all of them had fully recovered from the 1960/61 disaster.
The export of hides and skins, which had almost come to a standstül during
the war years increased sharply thereafter. 'The buying of hides and skins by
the Bata Shoe Co. at Loitokitok has been a great success. The excellent priées
paid by this fïrm have caused a genera! rise in priées paid by Indian traders in
the area' (KDAR 1950:18). In 1947 4,044 hides and 1,356 skins were officially
exported. By 1953 no less than 20,982 hides and 17,785 skins were transported
from Kajiado District. An estimated extra 20 per cent left the district illegally
in order to avoid the payment of a cess of 75 cents per hide and 25 cents per
Chapter 6: Pre-Independence History of the Economy and of Development Policy 253
skin to the Kajiado African District Council. Despite the posting of 12
instructors sent out to teach the Maasai the principles of suspension drying and
the correct way of flaying and cleaning hides, no noticeable improvement in
the quality of the product was achieved. Nonetheless, some success was
achieved in organizing the hide and skin trade. Traders were obliged to have
suitable hide stores and the clérical ability to maintain detailed records of all
transactions. In 1956 new hide drying bandas were built.
In accordance with the periods of starvation among cattle the number of
officially exported hides and skins fluctuated between some 10,000 to 20,000
during the 1950s. By 1959, as a result of the drought, a record number of
35,380 skins and 23,682 hides were marketed. For 1960 these figures stood at
28,399 skins and 31,671 hides. Priées received were as low as Sh. 51- to Sh.
II- per hide.
2. Veterinär) assistance
After World War II veterinary activities in Kajiado District were improved by
the establishment of 7 centres spread over the area. Contagious Bovine Pleuro
Pneumonia (CBPP), East Coast Fever (ECF) and Rinderpest were the main
diseases by the late 1940s. Appearance of the latter was in f act caused by a
mistake made by the Veterinary Department. They had inoculated Maasai
cattie with a faulty vaccine. As a result, approximately 10,000 cattle, mainly
belonging to Kaputiei Maasai, died in 1949,
In the early 1950s quarantine régulations were still in force in about 6 areas
of Kajiado District because of CBPP. The whole of the district was placed
under quarantine in 1952 due to an outbreak of Poot & Mouth disease. In 1953
the Rombo and Loitokitok areas suffered from ECF resulting in livestock
losses as high as 75 per cent. With a newly developed vaccine to attack CBPP
an inoculation scheme was launched in June 1957 with the object of
eradicating the disease throughout the district. Unfortunately, the stock in the
Loitokitok area reacted badly and hundreds of cattie died. Other areas did not
suffer from this but, by the end of 1959, CBPP was showing itself again. The
weakened situation gave several other diseases a chance. By May 1960 all
Veterinary staff were concentrated along the Machakos border, not in order to
protect Maasai cattle but to protect those belonging to the European farmers in
the setüed areas. The annual rinderpest campaign had to be curtailed and cattle
sales were suspended for six months.
By 1960 three dips (Illasit, Konza, Kajiado) were available to prevent tick-
borne diseases, a fourth being constructed in Loitokitok. The Kajiado township
dip was used by about 600 head a week, most of the animais belonging to the
school farm and local ranchers.
3. Water development
Water development was initially still an activity mainly undertaken by the
Kajiado Local Native Council. A new Township water supply was installed for
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Kajiado Town in 1947. The next year £3,000 was provided to (partly) cover
the costs of the drilling of 5 new boreholes for as many sections. Two
boreholes in favour of school farms were financed by the D ARA. Three
sections produced the finances for a borehole themselves. 'It has become
increasingly evident that the Masai themselves are anxious to play their part in
this programme. During the year, and a very hard year at that, over £300 was
collected by voluntary contribution and deposited with the District
Commissioner for the construction of various water supplies' (KDAR
1949:14). Unfortunately the results of the boreholes drilled were disappointing.
Of the five LNC boreholes three were complete failures and the other two
produced only small quantities. The two school boreholes were successful, but
of the three private Maasai boreholes only one turned out to be productive.
In spite of these difficulties new plans were made for the drilling of 20
boreholes to be financed by a DARA grant. A proposai to collect money for
the maintenance of the LNC boreholes was, after an earlier rejection accepted
by 1949 and a Sh. 6/- Maintenance of Water Supplies Rate, as part of the
animal Native Council taxation, was introduced in 1950. Récurrent expenditure
for Water supplies was £2,366 in 1951 rising to £6,824 by 1955.
In 1950 thé African Seulement Board had provided additional DARA funds
for thé establishment of a Dam Construction Unit, with the object of showing
the Maasai how to make earth dams for themselves using their own labour and
oxen. In the first year a total of 8 dams was constructed, in Kaputiei,
Matapato, Konza and Kajiado, with the help of 60 Maasai ilmurran and 56
oxen trained to draw scoops. Only two dams had water by the end of the year
but in later years more dams were built.
Another way for the Maasai to obtain water was by agreements made with
companies which applied for mining concessions in Kajiado District. As a
result 2 boreholes were drilled in the Sultan Hamud area. The Magadi Soda
Company, having obtained approval for the construction of a 200,000 gallons
per day pipeline from the Oloibortoto River on the Nguruman Escarpment to
their factory at Magadi, agreed to provide 10,000 gallons of water a day to the
Loodokilani living along the pipeline. This arrangement was also made with
the Railway Company who constructed a 100 km pipeline from Noolturesh
near Loitokitok to supply a 3,000,000 gallons reservoir near the main railway
line at Sultan Hamud. Along the new pipeline, completed by 1956 and
transporting 500,000 gallons a day, 5 take-off points were created for the
Maasai providing 50,000 gallons a day. By 1960 38 boreholes and over 50
dams were operating in Kajiado District belonging either to the African District
Council, the Central Government or to individual Maasai.
4. Education
Other fields of development in the period before Independence were éducation,
health and infrastructure. As compared to the pre-war years some progress was
made, but it should be realized that, compared to other districts, the Maasai
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were in a less favourable position.
In 1946 Kajiado District had five Government primary schools in Kajiado,
Loitokitok, Mashuru, Bissel and Oloyiangalani, plus two missionary schools at
Ngong. The Kajiado and Loitokitok Secondary schools had long been closed
due to insufficient pupils. In 1945 the fïrst two Maasai students at Makerere
University pleaded for the use of sanctions, if needed, to bring about social
change through éducation. One of their proposais was to enrol girls in the
schools. In 1948 there were only 15 girls as opposed to 279 boys on the school
registers and a total of 11 teachers. The quota System was still in use.25
According to the District Annual Report of 1948 éducation remained
unpopulär with the bulk of the Maasai primarily because of the 'necessity for
the mother and a sufficient number of catüe to accompany the child to school,
but others maintained that it was merely because children were wanted for
herding' (KDÀR 1948:18). An attempt had been made to overcome a former
important complaint, concerning the non-relevant curriculum used in the
schools. It was stated that éducation 'paid no attention to the priority of catüe
in Maasai life, and did not attempt to inspire any reforms in land use or animal
husbandry' (King 1970:226). However, the emphasis of training Maasai youths
to become veterinary officers was not appreciated either.
By 1949 a primary boarding school was opened at Kajiado. This turned out
to be a success as there was no longer a need to send a wife and cattie to the
schools to accompany a child. The Maasai asked for all the other out-schools
to be turned into boarding schools. The Kajiado Intermediate School was
opened in 1953 with 36 pupils in Standard V. The following year the school
totalled 104 boys and 14 girls, 80 per cent being pure Maasai.26 School fees
were raised to Sh. 80/- in 1954 covering approximately 20 per cent of the
récurrent expenditure for boarding schools. By 1957 the District Education
Board schools numbered 442 boys and 104 girls. The Kajiado Government
school had 153 (primary) pupils. That same year two Intermediate Schools
were opened in the Ngong area, one under PCEA and the other under the
(Catholic) Holy Ghost mission. The AIM Girls' school at Kajiado made the
most spectacular progress. The school starled in May 1959 with 53 girls and a
year later had 150 pupils, mostly from nomadic homes. A primary school was
opened at Mile 46. By 1959 Kajiado District had 15 primary and 4
intermediate schools.
Still, school attenders as a percentage of school-age youth would only have
been in the order of 5 to 10 per cent. In addition, the number of drop-outs,
especially among girls, was very high. Moreover, it should be realized that the
25 The quota settled, however, was very low. For example the Loitokitok Section, with some
2,500 school-age children by 1959, was supposée! to send only 27 pupils every year.
26 Intermediate schools included standards V to VIII. Until 1966 they acted as an
intermediate between the 4 years primary and the secondary schools.
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increase in schools and pupils was partly the result of the influx of non-Maasai
mto the district. For example, out of the 15 primary schools in Kajiado by
1959, 8 were located at Ngong and almost exclusively used by the agricultural
Kikuyu. The wind of change that swept through the district in the beginning of
the 1960s resulted in greater emphasis being laid on the efforts to increase
literacy among the Maasai. Plans were made to raise the number of schools in
the District to 41 by 1963. 'Of these, board day primary schools for the
pastoral Masai are expected to be built at the rate of four in 1961, three in
1962 and two in 1963. The other schools are for the more static agricultural
groups who are very keen on éducation' (EAS 28/08/59). The Maasai realized
that they had been placed in a disadvantaged position and had to change as
quickly as possible.
Education received a big impulse from the arrivai of more missionary
societies. The Mill Hill Mission took over from the Holy Ghost Mission and
promoted three new schools in the Kisonko and Kajiado areas. Loitokitok and
Bissei opened an Intermediate School in 1960. 'Desertion by pupils from
intermediate schools has also become a rarity and almost all pupils now show
détermination to finish the school course' (KDAR 1960:26). Despite the
intentions to increase the number of primary schools to 41, only 22
Government aided schools, nine of them being intermediate, were available by
1963. The number of pupils, however, had increased to just under 3,000 or
approximately 15 per cent of the eligible age group of 7-15 year olds (see
Gorham 1977:5). Again, children of agricultural groups like the Kikuyu and
Kamba and young Maasai of mixed parents were mainly responsible for this
expansion. 'In 1965, for instance, it was noted with concern that the recently
established A1M girls' boarding school at Kajiado had changed to being non-
Maasai' (King 1970:229).
Also the geographical distribution of these 22 schools favoured the non-
Maasai population of Kajiado District. Ngong Division was served by 9
schools, Loitokitok by 6 and the remaining 7 were located in Central Division.
Moreover, most schools were present in the small, non-Maasai dominated,
towns of the District. Sections like the Loodokilani, Dalalekutuk, Ildamat and
Purko had no primary school at all. 'Clearly then, in 1963, the majority of
Kajiado District schools were located either in areas where there were very few
Maasai at all (i.e. Township) or in those rural parts of the district where
Maasai were well outnumbered by other ethnie groups' (Gorham 1977:9).
Finally, mention should be made of the start of two adult literacy classes at
Ngong and Kajiado in 1960.
5. HeaUh
By 1948 the Kajiado District Health sector was made up of two hospitals at
Kajiado and Magadi, and 3 dispensaries at Namanga, Mashuru and Loitokitok.
By 1960 the number of dispensaries had increased to 7 (Namanga, Mashuru,
Shompole, Bissel, Euaso Kedong', Meto and Zebra (near Amboseli National
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Park) and Health Centres present in Mashuru, Loitokitok, Ngong and Bissel. A
mobile unit was also operative in the District.
6. Infrastructure
In 1948 the Kajiado-Namanga track was resurveyed in préparation for
rebuilding and tarmac surfacing of the Athi river-Namanga road. Funds from
DARÂ were provided for road improvement in the district. Still, by the
beginning of the 1960s large parts of Kajiado District were almost inaccessible
to motorized transport. Air transport to Loitokitok became possible in 1954.
Buildings constructed were mainly for educational, médical and administrative
purposes.
In addition an "Improved Housing Scheme" costing £200,000 was starled in
1953. ttmurran were often used as labourers for the Public Works Department.
Courses were once in a while held in instructing the ttmurran in animal
husbandry, hygiëne and Government affairs. Most importantly attempts were
made through these contacts to control the Maasai warriors as they were often
engaged in raiding the stocks of neighbouring groups. In 1948 a special
Ilmurran-Qfücer was appointed to deal with these issues. Discussions over the
abolision of the Emurrano System and/or a réduction in the warrior period
continued all through the years now under review.
7. Cultivation
Agricultural activities in Kajiado District fluctuated over the years as a result
of land use législation, weather conditions and the availability of non-Maasai
labour. This last had been affected by the Emergency and by the résultant
immigration restrictions (see section 5.5.4). As far as thé Kajiado Kikuyu are
concerned it should be noted that éviction was mainly a measure to control and
destroy thé Mau Mau movement rather than to safeguard thé Maasai grazing
grounds. The Government and individual Maasai alike welcomed thé increase
of agricultural activities. For example, during thé drought of 1953 thé eastem
portion of thé district had obtained maizemeal produced at the gardons located
near Loitokitok along thé Tanganyika border. The rest of the district had to
rely on maize released by thé Nairobi controller. So "absentée landlordism"
with Chagga, Kamba, Kikuyu and Sonjo wives and/or labourers working for
thé Maasai remained thé primary arrangement in most areas.
Irrigated agriculture which had corne to Kimana, Sinnet and Rombo parts of
thé Loitokitok area was initiated by Maasai with mixed blood and by illégal
non-Maasai cultivators. In thé Ngong area, even under thé difficult conditions
of thé mid-1950s, 3,299 bags of maize and 4,635 bags of potatoes could be
exported to thé Nairobi markets by 1955. That same year a District
Agricultural Committee was gazetted. Loans for farm improvement were
provided to some Maasai cultivators. Cash crops made their appearance in
Ngong by 1961 when 20 acres came under pyrethrum and another 19 acres
were planted with coffee. Some farmers' co-operatives were started in that
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same year (see Muranja 1973/74:59). Irrigated agriculture at Nguruman by
Sonjo and Maasai was slightly expanded.
8. Wildüfe and Tourism
The abundant availability of wildlife sharing the Maasai pastures starled to
become a major source of revenue for the local Administration through the
licensing of controlled hunting parties and the development of a tourist
industry. '130 hunting parties, of which 30 came to shoot birds only or to
photograph, entered the district in 1953 and accounted for 4 lion, l léopard and
202 'hoofed' game for which the African District Council received revenue of
Shs 2,300/-' (KDAR 1953:16). Furthennore, the 50 acre 01 Tukai Camp Site
in the Amboseli Reserve was leased to Kenya National Parks who administered
the Reserve. A proportion of the entrance fées and accommodation charges
was also to benefit the District Council.
During the 1950s the number of visitors to Amboseli Game Reserve had
risen from less than 1,000 by 1952 to just over 10,000 by 1962. The transfer of
the Amboseli Game Reserve and the diffïculties of collecting taxes during the
drought of the early 1960s suddenly made tourism the foremost supplier of
revenue for the Kajiado District Council.
9. Mining
In the late 1940s, the Local Native Council agreed to some land concessions
requested by companies in various parts of the District (e.g. near Sultan
Hamud and near Elang'ata Wuas). Most of the enterprises were seeking
magnesium free limestone for the manufacture of cement. Other concessions
included the KMQ area near Mile 38 (Magadi Line) (176 acres), a Military
Camp near Athi River (600 acres), a tourist rest camp near Loitokitok (2 acres)
as well as fuel (charcoal) and sand concessions for Indian traders, KMQ and
the Magadi Soda Company.
The decade following the war saw business increasing steadily for the
Magadi Soda Company. In 1948 it produced 116,350 tons of soda ash which,
in cash terms made this the third most important Kenyan export. During the
1950s total production had risen to 182,500 tons by 1959. South Africa, India,
New Zealand and the Belgian Congo were among the main importers of
Magadi Soda Ash. Other products made by the Magadi Soda Company were
sait, household soda and cattle sait.
KMQ's production of limestone, chips and marble rose from some 3,700
tons in 1952 to 5,000 tons by 1957. Over this period the number of labourers
increased from 103 to 155. Towards Independence KMQ's production and
labour force declined to the level of the early 1950s.
After years of standstill the East Africa Portland Cement Company took
over the donnant Sultan Hamud limestone project. A total of 900 acres located
in the Kibini Hill limestone area were leased to the Company. A branch railway







Chapter 6: Pre-Independence History of the Economy and of Development Pohcy 259
place at Athi River. By 1959 production was statted. Over 80,000 tons of
limestone were extracted.
Indian traders exploited sand taken at various centres from rivers adjacent to
the Mombasa Railway Line for building and other construction work in
Nairobi. A parallel trade in boma manure also existed and most of the sand
exporters also exported manure. Royalties had to be paid to the Local Native
Council. In 1949 55,000 tons of sand and 7,300 tons of manure were exported
from the district. Royalties paid per ton were 50 cents and Sh. l/-, respectively.
Wood fuel royalties, at Sh. II- per ton, stood at £1,680 for 16,800 tons of
fuel. This resulted mainly from the concession granted to the Magadi Soda
Company to eut trees in the area between the Euaso Ng'iro River and the
Nguruman Escarpment.
In 1952 the export of manure came to a standstill owing to the ban on its
movement caused by Poot & Mouth disease. This lasted until 1955. Sand and
wood fuel continued to leave the district and a total of 54,876 tons exported
brought in £4,860 revenue to the African District Council. In latter years, with
slightly raised royalty rates, revenues for the ADC from these sand, manure
and wood fuel concessions ranged between £4,000 and £6,000 annually.
10. Trade
Imports into Kajiado District of mainly sugar, maizemeal and cotton pièce
goods, remained firmly in the hands of Indian and Somali traders, despite the
establishment of the Kajiado Joint Loans Board in 1956 for the purpose of
issuing and administering loans of between £50 and £100, to selected African
traders. In 1955 Somali traders had tried to obtain import licences for goats but
their attempts were unsuccessful. In an attempt to get Maasai traders
established in areas free from compétition by Indians and Somali, markets
were set up where no plot rents were payable and only an ADC licence of Sh.
15/- was required. A few cashed in on this, "renting" their plots to alien
traders. By the end of the 1950s more Maasai had applied for loans to venture
into local business, mainly livestock trading.
6.4 Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter we focused our attention on the Maasai economy and its
development since the late 19th Century until 1963, the year Kenya gained
Independence. We also reviewed the development policy conducted by the
former British colonizers in Kenya and Maasailand in particular and we looked
at three distinct periods.
In the fïrst period 1895-1919, the Colonial Administration tried to stimulate the
European settler economy by every possible means. Huge tracts of land were
offered at low priées and concessions granted to The Maasai, whose economy
was in disarray due to the 1890/91 outbreak of rinderpest and smallpox and
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who had lost their best grazing areas. As a strategy of survival some Maasai
settled in the fertile Ngong and Loitokitok areas and commenced cultivation.
This move was warndy welcomed by an Administration striving to hold back
"the pernicious pastoral proclivities" and encourage peasant agriculture as a
first step towards "civilized" forrns of land tenure and usage.
However, this switch was only of a temporary nature as by the beginning of
the 20th Century Maasai herds had recovered and nomadic pastoralism became
the mainstay for all of the Maasai once again. This building up of the herds
again had been actively speeded up by young Maasai ilmurran involvement in
raiding expéditions undertaken by British against other African groups. In
return for their assistance they received a share of the loot. A negative aspect
of British pressure was the déclaration of quarantine régulations in 1917 to
protect the settlers' livestock industry. This put an end to the Maasai tradition
of sélective breeding using Boran bulls from Samburu and Somalia.
Within the Maasai territory the colonial development policy was mainly
directed at the "pacification" of the population and to maintaining law and
order. For this purpose heavy fines were levied now and then upon the Maasai.
Some minor projects were funded from the proceeds. Another interest was the
supply of Maasai cattle to newly arriving settlers. Only towards the end of
World War I were the first plans formulated to raise the productivity of these
areas.
By this time colonial officials considered the Maasai to be among the
liehest peoples in the world, their owning some 600,000 catüe, 2 million
smallstock and 10,000 donkeys. Taxation was proposed but difficult to employ.
Understaffed departments meant that the assistance offered was restricted to
some small attempts in the commercialization of ghee for instance, in offering
veterinary care to intensify the cattle farming and in various constructions such
as irrigation works to diversify thé Maasai economy.
A second distinct period is thé 1920-1945 timespan. The Kenyan economy
went through a séries of lises and falls in its economy and in some years
several settiers were forced to abandon their farming enterprises. Economie
activities in Kajiado District suffered less from thèse developments as, since
thé early 1920s, thé Maasai had become even more restricted from trading
livestock in order to protect European sales. Moreover, settlers dernand for
cattle had been fulfilled by this time. Maasai did hâve problems, though, as
livestock diseases killed many animais by thé early 1920s.
Education (opening of the Government school in 1927 in Kajiado Town),
thé provision of water (e.g. borehole construction near Simba, earth dam near
Oloyiangalani, troughs and tanks along stock routes) and veterinary care
(inoculation and expérimental crossbreeding), were the most important efforts
to develop thé Maasai of Kajiado District by the middle and late 1920s. The
Maasai often openly asked for this kind of assistance but frequenfly without
success. The funds for these kind of projects were, in fact, provided^by thé
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Maasai themselves. Being the highest taxed group in the country, the Colonial
Government received three to five times as much money than it actually used
for (development and récurrent) expenditure in thé area. Increased interest in
thé Maasai had been the resuit of the 1923 déclaration of the "Dual Policy";
European and African areas should develop alongside one another.
Disagreement appeared to exist, however, between the kind of development
needed in the Maasai reserve; meat or dairy-oriented. A major problem for the
first option which had the support of the Department of Livestock, was the
lack of a meat-canning factory. Thus the second option, promoted by the
Department of Agriculture, was adopted and attention was concentrated on the
processing of ghee. After some successful years the production of ghee
collapsed due to the 1929 drought and by 1932 all daines had been closed. The
trade in hides and skins was more successful but also came to a standstill by
the 1940s. Other measures initiated by thé Colonial Government interfered
with Maasai customs and pastoral economie practices (e.g. the attempt to
abolish the ilmurran System and heavy stock fines).
The most important for the Maasai was the trade in livestock. Some
livestock auctions organized by the late 1920s failed, because of the low priées
offered and because of quarantine restrictions. After eradicating livestock
diseases and establishing more livestock outlets (e.g, Loitokitok for sale to
Tanganyika) priées increased slightly. This increase was brought to a standstill
as a result of the 1933 drought. The Colonial Administration blamed the
Maasai for having too many animais. The Maasai responded by reminding that
they had lost large tracts of their best grazing pastures. The Maasai gained
support from an official report stating that some 40 per cent of the Maasai
pastures were now useless, either due to the présence of livestock diseases or
as a result of lack of water.
By 1937 the Liebig's meat processing factory was in production in Athi
River. Though starled under favourable conditions the Company could not
compete with individual traders due to the too low priées (25-50 per cent of
private trader's priées) offered. Illegal trade to Ngong and Tanganyika by
contrast was flourishing.
The Maasai contributed to the finances of the Colonial Administration by
giving "donations" of cattle during World War II. Alternately Narok and
Kajiado District provided some 2,000 cattle at fixed priées every month.
Though the price was fair the Government made a huge profit from this
arrangement. During the war Kajiado District supplied between 10,000 to
13,000 head of catüe annually, or almost 60,000 in total.
Developments in other sectors of the district's economy (e.g. mining and
cultivation) showed that the Magadi Soda Company suffered from the collapse
in the world economy in the 1930s. Production and employaient feil
significanüy for non-Maasai in the main. Cultivation was of minor importance.
In 1931 an area of less than 1,000 acres was under the plough in the whole of
the Maasai Reserve. During the 1930s and 1940s it remained an activity
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mainly perfonned by Maasai stricken by drought and by immigrants. Trade
was in the hands of Indians and Somali.
The third period 1946-1963, is foremost characterized by an increased
concentration of interest in the African areas. This commenced after World
War II at the instigation of the British Government, at least partly to benefit
the British economy and to replace the laissez-fair attitude by an approach
oriented at a kind of planned economie development. Special agencies were
created to produce and implement a 1946-55 Ten Year Development Plan.
Veterinary assistance, hides and skins drying training, livestock marketing
organizations, éducation and water development (e.g. boreholes and dams)
were some of the major projects implemented. The scope and volume of the
Provincial Administration changed from one of only collecting taxes and
maintaining law and order into a more active one, This process was speeded up
as a result of growing tension among agricultural groups (mainly Kikuyu).
Over the years the revenues collected in Kajiado District had been
approximately twice that of the expenditure. By 1953 this situation had
changed as a result of a threefold increase from 1949 to 1953 (Sh. 250,000/-).
Emergency measures and development funds were the main causes of this rise.
Revenue from taxation rose to some Sh. 200,000/-. In addition, the Local
Native Councils had become involved in development-oriented projects (water,
éducation, health and infrastructural developments mainly) averaging some Sh.
300.000/- annually. Finances were derived from a Local Native Council tax,
fées, fines, grants and sand, wood and limestone royalties. The Maasai
continued to be the highest taxed group in Kenya.
Finally mention should be made of missionary activities that had gained in
importance by the end of the 1950s. Most of their efforts were in the field of
éducation, health care and water development.
The Maasai pastoral economy in the post-war period was characterized by both
an initial drop in livestock numbers to some 335,000 head of cattle and an
increased (legal) off-take, partly in response to increased livestock priées. Until
the mid-1950s black market sales (to Nairobi, Central Province and
Tanganyika in particular) doubled official sales with the former receiving
priées some 20 per cent higher than the latter. Auctions organized on a
voluntary basis were a failure even after when official livestock priées were
raised. The prohibition of private trading between districts, only relaxed in
1961, also made buying cattle at official auctions unattractive. Liebig's also ran
into trouble and closed down in 1949. The next year the Kenya Méat
Commission (KMC) was established which took over the Liebig's factory.
Now official producer priées became even less lucrative with private traders
paying more than doublé the KMC priées. Illegal trade towards Tanganyika via
Illasit became very populär. Kajiado Administrators were said to have
prolongea this practice deliberately as it was an important source of money for
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the Maasai and therefore by way of taxes also for the Administration. Still, by
1955 Illasit was made an official outlet and official sales increased
dramatically to some 25,000 annually.
By 1960 the Maasai livestock economy had collapsed äs result of a sévère
drought. Livestock numbers had decreased by some 65-80 per cent. Food aid
had had to be provided to some half of the Kajiado District population. The
KMC was paying very low priées and could not handle the huge numbers of
cattle offered. Outside assistance from Tanganyika was refused for commercial
and strategie reasons. As with the cattle sales the marketing of hides and skins
increased sharply in the mid-1950s.
Cultivation in Kajiado District fluctuated over the years as a result of land
use législation, weather conditions and the légal or illegal availability of non-
Maasai labour. Irrigated agriculture was starled in the Loitokitok locations of
Kimana, Sinnet and Rombo. In the Ngong area some cash crops such as coffee
and pyrethrum were introduced and also tourism gained importance. Within a
decade the number of visitors to the Amboseli Game Reserve had increased
tenfold, making tourism the main source of revenue for the Kajiado County
Council. The mining of limestone, marble and soda ash all increased
considerably. In the next chapter the création, performance and subdivision of
group ranches will be discussed.
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CHAPTER 7
KAJIADO GROUP RANCHES; CREATION,
PERFORMANCE AND SUBDIVISION
7.1 Introduction
In chapter 5 we outlined the history of land use and land use policy in colonial
Kenya and the position of the Maasai pastoralists in this respect. In chapter 2,
we had already highlighted the Kenyan land issue in the humid and semi-
humid areas. We concluded that a huge shortage of land, partly the result of a
large population, but even more due to an unequal distribution of land among
the population of this zone had pushed farmers away to the best agricultural
areas within the semi-arid zones of Kenya. As a result, and in addition to the
natura! growth of the pastoral population, compétition about land in the dry
régions of Kenya increased.
In the following an analysis of post-colonial land policy and the state of
affairs in Kajiado District will be presented. Pressure on ranging land in
Kajiado District shows itself mainly by way of loss of pastures to other land
use activities such as cultivation and National Parks and through a process of
privatization and individualization of land use and ownership. The growing
importance of agriculture and immigration to the relatively high-potential zones
of Kajiado District and of wildlife conservation activities have been intensively
studied by Campbell (1979a, 1981b), Muranja (1973/74), UNDP/FAO (1978),
Western (1982a) and Ecosystems (1982).
In the last section of this chapter an updated overview of these developments
will be presented. First and foremost, however, we will address ourselves to
the création, performance and, most specifically, to the process of the
subdivision of group ranches into small individual ranches in Kajiado District.
This is the most hotly debated item in Kajiado District today.
7.2 The Création of Group Ranches in Kajiado District
7.2.1 Diminishing Opportunities for Nomadic Pastoralism Around
Independence
We ended our description of land use in the late colonial period in Kajiado
District by concluding that a process of setting aside individual ranches had
started by the early 1950s, and this had resulted in the création of 24 individual
ranches by 1963. This development had worried Colonial Government officials,
because they feared a land grab by rieh, influential and educated Maasai at the
expense of the majority of the Maasai people. Still, as the Administration
favoured an eventual transition to freehold land tenure, it declined to register
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the Kaputiei section as one unit having one title deed as had been proposed by
the newly created Kaputiei Development Committee. With the consent of the
Kaputiei senior elders this committee had been formed by a few formally
educated members of both junior elders and senior warriors. According to
Hedlund (1979:31) the one title deed option was rejected by the colonial
authorities 'as it would only preserve the present economie structure and
circumscribe expected commercial changes'. Not surprisingly, a new proposai
made by a few members of the Kaputiei Development Committee to allocate a
limited number of private ranches was accepted by the Authorities. However,
elderly Maasai were opposed to the création of individual ranches, thought to
be too smal! and not viable.
Those in favour of individual tenure mentioned the possibility of forming a
buffer of individual ranches on the fringes of Maasailand to stop illegal
intrusion. In chapter 5 we reported on the fear among the Maasai at the time of
Independence concerning the dissolution of the old Maasai Treaties which had
resulted in the removal of the status of closed district, enabling other groups to
enter the Maasai Districts freely.' As early as 1966 the Lawrance Mission on
Land Consolidation and Registration quite boldly stated that securing tribal
lands against infiltration by members of other ethnie groups through a process
of registration would turn out to be an illusion. To underline their statement the
Mission pointed to the Ngong area where 'registration of land to individual
Masai has resulted in immédiate sale to Kikuyu farmers and consequent loss of
the land to the Masai tribe, probably for ever' (Lawrance et al. 1966:25).
By 1964 over 8,000 ha, or more than half of the best dry season grazing
areas round Ngong had been allocated to small individual farms (see Bekure et
al. 1987:92). By mid-1968 this had increased to over 10,000 ha in the Ngong
Division alone (see EAS 07/06/68). Indeed, increasingly these small plots were
sold to Kikuyu holders either for agricultural or spéculative purposes. The
Kajiado District Annual Report for 1967 reports 'While some plot holders have
endeavoured to get money for development, others have spent their time
searching for rieh people who could buy their land at high priées' (KDAR
1967:4). Land was turning out to be a very valuable Investment, In 1963 land
in the Ngong area could be bought for as little as fifty shillings per acre, but
the priée for an acre had risen to four to five thousand shillings by 1972. In
that year alone, some 431 hectares (almost 3 per cent of the total Ngong area)
was sold and 188 land transfers carried out (see KDAR 1972:38). According to
Muranja:
'The infiltration of the Kikuyu in this Region has completely destroyed the
1 Tobiko (1989a:58) dismisses the idea that the acceptance of land registration was connectée!
with a fear among the Maasai concerning the expirmg of the Maasai Treaty of 1911. However, hè
agrées that the Maasai were looking for means to stop infiltration by non-Maasai and Game
Reserves. In my view the two are definitely linked as explained above.
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Masai economie System and the Region is now like any other Kikuyu area
in the Central province. Kikuyu being agricultural people (...) were obliged
to fence their acquired plots to protect their crops. This process of land
enclosure has reduced the area of grazing land and has left no room for
pastoralism. (...) All that land consolidation has done for Masai in this area
is to render them landless' (Muranja 1973/74:58).
By January 1967, the then Minister for Land and Settlements, Mr. Angaine,
assured Maasai représentatives that no newcomer would be allowed to settle in
their areas without their consent, as the areas were owned by the Maasai
people and not by the County Council. The latter's task was only to protect the
existing rights and interest« under customary law. The Government would
ensure that the selling of land as had happened in the Ngong area would not be
repeated. He urged the Maasai to set up group organizations and register their
land (see EAS 13/01/67).
However, the influx of non-Maasai continued especially in the Loitokitok
area on the higher-potential slopes of Mt. Kilimanjaro. Between 1966-1969
over 16,000 ha were allocated there to individual holdings. 'The original land
owners were Maasai leaders, government officers and others who realised the
value of obtaining titie to land, and many acquired large tracts' (Campbell
1979b:4).2 Once the monetary value of these lands had become apparent when
immigrant farmers from other districts offered to buy or rent them, subdivision
into small farms took place.
From the early 1960s onwards the initial idea of individual ranches had been
backed by the Kajiado County Council. They also acted as a guarantor to the
Agricultural Finance Company (AFC) when loans were provided to individual
owners (see Sadera 1986:21). Peron (1984:53) sees the rôle of a political
element setting the tone for the pro-individual land tenure position of the
Kajiado County Council; two opposing influential politicians, both candidates
in the 1963 genera! élections for the position of Member of Parliament,
rewarded their supporters by granting them title deeds.3 Some of the récipients
were members of the sectional development committee in the Kaputiei area.
Although a process of land adjudication was started in Kajiado District in
1961 under the Land Consolidation Act, the Lawrance Mission stated that this
act and the procedure followed by the County Council was not suited to and
2 According to Fallon in addition to requests made for 2,000 acre ranches in the plains, a
number of Maasai had earlier made applications for farms varying in size from 30 to 180 acres in
the high- potential areas on the slopes of Kilimanjaro on which they planned to establish mixed
farming enterprises (see Fallon 1962:26).
3 Over the years unul the early 1980s, one of the candidates managed to acquire a vast
temtory of 15,000 hectares for his own purpose with the help of the County Council (see Peron
1984:45).
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was in principle illégal for the Kaputiei area. The report did not rule out
individual ownership entirely, but warned that it required urgent and firm
control. Most of Maasailand was considered unsuitable for mixed or arable
farming and the report opposed the haphazard approach of the Government
towards the land issue in Maasailand (see Lawrance et al. 1966:31 and EAS
22/08/67).
By 1965, 22,000 ha (out of 322,000 ha) in Kaputiei Section alone had been
allocated to 28 families out of a total of approximately 8,400 people (see
Hedlund 1971:3).4 In the whole of Kajiado District the number of individual
ranches was 82, the average size being 1,630 acres. This means that by 1965
some 53,475 ha or 2.5 per cent of Kajiado District was set aside under
individual ownership. Yet it was estimated by the Lawrance Commission that
if the whole of Maasailand was divided between Maasai adult males each one
would only get about 200 acres, which was not considered viable for a single
person let alone for a family (see Lawrance et al. 1966:31).5 This development
created growing opposition to the allocation of individual ranches and had to
be brought to an end for three main reasons:
1. Fear that people in the Kaputiei area would be left landless if land
continued to be distributed in parcels of 2,000 acres. The alternative would
be the création of small non-viable units;
2. Risk of losing land to non-Maasai (e.g. Kikuyu and Kamba) wishing to
start cultivation in the area or engage themselves in spéculation with land
bought from the individual Maasai owners;
3. The Lawrance Mission on Land Consolidation and Registration declared in
1966 that "approval" by the Kajiado County Council in the case of the
individual ranches had no legal authority.
4 According to information provided by the Office of the Central Bureau of Statistics in
Kajiado, the Kaputiei area amounted up to 264,900 ha with a population of 6,674 people in 1962.
By 1969 the Kapuüei area measured 280,600 ha and supported 9,328 people. Perhaps the
différence between Hedlund's total Kaputiei area and these figures stems from the inclusion of the
Kitengela Game Conservation Area totalling 54,130 ha and populated by 949 and 1,759 people for
the respective years. Including these people and averaging the resulting population figures for
1962 and 1969 gives a total population of some 9,355 people. If we présume 10 per cent to be
non-Maasai (district-wide this was 31 per cent) and thé Maasai family size to be 10 persons, we
can calculate that 280 people (3.3 per cent of ail Maasai in Kaputiei area) had obtained 6.8 per
cent of the total area as their own ranch.
5 For thé Kaputiei area, Halderman (1972b:l) estimated a potential average ranch size of 471
acres by 1968/9.
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7.2.2 The Group Ranch Concept: Objectives and the Search for
Traditional Land Units
It was now time to search for an alternative. According to Davis (1970:13) the
birth of the group ranch concept should be placed in time between the East
African Royal Commission of 1955 favouring individual tenure in the whole of
Kenya and the Lawrance Mission in 1965-66 preferring the establishment and
registration of group ranches in the semi-arid régions. Grandin refers to the
Range Management Division (RMD) and a report written by L.H. Brown in
1963 entitled 'Development of the Semi-Arid Areas of Kenya' as an important
marker in the start of the land tenure changes in Maasailand.6 From 1963 to
1967 RMD laid the groundwork for the Kenya Livestock Development Project
Phase I (KLDP I) by recruiting and training staff; designing ranch structures
and pilot projects; promoting législation for the allocation of communal
pastoral lands; introducing ranch research and drafting a credit request for the
necessary funding (see Grandin 1981:1). Another plan for the development of
Maasailand, the "Lewis Document" of 1965 divided the area into three
ecological zones of high, medium and low-potential areas. It recommended
mixed farming in smallholdings for the high-potential areas, commercial dairy
and beef ranching for medium-potential areas whilst low-potential rangelands
were to be adjudicated for group ranch development (see Njoka 1983:56).
After Consulting with educated Maasai the RMD held meetings throughout the
Kaputiei area to inform people of the group ranch concept. In brief this
concept involved the setting aside of a certain pièce of land, communally
owned by a group of people and recorded and registered as the legal owners
through membership of the particular ranch. Livestock movements would be
restricted within the boundaries and outsiders not allowed to enter with their
stock. Development capital loans were to be provided for infrastructural
development such as water facilities, dips and firebreaks. In addition, by
6 m my opinion, a report written in early 1962 by Leland Fallon, range management advisor
of thé United States Agency for International Development for thé Kenyan Government Ministry
of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry has also been of importance in this respect. Fallon
(1962:47) recommended that 'the era of unregulated and free use of the land resources in the
Kajiado District should be terminât«! as soon as possible through the formation of Land Use
Commissions, Co-operatives or Corporations under proper legal authority'. These new legal bodies
should preferably be established at the enkutoto level. A Commission of 6-12 elected members
should be appointed responsible for the management and development of resources including all
administrative fonctions and the collection, bonrowing and expenditure of funds and the ownership
of property. These administrative organizations should be subdivided as soon as possible into
individually and family owned ranches 'where water and other conditions permit' (see Fallon
1962:46)! Fallon furthet proposed an annual development fee (Sh. l/- for catüe and donkeys and
Sh. 0/20 for small stock) to be paid by each family for the use of the grazing resources based on
the number of livestock owned or conttolled. In addition, a range management system based on 4-
paddock relational grazing combined with a three-month grazing period should be introduced.
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providing working capital loans, young animais could be purchased, fattened
and afterwards sold on the Nairobi meat market to repay these loans This new
approach to pastoral development was conceived as a first step in the radical
transformation of nomadic subsistence production Systems into sedentary, more
commercially oriented Systems. We will now summarise the targets set by the
Government authorities conceming the introduction of the group ranch
concept.7
1. Réduction of the total number of livestock from the pastoral areas who
were thought to be responsible for pasture dégradation. The 1960/61
drought had turned the arid and semi-arid zones into a déplorable area.
Free access to land, in combination with private herd ownership was
thought to be the wrong basis for a sound ranch management strategy.
Small ranches restricted to the livestock only of registered members should
promote strict grazing controls and "create a feeling of responsibility";
2. Production of méat for the national market. A report by the East African
Livestock Survey of the mid 1960s had wamed that, unless something was
donc to commercialise the pastoral areas, Kenya would have to import
meat by the 1970s (see Tobiko 1989a:59);
3. Prevention of the spread of livestock diseases by dipping, vaccination and
quarantine. In addition, stock should be improved and water provided.
Loans could be provided with the group's titie deed as security;
4. Settlement of pastoralists in group ranches would considerably ease in
meeting basic needs such as éducation, health and infrastructural facilities.
Implications of the introduction of the group ranch lay in the organisational,
juridical and economical sphère. In the remaining of this and in the next
section these conséquences will be discussed.
One of the most important organisational adjustments was the formation of
spécifie groups of Maasai whose area was, in future, to be confined to strict
boundaries. FAO experts stated that group ranch boundaries had been based on
"sociological groupings of the population". It was assumed that the Maasai
group was made up of several sections, each of these made up of smaller
politica! units, known as elatia. Group ranches, it was believed, could be
formed by subdividing these elatia. Unfortunately, this analysis of Maasai
society was essentially faulty. Elatia can be translated as 'neighbourhood'.
Depending on a spécifie région within Maasailand and upon a time in history
this refers to all members of a borna. As early as 1970 Davis reported that,
Chapters 9 and 10 will go into more detail conceming pastoral production stratégies and
commercial Systems of Uvestock production
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after consultation with a large number of Maasai, the term elatia referred to
thé members of a single borna. Jacobs used the same définition. Later, some
authors (e.g. Bekure et al. 1987.126) included one or more adjacent bornas as
making up a neighbourhood. In ail probabihty this was due to thé fact that,
since thé early 1970s, thé size of bornas had decreased considerably, resulting
in thé dispersai of the elatia over a larger area. As a resuit, today elatia refers
to thé members of one large or a number of adjacent small camps. In any case
it will be clear that a group ranch could never have been formed by
subdividing an elatia. Jacobs explained that the group ranch identification
exercise had not been done by an anthropologist or a sociologist but rather by
a grassland botanist (see Halderman 1972a:17).
Another confusion exists conceming the term enkutoto. According to Jacobs
(1963:48-9) each Maasai section is further subdivided into a number of named
localities (enkutoto), in which adequate water and pasture to support local
concentrations of kraal camps throughout the dry season may be found. Each
such locality is a self contained ecological unit with contiguous areas of wet
season pasture, to which camps disperse in the rains on locally scattered
temporary water. A typical locality of the sort described by Jacobs is rarely
more than 200-300 square miles and contains some 600-700 people divided
amongst twelve to fourteen kraal camps. The average cattie population for the
area would be of 8,000-9,000 head, with roughly fourteen to twenty-four acres
per beast. Individual kraal camps always tended to move within the same
locality from year to year. In addition each locality had their own council of
elders and warrior group. The self-contained ecological unit enabled the
council of elders to manage the affairs of the area as if they "owned" the land.
However, as Hedlund and Tobiko pointed out, Jacobs' enkutoto concept is
wrongly applied. According to Tobiko (1989a-77) enkutoto as a subdivision of
the Maasai section is simply unknown. Enkutoto, in fact, means something
quite different from Jacobs assertion. It is a flat area of land which encroaches
into the hillside particularly in arid areas where good forage exists as a result
of fertile soil deposits coming from érosion of the hills. Apart from this
geographical perspective, it bears no socio-political characteristics. It
constitutes a small area of land, normally used for grazing, but which is neither
self-contained ecologically nor capable of being the basis of a group ranch. In
fact, a group ranch might have several mkutot or might contain none at all. For
Kiboko group ranch Hedlund found 21 such areas. He further reports that the
word enkutoto is normally not used by the Kaputiei, but in the rare instances
when it is used, it defïnes an area where people have setüed down more
permanentiy (see Hedlund 1971:5).
In fact this brings us to the concept of "emparnat", meaning permanent borna
or home area. It is an area in which the family's patriline has stayed for a long
time, one to which it belongs and in which it has a right to live. So indeed,
despite frequent movement, each Maasai household has a place to which it has
a unique sensé of belonging (see Bekure et al. 1987:69). This residential
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association normally referred to as emparnat, sometimes called enkutoto, is of
a much smaller scale, however, than a group ranch territory. For now, the most
important point to be made is that we can conclude that group ranches had
nothing to do with traditional land units.
Why then, did the Maasai accept the group ranch concept? Part of this question
has akeady been answered in our discussion of the increase in the number of
individual ranches and encroachment of non-Maasai into the district. Also, the
fear that more land would be lost to Game Reserves or National Parks can be
seen in this light (see Western 1982a:304). In addition, it is mentioned that the
Kaputiei especially, whose area was the first to be placed under the group
ranch programme, were willing to accept the group ranch concept because their
area was closest to the neighbouring groups of Kikuyu and Kamba to the
north.8 Towards the south the Kaputiei feared the Maasai of the Kisonko
section. Several disagreements mostly over water and land resources had
occurred between the two sections. For example, Mr. Stanley Oloitipitip, a
Kisonko Maasai who had become a Member of Parliament (MP) for Kajiado
South in 1963, employed his position to deprive thé Kaputiei of their water
point at Eselenkei river and transfer it to his own section. This situation
obtained until 1988 and required a séries of violent confrontations before it
was handed back to the Kaputiei.
Furthermore, the disaster of the early 1960s is said to have been responsible
for making thé minds of many Maasai "development oriented". However, as
we have seen before, Maasai pastoralists have always been interested in new
opportunities. This désire for improvements in water facilities and veterinary
assistance could be obtained by thé provision of loans using thé group title
deed as collatéral. Grandin (1981:6) reports 'The average Maasai seems to
have accepted the group ranch concept because it was presented as a "total
package" - as thé only way to get a title deed, dips, water, etc.' From the start
the international donors had insisted that, without some policy of privatization
of land-holdings and without the certainty of ownership, no agency would be
prepared to lend money for range development (see Holland 1986:38). Tobiko
(1989a:61) and Gutto (1981:47) believe that the rôle played by the Government
of Kenya and international donors has in the end been the most important
driving factor behind the création of group ranches in Kajiado District. Some
backing for this statement can be found in the Lawrance report statement that
initially the Mission was:
When the World Bank Appraisal Mission took place in April 1967 it was iniüally decided
to restrict group ranch development to the Kaputiei section because the area had a comparatively
high grazing potential, its people seemed to be more in favour of development than those in other
areas, the Kaputiei Maasai had had some level of éducation and they had a history of contact with
outsiders. Lessons leamed in the Kaputiei section would later be extended to other parts of
Kajiado District and Kenya as a whole.
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'in some doubt as to the real need for registration of group ranch land as a
condition of loans. Individual ranches whose land is not registered have
already been given credit by the Agricultural Finance Corporation on other
security, and obviously the pledging of group range land against a loan
will not by itself provide any valid security to the lender, (...) We are,
however, convinced after discussions with représentatives of the World
Bank, that registration of group ranches is a prerequisite to the loan of
money for development purposes. Without the certainty of ownership and
the clear right of the group to exclude outsiders, which is provided by
registration, no agency would be prepared to lend money for range
development' (Lawrance et al. 1966:31).
Did all Maasai accept the group ranch concept? No, in northern Kaputiei and
south-eastern Keekonyokie especially, near the better watered Ngong area,
strong opposition existed towards the introduction of group ranches. Those
Maasai favoured only the démarcation of individual ranches. In the end their
group ranches (Kisaju/Kipeto, Olooloitikoishi/Kitengela, Nkatu/Saikeri and
Olchoro Onyori) never functioned as such and the area was, in fact, under
individual ownership (see Bekure et al. 1987:102).
In a survey conducted by Njoka in 1977 76 per cent (out of 148 responding
Kaputiei Maasai group ranch members) were said to be in favour of the group
ranch concept. Of the 24 per cent not in favour 85 per cent preferred an
, individual ranch. Developments like water, dips, schools and shops were
mentioned by 49 per cent of the respondents as being the most important
advantages of the group ranch concept. Free grazing under communal rights
and land rights for the Maasai were mentioned by 30 and 16 per cent of the
respondents, respectively. In other words, improvements and security of land
rights were virtually seen to be of equal importance, at least by the late 1970s
(see Njoka 1979:216-7).
In conclusion it can be stated that the group ranch concept was, in many
respects, an artificial création having no traditional basis, being established as a
result of administrative propaganda for change and accepted by a majority of
Maasai because of securing access to land and the provision of several
improvements such as water and veterinary facilities.
7.2.3 The Process of Adjudication and Registration of Group Ranches
The actual establishment of the group ranch followed a phased structure that
starled with the déclaration of an "Adjudication Area". The essence of this land
adjudication programme was the turnover of "Tribal Lands" held under trust by
the County Council, from common property into private property to be held by
individuals or groups. Supervision of this process was in the hands of a District
Land Adjudication Officer (DLAO). Démarcation, recording and survey
officers were appointed to assist in the technical process of this exercise.
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Determination of the Adjudication Section's boundaries was précédée by
feasibility studies performed by the RMD. After discussions with the chiefs
and elders of a section rough boundaries were drawn. Next, parts or the whole
of an adjudication area were declared an Adjudication Section. In Kajiado
District the Adjudication Sections were virtually congruent with the
administrative boundaries where these tended to coincide with il-oshon
boundaries.
The moment that Adjudication Sections were pronounced, any person
claiming to have an interest in that section had to bring his claim before an
Adjudication Committee, formed by no less than ten persons resident within
the Adjudication Section and appointed by the Adjudication Officer. According
to Peron (1982:54) the Adjudication Commutées were 'essentially composed of
educated Maasai, politicians and government officials' and Grandin reports that
most of them were given individual ranches (see Bekure et al. 1987:101).
In addition, an Arbitration Board for the whole of the adjudication area was
set up in early 1967 and was comprised of ten Maasai originating from every
Maasai Section in Kajiado District including a représentative for the Ngong
area. Most of them were individual ranchers and/or politicians whose main task
was to deal with disputes over sectional boundaries or claims concerning land
ownership which could not be dealt with by the Adjudication Committee.
Among the cases dealt with by the Board were a dispute between Purko and
Matapato Maasai in 1967 over the drilling of a borehole by a Matapato
individual rancher who had been "given" the ranch in Purko area by the
Matapato.9 Galaty has reported on other more bloody armed clashes over
boundary disputes, which occurred between the Matapato and the Dalalekutuk
in 1965, between the Purko and Loodokilani in 1972 and between the Ildamat
and Loodokilani in 1975. In the last case it was said that an Ildamat chief had
influenced the Land Adjudication Officer as a result of which a substantial
portion of the Loodokilani section had been adjudicated to the Ildamat (see
Galaty 1978:15/6). Like the Purko, it should be noted that the Dalalekutuk and
Ildamat only entered Kajiado District af ter the Maasai Moves of 1911-13.
The Adjudication Record was usually open for a period of sixty days. The
Adjudication Section was divided into individual and group ranches and people
were recorded as belonging to one spécifie parcel (a group or individual ranch)
marked on the section démarcation map. The map and the record together
comprised the Adjudication Register. All those who were recorded in the said
Adjudication Register as having an interest in the group land were entitled to
become members of the group. After completion of the registers they were
9 It should be remenibered that the Purko Maasai entered tbis part of Kajiado District only
after they had been removed by the Colonial Government ftom Laikipia in 1912. At Ihat time few
people inhabited the area and the Matapato Maasai did not bother so much (see GoK/MLS 1967).
Troubles between the Malapato and the Purko continued into the 1980s (see DN 15/08/81).
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open for inspection for a period of sixty days during which complaints could
be made to thé Adjudication Officer. Finally thé Adjudication Register,
including the amendments made, was sent to thé Chief Land Registrar.
At a meeting thé group of potential members then elected at least 3 but no
more than 10 représentatives. Their task was to apply for incorporation of the
group ranch to thé Registrar of Group Représentatives (see below). In addition,
thé group members elected group ranch committee officers from among
themselves (i.e. thé Group Ranch Committee) responsible for day to day
management of thé group ranch. Finally, a certificaje of incorporation and thé
Adjudication Register was forwarded to thé Land Registrar of the District
concemed who then issued a group title in the name of the group. This marked
thé birth of a légal group ranch; a corporate body, with a distinct name, a
perpétuai succession and with thé rights and obligations to sue and be sued, to
acquire, hold, charge and dispose of property of any kind and to borrow money
with or without giving security (see Coldham 1982:2).
Légal authority concerning group ranches was based upon the Land
Adjudication Act 1968 and the Land (Group Représentatives) Act 1968 (see
RoK 1970b and Wanjala 1990:34). The former governs the process of création,
démarcation of group boundaries, adjudication of group rights and conséquent
registration of title under the Registered Land Act. The latter deals with the
opération and administration of the groups. These Acts had to be newly
introduced in 1968 because the Land Consolidation Act and Registered Land
Act contained no provisions fof the ascertainment and registration of group
rights.
7.2.4 The Structure and Administration of a Group Ranch
For the internai functioning of the group ranches four main components are of
vital importance;
1. The Registrar of Group Représentatives
2. The Group Représentatives
3. The Committee
4. The Members
ad 1. The Registrar of Group Représentatives, appointed by the Minister of
Lands, is a public officer responsible for the général supervision of the
administration of group ranches. The Registrar keeps a copy of the list of
members and may check on the group's financial performance and day to day
functioning. Décisions of the group représentatives, the committee and the
members are all subject to the approval of the Registrar;
ad 2. The Group Représentatives hold the land and other assets of the group on
behalf of and for the collective benefit of all members of the group. Group
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Représentatives can be replaced voluntarily or by resolution of the members;
ad 3. The Group Ranch Committee is composed of a chairman, vice-chairman,
secretary, treasurer and three members. The Committee is responsible for the
conduct of all business. It is charged with the responsibility to draw up and
implement development plans. Correspondence and the maintenance of proper
record keeping and accounts is also done by the Committee. It may issue
instructions to Group Ranch members and make rules for the opération of the
group. Among the most important régulations are the enforcing of grazing
quotas and grazing management as well as the maintenance of the récognition
of the group ranch boundaries. Group Ranch Committee officials are elected at
a General Meeting held, in principle, once a year;
ad 4. The Group Ranch Members are in fact shareholders of the group land
and other assets such as water facilities and dips. Their share in the ownership
of land is in undivided shares. A group ranch member is entitled to réside free
of charge on the group land together with his family and dependents and is
entitled to use the land, water, machinery, credit facilities, veterinary services,
marketing arrangements and other provisions either free or in return for a cess,
fee or other charge. Members are responsible for the élection and removal of
the group officials. At the time of group ranch incorporation all those people
listed in the adjudication register were automatically recorded in the Group
Ranch register. New members could only be added to the register by décision
of the group représentatives confïrmed by a 60 per cent majority at a General
Meeting of the Group Ranch. As we will see, this is the most debated issue in
the process of group ranch subdivision in Kajiado District of today.
Beside the Registrar of Group Représentatives within the Ministry of Lands,
the Kenya Livestock Development Project meant the involvement of a whole
range of other Government agencies: the Range Management Division (RMD),
Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC), Water Development Division,
Veterinary Department and the Livestock Marketing Division (LMD).
UNDP/FAO assisted in preparing detailed studies of range resources,
hydrology, livestock and wildlife populations. Initially, the Kenyan
Government proposed establishing a special unit within the RMD for the
supervision of group ranch development. However, the World Bank Appraisal
Mission of 1967 decided to lay the responsibility for project implementation in
the hands of the AFC. A special Range Division, headed by an international
development expert supported by 5 livestock specialiste, was newly established
within the AFC (see Grandin 1981:7).
7.2.5 Poka Pilot Group Ranch
In 1964 the pilot Poka group ranch located in South Kaputiei location south-
east of Sultan Hamud was started. The ranch was viewed as a test case for the
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group ranch concept to be extended to the rest of Maasailand, Kenya and
possibly even Africa. Some 30 families were grouped together in an
ecologically favourable ranch of 8,926 hectares and given grants for water and
dip facilities. In 1967 they were granted a loan through which every member
was given a Sahiwal buU and cash to buy steers for fattening. In addition
poorer members were provided with breeding stock. Twelve year span
livestock projections were made by UNDP/FAO experts, which intended to
bring down the number of breeding cows from 1,328 bef ore development to
900, the number of bulls from 84 to 30 and the number of 214 old steers of
above 4 years of age to nil, whilst raising the number of calves, heifers and
purchased steers for fattening. Over the twelve year period it was planned to
purchase 3,714 steers. 4n terms of stock units the grazing pressure of 1,462
KSU before development was allowed to rise to the carrying capacity placed at
1,567 KSU.10 A total of over K£ 10,000 investments were planned, of which
the bulk (K£ 6,000) was used to pay for the improved Sahiwal bulls. Water
facilities, buildings, dips, tools and firebreaks completed the investments. It
was calculated that, after an initial discounted balance in the first four years
because of having employed development loans for working capital and
operating costs, the following eight years would then make up for the deficit
and, taking into account a 19 per cent rate of return, resuit in a final positive
balance."
According to John Halderman, who was attached to the group ranch as a
ranch manager, Poka turned out to be rather successful in comparison with the
traditional Maasai way of herding. Most of the Poka Maasai were progressive
men who wanted to settle and take advantage of water development and cattle
dips. Poka cattle was watered daily, dipped every week, covered only short
distances and was as a result in better condition, produced more milk and had
lower rates of mortality. However, as Halderman stresses, concerning the
reproducibility of the Poka experiment it should be taken into account that the
Poka members were convinced that seulement in this area would be possible
due to the unusually favourable conditions of relatively high and consistent
rainfall and the présence of both wet and dry season forage' (Halderman
1972a:28). Let us analyze the functioning and impact of the Kajiado group
ranches which came into opération by the end of the 1960s.
7.2.6 Kajiado District Livestock Development Project Phase I, II and III
Officially Phase I of the World Bank Kenya Livestock Development Project
10 In those days Kenya Stock Units (KSU) were used: an average ratio of O 55 for cattle, and
0.07 for shoats.
11 Poor members would be provided with working capital loans for steer fattening providing
an additional income.
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(KLDP I) commenced on the Ist of May 1969.n Besides the development of
group ranches in Kajiado District, KLDP I created grazing blocks in North
Eastern Province, commercial ranches (especially in Nakuru, Laikipia and
Machakos districts) and Company and co-operative ranches (in Tana River,
Kwale, Kilifi and Taita-Taveta). A total of US$ 11.8 million was set aside
under Phase I of the Kenya Livestock Development Project of which US$ l .8
million (about Ksh. 13-14 million) was reserved for Kajiado District group
ranch development (see Njoka 1979:27/49). Water development was given
priority under KLDP I in Kaputiei area as it received 57 per cent of the
allocated funds. Upgrading of herds was also a major area of investment.
On December Ist 1966 the Kaputiei Section was declared an Adjudication
Section. UNDP/FAO planners proposed to demarcate a total of 19 ranches
covering an area of 798,000 acres for some 900 families. This, however, was
far from the FAO Standard model for ranch development which proposed 30
families on 35,000 acres. The need for entities to be manageable seemed to
have reduced group ranch sizes. By 1970, in addition to Poka, 14 group
ranches covering 603,000 acres for some 1,300 families had been created in
the Kaputiei area.13 With respect to land availability this was a shortfall of
over 50 per cent in comparison with the model figure of 1,166 acres per
family!
Group ranch boundaries were tentatively established after discussion between
the Maasai section leaders and the Range Management Division staff in
consultation with local résidents. In most cases, thèse boundaries followed
natural landmarks such as Mil tops and rivers. They were later demarcated by
Land Adjudication officers.
The Maasai were free to choose to become members of any group ranch.
Most people registered for thé ranch in which they were residing at the time.
In violation of thé group ranch rules some people managed to register in more
than one group ranch. Those fully aware of thé possible conséquences of the
group ranch concept spread their families and herds over adjacent group
ranches in order to be able to transfer their cattle from one group ranch to
another or to reduce thé family's herd size in trying to prevent forced
" According to Halderman (1972a:8) Kapuüei area had already been divided into group
ranches to 1965. However, it seems thèse were "self-help" schémas, by which groups of Maasai
worked together to develop a particular area. For example, Embolioi scheme had 10 parücipaüng
families who constructed a dip and a watertank m 1966/7. In général, however, there was no
development, except on Poka and thé individual ranches and thé Maasai continued their semi-
nomadic practiccs.
13 H should be noted that Grandin (1981:8) speaks of 1,700 families. Grandin's figure,
however, is based on membership totals. For 1970 1,700 members are équivalent to some 1,300
families as confirmed by Njoka (1979 41). For example, Kiboko members, numbenng 67 in 1970
had 37 different family names. So, some of thé members will have been brothers or fathers and
(still dependent) sons as well as independent brothers having established their own independent
household.
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destocking. In général, however, most Maasai did not have a clear idea of all
thé conséquences of thé group ranch concept. This is partly due to thé fact that
planners did not stress issues like grazing quotas and strict boundary
maintenance so much as they emphasised thé positive aspects such as dips and
water development. In order not to eut off any Maasai from their culturally
defined right to résidence and grazing in their section, gréât efforts were made
to register all the Maasai, whether or not they were still engaged in pastoral
pursuits atjthe time (see Bekure et al. 1987:100).
The Adjudication Registers for South Kaputiei were completed by thé end of
November 1968, and those for North Kaputiei by March 1969. It took another
year before thé first group ranches (Poka, Kiboko and Olkarkar) were offïcially
incorporated by the 3rd of April 1970. Table 7.1 summarises Kajiado District
Phase I group ranches.14
Phase II of the Kenya Livestock Development Project (KLDP H) commenced
in late 1974. Nationwide, KLDP II was a much more ambitieus plan. Funds
were increased fourfold and targets set at thé development of 2.8 million ha of
grazing land in North Eastern Province and thé establishment or improvement
of 60 group ranches, 100 commercial ranches, 21 Company and co-operative
ranches and 3 feedlots all over Kenya (see Evangelou 1984:47).
Most of the new group ranches were established in Kajiado District.
Adjudication sections in other parts of Kajiado District had already been
declared during thé Phase I period. In thé Loodokilani, Ildamat, Purko and part
of thé Kisonko and Matapato sections 16 Phase II group ranches were
incorporated. Table 7.2 shows Phase II Kajiado District group ranches. With
thé exception of those of thé "intruding" Ildamat and Purko sections, most
Phase II group ranches were considerably larger in size in comparison to thé
Kaputiei section group ranches. In most cases thé whole of an adjudication
section was turned into a single group ranch. Group ranches created in Magadi
Division, a dry area having a recommended carrying capacity of 8 hectares per
stock unit, had to be sizeable of necessity. In spite of this improvement, World
Bank évaluation reports of 1976 criticized thé group ranch programme
especially for ils failure to increase herd offtake.
14 In a RMD inventory of June 1969 a total of 16 group ranches comprising 26,565 hectares
were considered to hâve a stock potential of 51,770 Stock Units (mature bull 1.25/cow with calf
1.0/steer and heifers: 1 year old-0.5/2 year old-0.75/3 year and over 1.0 SU). Their baseline survey
numbered a total of 43,331 SU and a human population of 5,232 Adult Equivalents (AEs). In
other words, thé Kaputiei area overall was not overstocked and average livestock ownership
amounted to 8.3 stock units per AE. From these figures and using 1973 membership data it can be
calculated that on average l group ranch member is probably equivalent to 3.0 AEs. A sample for
Merueshi and Olkarkar made by ILCA (1981:18) in early 1980 included 76 households totalling
813 people (717 AE) of which there were some 135 official group ranch members. This means on
average 10.7 people (9.43 AE) per household or 1.77 member (1.56 AE) per household or 5.3 AE
per group ranch member. So the 1988 livestock census total of 1,385 households for 2,430
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Phase lu, begun in 1979, was not part of the Kenya Livestock Development
Project, as the World Bank and other donors had stopped financing it.
Nevertheless, 20 more group ranches were formed in Matapato, Kisonko,
Keekonyokie and Dalalekutuk sections. Even in parts of the northern Kaputiei
area (Kitengela), where the group ranch concept had been refuted, group
ranches were now incorporated.15
This brought the total number of Kajiado District group ranches to 51
covering some 15,200 km2 or 75 per cent of the district.16 Table 7.3 présents
details of Kajiado District Phase III group ranches. It should be noted that, in
the Keekonyokie section especially, some group ranches (Olosho-Oibor,
Olchoro-Onyori and Saikeri) existed only on paper. Moreover, a process of
dissolution of group ranches had begun by the beginning of the 1980s.
Some care shojdd be taken with regard to the availabiiity of Hvestock for the
Maasai pastoralists for each of the group ranches mentioned. Firstty, figures
for group ranch members are not identical to the group's total number of
households, people or adult équivalents (see note 14). Moreover, ratios between
these variables differ per group ranch. Secondly, the number of stock units is
based on livestock present on the group ranch at the time of the 1988 census.
In other words, livestock belonging to households which had only temporarily
settled or animais stationed with relatives or friends were included in the host
group ranch total. Thus, relating livestock numbers to group ranch membership
results either in an over or an underestimation of Hvestock. For this reason in
tables 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3 we included the number of households from which the
livestock figures were obtained.
Finally, livestock numbers fluctuate over the years as is shown in table 2.15.
A baseline survey conducted by Bille and Anderson among Elang'ata Wuas
group ranch members in April 1978 (two years af ter a drought) estimated an
average household size of 9.4 persons owning some 49.6 livestock units of 250
kilo. This is equivalent to 5.3 Hvestock units per person or 5.4 Livestock
Equivalents/Active Adult Male Equivalents (LE/AAME) (see Bille & Anderson
1980:28).17 By early 1990 our survey estimated an average of 10.5 persons
15 For example, in July 1978 troubles arose in the Oloyiangalani/Kipeto scheine as a tesuH of
the démarcation of 11 tadividual ranches allocated in 1969 by thé Olkejuado County Council
(OCC). A group of 58 Maasai was evicted for chasing land adjudication surveyors. In thé end
14,000-16,000 acres were set aside for thé 11 individual ranchers. Also in Ewaso Kedong 34
influential people claimed 2,000 acres each (see NT 24/09/78).
16 In addition two more group ranches, Oloyiangalani/Kipeto (5,895 ha/191 members in
Keekonyokie area) and Embakasi (2,400 ha/62 members located north of Kitengela town, actually
outside Kajiado in Machakos District also known as Kitengela farm), are sometimes mentioned as
being registered as group ranches.
17 Using their crade figures a recalculation to LE/AAME can be made to 39.7 LE for 7.3
AAME, which corresponds to 5.4 LE/AAME. Bille and Anderson's data excluded Hvestock away
from thé borna, which was estimated to be some 2 per cent of total livestock units.
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per household possessing 11,1 LE/AAME in Elang'ata Wuas group ranch,
suggesting a doubling of livestock wealth per person in the last 12 years!18
In the following pages we will present some of the achievements and
problems of the group ranch programme in Kajiado District. It should be kept
in mind that it is difficult to distinguish time effects from group ranch effects.
Developments outside the sphère of the project can have a larger impact than
the efforts of the project itself. For example, a favourable raise in livestock
priées will probably have much more effect than the improvement of a whole
range of marketing facilities when a rise in priées does not occur.
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district as belonging to group ranches of which 23 were operational. Individual
ranchers owned 155 boreholes (56 functioning). Institutions such as Livestock
Training Centres (59bh/22 f), Ministry of Water Development (54bh/23f), other
Departments (27bh/2f) and the Kajiado County Council (37bh/13f) owned the
other boreholes. Ten boreholes, all out of opération, had unknown owners.
Nevertheless, individually owned boreholes are sometimes available to group
ranch in return for group ranch pasture or diesel oil, for example. Water from
boreholes owned by one of the other groups mentioned is used for human
consumption near towns, schools, health centres and also for livestock.
7.3 Kajiado District Group Ranch Performance
7.3.1 Achievements of the Kajiado District Group Ranch Project
The primary effect of the introduction of group ranches was to (re)place the
control over a vast area of Kajiado District in the hands of the Maasai
pastoralists. The rôle of thé Kajiado County Council as "trustée" of Maasai
lands was restricted to the benefit of the local résidents. As such group ranches
have been instrumental in stopping a further carving out of large areas being
brought into individual hands. As Pasha (1986:304) concludes, thé 'fact that
most of the land was adjudicated to groups who cannot seil the land has
prevented wholesale aliénation of land through the market'. During the 1970s
and 1980s small, individual ranches were created and the immigration of non-
Maasai into the district also continued although probably at a slower rate than
otherwise would have been the case.
Secondly, the group ranches have served as mechanisms for the
improvement of livestock management techniques, the provision of information
and the investment of capital in co-operative facilities such as boreholes, dams,
troughs, tanks, pipelines, catüe dips, crashes etc. Table 7.4 provides
information about the facilities existing on the various group ranch territories
and Kajiado District by 1988.
The majority of the facilities available are not the result of loans provided by
the Kenya Livestock Development Project. According to Dietz et al. (1986:12),
only 15 boreholes, 15 tanks, 15 troughs and 16 dips were constructed during
KLDP Phase I. Phase II added 4 tanks, 5 troughs and 4 dips only. In addition,
other donors provided funds for the construction of boreholes and other
facilities in the group ranches. Some of these became the property of the group


































































































































The ILCA baseline surveys in Olkarkar and Merueshi group ranches conducted in 1980-81
among 76 households registered 8.85 and 10.08 AAME pet household and 3,477 and 3,855 LE
per group ranch, respectively. This is 9.83 and 10.62 LE/AAME for Olkarkar and Merueshi group
ranches,
Source: MOLL» w»»; Mwangi iy?v
F=Functioning, NF=Not Functioning, GR=Group Ranch area, KD=Kajiado District;
# underestimate; Figures given tefer to facilities found in the group ranch area of Kajiado District,
excluding individual ranchers. Faciliües belonging to these are included in the Kajiado District
total. Borehole figures provided by the Ministry of Livestock Development (MoLD) apparently are
far below those of the Ministry of Water Development (MoWD) survey (1989). Non-functioning
boreholes are eilher non-operative (144), abandoned (21), dried up (12) or untraceable (71).
Thirdly, according to some authors (e.g. Pasha 1986, Timoi & Kuluo 1990),
group ranch development has direcüy or (in)directly been responsible for the
establishment of schools, shops and health centres. It should of course be taken
into considération that it is difficult to separate project effects from those due
to population growth and increased Government and NGO efforts over the last
20 years.
Fourthly, group ranches have allowed wildlife to roam freely over large parts
of Kajiado District. Enclosed individual ranches would certainly have created
sévère problems for wild animais. For example, Maasai in the Kitengela area
who opposed the inclusion of their area as a group ranch were instructed not to
fence and cultivate the area to allow free movement of game park animais
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from the adjacent Nairobi National Park.19
7.3.2 Problems and Failures of the Kajiado District Group Ranch Project
The major aim of the Kenya Livestock Development Project for the range
areas from a governmental point of view, was to change a traditional pastoral
system into a commercially oriented production System. Key issues in this
process of transformation were the réduction of the number of livestock
through the allocation of stock quotas, boundary maintenance and steer
fattening. As the 1979 review mission concluded this was an extremely
ambitious objective (see World Bank 1979:3). On the other hand the Maasai
pastoralists as well as having different objectives (e.g. securing their land as
well as acquiring facilities such as dips and boreholes) had high expectations
which for several reasons failed to be met (see Timoi & Kuluo 1990:85).
1. Delays and Problems in Implementation
According to Njoka (1979.49) the 'greatest delay in the incorporation stage
stemmed from undue emphasis on egalitarian considérations geared toward
avoiding the émergence of landless Masai'. However, other issues have been of
more importance in contributing to delays in implementation.
Through subséquent législation much of the supervision of the group ranches
was given to the Registrar of Group Représentatives. This one-man office was
inadequate to deal with the task, so that group ranches actually received no
help with organizational matters. Qualified managers for the group ranches
were not provided. Ranch models were often unrealistic and overoptimistic.
There was a serious lack of co-ordination between the several institutions
mvolved. In total there were about 17 agencies whose opération affected the
project in one way or another. A Project Co-ordinating Unit (PCU) was not
able to streamline the opérations of all these groups (see Langat 1983:54).
Immature steers for ranch fattening were often not available. Also the AFC,
having had no expérience in dealing with traditional pastoralists, faced serious
staffing problems resulting in the project falling behind schedule.
Phase I was extended by an extra year. Phase II needed 3 more years before
it was finally completed by 1982. Another major factor which created delays
and major obstacles were periods of drought which occurred most significantly
in the beginning and mid 1970s and in 1984. The World Bank's 1976 review
mission resulted in a number of revisions including the lowering of the official
targets to 29 group, 46 commercial and 29 company and co-operative ranches.
At the close of phase II 27 group ranches had been financed.
19 The Maasai were able to stop the Nairobi National Park authormes acquinng 100,000 acres
of the Kitengela area Their attempt to acquire this had begun m 1966 (see Sunday Post 29/07/73)
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2. Investments and Loan Repayment
From the start of the livestock development project the rate and amount of
lending to group ranches has been a disappointment to World Bank officials.
By Maren 1975, only 5 group ranches had circulated more than 50 per cent of
their development capital loans (see Grandin 1981:9). This is in part
attributable to a 4 to 26 months period which was needed before loan
approvals were provided. In other words, some group ranches received loan
approvals only by the end of Phase I. Actual utilisation of funds was as a
result very low. Only 50 per cent (US$ 0.9 million) of the total KLDP Phase I
budget for Kajiado District had been distributed by 1974. In terms of
Investments per acre by the end of 1980 for KLDP Phase I ranches this
amounted to Ksh. 9/52 for development capital and Ksh. 5/62 for working
capital as opposed to appraisal figures of Ksh. 17/71 and Ksh. 4/80,
respectively.
Development during Phase H had many problems to face especially after the
drought of 1976. Engines and vital spare parts of boreholes had been stolen
and "AFC steers" lost. For example, Kiboko and Olkarkar group ranches had
been provided with a central AFC herd of 2,000 steers in 1973/4. Only 577
reached the KMC as the steers were abandoned or sold illegally when group
ranch members migrated away during the 1975-6 drought period in order to
save their own animais (see Livingstone 1986.271). Erankau group ranch
members were obliged to repay a development loan for dry boreholes which
had been drilled on a site without a water layer (see Peron 1982:61).
Successful boreholes on other group ranches faced the difficulty of machines
breaking down and expensive and time-consuming repairs. In addition, a
number of group ranch committees misused funds for their own benefit (see
below).
By December 1980, the 15 Phase I group ranches had a total of Ksh.
9,468,545/- AFC loan disbursed. Several group ranches had difficulties in
repaying their loans for ranch development as well as steer fattening. A total of
Ksh. 2,133,747/- was in arrears, which is 23 per cent of total disbursement.
Average loan disbursement per Phase I member was Ksh. 5,429/- with Ksh.
1,223/- in arrears. Mbilini (Ksh. 4,183/member), Kiboko (Ksh. 3,976/m),
Olkarkar (Ksh. 3,699/m) and Nkama (Ksh. 2,145/m) in particular had high
levels of debts (see Grandin 1981:12). Difficulties in repayment occurred,
especially in Nkama (90 per cent arrears), Mbilini (45) and Imaroro/Mashuru
(38). The former had been able to pay off by 1986 while others were still
having sévère problems. The interest rates of 12 to 13 per cent charged by
AFC further increased the financial bürden of the group ranches. This was an
extremely high rate for a loan that was intended to be promotional in nature.
Though repayment included a so called "grâce period" of 3 years, during which
only interest had to be paid, it should be noted that the World Bank charged
only 2-3 per cent for the on-lending credit.
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As a result of the difficulties in loan repayment other group ranches that
were ready for financing became reluctant to take loans. Others believed that
AFC, a Kikuyu-donünated organization, purposely tried to inflict heavy
burdens of debt upon the group ranches in order to be able to seil the land to
outsiders. Consequently infrastructural development slowed down. Moreover,
the costs of development had risen dramatically with items like tanks, troughs,
firebreaks and pipelines doubling in price since the start of Phase H.20




















Source: MoAU>' 1986; Vennaat 198«:4i
* Kilonito, Oldoinyo Nyokie, Elang'ata Wuas, Esokota, Totosei, Oloyiangalani, Olkeri,
Olkiramatian; ~ Mbuko, Empuyiankat; A Totosei; # Nkama, Metueshi; @ Oldoinyo Nyokie,
Esokota, Olkeri; " Olkarkat, Mbilini, Imatoro/Mashuru, Arroi, Ilmamen
Table 7.5 summarises the situation of loan approvals and arrears for Phase I
and II Kajiado group ranches by 1986. Total outstanding loans for group
ranches with AFC amounted to Ksh. 60 million, of which Ksh. 16 million was
due for payment in 1986 (see Dietz et al. 1986:12).21 Understandably
members were not too willing to contribute to repayments of loans for
structures that were mostly not working or from which they had no advantage.
It should be noted that auctioning of group land was not feasible. Declaring a
group ranch bankrupt and selling its land was politically impossible. A
member's share in repayment was determined according to livestock
ownership. Livestock inventories, however, were not carried out annually. This
sometimes resulted in a situation whereby, as a result of the 1977 drought,
impoverished members were forced to repay a large part of the loan while
others who had been lucky enough to save or restore their herd paid hardly
anything.
By the end of the 1970s each debtor group ranch member was persuaded by
20 Nevertheless, because of exchange rates falling from Ksh. 7.40 to Ksh. 10.80 for l US$
resulting in less dollars being drawn from the original budget total project allocation was reduced
from US$ 21.5 million to US$ 17.5 million by 1980.
21 By the end of 1989 Nkama group ranch had an oatstanding AFC loan of Ksh. 228,000/-.
Other ranches (known) outstanding loans wete Ksh. 791.244/- for Imaroro/Mashura (some
members also willing to seil part of the ranch to clear the loan, but discouraged by the MoLD);
Erankau: Ksh. 35,365/-; Shompole: Ksh. 2,041,742/-; Oldoinyo Nyokie: Ksh. 1.500.000/- (see
MoLD-RMD/AR 1989).
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AFC officers to repay its part of the group's loan.22 This was an expensive
and time-consuming exercise. Another AFC method used to recover (part of)
development capital loans was by channelling the profits created from steer
fattening. The steers were given for fattening to the group ranch as an
entity.23 In général, AFC was reluctant to provide loans to group ranches and
preferred to deal with individual ranchers having better facilities and whose
land would be more easy to auction if required.
During the 1984 drought individual ranchers also suffered huge losses. Some
of them were threatened by the auctioning of their land. A presidential
directive of May Ist 1986 was needed to ban this proposition made by the
AFC.24 On ^April 14th 1989 president Moi directed the AFC, headed by his
son, to write off loans given to dairy farmers (mainly individual ranchers)
whose catüe had died during the 1984 drought (see DN 15/04/89).25
3. Boundary Maintenance, Stock Quotas and Range Conservation
A major and most criticized objective of the group ranch planners was the
Implementation of boundaries and the imposition of individual stock quotas.
Both measures were intended as ways of seetóng a balance between the
carrying capacity of the ranches and the number of stock allowed to graze on
22 In order to be able to repay its AFC loan, Olkiramatian gtoup ranch sold 500 ha near
Nguruman bridge to the Tana and Athi River Development Authority (TARDA: a governmental
regional development organization covering 31 per cent of Kenya's surface area). The proceeds
cleared the AFC loan of Ksh. 2,513,0007- (see MoLD/AR 1988:7). So far TARDA bas taken no
action. Initial plans to develop thé area as an irrigation scheme had to be dropped because of the
failure to find donors willing to finance this venture.
23 Poka group ranch suffered ftom questionable AFC practices which, according to thé latter,
were due to "computer problems". Ovet thé years money transactions had been booked on thé
group's current account instead being used to repay the interest affected development loan. This
resulted in a considérable accumulation of arrears. To solve this problem money from thé current
account and a new development loan were used, without informing Poka members, for providing
Poka members with 300 steers 50 of which died shortly afterwards due to ECF. Following thé
selhng of thé steers, AFC once again deposited thé revenue, which cancelled thé loan debt on thé
Poka group ranch current account instead of paying off the loan. The AFC informed thé merribers
that they had a positive balance on their current account which could be withdrawn. This
immediately happened and in thé end, thé Poka group ranch ended up in arrears!
24 Kajiado District farmers and ranchers owed a total of almost 133 million Kenyan shillings
to thé AFC by June 1986. The AFC agreed to reschedule only thé needy cases. By early 1987,
however, nothing had been done to assist the most badly affected debtors (see DN 15/06/86 and
DN 23/01/87).
25 According to key informants thé final handling of this case excluded initially appointed
debtors and vice versa sometimes ignoring the most needy ranchers. Sometimes, debts of over
Ksh. 1 million were written off.
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them.26 The way the first group ranches were formed has already been
discussed. We concluded that they were supposed to have been based on viable
socio-ecological units containing wet and dry season areas. However, a
UNDP/FAO range ecologist, who was member of the original survey team in
Kaputiei, later stated that out of 14 Phase I group ranches only 6 ranches were
considered viable (Poka, Kiboko, Nkama, Imaroro/Mashuru, Empuyiankat,
Embolioi), 4 doubtful (Arroi, Olkarkar, Merueshi, Mbilini) and 4 not viable
(Mbuko, Erankau, Ilmamen, Eraarti) (see Halderman 1972c:20-24).
What is more, the viable prototype Poka ranch saw ils members leaving thé
ranch in 1970 as thé resuit of thé failing of thé short rains and thé infestation
of thé area by army worms. Neighbouring Olkarkar, Kiboko and Mashuru were
among the few ranches that did receive rain and so those ranches were invaded
by other Maasai pastoralists. This happened again in late 1973 and early 1974
when Maasai from North Kaputiei even went as far as thé outskirts of Nairobi
while those from thé southern and central areas mainly went to thé Chyulu
Hills. During late 1976 the situation became even worse and thousands of
Maasai cattle from as far as Tanzania actually moved into Nairobi. The Maasai
were charged and banned from the city whilst their cattle were dying by thé
hundred. An estimated 150,000 cattle died (see KDAR 1977:1). In 1984 large
numbers of Maasai cattle moved in thé opposite direction towards thé
Namanga région and as far as Tanzania in a vain attempt to escape the
drought.
As well as thèse major droughts, over the years small localized failures of
thé rains or outbreaks of diseases like ECF or Malignant Catharr forced group
ranch members to seek grazing pastures outside their group ranch territory. In
most cases members of other group ranches in need of green pastures were
allowed to enter thé group ranch territory. Closing one's ranch to neighbouring
groups would be unwise as ail knew that, due to thé erratic rainfall pattems,
reciprocal relationships needed to be maintained. Nonetheless, boundary
disputes have been going on for many years, particularly between Mbuko
versus Mbilini and Kiboko versus Merueshi group ranches.
Another more problematic issue was the grazing of livestock belonging to
neighbouring individual ranchers within the group ranch boundary during the
wet season. By the time the dry period came thèse animais were returned to
thé individual ranch which had conserved enough grazing to cover until the
next wet season. In some cases this practice was officially allowed by thé
group ranch committee in return for money or other assistance but it also
sometimes happened illegally when animais were taken to family members
Imtially thé Land Adjudication Officer suggested planting sisal hedge-rows between thé
gtoup ranches This was rejected by S Meadows, head of thé RMD, because of the high costs
involved in their establishment and maintenance Moreover, it was expected that thé boundanes
would be grossly neglected anyway' (see MoLD/RMD 1966) Instead beacons and tractor Unes for
firebreaks were used as boundary markers
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living in thé group ranch. The 1988 Kajiado District livestock census clearly
showed this habit of moving cattle to another area with or without the owners
by group ranch members and individual ranchers alike. As Coldham (1982:7)
states The establishment of group ranches has not put an end to thé Masai
custom of inviting friends and relations (particularly sons-in-laws) to corne and
settle'.
Branding cattle was tried in order to stop this practice. By October 1969
Poka group ranch members marked their cattle in order to be able to impound
any cattle found within thé group ranch boundary not bearing the Poka brand.
It also allowed close controls to be kept on grazing quotas issued for each
member and eventually led to forced destocking. The stock quota issue had not
been stressed at the time of group ranch formation as it was expected that this
measure would be opposed by most group ranches. Rieh members wanted the
quotas to be based on actual holdings at the time of incorporation. Poor
members wanted equal allocations. A compromise was reached whereby, on
top of a minimum quotum, extra allocations were given to wealthier members
(see Heiland 1980a:190). However, this object of the group ranch concept did
not materialize in practice. Stock numbers belonging to individual members
continued to be highly distorted on most group ranches. The lack of any
effective power on the side of the group ranch committee to take action against
trespassers and rieh stockowners was responsible for this. Even if regulating
instruments had been available it is highly doubtful if they would have been
implemented as in a not insignificant number of cases the group ranch
committee members themselves would have been affected.
Does this mean that the group ranch concept has failed to conserve the Maasai
pastoral lands? Firstly, we should note that rotational grazing has not
materialized because most of the group ranches did not have a suitable balance
of wet and dry season grasses. Secondly, reseeding was not undertaken. By
contrast, range ecologists feared that, if the group ranches were developed as
proposed, they would suffer overgrazing resultmg in the détérioration of the
rangeland resources.
According to Njoka (1979:126) who compared permanent végétation
transects in Kaputiei ranches for 1967 and 1977, the range trend has been
downward within this period. The total species frequencies for désirable plants
decreased by 44 per cent, while undeskable plants increased by 77 per cent.
The mean basai cover in southern Kaputiei grasslands decreased from 18 per
cent in May 1969 to 2.4 per cent in May 1977. Climatic and range
management factors have been responsible, with Njoka pointing to the latter as
being the main cause. Livestock figures increased between 1967 and 1974 from
an estimated 400,000 to almost 700,000 head of cattle, failing to less than
400,000 head of cattle by 197? again (see table 3.3).
Njoka states that thé range development inputs in thé Kaputiei région are
responsible for thé rapid increase of livestock. For example, water faciüties
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more than doubled between 1968 and 1974 in the Kaputiei ranges (see Njoka
1979:181). In addition, dipping, vaccination and other disease treatments
resulted in a decrease in mortality and an increase in calving rates. The steer
fattening programme enlarged the import of cattle from northern areas.
Moreover the AFC wanted the best grazing areas reserved for the young steers.
The growth of the Kajiado wildlife population further increased pressure on the
district's rangelands, which continued to shrink throughout the 1970s due to
the influx of non-Maasai occupying the high-potential régions. Finally, we
believe that the increasing obstacles to mobility and flexibility will have
increased pressure on certain spécifie areas such as around watering points and
human settlements.
From 1978 to 19801LCA conducted a follow-up survey which indicates that
Njoka's statement that the Kaputiei range would probably not be able to
recover turned out to be wrong (see Grandin 1981:40). ILCA data show that
the 1975-76 drought had been followed by a good recovery and that no
évidence exists for increasing dégradation of the range lands. Rather, the group
ranch programme has failed to prevent a calamitous loss of livestock
population which itself enabled the post-drought recovery of the pastures.
4. Conunercialization
The aspect of commercialization of the pastoralists livestock production was
discussed briefly in chapter 4 and will be dealt with in more detail in chapters
8, 9 and 10. Now it is appropriate to report that several writers have said that
it 'does not appear, then, that the Group Ranches are serving the function of
radically transforming Maasai pastoralism, from subsistence to commercial
herding' (Galaty 1978:11). White and Meadows concluded that the
composition of Maasai herds by the early 1980s was still dominated by female
cattle (65 per cent) geared at the production of milk and less towards meat
production (see White & Meadows 1981:i).
Others like Livingstone (1986:257) have reported that this failure of the
group ranch to change the livestock production System is partly the result of
factors like a diminishing people-livestock ratio. Planners seem to have stressed
factors like "overstocking" which has blurred the fact that the Maasai
throughout the 1970s actually became short of livestock and land.27
7 We have seen in section 6.2.6 that the FAO model requiremem for land per Kaputiei
family was more than twice as large as the final actual allotment In case of livestock,
requirements were placed at some 30 SU per family of six AE. In June 1969 at the start of KLDP
I the RMD noted some 50 SU/family and 6.2 ha/SU. Overall carrying capacity was estimated to
be 5.2 ha/SU. In other words, even though the model requirement was not met, at the start of the
group ranch project the Kaputiei Maasai on average had an adequate number of livestock for
subsistence without the area being overstocked. However, accorduig to Halderman (1972a:16),
différences in human population densities and ecological viability between group ranches resulted
in a very inéquitable allotment of potential grazing resources (e.g. SU/AE varied from 6.0 to 19.1).
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Also problems in the marketing structure such as the low priées offered,
priée controls, lack of (functioning) holding grounds and KMC capacity
problems in times of stress have been named as among the most important
reasons for thé low level of commercialized livestock production in Kajiado
District. A spécial consultation workshop sponsored by thé World Bank and
RMD held in 1983 recommended thé development of an improved marketing
transportation System and the organization of auctions in the two Maasai
districts (see MICCD 1983:38)
5. Internai Administrative Problems
The création and functioning of thé group ranch committee is thought to be
responsible for a number of thé problems highlighted above. Instead of being
an autonomous producer f ree to go within the section's area ruled by the
council of elders on the basis of decision-making by consensus, the Maasai
pastoralist was now confined by the authority of a democratically elected
committee.
Initially, most committees are said to have been formed by influential and
wealthy Maasai. Not surprisingly these people were not very willing to
implement strict ranch boundary maintenance and réduction of stock. Most of
them were illiterate and this hampered good ranch administration. Even those
who were able to read Kiswahili could not deal with the Land (Group
Représentative) Act as it was written only in English. Later many of these
committee members left and were replaced by young, educated and ambitious
Maasai. As a result, in many group ranches a single age group monopolised
power. However, they lacked natura! authority which made the committees in
some ranches rather weak institutions.28 In most ranches the obligatory annual
genera! meeting was not held for years in a row. When a meeting could be
held the necessary 60 per cent quorum was often not met.
Corruption also undermined the functioning of the ranches. For example, in
Poka group ranch 11 group ranch members, most of them committee members,
used group ranch funds to buy 13 bulls for their own use. In Kiboko the
chairman illegally sold some AFC loan steers. Those who criticised were
removed from the committee. Not seldom were the committee members backed
by politicians and civil servants, often themselves members of the group ranch
committee. In some cases national leaders forced a committee to provide them
with plots of group ranch land (e.g. Kitengela and Rombo group ranches, see
28 Tobiko (1989a:98) reported for Mashuru group ranch that nobody wanted to take up a post
in the group ranch committee because they did not know or onderstand ils importance. Finally, all
non-Maasai members (Kikuyu and Kamba) were unanimously proposed and elected because of
their proficiency in the languages spoken by the ."Big Men from Nairobi" and they could act as
intermediaries. They held no power at all, however, over the group ranch members. Allhough this
"solution" is an exception, it does illustrate the local Maasai' genera! attitude towards the Institute
of the group ranch committee.
N"t"ï
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Peron 1982:69). Politicians divided the group ranch members and formed small
splinter groups according to age group or clan.
Nowadays, as a result of the membership issue, opposing factions split along
the lines of wealth in cattle or in sons seem to have appeared (see below). In
some cases (e.g. Olkiloriti and Lorngosua ranches) this has resulted in violent
clashes. In fact an alien governing body had been introduced into Maasai
society, burdened with a whole range of responsibilities, unsuited to fulfil its
task and which, in the end, became increasingly politicized and corrupted.
7.4 The Process of Subdivision of the Kajiado District Group
Ranches
7.4.1 Introduction
With the above mentioned problems and the resulting frustrations in mind it
will be no surprise that a large number of group ranches wanted to subdivide.
The main disadvantages of group ranching were: management problems (38
per cent), poor facilities (34 per cent), lack of individual title (21 per cent) and
loan repayments (7 per cent) (see Munei 1987:120).29
Again, Poka group ranch took the lead. Already by 1972 it declared being in
favour of dissolving the ranch into individually owned shares. In tables 7.1, 7.2
and 7.3 we included the subdivision status of the Kajiado District group
ranches as at 1990. So far, seven group ranches have been subdivided and tiüe
deeds issued. At the other extreme five group ranches, all located in Magadi,
the driest part of Kajiado District, have decided to continue their group ranch
on a communal basis.30 Table 7,6 summarises the particulars of the Kajiado
District group ranches subdivision status in 1990. By 1990 already 40 owners
of ranches totalling 7,933 km2 had decided to subdivide, 4 amounting to 1,777
km2 were opposed to this idea and 7 covering 5,458 km2 had not yet decided.
In other words, by 1990 the whole of Ngong and Central Division group
ranches covering some 52 per cent of the district's group ranch area and
including 78 per cent of the ranches has either already ceased to exist or will
do so in the years to come.
For 1988 these figures stood at only 35 per cent of the ranches and 17 per
29 Among members of subdivided group ranches the most important disadvantage of group
ranches was said to be the lack of an individual title deed (44.2 per cent), communal co-operation
and corrupt commmees (27.7 per cent) (ASAL Kajiado Programme pers. communication).
30 Recent reports (August 1991) however, speak of Oldoinyo Nyokie and Olkeri group
ranches of Magadi Division as also being willing to subdivide their group ranches. Huge
outstandmg AFC loans, of Ksh. 1.5 m and 0.8 m. respectively, are prohibiting mis for the moment
despite president Moi's directive. Oldoinyo Nyokie group ranch committee proposed «s members
seil 600 acres to clear the loan and pave the way for subdivision (see Kajiado Focus 1991a:4).
l
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cent of the territory. Magadi division group ranches want to continue while
those in Loitokitok Division are still discussing the pros and cons of
subdivision. Figure 7.2 shows the Kajiado District group ranches and their
subdivision status as at 1990. The resulting average plot size if the group ranch
were to be subdivided is also mentioned.































































n to subdivision byNote: Subdivision status Key: i suooiviucu am» uu«> i»,>Ui~, _ a
Registrar of Représentatives and Land Control Board; 3 consent obtained from Registrar of
Représentatives; 4 no consent given; 5 not willing to subdivide; 6 no décision taken yet.
7.4.2 The Rationale for Group Ranch Subdivision
By the late 1970s, when increasing calls for subdivision were heard, the
Central Government clearly opposed the idea arguing that the semi-arid régions
were ecologically and economically unfit for small individual ranches. An
average of 2,000 acres was considered to be a viable ranch for a household
within medium to high-potential ranching areas. In Kajiado District, however,
an average plot size of only 529 acres would be available in theory for a
standard Maasai household of 10 persons by the early 1980s.31 In terms of
group ranch members an average of 132 and 101 ha per member were
available for respectively 1982 and 1986.
31 Por 1968/69 Halderman (1972a:l) calculated an average availability of land per adult maie
of 191 ha, which hè considered to be insufficient. By 1979, 9,356 Maasai households were
counted in Kajiado District which could in potenual share some 4,953,162 acres of ranching land,
which means a potenual average parcel size of 529 acres per household.
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NAKURU
mdividual ranch
subdivided and titles issued;
consent given to subdivision by Registrar of
Représentatives and Land Contcol Board;
consent obstained from Registrar of Représentatives;
no consent given;
not willing to subdivide;
au no décision takôn yet
7 no information avaitable. Never incorporated as a gfoup ranch
Figure 7.2 Kajiado District Group Ranches and 1990 Subdivision Status
Table 7.7 présents the distribution of potential mean sizes of individual parcels
were the Kajiado District group ranches to be subdivided among thek members
by 1990. It shows that more than half the ranches would end up having plot
sizes of less than 100 ha. Only Poka and Kiboko group ranches would have a
mean plot size of more than 200 ha/member. However, it must be remembered
that this is the result of the refusai of these ranches to register more members.
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In reality the availability of land per person will probably be in the order of
other Kaputiei group ranches. With référence to the economie viability of
subdivided Kajiado group ranches, according to Halderman (1972b:l), most of
them would be economie disasters.
Table 7.7 Potential Mean Plot Sizes for Subdivided Kajiado Group Ranches












































In 1981 Poka group ranch members officially requested the dissolution of thek
group ranch. This was reluctantly accepted at district level but refused by the
Ministry of Livestock Development headquarters in Nairobi. Another group
ranch, Kisaju/Kipeto, ignored this dkective and went directly for a subdivision
of thek area, This group ranch had existed only on paper, without official
registration, thus its "members" did not feel bound by official opposition. With
pressure building up and knowing that, in fact, the 1968 group ranch act
included an option for the dissolution of the group ranch, in May 1982 the
Central Government proposed to set up a committee to examine the pros and
cons of group ranch subdivision.
By March 1983 the Group Ranch Education Programme (GREP), on behalf
of the Maasai Inter-Church Committee for Rural Development organized a
Group Ranch Consultation Workshop at Buffalo Lodge, near Amboseli
National Park.32 This workshop, funded by the World Bank and attended by
Government officials, group ranch members, researchere and représentatives of
the churches acted more as a sort of substitute for the proposed committee that,
in fact, never materialized. In préparation for the conference several meetings
had been organized, whereby government officials and Maasai Members of
Parliament (Nampaso and Oloitipitip) were invited. Both MPs stated in these
meetings that they opposed group ranch subdivision and that they had made
32 GREP starled in 1979 as a department of the Development Education Programme (DEP)
of the Catholic Diocese of Ngong. Several workshops were organized by GREP during which
Government officials were invited in order to come to a better understanding between both groups.
GREP's main task so far bas been the création of awareness among the group ranch members in
identifying their problems and looking for suitable solutions to them. As such they have become
involved in the discussions conceming subdivision and the way it is executed, Since 1985 GREP
has been sponsored by NOVIB, a Dutch funding organization. Nowadays, the Group Ranch
Education Programme (GREP) is mainly operative in Loitokitok Division. A description and
analysis of the Development Education Programme in Kenya is presented by Kronenburg (1986).
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this view known to the President and the Minister of Livestock Production in
the past, However, not all Maasai MPs opposed group ranch subdivision (e.g.
ole Tipis), and those who said they did soon feil into disfavour with the
President.33
It seems the churches had indeed made a miscalculation as, af ter the
Consultation Workshop, the Government accepted the right of group ranches to
subdivide. The main condition was that subdivision should not resuit in
unviable holdings (see Timoi & Kuluo 1990:86). So, more group ranches
passed resolutions for dissolution. In 1984 thé government agreed to conduct a
vote by ail Kajiado District group ranches as to whether to do away with thé
groups or not. 28 ranches were in favour of this leaving 23 remaining.
The Government had nevertheless not yet made up ils mind although this
outcome seemed to have made it more reluctant, realizing thé possible négative
effects of an en masse individualization of semi-arid ranching. This position
was at sometimes publicly stated in early 1985 by Président Moi when ne said
that sub-division should not be undertaken in dry areas used only for livestock
keeping (see DN 05/02/85). The Ministry of Livestock Development in
particular feared that the final outcome of thé subdivision of group ranches
would be negative. The Kajiado District Range Officer warned the district's
group ranches that subdivision would not be a solution to their problems (see
DN 09/08/85). He was supported by several Kajiado District administrators
who stated that subdivision of undeveloped group ranches was uneconomical,
risked thé création of a class of landless Maasai and was a threat to the
livestock industry in the district (see DN 15/08/86, DN 12/10/86).34 The lack
of a clear Central Governmental land and development policy was partly
responsible for their worries. Developments in the district which demonstrated
an increase in the selling of land will have contributed to the other part.
Reports, concerning the illegal sale of group ranch land were being written
by the late 1970s and early 1980s especially from the Rombo and Kitengela
group ranches (see e.g. Weekly Review 11/07/77, DN 29/12/84). In the high-
potential areas of Ngong and Loitokitok dishonest speculators were selling land
that simply did not exist or which still belonged to a group ranch. In the
Attacks on Oloitipitip by rival politician John Keen started in January 1983 and involved
issues like nusmanagement of public funds and the corrupt allocation of land to himself and bis
politica! supporters. Oloitipitip, for instance, helped the Nairobi mayor Kahare obtain a tiüe deed
for a 100 acre farm hè bought in Kisaju "group ranch". This fact made the GREP members réalité
that Oloitipitip would not be of much help. This became even more clear by October 1983 when
Oloitipitip was dropped from the Cabinet. He was accused of being one of the leaders of the failed
"coup d'état" of August 1982 and was striving to become Vice-Président (see Weekly Review
30/03/84). A few years later, on January 22nd, 1985, hè died.
34 Already by August 1980 a nominated MP from Kajiado District, Mr. J. Napatao, appealed
to the Maasai to halt the "indiscriminate sale of land". Other politicians such as Oloitipitip and
Keen also castigated those Maasai for selling their land without approval of their families (see DN
18/08/80, 12/10/81,03/11/81).
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Ongata Rongai area over Ksh. 2.5 million was made by conmen selling non-
existent 1/4 acre plots to 182 willing buyers for the price of Ksh. 15,000/- each
(see Standard 04/10/77, Standard 29/09/88).
In other cases councillors, businessmen and administrative officials were
accused of grabbing land set aside for the seulement of poor landless people at
the Ngong Hills, in Ngong and Ongata Rongai townships, in Oloolua forest
and in Rombo and Ewaso Kedong' group ranches (see e.g. Peron 1982:67/9,
Standard 31/05/79, DN 17/09/81, DN 05/02/83, Standard 24/10/84, DN
15/11/84VDN 31/12/86). Accusations were also made about councillors
allocating^ themselves plots, which had been earmarked for public use (e.g.
schools, holding grounds, cemeteries) free or at favourable priées.35 This
practice occurred throughout all the echelons of power. At the top land was
grabbed as far as the Kenyan coastal strip. Maasai ministers and a former
Nairobi mayor were involved in the illégal acquisition of land (100 acre plots)
in the Kisaju-Kitengela area, with forest land in Narok District and with beach
plots near Malindi, a small town north of Mombasa. In addition, land in
possession of individual ranchers was increasingly being sold to outsiders.
Most of the buyers were rieh and influential Government officials from
Nairobi.
In spite of, or perhaps because of these developments, several group ranches
had passed resolutions for subdividing by the mid-1980s. The wind of change
towards subdivision was sweeping furiously through the district. The Central
Government dropped ils opposition towards subdivision and by September
1986 Olkinos group ranch members were issued individual title deeds. On
January 22nd 1987 Kajiado leaders resolved that all group ranches in the
district should be sub-divided equally on the basis of the family unit. Ranches
that had not completed repaying their loans from the AFC or any other
fmancial institution would not be subdivided (see DN 23/01/87).
More group ranches now speeded up their procedure for subdivision but saw
their efforts frustrated due to outstanding loans, lack of surveyors and conflicts
over membership (see below). By March 14th 1989 President Moi directed that
subdivision of group ranches in Kajiado District should no longer be curtailed
35 For example, all of the 15 elected members and one nominated councillor of the Kajiado
County Council, with among them a number of rieh individual ranchers, appeared on a list of
landless people who acquired one of 417 plots on the slopes of Ngong Hills. The allocation had
started after a directive by President Moi to seule landless squatters on Ngong Hills trustland.
Over 3,000 people had applied to obtain one of the 2.5 acres plots valued at some Ksh. 100.000/-
each. After press reports the Provincial Commissioner nullifled the plot allocation (see DN
31/07/84, Weekly Review 09/11/84, Standard 24/10/84, DN 15/11/84).
In another case a group of 50 rieh people, civil servants, councillors and businessmen, were
accnsed of excising 2,500 acres from Ewaso Kedong group ranch without the consent of the group
ranch members (see DN 31/12/86). To date the pracüce of providing urban plots, commercial or
residential, KI relatives or (political) friends still continues. Plots in one of the Ngong Division
rural centres are particularly valuaWe. For example, in Ongata Rongai priées of up to Ksh.
120.000/- for 1/4 acre plots are advertised.
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because of failure to repay loans and that title deeds should be issued as soon
as possible. This waving of loans will speed up the process of group ranch
subdivision in the years to come,
Beside the négative expériences with the group ranch concept it has also been
argued that a rationale for subdivision can stem from a positive expectation
concerning economie development and ecological conservation especially in
the view of Central Government. Development in Kajiado District will speed
up and better care will be taken of the rangelands if land is held under
individual tenure. Ironically, arguments for ecological conservation and
economie development were among the most important mentioned by the
government during the time of the introduction of group ranches.
At least the overgrazing of land by neighbouring (individual) ranchers will
no longer be possible when all land is kept in private hands, as stated by a
Poka group ranch member (see DN 12/10/86 - Elang'ata Wuas also suffered
from this practice). Whether destocking, rotational grazing, reseeding and other
range conserving methods will be introduced by the new individual ranchers is
more questionable. At least some of these measures are new to a large number
of them.
Envy of group ranch members of the wealth of owners of established
individual ranches has also been said to be responsible for their members'
willingness to subdivide their ranches. However, the position of the individual
ranchers is structurally different as their ranch areas vary from 350 to some
2,000 acres (140-800 ha). Frequently the head of the household also has a paid
job. Many of them have sold portions of land and that has made them
millionaires overnight. For example, since 1984 25 Kisaju individual ranchers
neighbouring Olkinos group ranch sold at least 2,490 acres of land earning
them Ksh. 12,245,500/-. This can be compared to the average eamings of a
farmer of almost Ksh. 500.000/-. This should be valued in the light of an
average annual income for unskilled labourers in Kenya of some Ksh. 15.000/-
to 20.000/- by 1990.
On average Kisaju farmers originally owned some 350 acres. Almost 30 per
cent of the original plot size has been sold by this group within a period of 6
years. The majority of the buyers were of non-Maasai origin and included land
buying companies, women's groups, a teacher's union, rieh politicians, civil
servants and businessmen.36 In some cases this has resulted in further
subdivision in hundreds of parcels as small as half an acre.37 Reselling, at
much higher priées to make profits of over 300 per cent has also occurred.
Kisaju and Kltengela are nowadays called the "Ptesidential area", a buying place for
district and national politicians including the President and Vice-Président. Impressive fences have
been erected and these exclude the Maasai from these lands.
For example, the Nairobi ex-mayor subdivided his 100 acre farm into 28 portions of l to 4
acres each. These are now ready for sale at priées of Ksh. 5.000/- to 10,000/- per acre.
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Only two Kisaju Maasai chargea a total of 190 acres for Ksh. 335.000A to the
Kenya Commercial Bank. It has been stated that the Maasai prefer to seil land
because of high interest rates and relatively low amounts of loans offered by
the financing institutions. For the small subdivided ranches it is feared that
their owners will not be able to attract enough funds from lending institutions.
The alternative of selling land will make them almost landless as their plot
sizes will be in the range of 125 acres only.
Pasha (19|6:307-9) has summarised the pros and cons of the subdivision of
group ranches. Those supporting the subdivision of group ranches state that it
would:
- help self advancement and raise the standard of living of the Maasai;
- help the Maasai procure loans since most banks accept freehold title deeds as
security;
- minimize exploitation of poor households by richer households;
- encourage the Maasai to engage in other agricultural or industrial enterprises;
- facilitate better opération and maintenance of infrastructures that currently
are being poorly maintained by inefficiënt committees.
People opposed to the subdivision offer four major reasons:
- aliénation of land to non-Maasai. They fear an influx of outsiders taking up
the better-watered parts;
- cultivation of large tracts of land will resuit in sévère érosion as experienced
for example in Machakos District;
- thé influx of non-Maasai will resuit in thé érosion and eventual loss of
Maasai culture;
- subdivision will resuit in fencing of farms and even complete individual
ranches to protect thé crops from wildlife and livestock. The free movement
of livestock will be further constrained.
In thé remainder of tins chapter and in chapters 8, 9 and 10 we will attempt to
analyze thé above-mentioned arguments using examples from several Kajiado
District group ranches. Olkinos group ranch, thé fïrst group ranch subdivided,
will be closely examined concerning thé sale of land and économie and
ecological developments. Let us start with a description of the group ranch
subdivision procédure.
7.4.3 The Procédure of Group Ranch Subdivision
A clear and légal procédure for the necessary steps to dissolve a group ranch
was lacking in thé Land Adjudication and Land (Group Représentatives) Act.
Therefore in 1984 Land Adjudication and Range Department officiais produced
a provisional scheme which was approved by thé Commissioner of Lands
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awaiting official législation The procedure for subdividing a group ranch into
individual parcels is as follows (see Tobiko 1989a: 130-33):
1. the décision to subdivide the group ranch has to be taken at a genera!
meeting at which at least 60 per cent of the members agrée to subdivide
their ranch;
2. the group ranch must apply for consent to subdivide from the Divisional
Land Control Board;
3. the group ranch must apply for consent to the Registrar of Group
Représentatives;
4. a "démarcation" committee composed of the group représentatives and
committee members plus a number of elected (mainly older) members is
then formed to demarcate an individual parcel for each registered member.
The maximum number is 25 members;
5. the Range Management Office has to be consulted to undertake a feasibility
study of the group land. A sketch map is produced showing the individual
plots. In addition public utility plots like water points, wells, schools,
churches, shopping centres are set aside. In the spécifie case of Phase II
and III group ranches where infrastructural improvements have been
minimal, development plans have been produced assessing the potentialities
and constraints of the area. In fact these plans are comparable to the
UNDP/FAO development plans created by the late 1960s for the Kaputiei
group ranches. They also include suggestions for destocking the area within
a ten-year span of time, give much attention to the existing water and
veterinary facilities and suggest possible improvements. Some new centres
of approximately 50 acres each are proposed to be set aside at certain
strategie points in order to enable every former member easy access to
several facilities after subdivision;
6. after viability has been confirmed, group members apply for a surveyor to
fix and adjust the boundaries of the sketch map in an attempt to equalize
the plots and establish their exact size. He also plots roads of access to
every parcel of land. After the map has been checked by the District
Surveyor it is forwarded to the Director of Survey;
7. the group ranches now apply to the Divisional Land Control Board for
consent to transfer the single group title into individual titles and to transfer
the public utilities to the county council;
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8 the survey map and the register containing names and plot numbers are
forwarded to the Chief Land Registrar in Nairobi. Soon after this the
District Land Registrar issues letters of consent to all persons registered as
landowners and title deeds are issued;
9. finally, in a special genera! meeting, a resolution for the disbanding of the
group ranch is passed.
It will be clear that the whole procedure from the décision to subdivide to the
final actual ending of the group ranch's existence is a lengthy and time-
consuming process.
7.4.4 The Problematic Process of Group Ranch Subdivision
In the introduction to section 7.4 we mentioned the fast growth of the number
of group ranches willing to subdivide. By 1990 almost 80 per cent of the
ranches had decided to do away with the group ranch structure and become
individual landowners instead.
Below details of the process of subdivision as it has been conducted in the
Olkinos and Embolioi group ranches (the first group ranches subdivided) will
be described. In addition some information concerning the process and state of
subdivision of Poka and the other group ranches which were covered in the
survey will be summarised.
OLKINOS GROUP RANCH
The décision to subdivide the ranch was made in 1981. A démarcation
committee was formed, which set aside individual plots. Except for 7 absentées
every member was able to state nis favoured location. The group of seven
obtained their plot via balloting of the remaining plots. Public plots for a
(proposed) school in the north eastern area, a dip, a borehole and another
(proposed) dip were set aside. Roads were demarcated so that every individual
ranch was accessible. In January 1984 the list of 138 merôbers was screened
and amended by removing doublé registrations (8), deceased without inheritors
(4), an individual rancher (1), under 18 years of age when registered in 1979
(4) and members who were also registered in neighbouring ranches and
preferred to go there (8). Registration of new members, most of them
belonging to the Ilmeshuki age group, was opposed. During the process of
subdivision the non-members put forward a claim for obtaining their own land
only to be told to build their homes on the top of trees! Also, their attempts to
bribe Kajiado District government officials were futile.
The resulting subdivision showed 116 parcels which ranged in size between
17 to 143 acres. When criticisms were made it was stated that this was the
result of allocating larger parcels in unfavourable areas and to large families.
Another complaint was made concerning the intended allocation to a non-
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member of a parcel belonging to a widow Another protester had erected a
fence for his shamba but saw the plot earmarked for someone else Others
complained about the small sizes of their plot. They also wanted to know what
would be done with three vacant plots. To settle this and other difficulties the
annual genera! meeting of November 1985 was to solve these problems. The
first of the vacant plots was given to another widow whose husband had died
before registration. The second unallocated parcel was balloted to a new
registree. The last vacant parcel (25 ha) was "given" to an individual rancher,
having land in Ngong and Loitokitok as a reward for his payment of the
outstanding AFC loan (Ksh. 97.000/-) and survey fees (Ksh. 240,000/-).
Registration of the last three people made a total of 116 "group ranch"
members. With the loan cleared and the surveyors' map produced by January
1986, the Land Control Board gave consent for the transfer of the individual
parcels to the new individual ranchers in September 1986.
EMBOLIOI GROUP RANCH
Embolioi group ranch members asked permission from the Land Control Board
to subdivide their ranch in October 1982. This was acceded and a démarcation
committee installée!. Disputes such as those in Olkinos arose over allégations of
parcels being allocated to non-members, thé éviction of a widow from a parcel
on which she had buried her husband and the setting aside of large parcels for
influential people at the cost of the powerless and absentée members. By
February 1984 consent to proceed was given by thé Department of Land
Adjudication. However, by July 1984 thé members had decided to install a
new committee as thé old one was accused of having allocated themselves and
their relatives excessively large parcels. In September 1984 the Range
Department gave consent to thé appointing of a surveyor who finished his
work by November that same year. Still, protests arose from people stating
that, in spite of having contributed to thé subdivision costs, they were not
allocated a plot.
The total costs of thé subdivision of Embolioi group ranch amounted to
some Ksh. 600.000/-, and it was partly covered by royalties paid in advance by
gypsum-miners. A Ksh. 900.000/- AFC loan was also repaid. In total 700 acres
were set aside for public plots used for (proposed) trading centres, schools,
boreholes and dips. Ail members agreed to use thèse facilities communally
even after subdivision. By May 1986 thé RMD noticed some remarkable
différences between theirs and thé surveyor's map in size, location and number
of parcels. According to thé group ranch committee, changes had to be made
because seven registered members had not been included in the RMD map and
because some RMD boundaries had been drawn without the area having been
visited.
At a genera! meeting in July 1986 the Embolioi register was fmalised. In
total 30 new members, most of whom had already been included in the land
subdivision, were officially now registered. Out of 18 deceased members 16
were replaced by their inheritors and doublé and multiple entries adjusted.
Unknown members and the sons of individual ranchers were removed from the
list. This resulted in a final allocation of 299 parcels rangmg m size from 40.5
to 71.2 ha. The Land Control Board gave its consent for the transfer of the
titles to the Embolioi members by November 1986. After individual payments
of Ksh. 200/- to the Board and another Ksh. 200/- to the District Land Register
Office the titles were handed over in December 1986.38
The reports above suggest that in most group ranches members easiiy met the
60 per cent minimum quota needed to commence the dissolution of the ranch.
This was confirmed by a survey based on a sample of 100 members (out of
571) carried out in Sajiloni Group Ranch in 1989, where only 8 per cent were
stated to be against subdivision (see Malleon 1989:1).
Opposition towards subdivision seemed to corne mostly from non-registered
members and from members with many unregistered sons. It should be noted
that thèse groups of opponents, thé former having no légal say, do not
necessarily reject thé idea of subdivision itself but reject thé way it is or has
been done. According to Tobiko (1989b:15-16), who conducted a survey in
Imaroro/Mashuru group ranch, elderly women in particular fear that
subdivision will destroy harmonious communal life, croate landlessness, limit
resource utilisation, lead to land being sold or auctioned and thus threaten
successful pastoralism as thé mainstay of their society. Middle-aged and young
women, in contrast support thé subdivision of land wholeheartedly arguing that
land parcelling is necessary for speedy development and thé création of a more
comfortable life.
The "second génération issue" of non-registered âge groups has particularly
divided group members and even families. We have seen how Poka and
Kiboko members opposed registration stating that thé resulting plot sizes would
be too small to be viable. In other group ranches thé younger génération has
been registered, though sometimes only after physical threats from young
people as happened, for example, in Oldoinyo Orok and Mailua group ranches
in 1987. In other cases, thé non-registered hâve sought légal assistance by
bringing their case to court as thé Kiboko young people did.M
38 One owner saw that, in retum for a water connection, his parcel was reduced by 5 acres
for thé installation by thé Muustry of Water Development of 4 boreholes for supplying water to
Kajiado Town and (in future) to neighbounng Isinya Town
39 Disputes under thé Land (Group) Représentatives Act are usually between thé members of
thé particular group or between thé group and other persons. The latter is thé case when dealing
with thé membersmp issue Aggrieved persons who have been refused to be given membership
status within a group ranch can file their case in thé District's Magistrates Court and if needed
appeal to the High Court Once thé court déclares that certain tndividuals qualify to be members,
then thé group représentatives will have no option but to register them as such (see Wanjala
1990-57) However, in several cases thé Court decided stated that it did not want to deal with the
membership problem and dtrected thé applications back to thé group ranch committee
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Box 7.1 POKA GROUP RANCH
By early 1981 the 30 Poka group ranch members decided to deny the request of 92 Poka non-rnembers for
registration. Moreover, a majority (76 per cent) of the members decided to slrive for individual ranches.
They argued that the registration of new members would result in the ranch being snbdivided into too
small parcels. In fact the average 297.5 ha per member was already considered to be unviable. The refused
members, most of them of the Dmirisho âge. group, married having children and even having been
promoted to the status of junior elder, supported by a group of 43 women (wives and mothers) requested
the Land Registrar and the late Mr. S. Oloitipitip, by then Minister for Local Government to help them.
The women feared that, after misappropriation of loans the land would be auctioned. Their plea was futile
and so were the letters that followed to the Ministry of Lands and Seulement referring to the registration of
their sons' peers in neighbouring group ranches.
By May 1983 a request for subdivision was approved by the Department of Land Adjudication.
Registered supporters of the Emirisho age group were removed from the group ranch committee. Other
members supporting the unregistered Poka résidents were those having large families. Some of them had an
effective weapon for delaying the subdivision as they refused to contribute into the repayment of the AFC
debt for the acquisition of bulls. Though finançai with group money, these were used solely by the
committee members. Préparations, however, continued and by February 1985, Poka group ranch signed a
contract with a private surveyor to finalise the boundary Unes and exact plot sizes as laid down by the
Range Department and Démarcation committee. Instead of a two month period the surveyor needed over
two years to draw the final Plan. It was only then that the Kajiado officials noticed that plot sizes varied
between 189 ha to 533 ha, completely different from the original Range Department map, Survey work,
costing Ksh. 75.000/- had to be repeated and a new map produced before April 1987. Again promises were
not kept and Poka group ranch threatened to cancel the agreement. Finally, by November 1987 a map was
produced, which became available only by July 1989. It shows a total of 30 ranches from 299 to 319 ha
and plots set aside tor a school, trading centre, Community centre and water point In August 1989 the
Land Control Board gave their consent to Poka group ranch for the transfer of individual titles.
KIBOKO GROUP RANCH
Like Poka, Kiboko group ranch members were opposed to the registration of new members. However, 32
non-registered members were more successful in seeking assistance from Mr. Oloitipitip in their struggle to
be accepted by the group ranch as new members. In a letter dated February llth 1983, Oloitipitip's
Ministry requested the Minister of Lands (Kariuki) to register the 32 people listed. By May 1983 the
Nairobi register was updated.
By October 1983 the official décision to subdivide Kiboko group ranch was made by the 67 members.
In awaitiög the actual allocation of plots members tried to claim certain parts of the group ranch by setting
aside private ot-okeri for their calves and sick animais. By January 1984 30 non-registered members of the
Dmirislio age-gronp complained to the Kajiado District Commissioner about the unofficial subdivision of
the ranch. In November 1984, after a heated debate, it was decided that the practice of creating individual
ol-okeri should stop as it undermined the grazing pattems within the group ranch. At the same time, with
the 1984 drought coming at its height, members of other group ranches were required to leave the Kiboko
area.
By October 1985 rumours arose that, in the Nairobi register Kiboko group ranch totaüed 99 members,
whereas the Kajiado and Kiboko registers still showed only 67 members. At a genera! meeting in
November this was confirmed. Following a heated debate, in which old and "new" members had to be
separated, only one member out of the group of 32 new registrations was accepted as replacing his
deceased father. The remaining 31 were "deregistered" in February 1986. In January the 67 members
wanted to seule on the parcels allocated by the démarcation committee awaiting official subdivision.
Tensions arose between the two groups. Kiboko group ranch tried to repay its loan as soon as possible by
acquiring a new lot of AFC steers. The animais were kept in a central berd. By May 1988 they were able
to clear the loan. The group of 31 still pressed for registration. Allhough more members seemed to have
turaed more sympathetic to this request, a majority of 74 per cent still opposed registration. A plea from
the assistant chief of the area was also fruitless. In October 1988 the annual genera! meeting dealt with the
subject extensively. The Land Registrar was present explaining the process of subdivision and the
procedures for registration. The group seeking registration admitted that they had sought help from
Oloitipitip. The Land Registrar proposed to screen every member of this group and orphans, for instance,
whose parents were not registered would not simply be able to inherit their father1 s plot. A statement by
one of the members that they should be given a pièce of their uncle's land was waived as it had no legal
backing. Finally, 21 people were said to be fatherless and in four cases the father was a registered member,
while two ethers were said to have been living on the Merueshi group ranch. Still, the registered members
(especially the Iseuri age group) refused to register a single new member. In the August 1989 annual
genera! meeting the group ranch committee reported that it was now ready to dissolve the group ranch. In
October 1989 the group of 31 obtained help from a lawyer, who summoned Kiboko group ranch to register
the applicants or else be sued in court By February 1990 a majority of 70 per cent (47 members) still
rejected the registraüon. The case is süll pending.
Box 73. ELANG'ATA WUAS GROUP RANCH
In 1985 Elang'ata Wuas group ranch had decided to close their register totalling 658 members At the
time of incorporation 415 members had been registered. A démarcation committee divided the whole
group ranch into individual parcels. After payment of Ksh. 600/-, members had to sign a paper mat they
jgreed to the size, quality and location of the allocated parcel. It should be noted that Elang'ata Wuas
bas a huge variety in the quality of the ranch. Allocation was rather biased favouring a few influential
members. For example, the Chief of the area, a member of the ranch and the Purka Land Control Board,
managed to designate himself some 700 hectares or almost 12 per cent of the total group ranch area. He
simply claimed all the land in between his newly built modem house and some young trees planted by
him near a dam. Anybody opposing was threatened with belng given a small plot north of Singiraine, an
unfavourable location. In February 1990 the Land Adjudication Offlcer Nairobi protested over this issue.
Since 1986 the Ilkishili age group of 218 persons has been trying to acquire the status of registered
member for all of their agemates. Ate one time the group presented a bottle of whisky, some tobacco,
and a bow and arrow to the committee. This was retumed by the elders who told them to bring a heifer,
a crate of beer and a Wanket in order to avoid being cursed. The non-registered members obtained some
support from an opposing politica! faction within the group ranch. This enabled them to contract a lawyer
for their case. The group made it a court case in November 1989, bat nothing has happened since. By
December 1989 Elang'ata Wuas group ranch had removed doublé and multiple registered members,
reducing the total membership to 487 members. On average this would mean an allocation of 114 ha per
member. Also in Elang'ata Wuas group ranch Uiose who came from elsewhere, even as f ar as Samburu,
and those orphans whose fathers never registered will be ignored. Only two widows whose husbands died
after 1982 have obtained membership. By contrast, three sons of an influential family within the group
ranch are said to have been registered illegally.
METO GROUP RANCH
In early 1972 only 12 Maasai in the southern Matapato area decided to accept the possibility of obtaining
their own individual farm. A majority of the people strongly opposed this idea and either became
members of the Meto or Oldoinyo Orok group ranches. By 1985, only a few years since Meto group
ranch had starled, it was decided to dissolve the ranch and form individual plots. The matter had been
left to rest for a while until September 1989 when, at an Annual General Meeting, the Meto members
officially decided to subdivide their group ranch. Only some older members, having many unregistered
sons opposed the subdivision. Over the years the Meto group ranch has registered new members raising
their total of 408 in 1982 to 607 in 1990. Unregistered members are those of the youngest age-gronp;
Ilkimunyak.
The process of subdivision in this group ranch is stil! in the early stages. By January 1990, official
permission from the Land Adjudication Office had been obtained. A feasibility study had been
condacted, but no single plots demarcated so far. This wil! be one of the most difficult group ranches to
be subdivided. Among the problems are the fact that out of some 600 members, only about half of the
members actually live there. A large group consists of Matapato and Kisonko Maasai living in Tanzania.
Others stay in neighbouring towns, once in a while coming to beg for a heifer or steer, which is sold
immediately for drinking money. The Tanzanian Maasai will be particularly willing to obtain a plot and
Kenyan citizenship alike. The group ranch committee has been thinking of allocatmg the Tanzanian
Maasai small plots along the borderline with Tanzania. It is possible that a family send a wife to settle
there. Denying them this parcel is a dangerous act. The Meto Maasai depend on watering points (wells)
some 10 km inside Tanzania. Before the arriva! of the Européens this was Matapato area. It is also the
border line between Tanzanian Kisonko and the Matapato. ff the Tanzania Matapato were denied their
Meto individual plot they could, in response, deny the Meto Maasai access to the wells. On the other
hand if all the Tanzania Matapato decided to settle on (relativeiy large) individual parcels in Kenya, there
is the risk of the Kisonko Maasai moving into the 10 km zone of Matapato area resulting in the loss of
the wells as well. This has already happened at the Meto/Torosei border becaose of Torosei group ranch
(Loodokilani section) recently denying Meto Maasai access to the natural pans situated on Torosei group
ranch which had previously been shared with the Meto Maasai' cattle. It has been stated that the aim of
this move was to force Meto members to move away from their part of Meto group ranch which was to
be left for Torosei ranchers. Another probten is the large variance of range quality. Towards Torosei the
grazing capacity diminishes. Some parts also are rather hilly, which most members dislike. After group
ranch subdivision Meto members will possess, on average, slighüy over 47 ha.
LORNGOSUA GROUP RANCH
By December 1980, three members who jointly patd for the siting and drilling of a new borehole
requested the setting aside of 30 acres for individua! nse. This was turned down. Yet by October 1989 all
members agreed to subdivide their ranch. They cleared their register of doublé and multiple entries,
accepted, after a heated debale, the registration of 182 new applicants bringing the total membership at
815. This will after subdivision result in an average ranch size of 47 ha per member.
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This has been donc, for instance, in Imaroro/Mashuru and Olkiloriti group
ranches. In the latter group ranch the issue of subdivision has ruined the social
harmony of the community. The "left hand" of the Ilkiseyia age group
(Irangirang) were not allowed to be registered, in contrast to the older "right
hand" section. During a meeting dealing with the registration issue the latter
did not support their younger left hand warrior group. The Irangirang went to
court in December 1989 and won their case.
However, Olkiloriti group ranch appealed against this verdict and the case is
stil! pending. During the time of this legal fight the Ildamat section was in the
process of their oln''gesher ceremony, It was seriously delayed as a result of
the problerns between the right and left hand group, who were supposed to be
united in one single age group of young elders after the completion of the
ceremony (see chapter 4). However, in fear of a Woody clash between the two
groups, instead of building one single big emanyata two small imanyat were
built, one for every single hand of the warrior age-group.
Once the décision to subdivide has been taken it still takes a long period
before the actual handing out of individual title deeds is complétée! due to
technical problems (see the above presented examples of Poka and Kiboko).
The lack of good surveyors particularly hampers the group ranch subdivision
process. As early as December 1984 Kajiado politicians urged the government
to release more government surveyors as private surveyors were considered to
be too expensive. Others pose that private surveyors work faster as government
surveyors get more allowances if they take more time to finish their job. Loan
repayment has been another hampering problem but has now been solved.
The whole process of group ranch création and subdivision has taken place
over a period of some 20 years or even less in the case of Phase UI ranches.
During this timespan developments within other land use activities like
cultivation, wildlife conservation, forestry and mining also continued. In
section 7.2.1 we already pictured some of the évolutions in the Ngong and
Loitokitok area until the late 1960s. In the next section we will briefly present
an outline of processes that took place from that time until the late 1980s.
7.5 Land Pressures Building Up in Kajiado District: 1970-
1990
7.5.1 Infiltration and Cultivation by non-Maasai Groups
In the foregoing chapters (i.e. sections 5.5.4 and 6.3.2) we described
agricuhural developments within Kajiado District since 1945 including the
infiltration by Kikuyu, Kamba, Chagga and other peoples in search of arable
land. As early as the late 1950s registration of land had been proposed for the
Ngong area to rule out the possibility of people from outside the area coming
and claiming land (see section 5.5.4). In section 7 1.2 of this chapter we made
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clear that the threat of a possible mass influx by non-Maasai cultivators
contributed to the Maasai willingness to accept the group ranch concept.
Possible locations for the non-Maasai to setüe were the traditional locations
of small rural centres like Ngong Town, Kajiado, Loitokitok, Namanga, Sultan
Hamud engaging in all kinds of trade activities. Others found employment with
the Magadi Soda Company or other mining corporations in the district. In
addition, the possibility of obtaining a small plot either under one's private
ownership or as a tenant had increased tremendously since the création of
individual ranches and the beginning of the registration of land in Ngong
(1961) and Loitokitok (1966). Wealthy non-Maasai now had the opportunity to
buy a pièce of land in Kajiado District. Less well-off people came to work for
the Maasai or their fellow kinsmen as agricultural labourers.
When, by 1968, Kajiado District had lost its status of being a closed district
and every Kenyan citizen could, in principle freely enter without the need of a
legal document it became even easier to get employment in cultivating a pièce
of land.40 As a result, through the 1960s and 1970s agriculture extended to
the south-west of Nairobi at an accelerating rate. By 1970 it had moved
southward along the whole eastern base of the Ngong Hills as far south as the
Kiserian river in later years followed by a spread along the southern boundary
of Nairobi National Park (see Ecosystems 1982:67).41
Expansion in Loitokitok Division seems to have occurred from halfway
during the 1960s. CampbeU's figures obtained from a sample population of
cultivators in the Loitokitok area, show that the break point for the migration































40 Before this date, one needed a pass to enter Kajiado District which had to be renewed
every 6-12 raonths The pass was only provided to those non-Maasai who had been placed on a
special list after invitation by two Maasai (the "Trespass Ordinance" régulations) Of course, after
the création of the group ranches in the Kaputiei area this région was provided with a new weapon
(i.e group ranch membership) to stop non-Maasai illégal infiltration Unless approved by the
group ranch, cultivaüon was not allowed
41 In 1974 it was decided by the Mimstry of Lands to station two surveyors pemnanently in
the Ngong area due to the increase in land transactions in the area (see KDAR 1974 48) Out of a
district total of 191 land transfers 117 requests had been made in this area while the total for
Loitokitok stood at 48
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Information from district annual reports (1969, 1973) underlines the growth of
land under cultivation since the late 1960s. For example, in 1969, acreage
under maize and beans, the most important crops of those days, was 3,090 ha
in Ngong and 1,880 ha in Loitokitok, By 1973 the area planted with maize and
beans had increased to 3,500 ha in Ngong and 6,600 ha in Loitokitok (short
rainy season acreage alone). Other important crops grown at the time were
potatoes, coffee, peas, bananas, pyrethrum (Ngong only), cotton (Loitokitok
only). To boost coffee production a coffee factory was opened in July 1965 in
Loitokitok.
Organizations (parüy) involved in demonstrating agricultural production were
started in Kajiado District throughout the 1960s. An important number of them
were initiated by non-governmental organizations (e.g. Oxfam, World Vision)
and missionaries as a follow up to famine relief efforts or in trying to broaden
existing development efforts, e.g. Isinya-Maasai Rural Training Centre (CPK-
Anglican Church-1961); Rombo-model farm project (Catholic Church-1962);
Ngong Farmers' Training Centre (British Council of Churches-Christian
Council of Kenya/Oxfam-1965) and the Olooseos-Maasai Action for Self-
Improvement Project (Presbyterian Church of Bast Africa-1969).
A strong momentum for the increase of cultivation in Kajiado District resulted
from the 1973-76 drought period. Kaputiei Maasai herdsmen had driven their
animais as far as the outskirts of Nairobi and the Chyulu hills, while those
from Loitokitok moved to the Dalalekutuk area as well as Kimana and Rombo.
Still, an estimated 60,000 cattle died in the June-December period of 1976
alone (see DN 13/01/77). Famine relief was provided by way of maize meal
and beans for some 60,000 people or over 40 per cent of the district population
(see KDDP 1980:9).
The non-Maasai farmers -especially those situated on the lower slopes of
Mt. Kilimanjaro- faced a hard time. Only those on the higher slopes and those
practising irrigated cultivation on the plains had been able to produce a
reasonable erop during the years of drought (see Campbell 1978:34). This
acted as an incentive for others to move to these better-watered, thus less
drought-ridden lands. Maasai group ranch members did not oppose this move
strongly as most of them were in déplorable circumstances and willing to
attempt cultivation themselves or, more usually, hire labour to do so. With thé
lower slopes of Mt. Kilimanjaro almost completely overtaken by cultivation thé
cultivators now started to buy or rent plots along thé margins of thé swampy
areas on thé plains like Kimana and Rombo. Moreover, in 1975 thé Kajiado
District Council decided to stimulate thé local initiative in irrigated agriculture
by providing a grant of Ksh. 53,0007- for thé Kimana-Tikondo irrigation
scheme. The scheme had started in thé mid-1950s and needed to be resurveyed
and expanded (see KDAR 1976:11, Kimani 1988:9). Other areas which had
started by thé 1950s such as Rombo, Isinet and Inkisanchani also increased
their production. In addition, new areas were opened in Loitokitok Division for
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irrigation by thé middle of thé 1970s; Impiron, Namelok, Elangata-Nkima and
Olorika (see section 4.4.2).
As a resuit thé area under cultivation increased rapidly. Moreover, with
irrigation it became possible to increase thé planted acreage for certain crops as
one could cultivate almost continuously throughout the year. The production of
horticultural crops gained in importance. The growing of onions became very
populär as this cash erop had a very high gross margin. This occurred mainly
at the cost of cotton growing. Agriculture lost its stigma of being only for thé
poor. Profitability triggered the opening of more parts of the Loitokitok's
better-watered areas (Illasit, Osoit) or thé extension of existing schemes like
Namelok and Impiron for irrigated cultivation. In Ngong Division (Kiserian),
Central Division (Namanga) and Magadi Division (Nguruman, Pakase,
Shompole) irrigation also increased (tomatoes, melons). In thé Ngong area it is
mainly non-Maasai farmers using borehole water to supplement the growing of
rainfed food crops, although tomatoes are also of importance. Irrigation
practices in Namanga are negligible as they concern a few non-Maasai farmers
using tap water only. In Ngong and Central Division it is expected that
irrigated agriculture will rise in Ewaso Kedong and Kitengela areas,
respectively.
Of more importance is thé irrigated activity taking place in Magadi Division
(e.g. melons, mangos and other fruits). In fact, this division probably contains
thé oldest irrigation scheme of thé district.42 By thé 1960s, thé area under
irrigated cultivation in Nguruman was estimated to be some 60 ha. According
to Ecosystems (1982:48) this increased to 400 ha by 1970 and 1,000 ha by
1980. This seems to be an overestimate. The Ministry of Agriculture
mentioned a total area of almost 300 ha of which half was cultivated by some
200 farmers in 1987 (see MoA/AR 1987:22). The 1988 farm census estimated
the Nguruman irrigated area to amount to some 825 ha of which 410 ha were
cultivated by 237 farmers, some 55 per cent being non-Maasai (Kamba
mainly). In Pakase 15 farmers irrigated 17 ha (80 per cent non-Maasai). In
Shompole there were 21 farmers farming 17 ha and with thé exception of one
41 Rev. Wakefield, a nussionaty stationed in Mombasa who gathered descriptions of the
îmerior duting 1866-1870 by imerviewing Arab Swahili caravan leaders, reports of small scale
irrigation pfactices for thé Nguruman and Pakase area (see Jacobs 1967:3: Jacobs 1975:17). Trade
caravans used to stop and barter for agncultural produce before continuing their journey through
Maasailand. By (hat time maize, beans, millet and sweet potatoes are said to have been grown by
a group of some 1,000-1300 people composed of intermarrying "agricultural" Maasai,
impoverished Maasai and neighbouring Sonjo. By early 1900 thé number of people seems to hâve
dropped to only 400, while by 1918 thé settlements were virtually abandoned. Thus, thé
Nguruman settlements seem to have been abandoned, resettled and abandoned again, depeading on
thé fortunes of thé pastoralists who occupied thé plains (see Bemtsen 1979:116).
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Kamba ail were Maasai.43
Disregarding individual irrigating farmers in Ngong and Central Division thé
total irrigated area in Kajiado District bas been estimated to be 2,294 ha by
late 1988 (see section 4.4.2).44 In the same Farm Census of 1988, the area
under rainfed cultivation was 11,529 ha making a total cultivated area of
13,823 ha. It is difficult to relate this figure to estimâtes made by other
authors. Agricultural officers have stated that the figures used by the MoA are
not reliable and should be considered guesümates at best. For example, the
Kajiado District Development Plan 79-83 estimated a total of 60,000 ha under
cultivation for 1978 (see KDDP 1980:3). The Ministry of Agriculture gives a
figure of 10,363 ha under crops for the 1982 long rains (see KDDP 1984:31).
A recent figure by the Ministry speaks of 176,600 ha for Kajiado District for
1988 (see MoA/AR 1988:3). Although the area under cultivation has certainly
increased this could never have happened by a multiplier of 17 times.45
Table 7.9 shows the annual cultivated acreage, thus in most cases including
two growing seasons, for some of the most important crops in Kajiado District
for the 1976-1987 period. We also included the 1988 Farm Census estimate for
1987, which reached a total of 20,456 ha planted crops. Official figures,
however, were much higher. It is thought that the real value will be somewhere
in between, rather towards the low side.46 Leaving aside these difficulties
table 7.9 clearly shows the increase in the cultivated area in Kajiado District.
This is thought to be due to a combination of the increasing number of farmers
" This area is threatened nowadays because of plans by the Euaso Ngi'ro South
Development Authority and the Kenya Power and Lightning Company to built dams in the Euaso
Ngi'ro river. A Ksh. 120 million pre-feasibility study made by a British consultancy firm, a
candidate for the Implementation of the project, did not take into account the environmental effects
satisfactorily. It has been prophesied by others that the Shompole swamp will dry up and that the
riverine area used by livestock mainly during periods of drought will diminish.
44 It should be noted that the 1988 Farm Census did not cover the Elangata-Enkima/Olorika
scheme estimated to be some 65 ha in size.
45 In 1982 the author stayed for a period of three weeks in a little village named Kikelelwa
along the Tanzania-Kenya border at the slopes of Mt. Kilimanjaro. At that time several scattered
plots planted with maize, beans and bananas existed. Down on the plains towards Nkama and
Illasit Maasai herders could be seen with their livestock. On return in November 1988 the pastures
had all been taken over by non-Maasai cultivator«. Beanng in mind the Ministry's potential arable
area estimate of 156,800-168,000 ha, the estimate of 176,600 ha seems to be unrealistic. On the
other hand, Ecosystems (1982:9) estimated that some 33 per cent of the district (i.e. some 700,000
ha) was not suffering from prohibitive obstacles for (rain-fed) cultivation.
46 Interplanting of crops was dealt with in the 1988 Farm Census by linking a portion of the
total acreage to each of these crops (especially maize and beans). Official figures do not seem to
adjust the cultivated acreage for each of these crops and thus results in an exaggerated acreage.
The Farm Census figure, however, probably underestimates the real planted acreage due to the
exclusion of some of the farmers and because of some respondent« who could not remember the
acreage planted for each erop.
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and the resulting extension of the cultivated area and to the growing
importance of irrigated agriculture particularly since 1982.
Table 7.9 Kajiado District Annual Planted Acreage 1976-87 (ha)
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The shift by the early 1980s towards cash erop production is also clearly
shown. As noted in chapter 4, by this time Loitokitok Division has become the
major supplier of onions and tomatoes for the Mombasa market. The decrease
in the 1985 onion acreage was attributed to a drop in priées.
Though some Maasai will have engaged in cultivation albeit only temporarily
in response to the disastrous 1960/1, 1973/76, 1980 and 1984 drought periods
or have entered erop farming through the acquisition of Kikuyu, Kamba or
Chagga wives, the most common arrangement still is to let the plots out to
tenants or sharecroppers. In chapter 4 information was provided concerning the
ethnicity and tenurial status of Kajiado District farmers. It was concluded that
Maasai farmers make up slightly above one quarter (27.2 per cent) of the
farming households. Here we will have a closer look at the involvement in
cultivation of Maasai and non-Maasai at divisional level.
In the Ngong Division the présence of Kikuyu farmers, the single largest
group of cultivators, is paramount (see table 7.10). Other important non-Maasai
farmers are Kamba (especially in Central Division) and Chagga (in Loitokitok
mainly). Table 7.10 also shows that 60.5 per cent of the cultivators owned their
plot, leaving some 36.7 per cent for tenants, 0.8 per cent for sharecropping
arrangements and thé remaining 2.0 per cent of the cultivators were engaged in
various combinations of thèse tenurial relations.
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Table 7.10 Number, Ethnicity and Tenurial Situation of Kajiado District
Farming Households
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The right to cultivate sterns from group ranch membership, individual land
ownership or the leasing of land either from the group ranch, an individual
member or individual rancher.
In contrast with other areas, most farmers in Loitokitok division are either
legal or illegal tenants. "Illegal" means in this sensé that these agreements have
never been sanctioned by the Land Control Board as required by law (see
KDDP 1984:14). Instead annual leases are agreed upon between the parties
involved and renewal is therefore always uncertain. This insecurity handicaps
them in acquiring loans. Moreover, there is always the risk of mass évictions
by Maasai owners. For example, Kikuyu tenants were chased away from
Impiron by early 1980 after having developed the irrigation scheme there since
the 1970s (see Masharen 1989:10). Kuku group ranch members decided to
chase away tenants (mainly Kamba) from Elangata-Nkima/Olorika schemes in
1987. On Rombo group ranch the Kenyan tenants have been replaced by
Chagga agriculturalists from neighbouring Tanzania (see Kimani
1988:appendix IIIc). The latter are said to be preferred because they pay higher
rents and are easier to handle due to their illegal status in Kenya. Moreover,
Chagga are respected Irrigators, who on the Tanzanian side of Mt. Kilimanjaro
have been very successful coffee farmers.
In Central Division tensions exist mainly in the Arroi group ranch near
Kalembwani on the Kajiado-Machakos border. Kamba invaders, some of whom
have been living there since the mid-1960s, and Maasai ranchers have clashed
several times over the years (e.g. in 1973, 1979, 1983, 1986), including the
stealing of livestock, burning of houses, destruction of shambas and the killing
of people. Most recently, November and December 1989, a total of seven
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people, including a nine months old baby, were killed in two clashes between
the Arroi Maasai and Kamba at Kalembwani (see NT 13/01/83, DN 22/02/86,
DN 14/12/89).
Reasons for evicting migrants stem from several causes. Irrigated agriculture
competes with livestock for the availability of water. The swamps are reserve
dry season grazing areas. Their capacity is said to have been reduced,
especially since 1982, due to the expansion of irrigation. Some are now
gradually disappearing thus reducing the holding capacity of range land near
such an area (e.g. Namelok, Rombo, Kimana-Tikondo, Inkisanchani). This will
become far worse when the proposed water pipeline cornes to transport most of
the Noolturesh water to Machakos and Kajiado Town (see section 4.5.2).
Furthermore, as a result of the use of chemicals and fertilizers for
combatting erop diseases, the drinking water for the Maasai herds downstream
has become polluted. This is a threat to both animais and humans. Also,
livestock that damaged crops is sometimes killed by the cultivators. Those
Maasai confronted with these setbacks want the immigrants to be evicted,
while group ranch members having made huge profits from leasing plots, use
thème to buy livestock and would like to see agricultural activities continue.
By combining the information presented in table 7.10 it is possible to give
an overview of the tenurial situation in relation to the f armer' s ethnicity for
each of the Kajiado District divisions. Table 7.11 shows that, as far as plot
ownership for each ethnie group is concerned, the Maasai still take the top
position in all divisions, although in Ngong this situation has almost been
overtaken by non-Maasai. The relatively high number of Maasai tenants in
Loitokitok seems to be the result of hiring plots by members of adjacent group
ranches. For example, almost half of those Mbirikani members living in its
northern area had plots near Amboseli (see KDAR 1976:50).
Cultivators are faced with problems such as the salinization of irrigated
fields and damage to crops by livestock or wildlife. According to the 1988
Farm Census, farmers in Magadi and Central division mentioned wildlife
damage as the most important constraint, while for Loitokitok and Ngong rain
fed cultivators this was the reliability of the rainfall. Loitokitok irrigated
farmers mentioned water shortage as one of the major problems. Like the
Maasai pastoralists, those irrigators in schemes depending on water from
Noolturesh river (e.g. Inkisanchani) are afraid that piping water from the
Noolturesh spring towards Machakos District, a process initiated in September
1987, will undermine their livelihood (see Masharen 1989:11). Otherwise the
influx of agriculturalists is a threat in itself to the medium and long term
viability of Kajiado District' s ecosystem. Among the négative conséquences are
the use of farming methods suited for the humid régions but probably
devastating to the vulnérable semi-arid soils (see Odundo 1992:20). The cutting
of trees on the slopes of Mt. Kilimanjaro for building huts and for firewood
increases the risks of landslides due to a diminished water conserving capacity.
316 Setting Wealth to Buy Poverty






















































































































































Figure 7.3 Landownership and Ethnicity of Kajiado District Farmers
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As early as 1975 reports existed claiming that the eastern portion of the
County Council Loitokitok forest was being destroyed by settlers feiling fresh
trees either for posts or for selling firewood and charcoal. This resulted in the
réduction of the avaüability of water from the springs in the Kuku plains (see
DN 10/12/75). Cutting trees for charcoal was banned. By April 1976, in order
to replace the destroyed trees, people were allowed to setüe in the forest to
cultivate under the "plant by cultivation" scheme.47
In August 1983, squatters are nevertheless said to have uprooted seedlings in
order to frustrate the afforestation programme at Loitokitok - allegedly
encouraged by politicians who promised them plots in this area (see DN
21/08/83). A few months before a new directive banning the illegal burning of
charcoal and the cutting of firewood in the District had been issued. Lorries
loaded with charcoal and firewood had been seen being driven towards
Nairobi. Only dead trees were allowed to be used and then only after having
obtained an official permit from the administration (see KT 22/04/83). By late
1984 the squatters, mainly from Tanzania, were given an order to quit. Chyulu
Hills forest is also suffering from cultivation and charcoal burning (see DN
01/07/88).
In the Ngong area early worries were voiced by local Maasai résidents that
the farming of the Kerarapon area at the foot of Ngong Hills, overgrazing and
tree cutting in the higher zones in combination with the damming and pumping
of water for irrigation purposes in the Kiserian area downstream and poor land
management in the Bulbul area had all resulted in the drying up of Embakasi,
Kiserian and Kantis tributaries of the Athi River (see J. ole Orumoi DN
11/10/76 and M. ole Shompa DN 17/02/81). In spite of these early warnings, it
was only by the beginning of 1985 that Ngong Hills forest was officially
gazetted at a total of 30.77 km2. In 1967 the trees covered an area of some 4
km2, while by 1980 this had been reduced to a mere 1.5 km2 of tree clumps
(see DN 30/08/84). A grazing ban for the Ngong Hüls was proclaimed in
1982. Since that time the Ngong Hills have been undergoing increasing
afforestation, though large parts are still open. Another gazetted area is the
indigenous Namanga Forest covering some 118 km2 of which approximately
half is covered (see Ecosystems 1982:59, KDDP 1988:144).
Nowadays, attempts are increasingly being made to counterbalance the
negative side effects of cultivation by soil conserving activities such äs digging
cut-off drains, constructing terraces, planting of trees/grass, fencing off and
prohibiting planting too close to watercourses and advising farmers on the
47 The land was set aside for some 200 landless people from Loitokitok and Taita-Taveta,
each having been tricked by a "landbroker". To help these people it was decided to provide them
with small plots in the ruined County Council forest While staying in this area in 1982,1 was told
that the farmers were allowed to intercrop maize and beans with the young trees provided they
look care of them and would leave the area the moment this new planting reached a certain height
(see Standard 03/04A76).
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advantages of erop rotation, légumes interplanting and the like.48
7.5.2 Wildlife Conservation and the Création of Amboseli National Park
In sections 5.5.4 and 6.3.2 the handing over of the Amboseli area to the
Kajiado County Council in 1961 was discussed. Tourism grew rapidly
following Kenya's Independence in 1963 and by 1968 revenues from Amboseli
amounted to some 75 per cent of the Kajiado County Council's annual income
(see Western 1982a:304). The Council obtained this money mainly from
hunting and booking fees, from the sale of confiscated skins, the renting out to
tourists of self-service bandas at Ol Tukai and from a 78 km2 lease to the Bast
African Wildlife Lodges Ltd.49 This area in which "Amboseli Lodge" was
situated was reserved for game only.
In fact, the company wanted to extend the stock-free area to some 520 km2,
while the local Maasai wanted the whole of the area set aside for grazing by
their herds and flocks. A third party, the international wildlife lobby, demanded
füll protection of the Amboseli area for the préservation of the animais in their
natural habitat. Growing human and livestock numbers were said to have
resulted in diminishing numbers of wildlife. As early as 1965 American
wildlife enthusiasts agreed to provide money for making waterholes for Maasai
cattle provided the Maasai herders no longer entered the Amboseli swamps on
which the wildlife and livestock heavily depended during the dry season period
(see DN 21/02/65). Calculations foresaw a 40-50 per cent décline for the
livestock population if thé Maasai were deprived of the basin's water and
swamps (see Western 1982a:304).
The local Kisonko Maasai did not see why they should lose their traditional
dry season grazing grounds for the benefit of the Kajiado County Council, thé
Kenyan Government and thé tourists, while thé costs were placed on their
48 Barlier efforts by the late 1960s had often been frustrated due to absentée farmers {see
KDAR 1969:21). Odundo (1992:23) beheves uidividual land tenure to be favoutable for tree
planting but recognizes that in thé North-Kaputiei région the area is bare with very little tree cover
because of poor protection offered to the trees in their infancy from damage by livestock. In my
view, wildlife and livestock damage can hardly be controlled. Moreover, livestock-keepers favour
grassiand pastures. Only small fenced plots used for résidence or cultivation could possibly
increase the tree cover.
Hunting in Kajiado District was administered through thé Game Department under a
Controlled Area (Hunung Blocks) System that was operated throughout the country. When the land
had trust status before adjudication and registration of group ranches, thé Government had
operated hunting, returning Controlled Area fees and booking fees to thé Kajiado County Council.
In 1972, for instance, a total of Ksh. 396,0807- had accrued from hunting rising to Ksh. 532,84l/-
by 1974. The money was distnbuted over the whole of thé district towards development projects
such as cattle dips, dispensaties, water projects and construction of schools (see KDAR 1974:11).
Following adjudication there was a verbal agreement with thé Kajiado Maasai that thé Government
should continue to be responsibie but that thé income sltouid be directed toward oie landowners
and not the Council (see UNDP/FAO 1978:25).
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shoulders.50 Instead they argued firmly that they be given exclusive land
rights for thé whole of the Amboseli région. Promises made by British
Governors and Kenyan Ministers throughout thé 1950s and early 1960s had not
caused them to lose their fears of loosing access to thé Amboseli swamps.
Indeed, by 1968 a plan had been launched before thé Kajiado County
Council to carve out slightiy over 500 km2, comprising of the Amboseli dry
season basin, from thé 3,260 km2 Maasai Amboseli Game Reserve, for thé
exclusive use of wildlife. The Maasai protested using every politica! force they
had and begging thé Government to think twice before allowing thé création of
an Amboseli National Park.51 Beside the loss of dry season grazing thé
création of a National Park would mean vesting legal ownership in the hands
of thé Central Government including thé revenues. This would make thé
Kajiado County Council bankrupt in one feil swoop.
Finally, in 1970 a presidential directive had to be issued to résolve thé
impasse. In 1972 thé boundaries of thé new wildlife sanctuary were demarcated
and thé area gazetted as Government land. To go some way along with thé
Maasai thé area was reduced from 518 km2 to 388 km2, leaving 160 ha of land
surrounding thé Ol Tukai tourist lodge owned by thé Council and guaranteeing
them an extra income besides a portion of gâte receipts. Récurrent and
developmental costs were to be for thé Central Government. The latter will
have been very much willing to do this as, for example, in 1976 it was
estimated that the Kenyan Government and the Kajiado County Council jointly
received revenues of approximately Ksh. 69 million in 1976 from hunting,
game photography and motorized game viewing in the district (i.e. Amboseli
and Nairobi National Parks). The costs were estimated at only Ksh. 4
million.52
Though the Central and Local Government had protected their own interests,
the local Maasai had not. It should be noted that during the wet season game
animais do not stay within the Parks' boundaries but spread out into the
neighbouring "dispersai areas" or "spill-overs". For Amboseli and Nairobi
50 The increasmg number of tourists willing to visit Amboseli placed sévère stress on the
absorption capacity of the area and threatened to damage ils ecological habitat irreversibly as a
result of heavy off-road traffic withm a fragile terrain.
51 Moreover, it has been stated that the Maasai, in an attempt to preempt the loss of their
dry season grazing area deliberately killed game, especially rhinocéros. From 1966 to 1982 the
mimber of rhinos declined from 70 to 14 (see Western 1982a:308).
52 It was calculated that the net foreign exchange earnings for the Kajiado District from
wildlife were some Ksh. 29 million, while an extra sum of Ksh. 40 million was thought to be
eamed from money spent outside Kajiado District by a certain number of those tourists who came
to Kenya foremost because of Keaya's wildlife héritage. Direct revenues from wildlife viewing
and hunting was esümated to be some 16 5 million. An estimated Ksh. 400,0007- from viewing
and Ksh. 950.000/- from hunting (i.e. 8 per cent of total direct revenues) went to the Kajiado
County Council whilst the Central Government earned 92 per cent (see UNDP/FAO 1978:xvii/12).
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National Parks dispersai areas of some 5,000 km2 and 2,000 km2, respectively
were calculated while both parks together amount only to some 500 km2.53 As
a result wildlife outside the parks had to be acceptée as a part of land use in
order to fulfil conservation goals.54 In fact, the only gain for the local Maasai
came from outside donor funds provided by the New York Zoological Society
who, in March 1973, signed a contract with the Kenyan Government through
which US$ 140,000 was donated for the building of five new watering areas
outside Amboseli National Park (see DN 10/01/73).
In October 1974 Amboseli National Park was offïcially gazetted. The local
Maasai were still allowed to trespass into the Park until 1977 due to the sévère
drought period of that time (see Campbell 1981a:231). Alternative water
sources for the Maasai cattle, two boreholes outside the park supplied from a
pipeline, were only completed by 1977, although they proved to be defective in
design and deficiënt in cost-effectiveness frequenüy forcing the Maasai to re-
enter the park for water (see Western 1982a:308). Erection of bornas inside the
Park, however, was not allowed.55
In order to win support from the local Maasai an UNDP/FAO study team,
contributors to the "Kenya Wildlife Management Project 71-11: (KWMP),
proposed to install a "Wildlife Utilization Fund" (WUF) in 1975 through which
money could be paid to people living in the vicinity of the Park.56 The
amount donated should be in proportion to the amount of wildlife sustained on
their land. Information for each area had to be collected from the seasonal
distribution of migratory wildlife species (wildebeests and zébras mainly)
calculated from data collected during "Systematic Reconnaissance Flights". The
group ranch committee was chosen to be the direct receiver of these payments.
Besides Uu's grazing compensation fee revenues were to be attracted through
organized hunting parties, camp sites and game cropping. The annual WUF
compensation fee for the Amboseli group ranches was Ksh. 250.000/-, while
By 1973 tensions had also arisen in the Kitengela area when, due to the drought, the
Maasai moved their animais into Nairobi National Park where 15 bulls were killed by the park's
wardens. It was stated that this act was part of an attempt to take over the Kitengela area as an
extension of Nairobi National Park. Negotiations about this had been going on since 1966 (see
Sunday Post 29/07/73).
54 Western (1982a:304) stated that permanent restriction of large herbivores to Amboseli Park
would lead to a réduction of some 40-50 per cent of these populations. UNDP/FAO estimâtes
speak of even less than 10 per cent for the Nairobi National Park wildlife migrating population
(see UNDP/FAO 1978:xxii).
55 During the 1984 drought the Wildlife Department was not able to pump water to the
Maasai outside Amboseli Park due to budget restrictions. First, the Maasai were allowed to enter
the Park for water and later when the drought began they were also to graze their herds (see Moss
1989:230).
Loss of the dispersai areas was thought to be equivalent to a reducüon of potential
revenues from wildlife of some Ksh, 3.3 million (see Western 1982a:306).
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revenues from entrance fees alone in 1976 amounted to Ksh. 2.0 million for
Amboseli National Park and were expected to rise to almost Ksh. 14.0 million
by the year 2000 (see UNDP/FAO 1978:11/87/99).
Finally, the KWMP proposed to establish a "Wildlife Extension Project"
(WEP) permanently as it had experienced difficulties in involving the Maasai
and gaining their understanding and support in communicating with other
departments. Institutional and legal support was provided due to a
reformulation of Kenya's national wildlife policy in 1975 and the Wildlife
Conservation and Management Act of 1976. The newly established Wildlife
Conservation and Management Department (WCMD) became responsible for
the co-ordination of all the proposed plans for action.
Although some improvements have been made inside the park such as the
relocation of much of the parks's infrastructure and a less destructive road
System, the most essential improvements made in order to gain local support
quickly failed. Hunting fees were paid only until 1977 when a nation-wide ban
on hunting was issued. Wildlife cropping was never seriously conducted. Only
a few tented camps were established initially and without much success (e.g. in
Olgulului and Kimana). Grazing fee compensation has been responsible for the
building of some dispensaries, schools, dips, curioshops and boreholes but
payments were stoppée after 1979.57
One adult educator was employed to manage the Wildlife Extension Project
in Kajiado District as well as in Narok! Assisted by some NGO's and through
finances obtained from other donors workshops were conducted, wildlife
committees established, tree nurseries starled and some educational material
produced. In August 1984 WEP made a new start funded by the African Fund
of Endangered Wildlife (AFEW) and the United Nations Education, Cultural
and Scientific Organization (UNESCO). The new style of the WEP assisted
some group ranches in pressing the Government to pay hunting fees which
were still owed to the ranchers since 1976. The project increasingly tried to
educate ranch members concerning natura! resources and wildlife conservation
via the recruitment and training of "Conservation Action Leaders" (CAL). In
addition, it helped to negotiate between Park officials and Maasai ranchers over
access to water and grazing during periods of shortage. Unfortunately, WEP
lacked official bacMng while at the same time was still considered to be a
"top-down" managed project (see Berger 1987:9).
Most disappointing, however, has been the failure to satisfactorily fulfil the
promises made to the local Maasai of the provision of an adequate number of
new watering points and dry season areas outside Amboseli Park. Until the late
57 In 1979 the Kajiado County Council expected to earn a revenue totalling Ksh. 5.490.000/-
its greatest source being the annual payment of Ksh. 4,600,000/- by the Ministty of Tourism &
Wildlife as a royalty for Amboseli National Park (see Standard 07/01/79). By 1984 the Council
was crippled financially. In 1986 it leased the 01 Tukai lodge to a private hotelier in an attempt to
raise more revenue for the Council (see Standard 09/12/86).
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1980s no funds were made available to fmally résolve tins issue. By May 1987
the Director of the WCMD, Dr. Olindo, told the local Maasai that some US$
200,000 had been raised in America for Amboseli but that more was still
needed (see Berger 1987:13). The Kajiado District Development Plan 1989-93
mentioned a number of projects the district intended to realize over this period.
Among the most important targets were the construction of a 57 km pipeline,
two boreholes and a dam costing an estimated total of Ksh. 2,734,000/-.
Furthermore three model campsites, three Maasai cultural centres, an éducation
centre, a rhino survey and thé construction of game-proof electric fences in
Ngong-Kiserian and near Namelok were listed (see KDDP 1988:151-156).
Requests for fences near Amboseli had been made as early as 1980 (see DN
21/11/80). On thé Ngong Hills some game-proof fences existed prior to the
mid-1970s (seeKDAR 1974:10).
Complainte about wildlife from farmers and pastoralists alike hâve continued
over the years. Until recenüy it has been possible to obtain a compensation fée
if crops, livestock or human beings were mauled by wildlife.58 Expansion of
agriculture and a growing human population is thought responsible for thé
persisting conflict as wild animal numbers are on thé décline. Drought took its
toll in 1973-76 and 1984, (particularly of zebra's).
In addition, and rather more significantly, some species (e.g. éléphants and
rhino) were endangered due to poaching. Rhinos in Kenya declined from
20,000 in 1971 to some 600 by 1986. For Africa a total of 4,000 is mentioned
(see DN 01/11/88). Though thé Amboseli rhino population increased slighuy
after years of décline by 1977, there are now only a few remaining. Amboseli
éléphant numbers have been fairly stable over this period numbering some 750.
Eléphant numbers in Kenya, however, hâve decreased from 70,000 to only
18,000 between 1980-90 (see DN 27/02/90). In thé whole of Africa their
numbers hâve dwindled from 1.5 million to 500,000-700,000 over this same
period (see DN 20/01/90).59
By thé end of thé 1980s poaching had increased considerably in Kenya. To
combat thé poachers thé Kenyan Government increased thé anti-poaching
budget to Ksh. 120 m. for 1988/89 and intensified thé search for thé poachers
(see DN 27/10/88). This time not so much Maasai ilmurran but ex-civil war
soldiers from Somalia and Ethiopia were said to be responsible for the killing
According to thé 1989 Wildlife (Conservation and Management) Amendment Bill
compensation for damaged crops and livestock was stopped, excluding cases of deaths ot sévère
injury of human beings (see DN 30/11/89).
59 Eléphant populations in Africa have either been completely destroyed or reducêd to small
isolated patches due to thé tiade in wory By the beginning of this century wild reserves were
established by thé colonial authorities. Nowadays thé main concentrations of éléphants (> 1/km2)
can be fourni in central and southern Tanzania, northern Zimbabwe, north-eastem Zambia,
northem Botswana and isolated patches m Kenya (e.g. Amboseli) (see UNEP/GEMS/GRID 1987).
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of thé animais. Their target was the rhino's hörn and the éléphants tusks.60
The poachers are more than ever well-armed, use automatic guns and persist in
reaching their goals. In Kenya, Tsavo éléphants especially have been killed.
Amboseli animais are still fairly safe, certainly as long as they stay inside
the park, a habit they seem to have developed these days. This, however, also
has its repercussions on the park's carrying capacity. The swamps' water is
becoming increasingly polluted as a result of their urine and droppings. In
addition they have become perfect foragers for the left-overs from tourists and
from the lodges and they also harass cars stuffed with foodstuffs. Moreover,
approximately 90 per cent of the Park's füll grown Acacia xanthophloea trees
had died by the early 1980s. Initially it was thought that (male) éléphants were
responsible for this by stripping the trees of their bark. It turned out, however,
that these old trees were dying because of a rise of the water table and in
increased salinity due to unrestricted tree feiling on the slopes of Mt.
Kilimanjaro for agricultural purposes. The éléphants are now busy destroying
the young Acacia trees (see Moss 1989:262).
It is not only because of the attempt to conserve fauna and flora that
solutions have to be found to the rising pressure on Kenya's National Parks
and Game Reserves. By 1988 tourism overtook coffee as the main net foreign
exchange earner (see chapter 4). To safeguard these interests the management
of Kenya's wildlife héritage was transferred to the newly established
independent Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS). It seems that the KWMP ideas of
the mid-1970s are being revived as approximately 25 per cent of KWS funds
have to go to the rural communales in terms of schools, clinics, water supplies
and veterinary services and cropping of game by the Kajiado ranchers is
propagated.
However, nowadays Kajiado group ranches are in the process of dissolution
and this threats the access of wildlife to the dispersai areas. KWS' major
concern is the group ranches surrounding Amboseli National Park. The
60 By the end of the 1960s the price of ivory increased sharply, rising to over six limes by
the end of the 1970s. Japan is the largest importer of ivory (some 60 per cent), followed by Hong
Kong (20 per cent). It is mainly used to manufacture small seals, preferred by the Japanese instead
of a signature, sculptures and Ornaments. An estimated number of 70,000-80,000 éléphants are
killed worldwide to provide 825 tonnes of ivory every year. This is equivalent to a 5-10 per cent
annual réduction. In other words, within ten years the African éléphant can be completely
exterminated. Younger éléphants (with lower tusk weights) are increasingly being killed meaning
that yet more animais need to be massacred in order to fulfil the demand for ivory. In 1986 the
international lobby resulted in the introduction of an ivory quota (see Moss 1989:250-2). In June
1989 the United States banned the ivory trade completely to save Afncan éléphants. By January
1990 an international ban went into force. This move was supported by Kenya and Tanzania.
Unfortunately, other countries (e.g. Zimbabwe, South-Africa, Malawi, Zambia and Botswana)
oppose the ban.
Rhino hom is also mainly exported to Asia. It is used for médical purposes and also as an
aphrodisiac. Poachers have gone as far as to kill the five rare white rhinocéros who stood under a
24-hours protection by special trained guards in the Mem National Park (see DN 01/11/88).
tl;
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"speette of fencing" -which has to interrupt the animais' cycles of migration
and which leads to overcrowding and finally to decimation- has speeded up
and renewed the Governments' willingness to allocate funds to the surrounding
group ranches. The interesting outcome of this has been that game department
officials are threatening to exclude Loitokitok group ranches from their share
in an annual fee of Ksh. 4,000,000/- from Amboseli gâte earnings if they
décide to subdivide. KWS has come up with a plan to persuade land owners
not to fence their fragmented pièces of land but to charge touriste coming to
view the animais (see Kajiado Focus 1991a:ll).61
7.6 Summary and Conclusion
This chapter has explored developments in land use and land policy concerning
the livestock, wildlife and cultivation sectors of post-colonial Kajiado District.
Special attention has been paid to the création, performance and subdivision of
group ranches. The birth of the group ranch concept should be placed
somewhere between the 1955 report of the East African Royal Commission
favouring individual land tenure for the whole of Kenya and the Lawrance
Mission of 1965-66 which preferred the establishment of large ranches where
ownership was vested in the name of a group in Kenya's semi-arid régions.
In short, the idea of a group ranch meant the setting aside of a certain pièce
of land, communally owned by a group of people recorded and registered as
the legal owners through membership of the particular ranch. In contrast with
the past, livestock movements would be restricted within the group ranch
boundaries and non-members would be forbidden to bring and graze their
animais. Through the provision of loans for infrastructural development and
steer fattening an attempt was made to radically transform the nomadic
subsistence-oriented production of the Maasai pastoralists into a sedentary,
more commercial System. This market-oriented production was to bring about a
destocking of the Maasai pastures while at the same time providing méat for
the (inter)national market. It was thought that this approach would provide an
answer to the 1960/61 collapse of the Maasai livestock sector.
From the side of the Maasai a certain willingness to accept this proposai did
exist. However, besides welcoming the idea of improvements in the provision
of water, veterinary care, livestock quality and the like, a major rationale for
accepting the group ranch proposai was the increase in the number of Maasai-
held individual ranches and the encroachment of non-Maasai into the District.
A conteoversy already exists on how to distnbute uus amount of money among the
Mbinkam, Selenkei, Kunana-Tikondo and Olgulului group ranches The latter claims a total of
Ksh 2 4 million, while Ksh l 6 million has been offered To make maiters more complicated the
Kajiado County Council and the District Development Commutée have also put a claim to this
new opporturuty for raisuig revenues, argutng ihat all the Kajiado District mhabitants should profit
from the distnct's wildlife
The fear that more land would be lost to Game Reserves or National Parks was
also of some significance.
In the early 1960s discussions concerning the status of Maasailand reached a
height. The Maasai feared losing their land after Independence which until that
time had been safeguarded by the Colonial Maasai Treaties which gave
exclusive rights of occupancy to the Maasai within Kajiado and Narok
Districts. Among the Kaputiei Maasai this debate was of particular importance.
Several proposais such as the registration of the whole of the section under one
titie deed, or the création of a fringe of individual ranches near the northern
boundary to stop illégal infiltration were discussed. The Colonial Authorities
disapproved the one title deed option. The finally accepted variant of individual
ranches had been suggested by some of the young formally educated Maasai,
but was objected to by the elderly. The Kajiado County Council, however,
backed the idea of individual ranches, whereby apparent personal gain also
played a rôle. The haphazard approach of the Government towards the Maasai
land issue and the illegal approval of the création of individual ranches by the
Council was criticized by the Lawrance Mission. Finally, all of the Maasai
sections accepted the group ranch concept, though in some régions of northern
Kaputiei and the better watered parts of the Ngong area opposition persisted.
Even where ranches were officially installée they never functioned as such
among this group of Maasai.
Implications of the introduction of the group ranch lay in the organizational,
juridical and economical sphère. Actual establishment of the group ranches
followed a phased programme. After the déclaration of an "Adjudication Area",
split into Adjudications Sections, any person claiming to have an interest in a
particular section had to bring his claim before the Adjudication Committee
composed of not less than ten people. Most of these were recruited from the
group of educated Maasai, politicians and Government officials. After sixty
days the section was further subdivided into individual and group ranches.
Members then elected a total of 3 to 10 représentatives and a group ranch
committee for day-to-day management. A certifïcate of incorporation was
finally issued by the Land Registrar of Kajiado District and the group officially
registered under a spécifie name.
In 1964 the pilot Poka group ranch had already been starled in the south
Kaputiei location. By 1969 phase one of the Kenya Livestock Development
Project (KLDP I) was officially starled. By 1970, 14 group ranches, covering
over 10 per cent of the district's area were recorded in the Kaputiei area. Phase
II was started by late 1974. A total of 16 ranches comprising another 25 per
cent of the Kajiado District area were ultimately added. Finally by the early
1980s, although no longer under the KLDP, 20 more ranches were
incorporated. This brought the total of group ranches to 51 covering some
15,200 km2 or some 75 per cent of the area.
Analyzing the performance of Kajiado District group ranches revealed that
group ranches had indeed been an effective instrument in stopping the further
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massive excavation of individual ranches at the cost of the majority of the
Maasai people. Secondly the group ranches served as mechanisms for the
improvement of livestock management techniques and the construction of
facilities such as boreholes, dams, troughs, tanks, pipelines and cattle dips.
Most facilities were constructed by funds from sources other than the KLDP.
Nonetheless, the existence of a framework such as the group ranch is
considered to be partly responsible for being able to attract these funds.
Thirdly, group ranches are thought to have stimulated the erecting of schools,
shops and health centres. A final achievement of group ranch development is
said to have been to allow wildlife to continue roaming freely over large parts
of Kajiado District.
Alongside these achievements a number of problems and failures have to be
mentioned. The targets of pasture destocking and commercialization of
livestock production were not realised. Major problems were encountered while
trying to achieve these extremely ambitieus objectives e.g.: delays and
problems in implementation; disappointing rates of Investment and difficulties
in loan repayment by those who actually did receive some funds for
development; continuing trespass of group ranch boundaries; no transformation
into or substantial increase of market-oriented livestock production and
corruption among several group ranch committees.
The final outcome of these problems and resulting frustrations among many
group ranch members was that by the late 1970s the wish for subdivision of
the group ranch into individually owned shares could increasingly be heard. As
at the time of Independence the Government did not take a clear position in
this issue. Within the Ministry of Livestock Development in Kajiado District it
was feared that the final outcome of group ranch subdivision would be very
negative. Other government echelons and departments held less clear views.
In genera! those opposing subdivision stated that it would lead to the
aliénation of land to non-Maasai; create sévère érosion in areas where
cultivation should be starled; erode Maasai culture and restrict the free
movement of wildlife and livestock to the detriment of the meat-producing and
tourist-attracting functions of the district. Those in favour of subdivision said
that subdivision would: help self advancement and raise the standard of living
for the Maasai; raise the ability to procure a loan from the bank using the
freehold title deed as collatéral; minimize exploitation of the poor by the rieh;
promote Maasai engagement in agricultural and industrial enterprises and
facilitate better maintenance of the existing infrastructure.
The procedure of group ranch subdivision is a complex one requiring several
stages. Most important is that agreement is needed from at least 60 per cent of
the members. If this is obtained a démarcation committee will be installed and
the RMD will perform a feasibility study. Finally the boundaries of the newly
created individual holdings need to be surveyed. By 1990, 40 ranches had
already decided to dissolve their ranches. Only 4 were opposed to this idea and
another 7 had not yet decided. In other words, at that time the whole of Ngong
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and Central Division which incorporated 78 per cent of the ranches had either
ceased to exist or were in the process of dissolution.
Examples from Olkinos and Embolioi as well as many other group ranches
were provided to illustrate this complex and time-consuming process. Disputes
over ranch boundaries, corruption in plot allocation, conflicts between
registered and non-registered group members are among the problems that
accompany the process of group ranch subdivision in Kajiado District.
Reviewing the création, performance and subdivision of Kajiado District
group ranches it can be concluded that in many respects, the group ranch
concept proposed by outsiders turned out to be an artificial création, lacking a
firm traditional sociological as well as an ecological basis and which was
overambitiously geared at destocking and commercialization of production
while taking no account of pastoralists stratégies and household needs. Funds
provided by international donors such as soft loans were ultimately channelled
towards the group ranches at high interest rates. Once they ran into trouble in
repaying these loans, either because of corrupt group ranch coromittees or
natural causes like droughts and diseases killing the steers bought for fattening
purposes, many members no longer feit obliged to contribute to the well being
of the ranch In addition, the use of the group's pastures by herds belonging to
neighbouring individual ranchers and the fast increasing numbers of young
Maasai willing to become registered contributed in many cases to a growing
negative feeling towards existence of the group ranch and the ultimate call for
subdivision. The initial opposition of Central Government seems to have
changed towards a standpoint of modesüy support of this process.
In the following chapter we will attempt to analyze the outcome of the
subdivision process so far. In particular the state of affairs for the subdivided
group ranches of Olkinos and Embolioi will be considered.
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BOX 8.1 OLKINOS GROUP RANCH PROFILE
OUcinos (Phase I) group ranch (6,020 ha), located some IS km north-east of kajiado Town
borders the Athi Rwer-Namanga road to the west, the Isinya Rivet and Embolioi group ranch to
the east, Kisaju River and Kitengela group ranch to the north and Isinya Town to the south. It is
part of the Isenya sublocation of the North-Kaputiei location of Central Division. Approximately
750 people tóve on this subdivided group ranch.
In Isinya T.C. ther is a primary school, a secondary school, a health centre, the
Maasai Rural Training Centre and some shops. Other Olkinos shops are located near the cattle
dip (Oldokunyi) and at the Empatipat area in the north. Recently immigrants have also started
small shops. In the north is Korompoi primary school. Finally a borehole (1974) is available
near the east-central part of the ranch. Olkinos résidents also raake use of Embolioi primary
school and the borehole at Olturoto.
Situated on the Athi-Kapiti Plains, Olkinos group ranch covers a flat area. The
altitude is about 1,585 to 1645 m. Rainfall is about 500-600 mm. The sous are generally
impetfectly drained, cracking clay, Vertisols (Lll) in the south, with patches of moderate to
well-drained firm clay Pianosols (L9) in üie central part. In the north soils are firm gravel clay
(V2 with lypical brownish stones giving the area its name: Empatipat. The Olkinos végétation is
classified as open grassland. Pennisetum mezianum and slratnineiim, Themeda triandra,
Sporobolus ftimbrialus, Digltaria milanjianl are the dominant grass species. Some scattered
shrubs, mainly alongside the rivers, include Balanites eagyptica and Acacia spp.. Near the cattle
dip a resting camp for mine workers is located (mauüy Kamba). Olkinos women's group runs a
tannery and cultivâtes some small plots near the borehole. Grants and Thomson's gazelles are
found in the ranch throughout the year. Wildebeest dominate during the rainy season.
EMBOLIOI GROUP RANCH PROFILE
Embolioi (Phase I) group ranch (24,000 ha) is located to the north of the Konza-Magadi railway
branchline, its south-western tip being only some 5 km from Kajiado T.C. Administratively the
ranch belongs to the Isenya sublocation of the North-Kaputiei location of Central Division,
Olturoto and Engirigiri centres serve the area. Here liiere are shops, churches and primary
schools. For médical assistance people have to go to Isinya T.C. Embolioi group ranch has two
boreholes, one being out of order. Otherwise use is made of water collected in the holes made
by the gypsum mining activity which is prevalent in the area, particularly in the Engirigiri area.
Embolioi group ranch is a relatively flat area and, like Olkinos, is part of the
Athi-Kapiti plains. The végétation is an open grassland with scattered trees. Dominant grass
species are Pennisetum mezianum, Themeda triandra and Sporobolus spp.. Acacia species are the
dominant bush species. The soils are mainly the well-known cracking clay saline imperfectly
drained Vertisols (Lll). In addition patches and complexes of moderate to well drained
Pianosols are found. The are id in agro-climatic zone V, Mean annual températures vary between
18-20°C and rainfall amounts to some 500 mm annually. Embolioi is frequently mvaded by
wildlife, wildebeest in particular.
One women's group opérâtes and specializes in the production and selling of traditional
Ornaments.
€HAPTER 8
THE IMPACT OF SUBDIVISION OF OLKINOS AND
EMBOLIOI GROUP RANCHES
8.1 Introduction
In the next two chapters the effects of the process of group ranch subdivision
as in early 1990 will be présentée. Statements made by opponents and
supporters of the dissolution of group ranches as summarised in section 7.4.2,
have been the leading starting points for our analysis of this process;
destocking of ranches, Investments in infrastructure, picking up other activities,
fencing of parcels and selling of land, among other issues, were studied in
order to estimate the impact of group ranch subdivision so far.
Besides population characteristics this chapter will pay particular attention
to the direct outcome of the subdivision process in Olkinos and Embolioi
group ranches, the allocated plot sizes and their economie and ecological
viability and the resulting changes in résidence patterns. Furthermore, other
changes that occurred in the use of land such as herd movements, fencing and
the establishment of shambas and ol-okeri will be discussed. Survey results
obtained among the Maasai of Kiboko, Elang'ata Wuas, Lorngosua and Meto
group ranches -none of these ranches at the time yet subdivided- and from
established individual ranchers of northern Kaputiei, Loodokilani and Matapato
and from a group of land buyers in the Olkinos territory will also be presented.
In chapter eight the effects of the commoditization of land will be dealt with,
including investments made by the plot owners to improve their individually
owned parcels.
8.1.1 The Characteristics of the Sample Population
A total of 543 households were interviewed during the survey period. Out of
this group 183 had recenüy acquired a former group ranch parcel (i.e. Olkinos
and Embolioi group ranch members), 317 households still lived on a group
ranch (i.e. Kiboko, Elang'ata Wuas, Lomgosua and Meto), 34 respondents
owned an established, individual ranch and 9 individuals had recentiy obtained
land on the former Olkinos group ranch. Figure 8.1 shows the survey locations.
The exact sample fraction for each group ranch or group of individual
ranchers is hard to know because the latest Kajiado District population figures
are from 1979 and are available only for the sub-locational level. To overcome
this problem, the total number of registered members within our sample
households was related to the 1990 official number of registries for each of the
group ranches. The spécifie ratio found for each group ranch was used to
estimate the probable total number of households living on this group ranch.
Table 8.1 shows the resulting sample fraction estimâtes. Also included is
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information concerning the registration status of the head of Household.



































































































Note: the estimated total number of households presented is spéculative. For Olkinos and Embolioi
we used the number of parcels. For the other group ranches we calculated a conversion factor
based on the total number of registered household members of our sample population.
individus! ranch
Figure 8.1 Location of Survey Area in Kajiado District
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It should be noted that, in spite of our intention, we did not succeed in
interviewing all of the former 116 Olkinos members due to what could be
called "absentée ownership". A total of eight plot owners were either living
elsewhere permanently or roamed around in or even outside the district.
Information obtained showed that the absentées either had another occupation
(e.g. catde trekker), owned a second farm elsewhere, stayed on their father-in-
law's individual ranch or, as in one case, were in prison.
In addition, a number of the owners interviewed had not yet settled in their
new location, but were staving with relatives or friends in another borna either
nearby or far away (e.g. Mashuru, Embolioi, Kitengela, Kisaju, Kiambu). Por
example, in Embolioi 52 individual parcels (17 per cent) were found that had
not yet been settled. The majority of these belonged to young members or to
widows who were staying in other households as dependents.
A similar problem existed with référence to the group of buyers. In fact,
absenteeism among the buyers is even more significant. Out of a group of
some 63 buyers in Olkinos group ranch only 10 had settled by February 1990.
As a result our buyers sample will be biased due to the fact that non-settled
outsiders, who could possibly have bought for spéculative reasons only, could
not be interviewed.
Finally, it should be stressed that great care has to be taken in accounting
for the différences between the subdivided and not yet subdivided ranches
solely to the fact of individual ownership. Each of the group ranches has its
own spécifie history and level of development and différences also existed
before the start of group ranch subdivision in late 1986. Longitudinal changes
within the same area should be studied to assess this impact. Whenever
possible historical data will be cited for the sample group ranches. Bearing the
above remarks in mind genera! référence will also be made to other base-line
studies such as those of Metson (1974), Njoka (1979), ILCA (1981) and White
and Meadows (1981).
Table 8.2 shows the human population characteristics of our sample Maasai
population. The mean household size (including dependents - see below) for
our sample of group ranches which include Olkinos and Embolioi was
estimated to be 8.6 persons. Individual rancher average household size stood at
14.4 persons. A clear north-south increase in mean household size can be
found for the study area (e.g. Olkinos 6.0 to Meto 10.6). It is generally held
that the Maasai sections, residing in the southern parts of the district, are "more
traditional".
Data for Embolioi and Kiboko for early 1968 gave average household sizes
of 5.7 and 5.6 people, respectively. Average household size figures provided
by Metson (1974) and ILCA (1981) stood at 8.1 and 9.6. Metson's survey was
conducted among 174 households all over Kajiado District. ILCA's base-line
figures were obtained from a group of 202 households in the south-eastem
région of the district.
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The number of children (excluding dependents) in the 0-15 years of age
cohort among the 500 group ranch households was estimated to be 1,933, or
50.3 per cent. For Embolioi and Kiboko figures of 45.7 and 47.4 per cent for
1968 were found (including children of above 15 years of age). The 1990
youth figures for these ranches were 64.4 and 64.0 per cent. Metson (1974)
and ILCA (1981) enumerated overall percentages of 56.1 and 68 l for the
under 16's, respectively.
The number of dependents (i.e. adults and children not originally belonging
to the household, such as grandparents, unmarried sisters or disabled brothers
for instance) stood at 458 persons (10.6 per cent) of the group ranch sample
and 65 persons (13.2 per cent) for the individual ranchers. Embolioi and
Kiboko dependency ratios for 1968 were 9.9 and 9.5 per cent as compared to
1.9 and 5.8 per cent for 1990, respectively. In 1981 ELCA found 22.8 per cent
of the household members to be dependent.
The husband-.wife ratio was found to stand at 1:1.63 for group and 1:2.28
for individual ranchers. The Embolioi and Kiboko ratio changea between 1968
and 1990 from 0.94 to 1.26 and from 1.40 to 1.74 wives per husband. Metson
found a Kajiado District average of 1.76 wives in 1974. ILCA reached 1-207
for their Olkarkar, Merueshi and Mbirikani sample. Huge différences, however
existed between ILCA's sub sample locations; Olkarkar 1.63, Merueshi 2 11
and Mbirikani 2.74. This différence, apparently illustrative of the north-south'
factor, can also be found within our sample also (Olkinos 1.19 to Meto 2.09)
Again no hard conclusions can be drawn from the above délibérations
concerning possible trends as spécifie place and time characteristics will have
influenced the outcomes of each of the surveys mentioned.
Table 8.3 présents the livestock ownership characteristics of our survey
population. The average per capita cattie ownership for all our sample
households, excluding non-Maasai buyers, is estimated to be 9.1 head of catüe
per person. This seems to be a break with the trend of declining cattle/capita
ratios m Kajiado District as was presented in figure 0.3.' In addition a mean
small stock number of 12.9 per person was found. ILCA counted for the early
1980s for their Olkarkar, Merueshi and Mbirikani sample 10.6 catüe and 77
snoats per person.
The Embolioi and Kiboko samples underline these higher livestock
ownership figures. In 1968 Embolioi households owned on average 4 2 cattie
and 3.3 shoats per person. In 1990 this had changed to 7.2 catüe and 18 l head
of small stock. Kiboko livestock ownership increased from a mean of 8 l catüe
and 1.9 shoats to 11.3 catüe and 11.2 shoats per person
1 It should be noted, however, that our sample has a slight over représentation of individual
ranchers. For the 'group ranch pastoralists' the figure stands at 8.1 catüe/person. Extrapolation of
ILCA s pastoral people growth trend in relation to the MoLD 1988 rmlts applying ̂ Wal 10
for rwhoïof
e,f H81"6' T" P'aCe *" «""fr"«*» raü° « approxima^y 55 catüe/person
for the whole of the district. Catüe ownership in Central Division will be above this mean^ 43
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These data also show a change in the cattle:small stock ratio in favour of the
latter. For Embolioi the cattie:small stock ratio changea from 1:0.79 for 1968
to 1:2.53 by 1990. The Kiboko ratio changea from 1:0.33 to 1:0.99. For 1977
the overall ratio for our ranches (excluding Meto and Lorngosua) was 1:0,77
(see ILCA 1979:10). Our overall sample cattie:small stock ratio stood at 1:1.42
for early 1990. In other words, the importance of small stock within the
Maasai herds seems to have increased structurally with a factor of 2 to 3 over
the last decades.
Finally, the trend in the percentage of mature female cattle has been
studied. The Embolioi and Kiboko base-line studies of 1968 revealed a total of
69 and 70 per cent for cows and heifers. In 1990 we calculated a réduction to
54 per cent for Embolioi and to 61 per cent for Kiboko. The overall percentage
for our group ranches was 68 per cent, while for individual ranchers this,
surprisingly, stood at 67 per cent. A structural switch to a market and meat-
oriented economy for catüe, except maybe for Embolioi does not seem to have
occurred. The number of donkeys, camels, chickens and beehives owned are
also presented. In the last column the cattle and small stock numbers owned by
our sample population have been recalculated in terms of Livestock
Equivalents (LE) (see below).
Table 8.4 highlights the estimated mean landownership in ha per person and in
ha per Active Adult Male Equivalents (see below). The estimated population
density for both 1986 and 1990 is also given. Most striking is the large
différence in mean 1990 landownership between the individual ranchers (36.74
ha/person) and the (former) group ranch herders (9.29 ha/person). The table
shows a decrease in average landownership as the result of the growth of the
population. In addition, the net result of the transfer of land by Olkinos,
Embolioi and Kaputiei individual ranchers further decreased landownership.
We would like to discuss the estimation of wealth classes of the sample
population. In order to be able to compare the absolute data and estimate the
wealth stratification of our survey population we recalculated the human and
livestock populations in terms of Active Adult Male Equivalents (AAME) and
Livestock Equivalents (LE) respectively (see ILCA 1981:20).2
For their East African Range Livestock Systems Study ILCA developed these measutes to
tank wealth classes as it was feit tiiat this greatly influenced the stiategy of production. Several
parameters wete discussed -the number of cattle, the ratio of volume of milk available to a
household to that required for subsistence- but all were withdrawn, Finally, a tatio of hvestock
units to people units was accepted as the best available wealth parameter. A livestock equivalent
(LE) based on metabolic weight was developed as it gives a more précise indication of the feed
requirements of the herds. lts ratio to a human metabolic equivalent (AAME) was used as the
stratifying parameter (LE/AAME). Cut off points were established at 5 and 13 LE/AAME to
produce three strata. Adopting the ILCA wealth parameter enables us to compare our results with
theirs. This and the practice that wealth obtained through other sources of income is raostly
invested in livestock offset our initial idea of developing a new measure for stratifying the Maasai
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Figure 8.2 Distribution of Wealth Strata
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The distribution of our sample population along the three wealth strata is
shown in table 8.5 and figure 8.2. Compared to ILCA's 1980 data for
Olkarkar, Meroeshi and Mbirikani group ranches located in the eastern part of
Kajiado District, it seems that, on average, our sample group ranch households
are more evenly distributed along the three wealth classes, 34, 34, 32 per cent
for stratum I, n and III, respectively, while the ILCA strata stood at 27, 49 and
35 per cent. Strong conclusions cannot be drawn as we are dealing with
different populations in time and space. ILCA conducted their survey in a 3-4
years post-drought period, while our research was undertaken in a 5-6 years
post-drought period. Compared to the overall wealth distribution found,
Olkinos and Embolioi households show a similar percentage for stratum I,
while stratum Hl is slightly over-represented (Olkinos in particular). Let us
now turn to an in depth analysis of the subdivision process in Olkinos and
. Embolioi group ranches.
8.2 Olkinos and Embolioi: the Earliest Subdivided Group
Ranches
8.2.1 The Outcome of the Group Ranch Subdivision Process
Olkinos and Embolioi members mentioned four main reasons for the
subdivision of their ranches: préférence for individual land ownership;
construction of permanent houses; acquisition of individual loans; improvement
of livestock and pasture management (see GRF Olkinos (1985:1) and GRF
Embolioi (1986:1)).
An examination of group ranch documents learned that the members'
opinion on the principle of subdivision was primarily positive. Some prétests
were made, though these mainly concerned the way subdivision into individual
parcels was conducted rather than the process as such. Non-registered and
mainly young Maasai, fearing to become squatters or being left to the mercy of
their parents, did object. Table 8.6 summarises the Olkinos and Embolioi
members opinion conceming the process of subdivision and allocated plot.
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Figure 8.4 Embolioi Subdivided Group Ranch
The data of table 8.6 confîrms an overall, positive attitude towards the
principle of subdivision. Some intermediate and negative feelings are held
mainly with respect to the quantity of the allocated area, although some 80 per
cent still stated that they had a positive or very positive opinion about thé size
of the allocated parcel.
After the exclusion of public plots and roads a ranch mean of 46.71 ha
resulted for thé 116 Olkinos members. Some people complained that some
members of thé group ranch committee and thek relatives and friends, had
allocated themselves large parcels in the most favourable places. Indeed eight
out of ten committee-members fall into thé category of thé 25 per cent largest
plot holders. The chairman and vice-chairman obtained thé two largest parcels
of 132 ha and 131 ha, respectively. Figures 8.3 and 8.4 show thé subdivided
Olkinos and Embolioi group ranch area. Before the time of subdivision,
yr.
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ownership of thé ranch lay in the hands of ail group members and thek
families. As a resuit every single person had a theoretical uniform shared
ownership of land and free use of the total group ranch area. As shown by
table 8.4 the average "landownership" for Olkinos would be only 7.06 ha per
person for 1990 while in 1986 it was 8.43 ha per person. Subdivision of the
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Figure 8.5 Olkinos Plot Sizes (ha)
Source author's survey
Figure 8.6 Land per
household member (hhmb)
Figure 8.5 gives thé range of parcel size for 108 households on thé Olkinos
group ranch at the time of subdivision in 1986. Plot sizes averaged 47.62 ha
through a range from 11.00 to 132.00 ha per parcel. The gini-coefficient found
for this distribution was 0.26.
The inclusion of household sizes to assess thé distribution of the relative
land availability per household member (i.e. parcel size/family size) for thé 108
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households is shown in figure 8.6. The 1986 population was set at 0,94 of its
1990 size. It was concluded that for the households within our Olkinos sample
an average of 11.05 ha per household member (hhmb) was available ranging
from households having only 2.43 ha/hhmb to a maximum of households
owning 65.96 ha/hhmb at the time of subdivision. In majority most household
members have access to a potential area of less than 10 ha.
Plot sizes obtained by ten Olkinos committee-members averaged 81.80 ha
as compared to a mean plot size of 42.53 ha for non-members. The parcels
belonging to former members of the now dissolved Olkinos and Embolioi
group ranch committees are marked showing their favourable allocation (see
figures 8.3 and 8.4). Because the committee-members have relatively large
families the différence in mean landownership per household member between
them and non-committee members is somewhat reduced: 14.04 ha/hhmb for
comrnittee-member households and 10.75 ha/hhmb for non-committee member
households.
Por the Embolioi sample of 75 households the group ranch subdivision
resulted in an average plot size of 93.37 ha per household over a range of 30.0
to 225.0 ha per parcel. The mean land availability for the Embolioi households
was 19.83 ha per person, varying between households having only 3.44
ha/person and those in possession of 135.60 ha/person for 1986. Plot sizes
appointed to 11 former Embolioi committee-members averaged 130.74 ha
while those for non committee members were 86.84 ha. Taking into account
household sizes the mean land ownership was 28.49 ha/hhmb and 17.85
ha/hhmb for committee and non-committee member households, respectively.
From these figures it can be concluded that the subdivision process in
Olkinos and Embolioi ranches has been very favourable for the former
committee-members. Nonetheless, they are still far from the mean ranch size of
14 established individual ranchers interviewed in the northern Kaputiei area of
425.46 ha/household or 39.71 ha/person in 1986.
8.2.2 Changing Résidence Patterns and Social Conséquences
The subdivision process implies that a group of households who stayed
together in a single boma will split up and each will move to its own parcel.
This process of individualization, however, is not of recent origin but has been
going on for the last thirty years. It has been stated that the introduction of
group ranches and the individualization of production has led to a considérable
decrease in boma size and the émergence of single-household bornas (see
Bekure et al. 1987:204). As a result boma sizes in the Kaputiei area started to
decrease sooner than in the Phase III group ranches of Meto and Lorngosua.
Table 8.7 underlines this situation with Kaputiei bornas having
approximately half the average number of households compared to the
Matapato région. For the small Ildamat area in Central Division we were able
to reconstruct this process of borna size réduction. Soon after the 1960/1
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drought there were 7 big bornas of some 12 households each in the area. It was
densely bushed and populated by many wild animais. After the division of the
area into some ten individual ranches and 3 group ranches (Olkiloriti, Esokota
and Ildamat-Oloyiangalani) the number of bornas increased although they
became much smaller. According to our informant this process was pardy the
result of the réduction of trees and wild animais which had increased safety in
the area and the rise in the number of livestock, which both allowed and forced
people to spread out over the area.





















































































Por all of the other régions in Kajiado it is suggested that there is a clear
downward trend in the number of households living together in a single boma.
Unfortunately, we lack historical data for our survey area in this respect. Still,
information provided by other researchers indicates a total of 4 to 8 households
(30-50 persons) for a typical Maasai boma in the late 1950s period (see Jacobs
1963:42). Por the 1950s, Njoka (1979:222) found an average borna size for the
Kaputiei area of 6.22 households, dropping to 5.13 households per borna for
the 1960s and 2.70 for the 1970s. Grandin found a figure of 1.6 and 1.8
households in 1983 for Olkarkar and Merueshi Kaputiei group ranches (see
Bekure et al. 1987:175). Thus reduced boma sizes are not the result of
subdivision alone but stem from a variety of reasons such as the
individualization of production, reduced wildlife numbers and the demand of
livestock for food and water. As stated in section 8.1.1, subdivision will
probably have hastened this process though a number of plots have still not yet
been occupied by their lawful owners who preferred or were forced to stay
with their relatives.
The splitting of bornas has also increased the relative number of single Maasai
households. Table 8.8 clearly shows the large number of Olkinos and Embolioi
sample households living alone nowadays (54 and 43 per cent, respectively).
By contrast, the other group ranch households of Kiboko, Elang'ata Wuas,
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Lorngosua and Meto mainly live with at least one other household in a single
boma (only 10 per cent of group ranch households résides alone). No clear
picture émerges about résidence patterns in relation to the wealth strata.
Olkinos ranchers follow a pattern that can be found among the established
ranchers whereby it is the rieh households who stay alone, Wealthy Embolioi
ranchers, however, seem to follow the group ranch standard. Perhaps the
relatively large size of the Embolioi parcels and their remote location binders
the splitting up of rieh households having high labour needs.
Information was gathered on the household's labour efforts since the time
of subdivision. According to 45.3 per cent of Olkinos former group ranch
members leisure time since individualizaüon has decreased, while the
remaining members have not experienced any change. For Embolioi these
figures are 30.6 per cent (decrease), 2.0 per cent (increase) and 67.3 per cent
(no change). It has been argued by opponents of group ranch subdivision that
this will lead to a loss of co-operation between Maasai households and
possibly even a loss of culture; the changed résidence pattern puts a strain on
short time assistance; the dissolution of the group ranch committee means that
there is no longer a forum for mobilizing efforts towards communal action.
These developments are strengthened by the influx of non-Maasai as, due to
their different economie activities, they sometimes even run into conflict (e.g.
over fencing of shambas). Although the non-Maasai still only own a small
percentage of the land their numbers are increasing and will soon outnumber
the Maasai which will probably erode away Maasai cultural habits and rites.





















































































source auuior s survey
Ranchers in the subdivided areas were asked about their opinion on the level
of co-operation between former group ranch members since subdivision.
According to 72.7 per cent of the Olkinos members there had been no change
in this respect. According to 20.5 per cent collaboration had actually decreased
while only 6.8 per cent stated that it had increased. For Embolioi the opinion
was reversed as only 3.4 per cent mentioned a decrease in co-operation while
25.4 reported an increase. The remaining 71.2 per cent of the Embolioi
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résidents had experienced no change in this respect. From the group of
established individual ranchers 10.0 per cent talked of an increase, 13.3 per
cent a decrease and 76.7 per cent claimed no change m the degree of co-
operation since the time they had obtained their individual ranch. Kaputiei
individual ranchers reported an increase while Loodokilani and Matapato
ranchers were more pessimistic about co-operation.
Within the single Maasai household tensions anse nowadays as a resuit of
individual landownership if the head of the household décides to seil part of
UK. his land without the knowledge or approval of the other family members.3
This sometimes leads to such excesses as in a case near Illasit where sons took
their father to court to prevent him from selling thé remaining 17 hectares of
land that remained from an initial landownership of some 80 hectares.
The question of inheritance also anses. According to Kipury (1992:37)
many single, divorced or separated Maasai women hâve become disinherited
due to land subdivision which forced them to move to thé peri-urban slums
ending up in unfavourable activities like prostitution. In my opinion, this is a
too strong statement. For instance, thé Olkinos members believed that thé plots
should be inherited by all the sons (51.4 per cent), thé sons without land (7.5
per cent), all the sons and unmarried daughters (13.1 per cent), (unmarried)
daughters only (0,9 per cent), while 27.1 per cent had no opinion yet. In
Embolioi 93.3 per cent of the families stated that all the sons would inherit
their parents' land. Sons without land (2.7 per cent), the eldest son only (1.3
per cent), all sons and unmarried daughters (1.3 per cent) were also mentioned.
Only 1.3 per cent were stated to have no opinion. Thus the small group of
unmarried daughters seems not to be totally forgotten in respect of land
inheritance.
8.3 The Economie Viability of Allocated Plots
8.3.1 Introduction
The small sizes of thé Olkinos parcels in particular raises questions about
économie and ecological viability, stocking densities, fencing and access to
other parts of thé former group ranch territory. In this and thé following
sections we will attempt to provide some answers to thèse questions. We will
start our analysis assuming that ail household members actually live on thé
ranch, ail animais are kept on thé ranch and thé quahty of the individual plots
3 Officially thé faifflly has to be consultée! and to approve thé proposée! sale of land Indeed
the Land Conttol Boards who decide to approval of sale or mortgage of land often sent applicants
back to consult their farrnues However, in most cases wwes who object will lose this battle under
the tlireat of physical härm It has also been reported that sorne Maasai applicants claimed to be
unmamed while in reality they were marned and had chiidren (see Kajiado Focus 1991a 13).
s* |
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is uniform. The first question then is if the allocated plot sizes are able to
provide the Maasai households a reasonable standard of living under a system
of pure pastoralism. Of course, between seasons fluctuations will occur,
sometimes even resulting in periods of sévère drought. This should be kept in
mind when reading the following paragraphs.
8.3.2 Selfsufficiency Threshold Levels
According to Nestel, who surveyed the nutritional status of the Maasai, a
hôusehold of 6 persons will need at least 6 x 9.7 = 58.2 head of cattle to be
able to subsist completely on a diet of milk and méat (see Bekure et al.
1987:81/127).4 Recalculating this in terms of adults places the minimum level
for complete nourishment at 12.1 head of cattle per AAME. It should be noted
that ILCA did not include small stock as a possible source of food in their
exercise. Inclusion of sheep and goats places the minimum selfsuffiency
requirement at 8.6 LE/AAME. Utilizing this set of different keys we are able,
whilst showing the influence of the parameters applied, to détermine the
percentage of Maasai households having a surplus or deficiënt number of
livestock with référence to the "selfsufficiency" scenario i.e. the ability to be
completely selfsufficient in food from one's own herd alone. Percentages for
selfsufficiency will depend on the base of référence used.
For instance, for the cattle/person selfsufficiency scenario 47,200 head of
cattle would be needed for our total sample population while the total cattle
ownership stands at only 43,769 head of cattle. In terms of LE/AAME a total
of 31,410 LE would be required with overall sample ownership standing
favourably at 41,753 LE or 11.4 LE/AAME in 1990. Distribution of livestock
over the sample households, however, is not uniform and thus results in
households positioned above or below the threshold level on the scale of self-
nourishment from their own herd. The LE/AAME threshold would place all of
the stratum I households and a large part of those in stratum II under the level
by which they would be able to practise pure pastoralism.
Nestei's figure is based on a référence adult requirement of 2,300 Kcal; a daily output of
mük per lactating cow valued at 700 Kcal, and a fraction of cows in milk of about 20 per cent of
the total herd. In addition, each head of cattle is assumed to provide 50 Kcal/day in the form of
meat. This amounts to some 7 TLU per person needed. In chapter 2 we used a rough figure of 4
TLU per person as the bottom line for subsistence. It should be noted that this figure allowed
inclusion of other species besides cattle and used rainer low conversion rates for the 250 Kg
Standard Tropical Livestock Unit; 0.72 for cattle and 0.072 for small stock. In thé Maasai setting
the TLU conversion factors used by Nestel are higher; 0.1 for small stock and for cattle location
dépendent figures ranging between 0.70 and 0.83. The Mmistry of Livestock Department Kajiado
District used an overal! conversion co-efficient of 0.6 for cattle, 0.125 for shoats in estimating
total Stock Units (SU) (see chapter 7). Based on total livestock numbers of the Kajiado District
livestock 1988 census the following conversion rates between the group of Uvestock units can be
présente* 1 LE = 1.06 TLU (ILCA-Kajiado) = 1.17 TLU (Kenya) = 1.23 SU (MoLD 1988-
Kajiado).
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Table 8.9 shows that, roughly speaking, half to two thirds of the Maasai
households are no longer able to dépend solely on their animais for their food
needs. At one extrême, thé cattle/person key estimâtes that between 52.6
(Kiboko) to 81.7 per cent (Meto) lack enough cattle for self-nourishment.
Some 44.1 per cent of thé individual ranchers' households are in this same
position. In terms of LE/AAME the situation is less dramatic; 39.5 (Kiboko) to
65.4 per cent (Meto) for group ranches and 32.4 per cent for individual
ranchers.
Table 8.9 Percentage of Sample Households Living Below thé Minimum
Levels of Pure Pastoralism in 1990.
Cattle/person Cattle/AAME TLU/AAME* LE/AAME#

























































































































* TLU: 0.72 for cattle and 0.072 for small stock. # LE: 0.71 for cattle and 0.17 for small stock.
The subdivided group ranches, Olkinos and Embolioi, are between thé range
for group ranches and far from thé established individual ranchers' score. Our
group of setüed buyers seems to be split into well-to-do Maasai pastoralists on
thé one side and poor non-Maasai on thé other, at least in terms of livestock
wealth.
8.3.3 Selfsufficiency Versus Size of Allocated Plots
Herd sizes needed for the food supply of the human population in turn imply
certain requirements from thé rangelands. In chapter 1 we discussed thèse
requirements of forage, water and protection for herbivores. Forage avauability
expressed in terms of quantity (dry matter) and quality (protein and minerais)
is first of ail related to thé type and composition of forage, type of soil,
précipitation and evaporation. Management practices like relational grazing,
understocking or overstocking also influence the actual grazing capacity of a
unit of land in thé short and long term.
Forage requirements of livestock are usually expressed in terms of daily
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intake per kg liveweight and an average of 2.5 per cent bodyweight is normally
accepted. However, as the quantity and quality of the rangelands is also
determined by the use made of them an extra margin on the supply side has to
be taken into account. To offset losses from wastage and trampling ILCA
calculated a threshold of 10 kg/TLU/day for Kajiado District. To safeguard the
rangeland resources for the middle to long term, implying a maximum
consumption of forage growth that may be grazed each year without inducing a
downward trend in forage production, they doubled this figure to 20
kg/TLU/day (see Bekure et al. 1987:161). In terms of minimum land
requirements this would mean from at the low 10 kg/TLU/day allowance and a
year of good rainfall 1.5 ha/TLU to 4.2 ha/TLU at the 20 kg/TLU/day
threshold in combination with a poor long rainy season. Thus for the former
Olkinos and Embolioi group ranches this would mean that the permissible
stocking levels could vary from 1,433 to 4,013 TLU and from 5,714 to 16,000
TLU, respectively.5
The minimal herd size requirement for food subsistance can be expressed in a
minimal land necessity for each spécifie household. A threshold of 9.7 catüe or
7.0 TLU/person would mean a land requirement ranging between 10.5 and 29.4
ha per person depending on the short or long term grazing capacity. In other
words within this selfsuffïciency scenario the average Olkinos Maasai
household of 6.0 persons would need between 63 and 176 ha of land to be able
to keep some 42 TLU in an ecologically viable way. Utilising the livestock
equivalent and the active male equivalent would resuit in a requirement of 8.6
LE per AAME, indicating a land need of 13.7 to 38.3 ha per AAME
depending on the season.6
For an analysis of the subdivided Olkinos and Embolioi group ranches we
would like to start with an estimation of the potential availability of land per
person for our sample population in 1986, the time of subdivision. In addition,
the early 1990 situation will be discussed in order to discover a trend in the
land availability with référence to the minimum needs for every single
household within the sample. This estimation will be conducted using the TLU
(ELCA) per person as well as LE per AAME keys.
Accordmg to the ILCA team, Potter showed for the Athi plains (to which Olkinos and
Embolioi belong) that grasslands did not lose long-term productivity even when grasslands were
cominuously grazed at a stocking level of 2 ha/TLU (see Bekure et al. 1987:169). Potter himself
recenüy suggested a 4 ha/TLU stocking level for a 100 ha farm. He found that using 15 different
combinations of height and frequency of cutting grass to estimate herbage growth resulted in '15
quite different assessments of potential herbage availability for a grazing animal, with no clear
indication as to which was the "right" value' (Potter 1989:13).
6 l LE is equivalent to 1.06 TLU (ILCA). Thus 1.5 ha/TLU = 1.59/LE and 4.2 ha/TLU =
4.45 ha/LE. As a result land needs in terms of 8.6 LE/AAME is 13.7 ha for a good season to 38.7
ha for a poor rainy season.
ft;
Lfi
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At this moment it is interesting to recall the statements made by several
commissions and researchers concerning the availability or minimal
requirement of land in Maasailand. We have seen how, in the early 1930s, the
Carter Land Commission did not so rauch estimate the Maasai need for land as
rather castigate the availability of some 85 ha per person (3 persons per square
mile). In 1965, the Lawrance Commission considered a potential acreage of 80
ha per adult Maasai male as unviable for a single person let alone a family.
For the Kaputiei area, Halderman calculated a potential average ranch size of
almost 190 ha by the late 1960s. This was far below the UNDP/FAO model
figure of 467 ha per family or some 45 ha per person. Finally, according to the
Ministry of Livestock Development (Kajiado District) plot sizes below 200 ha
cannot support a family even on a subsistence level (see MoLD 1988:57).
For the situation in the late 1980s table 8.10 summarises the availability of
land for our sample households. The data underlines the diffïculty for the
Maasai producers of today in being able to follow the selfsuffïciency scenario
as far as the availability of land is concerned.
Table 8.10 Percentage of Sample Households Having an Inadequate Amount
















































































































































* ha/person-hh = the amount of land available per person per hoasehold;
# ha/aame-nh = the amount of land available per AAME per household;
the mean availability of land has been calculated by totalling the potential individual land
availability for each person (or AAME) for each household divided by all persons (or AAME).
This differs from the mean resulting from a division of all land by all persons (AAME)!
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In times of stress, when the carrying capacity of the ranch drops considerably,
only a mere 10 per cent or less of the Olkinos and Embolioi households would
be able to keep their animais on the individual ranch without suffering a
shortage in grass and/or severely overstocking it. Moreover, a comparison
between 1986 and 1990 data reveals that, over a three year period, this
capacity has been lost by another one to two per cent of the sample
households. Upto half of the established individual ranchers' households are
faced with a theoretical shortage of land in periods of low rainfall. Due to the
population increase this shortage of land will become more pronounced unless
émigration away from the livestock sector or even physically from Kajiado
District will increase.
A household having less than the minimum plot size could still be purely
selfsufficient if it possesses a large enough herd, although this would imply
that the ranch is overstocked. Of course the opposite, having a small herd and
a large parcel resulting in understocking, is also possible. We should have a
look at the distribution of the households in terms of selfsuffïciency in both
catégories of landownership; deficit and surplus. Table 8.11 shows the results
of the LE/AAME versus landownership crosstabulation for the 1990 situation,





























































































































It can be concluded that some households, in spite of having a shortage of
land, still possess an adequate amount of livestock for complete food
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selfsufficieny. For instance, within the group of Olkinos ranchers who lack
enough land even under the least restrictive stocking densities (quadrant A)
still 40.3 per cent do possess the number of animais required for complete
selfsuffïciency. This is equivalent to 26.9 per cent of all Olkinos households. In
contrast, 25.0 per cent of Olkinos households in quadrant B (having a land
availability of 13.7 ha/A AME or more) face a shortage of livestock. This is 8.3
per cent of all Olkinos households. In Embolioi the reverse situation existe. In
quadrant A, at the below 13.7 ha/AAME level, 28.6 per cent (or 8.0 per cent
of ail Embolioi ranchers) are selfsufficient in food while having a land deficit.
In quadrant B, above 13.7 ha/AAME, 42.6 per cent (or 30.7 per cent of all
Embolioi ranchers) have an inadequate food supply from their herd although
they own enough land. This indicates that large numbers of Embolioi
households hold a reasonable amount of land but lack the animais to make use
of it. This outcome underlines thé information of table 7.1 based on thé 1988
livestock census results, suggesting rather low ratios of stock units per member
for Embolioi group ranch, though more pronounced than in this survey (see
table 8.9).7
Olkinos and Embolioi Maasai, Kajiado individual ranchers and Olkinos
buyers were asked to estimate thé économie viability of their présent plot if it
were thé only source of income. Table 8.12 présents their opinions.





















































The opinions of Maasai owners seem to underline our analysis of the potential
viability of the subdivided group ranches. The low average parcel size (42.63
ha) in the Olkinos area is reflected in the opinion of ils inhabitants concerning
the viability of their plots today. In contrast, 73 Embolioi members
7 Applying the cattle/person instead of LE/AAME versus landownership will somewhat
change the above estimation of land and livestock deficiency. The cattle/person ratio will enlarge
the group of owners having a shortage of land as well as livestock. The TLU/AAME ratio is more
or less equivalent to the LE/AAME ratio as far as land is concerned but, due to ils lower
conversion rate for small stock (0.1 or 0.072 for TLU as compared to 0.17 for LE) thé group of
households categorized as having an insufficient number of animais for pure pastoralism will be
larger. As a conséquence percentages for each of the four quadrants arising out of the land-
livestock crosstabulation will change.
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interviewed, showed more or less the same livestock per person ratios although
they possessed an average plot size of 91.93 ha in 1990. The majority were
still convinced of the economie viability of their ranch.
Respondents from the group of established individual ranchers had an
average ranch size of 529.36 ha, ranging from 42.0 to 2,337.0 ha by 1990. In
spite of this favourable position they were less convinced of the economie
viability of their ranch than the Embolioi members. Their relatively large
household sizes, their current standard of living which also cornes from other
sources and the threatening loss of access to former group ranch areas were
held responsible for this attitude.
Finally, half of the immigrant buyers who actually settled in the area,
seemed to be aware of the marginality of the area for cultivation purposes and
they held an intermediate position concerning the viability of thek ranch. The
other half, however, thought very positively in regard to the economie viability
of their newly acquired plots. It should be remembered that the majority of
them practised cultivation which, in the 1986-1990 period, experienced
relatively good weather conditions. This, in combination with the relatively
large plot sizes, especially in comparison with those in their home area, is
thought to be responsible for thek moderate optimism.
8.4 Ecological Viability of the AHocated Plots
8.4.1 Introduction
Besides economie viability we attempted to gain insight into the ecological
viability of the allocated individual ranches. An argument often used in favour
of individual landownership is that it is supposed to enhance the (continued)
ecological viability of the ranch. Destocking one's ranch to recommended
stocking levels, practising rotational grazing or grass reseeding are among the
improvements expected to go along with the subdivision of group ranches. For
example, it is stated by the Ministry of Livestock Development in Kajiado
District that 'the subdivision of Group Ranches into individual Ranches has
compelled some of the Ranchers affected to dispose of livestock by sale to
levels Ranches can hold' (MoLD 1988:56).
Those opposing subdivision fear that the farms will be fenced, free
movement of stock and wildlife will be restricted and cultivation intensified, all
of these threats to the natura! habitat of the Maasai. These threats are also
recognized by the Ministry which stated 'This does not mean however, that
Group Ranch subdivision is the solution to maintenance of proper balance
between livestock and range resources on offer, far from it, the subdivision of
group ranches is in itself a problem that needs attention and urgently given the
small sizes of the résultant subdivisions which are not viable for livestock
upkeep, the enterprise most suited due to the prevalent ecological situation'
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(MoLD 1988:56).
In chapter 3 we concluded that over 90 per cent of Kajiado District falls within
zones V and VI. For our study area table 8.13 summarises information
presented by thé Livestock Department Kajiado District concerning thé
recommended stocking rate, range trend and actual stocking density. The
presented information underlines thé difficulty in defîning thé right stocking
rate and grazing capacity of a certain pièce of land. Kiboko group ranch, for
instance, though having a stocking rate recommendation of 7.0 ha/SU only and
being among the most overstocked locations in respect to ils potential (2.4
times), was characterized as being in good condition by thé Ministry of
Livestock Development in 1988.8
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Source: MoLD 1988; MoLD/RPU 1989a, 1989b,
Embolioi area, stated to be understocked, was labelled as having only a fair
ranch condition. Olkinos subdivided group ranch was categorized as being the
most overstocked group ranch though ils ranch condition was similar to that of
Embolioi. The one-time census observation of the actual stocking density
related to a yearround recommended rate of stocking could possibly be the
main factor held responsible for these discrepancies. In other words, massive
livestock movements towards an area in good condition will have blurred the
8 At the start of KLDP I, the UNDP/FAO range ecologist had placed both Kiboko and
Embolioi among the viable ranches. Norton-Griffiths (1977:11), however, produced a composite
greenness map of Kajiado District based on a Landsat images time series analysis, placing Kiboko
group ranch in category 2 (modest consistently dry) while Embolioi in catégories 3 (intermediate)
and 4 (modest consistently green).
9 The Ministry's applied thresholds of 6.0 ha/su for Embolioi and 5.0 ha/su for Olkinos are
equivalent to 7.38 ha/LE and 6.15 ha/LE, respectively. This is above ILCA's land need estimate.
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picture of high stocking densities going together with depleted areas and vice '•- ̂
versa.
8.4.2 Water and Forage Àvailability in the Areas of Survey
The availability of water varies as to seasons as well as to place. For our
sample households we investigated the sources of water, the mean distance to
these sources and the frequency of watering the catüe and small stock animais
in the dry and wet seasons (see table 8.14).


































































































































source: MOLL) lyss " ,^
Note: f = functioning; nf = not functioning
It should be noted that changes have occurred in the area and that the
availability of water sources in other areas outside the group ranch area should
also be taken into account (e.g. Meto moving to Tanzania and Torosei group
ranch).
Table 8.15 présents an overview of the study area water sources used in the
dry and wet season for both catüe and small stock. Borehole watering is
mainly practised by established individual ranchers in the Matapato and
Loodokilani area during the dry season. During the wet season pans (natura!
and man-made) are used. The Meto, Lorngosua and Elang'ata Wuas group
ranch members follow a similar pattern except in the dry period when wells
are used. Most of these are deep and dug in rocky hills by labour hired from
Tanzania. This job can take several years. The water is collected in buckets
which are thrown upwards passing through several hands before being emptied
in large troughs where the animais concentrate for drinking.
By contrast livestock watering in the northern part of our study area
(Olkinos and Embolioi) dépends on the nearby rivers (e.g. Kisaju, Olturoto and
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In the dry season Olkinos members turn to waterholes in the dry river bed and
boreholes. Embolioi members mainly use dams and boreholes. Finally, all
Kiboko members mentioned the use of dams in the wet season. For the dry
season use was made of the Kiboko river and boreholes.
Table 8.16 Mean Distances to Watersources in Wet and Dry Season (Km)
and Frequency of Watering Livestock
Cattle Small stock
Distance Frequency

















































































































Table 8.16 provides information on thé mean distance between thé household's
borna and their source of water for catüe and small stock in the wet as well as
thé dry season period. It can be concluded that, especially during the dry
season Lorngosua, Elang'ata Wuas and Meto lack nearby water sources.
Table 8.17 Présence of Dry Season Pastures
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Information was also gathered on the opinions of the plot owners about the
quantity of dry season pastures on their ranch (see table 8.17). The majority of
the Maasai respondents of the not yet subdivided group ranches stated to have
a large enough dry season grazing area as opposed to the subdivided areas of
Embolioi and Olkinos. Besides the availability of water the présence of forage
(grass, shrubs, bushes) is of importance. Forage capacity particularly in the dry
season détermines the overall grazing capacity of an area. In 1973, Metson
found among the 172 Maasai households hè sampled a percentage as high as
90.70 per cent stating that the dry season grazing pastures were not enough
(see Metson 1974:table 33). This negative response will probâbly have been
influenced by the harsh conditions of 1973/74. At the time of our fieldwork the
Maasai had experienced a number of good years. The majority of Olkinos and
Embolioi individual plot owners considered their private parcels not to contain
adequate dry season reserves. In contrast the opinions of group ranch members
and individual ranchers were more positive in this respect. Only the Matapato
individual ranchers who had the smallest ranches among the group of
established ranchers, also judged their dry season pastures to be too small.
8.4.3 Stocking Densities
The extent of over and understocking of each individual ranch within our
sample has also been estimated. If the availability of land per livestock unit is
less than the 1.5 ha/TLU (1.59 ha/LE) or 4.2 ha/TLU (4.45 ha/LE) stocking
levels the household's ranch should be considered overstocked in the short or
long run, respectively.































































Table 8.18 reveals that by 1990 at least half of all individual rancher
households faced thé situation of having a shortage of land on which to keep
all livestock on the ranch without threatening its long term potential. In
Olkinos specifically, 93.0 per cent of the households did not possess enough
land for the animais they owned. Olkinos' high stocking density is mainly the
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result of the necessity of meeting daily requirements from livestock keeping
and a basic lack of land. This applies to 96.3 per cent of the Olkinos
households. In fact, over 70 per cent of the established individual ranchers -of
whom only 50 per cent were considered to have a deficiency in land at the
4.45 ha/LE level- had overstocked their ranch.
In other words the postulation that the individualization of land will result
in stocking rates that do not bypass levels of carrying capacity is, to say the
least, somewhat questionable. The answers given by the individual ranchers
with référence to herd size management after obtaining their own ranch have
much to say in this respect (see table 8.19). Approximately one out of five
Olkinos and Embolioi members having their ranch overstocked in 1986, stated
to have increased the herd size even further since the moment of subdivision.











































































































Except for the Matapato individual ranchers the majority of households had not
actively changed the number of animais on their ranch after obtaining an
individual parcel. Of those who did, most decided to increase rather than
decrease their livestock numbers. This seems to be the trend both for the over
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as well as for the understocked ranches.10
It could be argued that the subdivided group ranches' members were not
interested in destocking their individual parcels as most of them were still
recovering from the 1984 drought. A longer time perspective would therefore
be désirable. Nonetheless, the group of 29 established individual ranchers who
obtained their ranch over a period of 7 to 25 years, are not in a significantiy
better position with regard to stocking densities and the réduction of herd sizes.
Considering the less well-off position of recendy subdivided group ranches
there seems to be little support for the destocking-after-individualization
hypothesis. It should be remembered that, in fact, no real destocking incentive
existed for the individual ranchers as they mostly continued having access to
group ranch territories either by way of family or stock friend relationships.
Baxter (1987:vi) goes even further by stating that 'It may still be arguable
in the West that natura! resources are best conserved when they are in private
ownership, but there is no évidence at all from Africa to support the
contention; indeed, all the évidence suggests the contrary. Overgrazing and
ecological damage are serious problems where wealthy stock-owners have been
able to override common rights and customary restraints.'
Blaikie and Brookfïeld (1987) have shown that land dégradation occurs all
over the world in a wide variety of contexts which include different types of
society, land tenure regimes, market relations, population pressures and the
like. In chapter 9 we will deal with the issue of privatization of land tenure and
land conservation practices in more detail.
8.5 Changes in Herd Mobility After Subdivision
8.5.1 Grazing Management
It should be realized that the figures provided and the conclusions drawn above
concerning stocking densities starled from the presumption of strict boundary
maintenance and a virtually uniform quality of the land in time and place.
Reality was found to be different. As at the time of the création of group
ranches Maasai households of subdivided Olkinos and Embolioi group ranches
continued using the pastures in a communal way for their daily herding
practices and for medium to long term movements. Reasons for this practice
are the following:
Firsüy, as stated by the Ministry of Livestock Development there is a need for
mobility due to the economie and ecological unviability of many individual
10 It should be realized that herd sizes for 1986 have been uniformly obtained by way of
reducing the livestock equivalent parameter to 85 per cent of ils 1990 level, not taking account of
the actual stocking density of the ranch for each and every household.
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ranches. Even daily grazing in most Olkinos and Embolioi individual ranches
virtually requires by définition that the plot boundaries be violated as the
average distance to watering sources far outstrips the mean plot hectarage.
Medium and long term mobility, whereby herds accompanied by family
members move away from the borna for a certain period in search of water,
disease free pastures, the grazing or lending of animais to friends or relatives
are ail methods used to optimize thé demand for and thé availability of thèse
resources.
Secondly, and as a resuit of subdivision, taking the herd to an Olkinos,
Embolioi, Empuyiankat, Kitengela or Poka Maasai rancher is now legal other
than when under the rules of group ranch ownership.
Thirdly, as many owners have not yet settled nor may ever do so, large
parts of the pastures, though individually owned, can freely be used with or
without permission by the neighbouring households' livestock for grazing.





































































Table 8.20 shows that a large number of households had transferred part of
their herd to bornas other than their own at the time of survey. Foremost
animais were located elsewhere because of assisting friends or relatives (loan),
fresh pastures (grazing) or for crossbreeding purposes or to avoid disease
infected areas (other). Meto members particularly mentioned this last motive.
To get an idea of the relative number of households involved in medium to
long term livestock movements respondents were asked to give the number of
catüe sent away and/or received during 1989, including the area of destination,
period involved, the relation to receiver/sender and the financial arrangement
(see table 8.21). Periods mentioned for sending or receiving livestock varied
from a minimum of two weeks to all the year round. Some authors had
expected that individual ownership could possibly result in the practice of
hiring grazing areas for payment. However, only one household in Embolioi
and another in Lorngosua stated that they had paid a certain sum of money for
taking cattle elsewhere. Among Olkinos and the established individual ranchers
nobody mentioned payment in return for grazing. It seems that this is restricted
to times of sévère stress. For example, an Olkinos household mentioned that it
paid Ksh. 4,000/- per month for letting its livestock graze in the Embakasi
ranch during the 1984/5 drought. Individual ranchers in the Nkoile area are
also mentioned as renting.



























































































































































































It should be noted that the need to send livestock away is not so much
correlated to the legal status of the area but to its ecological situation. Meto,
Lorngosua and Elang'ata Wuas have a larger variance in ecological potential
than the Kaputiei ranches. This is illustrated by the fact that, like most Olkinos
and Embolioi ranchers, established ranchers from the Kaputiei area did not
send away their animais during 1989. Only 21.4 per cent of the Kaputiei
households stated that 2.7 per cent of their cattle was located elsewhere. This
is comparable with Olkinos, Embolioi and Kiboko ranches.
In contrast, the mobility patterns of Loodokilani and Matapato individual
ranchers' animais are similar to those of the members in Elang'ata Wuas,
Lorngosua and Meto group ranches. The latter ranch in particular also makes
use of Tanzanian pastures.
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8.5.2 Fencing Characteristics in the Subdivided Areas
Daily herding journeys are becoming without doubt less easy to conduct.
Besides the légal obstacles there are physical barriers such as fences, shambas,
ol-okeri (reserved pastures) and the présence of wildlife in and outside the
National Parks. It has been stated by opponents to group ranch subdivision that
these constructions and changes in land use will, in the long run, undermine
the viability of the livestock economy in Kajiado District. Table 8.22 provides
information concerning fencing and free movement in the subdivided areas.





















































Note: percentages always refer to the total sample population and disregard the actual possession
of a shamba or ol-okeri.
From table 8.22 we leam that the effects of subdivision on mobility has so far
been modest. Approximately three quarters of the Olkinos and Embolioi
members sampled stated that the free movement of their herd has not changed.
So far, the Maasai pastoralists had not fenced their new individual plots, but
one of the immigrant buyers had done so (i.e. 17 per cent). The need for fence
construction is higher for the latter because they mainly use their ranches for
cultivation and want to protect their crops against wildlife and livestock
destruction. Moreover, the small parcels belonging to the immigrants are less
costly to fence than those belonging to the original Maasai inhabitants. Lastly,
most immigrants are familiär with fencing their areas whereas the Maasai have
no tradition in this respect. The fact that all ranches in Olkinos and Embolioi
are not (yet?) fenced is because of the following reasons.
Firsüy, fencing is a very costly affair. A fence made from pôles and barbed
wire costs approximately Ksh. 60/- per meter. Thus fencing a plot of 40 ha
will cost approximately Ksh. 150,0007-! (or Ksh. 75.000/- if one's neighbours
are willing to share the investment). In the Loodokilani and Matapato area
people construct natura! fences made from thorny bushes. This alternative is
not easily available for the Embolioi and Olkinos area which lack this kind of
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végétation. Material used for fencing of ranches and ol-okeri in Elang'ata
Wuas, Lorngosua, Kiboko and Meto is only thorn bush. Fences constructed in
Embolioi, Olkinos and established individual areas use both thorn bushes and
pôles and wires. Huge fences were only seen being erected in the so called
"Presidential Area" of Kisaju. Wealthy new owners have been responsible for
this development. Table 8.23 provides information on fencing practices in
Kiboko, Elang'ata Wuas, Lorngosua and Meto.








































Note: fenced individual tanches in Elang'ata Wuas group ranch are unofficial.
Comparing the situation in the subdivided and not (yet) subdivided group
ranches reveals that, in fact, the relative number of households having a fenced
shamba or fenced ol-okeri is higher in the latter areas. However, the increase
in fenced localities is higher in Olkinos and Embolioi area, especially as a
result of the influx of immigrant buyers. Also among the original inhabitants of
the subdivided group ranches the construction of fences has grown faster since
1986.
A second reason for the low level of fenced ranches in Olkinos and
Embolioi sterns from the fact that a large number of these parcels have not yet
actually been occupied by their owners and are still free to be used (see section
8.1). These plots either belong to Maasai living with their family in another
borna nearby or to people who roam around in towns or stay in other parts of
the district or the country. Areas bought by outsiders for spéculative purposes
are also still available for the local Maasai herds.
Thirdly, it is questionable if the livestock owners are really interested in
turning away from the traditional communal use of the pastures forced on them
by climatic conditions. Similar to what happened after the introduction of the
group ranch phenomenon, herders will not be willing to keep their animais in
places without grass or water. Subdivision will not have changed this attitude
as it cannot change the climatic conditions in the area. As long as an individual
rancher is not able to have an adequate source of water and feed for his
animais he is simply forced either to migrate to other places or to seil off part
of his herd. In my opinion, the collapse of the group ranch could even
encourage the mobility of herds to other ranches as there is no longer a ranch
committee to oppose the practice.
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8.6 Other Land Use Changes
8.6.1 Reserved Grazing Pas turcs (Ol-okeri)
Although we examined thé fencing practices of individual farms, ol-okeri
(reserved pastures for calves and sick animais) and shambas, it should be
realized that thé growth as such in thé number of the last two is also of
significance. Unfenced ol-okeri and shambas contribute to a réduction in thé
accessibility of grazing areas for thé Maasai herds. Tables 8.24 and 8.25
summarise thé number of ol-okeri and shambas possessed by our sample
population in a time perspective.






































































































Of our sample population 75.0 per cent stated to hâve access to an ol-okeri.
Table 8.24 shows that, except in Embolioi (34 per cent) and among Olkinos
buyers (33 per cent), more than half of the households in each région had
either a private ol-okeri or they shared one with one or more households. Table
8.24 also reveals that, for both catégories, an overall increase in thé number of
ol-okeri has recenüy occurred. For example, in Olkinos and Embolioi over
three quarters of the ol-okeri have been established in a relatively short period
since 1982." Splitting up of communal ol-okeri could be partiy responsible
for this récent increase. However, group ranches of Kiboko, Elang'ata Wuas,
Lorngosua and Meto which are not yet subdivided show a similar pattern of
The rationale for taking the 1982/3 dividing line is the acceptance of the group ranch
subdivision by thé Kenyan Government in 1983. It should be noted however, that thé
intensification of discussions and, in some cases, thé principal décision by thé group ranch
members of several group ranches to subdivide took place at différent moments from 1981 (Poka)
until 1989 (Lorngosua) (see chapter 7).
il-
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increase, albeit less pronounced.
From thé undivided group ranches 55 households claimed to hâve started a
communal ol-okeri in thé last 7 years as opposed to 42 who had done so
before. For individual ol-okeri thèse figures are 65 and 29, respectively. This
indicates a process of individualization in ownership of ol-okeri since thé early
1980s. By 1990 ail but Meto and Lorngosua group ranches showed a pattern of
préférence for individual ol-okeri. Of all households having an ol-okeri 57.4
per cent held this in private ownership, while 42.6 per cent had access to a
communal ol-okeri. In addition, we should bear in mind that the absolute
number of communal ol-okeri will be lower as thèse are shared tracts of lands,
Sizes vary, depending on thé number of boma's sharing and the size of the
herd from 20 ha in subdivided group ranches to 80 ha for established
individual ranchers.
The rapid increase in thé number of ol-okeri seems to have been influenced by
thé process of subdivision. As stated by Bekure et al. (1987:184/205),
frequenuy thé establishment of thèse spécifie kinds of plots in thé south
Kaputiei area has become a mechanism for claiming a certain part of the group
ranch area with thé expectation of subdivision. An example for Merueshi group
ranch where, shortly after incorporation, sons of a deceased chief established
their private ol-okeri is given to support this statement. Other methods of
laying claims such as the construction of permanent houses, thé digging of
wells or the drilling of boreholes could be of importance as well.
As such it is interesting to note that in Embolioi 40.9 per cent of the ol-
okeri was established in 1985, while 47.8 per cent of Olkinos members
established them in 1986 shortly before officiai subdivision. However,
surveying and allocation of plots had been done in November 1984 and
November 1985, respectively. Moreover, half of the Olkinos and Embolioi
members do not possess an ol-okeri at all. Lastiy, one would expect
committee-members to be among thé ol-okeri claimers, especially around thé
date that thé décision to subdivide was taken. Olkinos and Embolioi
committee-members, however, show a similar percentage différence between
those with and without an ol-okeri as non-committee members. In Embolioi ail
four committee-members established their ol-okeri in between 1983 and 1985.
In Olkinos, however, none of the four committee-members started their ol-
okeri in this period. In other words, although possibly being used as a location
claiming mechanism as suggested by Bekure et al. (1987) our data do not seem
to fully support this postulation for thé northern Kaputiei area.
8.6.2 Cultivated Plots (Shambas)
A similar pattern of récent origin for cultivated plots is shown in table 8.25.
Except for Elang'ata Wuas, where only a few members practise cultivation,
subdivided and undivided ranches alike show that some 80 per cent of those
Af-'
4 vo'^
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who commenced agriculture did so after 1982.
Of our total sample population 232 or 42.3 per cent claimed to be
cultivating a shamba. The total acreage cultivated by 231 households out of a
total group of 539 households was 291.9 ha équivalent to an average plot size
of 1.26 ha. The mean plot size for this group was 0.72 ha at the time they
started cultivating. This means that in a relatively short period, besides an
increase in thé number of Maasai households cultivating, the average plot size
cultivated increased by some 75.8 per cent. A total of 152 of the cultivating
households embarked upon this activity after thé 1984 drought, as opposed to
71 households who had begun bef ore leaving 9 households for which no
information could be obtained. In other words, approximately 10-15 per cent of
our total sample population had begun with cultivation before thé drought of
1984/5 and this rosé rapidly to over 40 per cent by 1990.12
Table 8.25 Increase in Number of Shambas of Sample Households (%)
Olk En* IR Buy Kib Ews Lor Met
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source' autnor s survey
As shown in table 8.26 the group of 223 households, for which füll
information is available had cultivated a total area of 273.72 ha by 1990. As
compared to the first season of farming the size of the shamba either increased
or remained the same (see last columns). Keeping this in mind the 1984
acreage cultivated by the pioneer group of 71 households will be in between
their total initial plot sizes (57.67 ha) and the 1990 acreage (118.78 ha).
In other words, a minor 0.1-0.2 per cent of the total area owned
(communally or individually) by our total sample population was farmed
before 1984/5. In any case, until 1990 the land under cultivation increased with
a minimum of 154.94 ha being the total area cultivated by the group of new
farmers. As a result the land farmed will have increased to approximately 0.53
per cent of the total area owned by our total sample population.
Nine households (Elang'ata Wuas:3, Individual Ranchers:2, Meto:2, Kiboko:!,
Lorngosua: 1) stated that they had cultivated m the past but were not doing so now.
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Total 51,327 273.72 0.53% 118.78 154.94
source: autnors survey
Note: the sample area totals presented (column 1 and 2) refer to land occupied by thé group of
223 households from whom which this information was available.
+ = increased; ± = unchanged; - = decreased size of thé shamba since thé household started
cultivating.
It should be noted that thé cultivated plots are not necessarily located near thé
household's borna. For example, one Loodokilani individual rancher had an 32
ha farm in thé Loitokitok région and another farm of 16 ha near Namanga
Town. Another individual rancher had a farm in the Kitengela area. Four
shambas belonging to Embolioi ranchers were located in Olkinos. In return
four "Olkinos plots" were located in Ngong and Kitengela area. One member
from Meto as well as one from Lorngosua had a plot in Ilmarba. Finally, one
Elang'ata Wuas group ranch member stated that he possessed a 2.0 ha farm in
Naivasha (Nakuru District).
Part of the absolute increase in shambas will be the result of a growth of
the population. Still, more factors must be operative for the booming increase
since the early 1980s. A factor which seems to have influenced the growth in
the number of cultivators and the acreage under crops has been the 1984
drought which left many Maasai with heavily reduced herd sizes. This seems
to explain the distinct increase in cultivating ranchers in most areas. The more
permanent position of Elang'ata Wuas could possibly be explained from this
factor as the Elang'ata Wuas Maasai did not suffer so much from the drought
as other groups did. In addition, large parts of Elang'ata Wuas group ranch are
not very well suited for rainfed cultivation.
8.6.3 Compétition from Wildlife
Finally, we should pay attention to the wildlife issue. In sections 4.4.3, 6.3.2
and 7.5.2 we pointed out the importance of the wildlife sector for the national
economy attracting many touriste from abroad resulting in a huge growth of
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tourism since the 1970s. We also concluded that the local Maasai, by allowing
game animais to spread over their pastures, supported the viability of Amboseli
and Nairobi National Parks and, as a conséquence, the national economy. This
hospitality, however, had detrimental effects on their livestock holdings
through prédation, compétition for forage and the spread of disease by game
animais. Over the years the Maasai have only been compensated minimally for
this bürden. Fencing of individual pastures is feared to (further) undermine the
wildlife sector, which is facing a declining trend anyway (see table 3.5).
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to calving wildebeests which cause Malignant Catarrh.13 Indeed, from table
10.13 it can be concluded that this disease mainly affects the northern Kaputiei
area and hence former group ranch members and established individual
ranchers alike. In addition, the recently settled non-Maasai complain about erop
damage. The doubling of the human population as a resuit of this influx and a
natural growth in combination with increased fencing is expected to at least
restrict the entrance of game and to change migration patterns.
Table 8.27 Wildlife Development in thé Subdivided and Established







































































source: autnor s survey ano peaen iy»4; urunoiatt et ai. iy»y; saia et ai
For thé Embolioi and Olkinos areas we were able to obtain some rough
estimâtes of game animais présent in March 1987. Zebra's, wildebeests and
Grants gazelles were the most important animais on thèse ranches. For both
ranches numbers diminishing since 1977 hâve also been recorded (see table
8.27).
Taking into account the 1976 drought which killed many wild animais thé
négative trend is even more significant. This is confirmed by the ranchers
opinion that wildlife numbers and therefore the damage are decreasing. Still,
Embolioi faces an above-average number of game. This is reflected by
Embolioi members when they mention the transmittance of diseases from
wildlife as one of their most important problems (see table 10.24). Embolioi
ranchers stated they often have to move their herds to safer places in response
8.7 Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter the effects of the process of group ranch subdivision in respect
of the size, economie and ecological viability of the new individually owned
parcels have been presented. Attention has also been paid to aspects of land
use, including patterns of résidence, fencing, livestock movements, cultivation
and wildlife habitats. This analysis was based on the post subdivision
developments as they have occurred on Olkinos and Embolioi group ranches
since late 1986 until the beginning of 1990. Developments in other group
ranches (e.g. Kiboko, Elang'ata Wuas, Lorngosua, Meto, and buyers and
individual ranchers) were provided by way of référence.
Our data showed average household sizes of 6.0 to 10.6 for Olkinos and
Meto, respectively. The number of children in the 0-15 years of age cohort was
50.3 per cent. For Kiboko and Embolioi this figure stood at 64.0 and 64.4 per
cent as compared to 47.4 and 45.7 per cent for 1968. This illustrâtes the
increased growth of the Maasai population, probably due to a réduction in
child mortality. In the words of a Maasai elder: 'these days, as opposed to the
past, we have children of every height'.
Catüe ownership under our sample population stood at 9.1 head of cattle
per person with the addition of 12.9 shoats. If the sample population is
représentative of all Kajiado Maasai pastoralists, this means that the declining
trend in cattle ownership as shown before for the 1950-1985 period has been
reversed.14 Besides, it should be taken into account that in genera!
productivity of Maasai cattle has risen due to the introduction of improved
Malignant Catarrhal Fever (MCF) is carried by the wildebeest and Red Maasai sbeep. The
virus is excreted by the female wildebeest during calving and lactation, The calving period of
wildebeest on the Athi-Kapiti plains usually coïncides with the onset of the long rains (April-June)
(see UNDP/FAO 1978:51). Wildlife acts as a reservoir for the blood parasites (i.e. rseöe-flies) that
are responsible for Trypanosomiasis in cattle.
14 The 1988 Livestock census enumerated 633,388 cattle for an estimated total of some
145,000 Maasai. A certain number of these cattle will have been held by non-Maasai (espedally
Kikuyu staving in the Ngong Division). Thus, district-wide, cattle ownership wilt probably average
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breeds (see chapter 10). Moreover, these days the number of smallstock in the
whole of Kajiado District is higher than that for cattle. The sample population
cattle:smallstock ratio found was 1:1.42. This is in line with the 1988
Livestock Census figure of 1:1.52 for the whole of Kajiado District. A less
dramatic shift occurred in the percentage of female cattle within the Maasai
herds. For Embolioi this was reduced from 69 per cent in 1968 to 54 per cent
by 1990. The overall percentage of female cattle with the herd stood at 68 per
cent for the group and 67 per cent for individual ranchers. A structural switch
to a market and meat-oriented economy for cattle does not seem to have
occurred.
Landownership per person has decreased over the 1986-90 period due to
natural population growth and the sale of land. The availability of land for
Olkinos ranchers decreased from 8.43 ha/person in 1986 to 7.06 ha/person in
1990, a 16 per cent réduction as a spécifie resuit of this last factor. Embolioi
figures for these years are 15.53 ha/person and 14.29 ha/person, respectively.
Wealth classes among our group of respondents are based on livestock
equivalente owned by active adult male equivalente (LE/AAME). A fairly even
distribution along three strata was found. The same eut off points had been
used as defmed by ILCA for their 1980 population. Their stratification showed
a larger group of respondents in the middle stratum and a smaller one in the
lower stratum.
The second section of this chapter dealt with the outcome of the process of
group ranch subdivision in Olkinos and Embolioi. An overall positive position
towards the process of subdivision and allocated plots was recorded among the
Olkinos and Embolioi ranchers. Approximately l out of 5 households,
however, had from mixed to negative feelings concerning the size of the plots
allocated. The former Olkinos member now possesses a 46.71 ha mean size
ranch ranging from 11.00 to 132.00 ha per parcel. Former committee-members
were found to have designated themselves and their relatives significantly
larger parcels at the most favourable locations. Plots held by committee-
members averaged 81.80 ha as compared to 42.53 ha for non-committee
member households. For Embolioi the average plot size was 93.37 ha varying
from 30.0 to 225.0 ha per parcel. Again former Embolioi committee-members
held a higher amount of land (i.e. 130.74 ha as compared to 86.84 ha for non-
committee members). Thus the process of subdivision has been favourable to
the most powerful within the Maasai group ranch constellation.
One of the main questions concerning the subdivision of group ranches deals
with the economie and ecological viability of the allocated plots. In the past
several scholars mentioned minimum land requirements for individual ranches
of some 80 ha/adult male or 467 ha per household. Herd sizes needed by each
Household irnply certian demanda on the amount of land required. Taking into
account livestock food requirements there is a land requirement ranging
KS-
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between 13.7 ha/AAME/hh to 38.3 ha/AAME/hh for the wet and dry season,
respectively. For Olkinos and Embolioi we concluded that only a mere 10 per
cent or less of the households would be able to keep their animais on the
individual ranch without suffering a shortage in grass or without severely
overstocking it. Moreover, since the time of subdivision this capacity had
decreased by another 1-2 per cent.
Starting from four different catégories of landownership based on a situation
of deficit or surplus for the wet season or the dry season it was estimated that
for those Olkinos households lacking sufficient land in both seasons 40.3 per
cent nevertheless owned a large enough number of animais for complete
selfsufficiency. In the opposite situation of having enough land for both
seasons 75 per cent of these parcel owners were selfsufficient in livestock. For
Embolioi these figures were 28.6 per cent and 100 per cent, respectively. We
also concluded for Embolioi that large numbers of the households held a
reasonable amount of land though they lacked the animais to make use of it.
Asked for their opinion on the economie viability of their individual ranch a
large majority (84.9 per cent) of the Embolioi considered it to be highly viable.
Olkinos households which, in général, had much smaller parcels, showed more
mixed feelings in this respect. Only 43.5 per cent said to believe their parcel to
be either viable or highly viable.
Information concerning the ecological viability of the newly allocated plots on
a group ranch scale collected by the Kajiado District 1988 Livestock Census
was presented showing the recommended stocking rate, the actual stocking
density, estimated range condition and trend and the availability and condition
of water sources. According to these figures an overstocking of most ranches
(except Embolioi) was determined at ratios of 1.7 to 2.9 times the densities
allowed. However, overall range condition was stated to be fair (or even good
as in the case of Kiboko).
An inquiry into the availability of dry season pasturage revealed the reverse
picture with Olkinos and Embolioi ranchers complaining of insufficient dry
season reserves on their privately owned parcels. Half of the established
individual ranchers -especially Matapato ranchers- shared this opinion.
One of our main intereste was to détermine the stocking densities betöre and
after the individualization of the now privately owned ranches in Olkinos,
Embolioi and established individual ranchers. Mean densities found for 1990
were 1.52 ha/LE (Olkinos), 4.04 ha/LE (Embolioi) and 5.02 ha/LE (individual
ranchers). In 1986 these figures were 2.32 ha/LE, 4.88 ha/LE and 5.38 ha/LE,
respectively. Short and long term thresholds were applied which revealed that
for both Olkinos and Embolioi the densities had increased resulting, for
Olkinos, in a theoretically unviable ranch size of 72.0 per cent of all the
ranchers on the short run and as high as 93.0 per cent in the long term. For
Embolioi these figures were 36.5 and 63.5 per cent, respectively.
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This outcome has led us to question the postulation that the
mdividualization of land tenure will resuit in a réduction of the stocking rate at
carrying capacity levels. In fact, those ranchers that actively changed the
number of animais on their ranch did so by increasing rather than decreasing
the total number of animais, irrespective of whether or not they possessed an
over or understocked ranch. Established individual ranchers behaved similarly.
Besides the level of stocking we showed an interest in (the change in)
grazing management practices after the subdivision of Olkinos and Embolioi
group ranches. It was found that some 20-25 per cent of households
interviewed had located part of their herd in other bornas at the time of survey.
Kaputiei established ranchers mentioned a total of 21.4 per cent. Overall a total
of 32.4 individual rancher's households mentioned that they had transferred
part of their livestock away from the ranch. Thus among the group of
Matapato and Loodokilani individual ranchers a similar number of households
had animais located elsewhere as their neighbouring group ranch members.
Detailed information for 1989 medium and long term herd movements of
cattle and smallstock revealed that it was not so much the legal status but the
ecological condition of the ranch which was the driving force behind
transferring animais to other places for medium to long periods of time. Also
no firm évidence could be found of a trend towards thé commoditization of
grazing. Only two households mentioned they had paid money for access to
pastures elsewhere.
The practice of locating livestock in other bornas is also influenced by thé fact
that thé subdivision process has accelerated a further decrease in borna size and
thé émergence of single household bornas. Nowadays half of the Olkinos and
Embolioi members live in single household bornas. On thèse ranches less than
two households réside in a single borna whereas for thé Matapato and
Loodokilani Maasai this figure stands at between 3 and 5. Reports for the late
1950s give an overall borna size of 6-8 households in Kajiado District. This
changing pattern of résidence influences the availability of labour and thé level
of co-operation. Tasks in household matters such as collecting firewood, thé
fetching of water and thé herding or milking of livestock has to be organized
along other Unes. No clear picture, however, emerged as in Olkinos co-
operation was said to have decreased, whereas Embolioi members reportée an
increase.
The complète fencing of ranches has not yet occurred among thé group of
respondent«. In thé Olkinos and Embolioi areas enclosures were erected to
prevent animais from entering shambas (cultivated plots) or ol-okeri (small
reserved pastures). This trend is on the increase. As a percentage of all
households interviewed 3.7 per cent of the Olkinos ranchers and 2.7 per cent
of thé Embolioi households were in possession of a fenced ol-okeri. For
shambas thèse figures were 8.3 and 9.3, respectively for 1990 as compared to
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only 1.9 and 1.3 for 1986. This increase is faster than thé increase in thé
number of shambas over this same period.
Enclosures made by not yet subdivided group ranch areas show an even
higher percentage of households involved in the practice. However, the
increase in this is somewhat slower than in the subdivided group ranches.
Fencing practices among established ranchers, particularly of ol-okeri, is in the
order of 35 per cent. In our view the fencing of shambas and ranches by non-
Maasai buyers will pose the major threat to the mobility of Maasai livestock.
By 1990, 23.6 per cent of the Olkinos respondents stated that in their view free
movement had indeed decreased after the subdivision of the group ranch. For
Embolioi this was 30.0 per cent. The need to défend the cultivated plots
against game and livestock is expected to result in a fast growth of small
enclosures scattered over the former group ranch territory. Because these
parcels are small, fencing will be not too costiy for an individual owner.
Maasai ranchers, not accustomed to this practice of enclosing one's territory
are faced with high costs if use is made of pôles and barbed wire. In addition,
many Maasai owners had not yet settled on their new plot. A final reason for
the non-appearance of fenced ranches is thought to be the realization of the
Maasai that, due to the climatic conditions, fencing one's ranch will result in a
dramatic collective disaster in the long term.
Furthermore, attention was paid to the actual increase in the number of oi-
oken and shambas as the growth as such, either fenced or unfenced, will also
reduce the accessibility of grazing areas for Maasai herds. By 1990, 75.0 per
cent of the respondents claimed to have access to an ol-okeri, either
individually or communally owned. Since 1983 a huge increase in the number
of ol-okeri was recognised, for both types of ol-okeri. By 1990 57.4 per cent of
the ol-okeri were held in private ownership. Communal reserved grazing areas
were mainly found among Meto and Lorngosua households. Other researchers
have pointed out the land-claiming rationale behind this move; by establishing
an ol-okeri in one's own favourable location one could anticipate the allocation
of individual parcels at the time of group ranch subdivision. However, our
Olkinos and Embolioi did not support such a hypothesis.
Of the total sample population 42.3 per cent claimed to be cultivating a
shamba by 1990. The total acreage cultivated was 291.9 ha. This is equivalent
to a mean plot size of 1.26 ha. When these cultivators starled growing their
first erop, the average plot size was only 0.72 ha. In other words, both the
number of shambas and the acreage covered has increased rapidly.
Approximately 10-15 per cent of our total sample population was engaged in
cultivation bef ore the 1984/5 drought and this rose rapidly to over 40 per cent
by 1990. We estimated that the area under cultivation had increased over this
period from 0.1-0.2 to 0.53 per cent of the total area available to our sample
population, including the non-cultivators. Besides a growth in the number of
households, the 1984/5 drought is held responsible for the rapid increase in the
number of cultivators. A loss of pastures could possibly be balanced by
'Jèi
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allowing livestock to graze the fields after harvesting. This requires good
relations between cultivators and livestock keepers. Damage donc to the crops
betöre harvesting could frustrate this relationship. Another often mentioned
negative effect of an increase in the cultivated acreage is that of trespass to
reach to watering points. This calls for corridors in order to allow herders to
travel as straight as possible.
Finally, we have attempted to highlight the compétition for pastures by
game in our study area. According to official wildlife estimâtes based on aerial
countings a décline in the number of wild animais has been recorded. This
trend was confirmed by our respondents. A doubling of the human population
and increased fencing is expected to further reduce compétition from wildlife,
particularly in the northern Kaputiei area.
Let us now turn to chapter 9 for an évaluation of the use of the individual
titie deed as a collatéral for loans as propagated by subdivision supporters or
for a quick seil out to (non) Maasai as feared by their opponents.
Chapter 8: The Impact of Subdivision of Olkinos and Embolioi Group Ranches 375
APPENDIX 8.1
KIBOKO GROUP RANCH PROFILE
Kiboko group ranch (15,870 ha) is a KLDP phase I group tanch, inhabited by some 1,000
Kaputiei Maasai. It is located in the far north-eastern end of Central (now Mashuru) Division,
Kajiado District, and approxirnately 150 km ftom Nairobi down the Nairobi-Morribasa main road,
The road passes through the ranch although the largest part is in the south. The ranch Stretches
from Simba T.C. to Kiboko T.C. (Machakos District). Simba centre has several shops, a nursery
and primary school, a health centre and slaughter house. Kiiunyeti centre is located in the south.
One shop, a dispensary and primary school make up the most important facilities hère. A borehole
and dip can be found in the centre of the ranch. Another borehole and dip can be found in the
north but they are not functiomng. In addition the ranch has 3 crushes, 4 troughs, 3 water tanks, l
well, l spring, l water pan and 5 km of water pipeline.
Kiboko group ranch is for the most part located in agro-climatic zone V. A large number of
prominent hills are present. The élévation of the ranch averages around 1,000 m. Soils are
dominated by red sandy loams on the plains, lava on the hills and riverine complexes along
Kiboko river bordering in the eastern part of the ranch. Other, seasonal rivers are the Esiteti in the
south and the Karungu in the north. The végétation is dominated by a complex of bushland and
bushed grasslands in the north and a complex of grassland to bushed grasslands on the erosion-
prone plains in the south. Grasslands make up some 60 per cent of the ranch. Approximately 25
per cent is covered by bushed grasslands. Some scattered spots of wooded dense bushland can also
be found. Dominant trees are Acacia species and perennial grasses such as Pennlsetum mezlanum,
Cenchrus cilliaris and satigum. There is a large variety of wild animais such as giraffes, hyena's,
hons, wildebeests and zébras for example and ui above average numbers.
The main activity is livestock keeping. Kiboko group ranch was rewarded for good résulta in this
respect by winning the second position in the Farm/Ranch compétition of Rift Valley Province in
1986. Some peuple are involved in subsistence cultivation and they mainly grow maize and beans.
Animal disease, especially East Coast Fever (ollikana), is a major problem for thé Kiboko
ranchers. During periods of stress animais are sent to Chyulu Hills in a search for pasture and
water.
On thé ranch there used to be one women's group which is now defunct. The group appears
not to have been functioning for thé last 3 years. There are no church buildings in thé ranch























Figure 8.7 Kiboko Group Ranch
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ELANG'ATA WXIAS GROUP RANCH PROFILE
Elang'ata Wuas (phase II) group ranch (59,497 ha), located some 15 km south-west of Kajiado
Town, includes two sublocauons (Lang'ata Wuas and Toroka) in the Loodokilani location of the
Central Division. Most of the 3,000-3,500 Loodokilani Maasai live in permanent bornas
concentrated in the eastem half of the ranch. In the south-western part of the ranch most of the 16
individual ranches (12,767 ha) are carved out. Along the Toroka seasonal river the Magadi
Raiiway branch and some trading centres can be found (e.g. KMQ, Mile 46 (also named Elang'ata
Wuas T.C.), Naudot and Singiraini). Oltepesi, located along the waterpipeline providing water for
the individual ranches in the south, is a growing small centre. Primary schools can be found in
Mile 46 (since 1960), KMQ, Singiraini, Naudot and Oltepesi (also called Enchoro Esentue). Most
schools lack good facilities. Mile 46 has had a Government run hêalth centre since 1966. Churches
are mainly found in Mile 46 (CPK, AIC), KMQ (CPK, Catholic Church, PCEA), Oloolera (AIC)
and Oltepesi (CPK).
Situated in the Rift Valley borderzone, the altitude varies considérable from 1,800 m in the east to
1,100 m in the west. Rainfall is between 450-500 mm annually. The ranch is in agro-climatic zone
V. Mean annual températures are from 19°C to 23°C rising towards the west. A wide variety in
landforms can be found (hills, plateaus, undulating plains). Soils are also diverse, but mainly
Chromic Cambisols (well-drained moderately deep, dark reddish brown stony clay loams).
The Vegetation is dominated by woodland & bushland in the west and some wooded & bushed
grassland in the east. Open grasslands can be found in the central and north-eastern parts.
Especially Comiphon africana, Acacia lortilis and grasses like Pennisetum meaanum, Sporobolus
marginatus and pelusides, Cenchrus cilliaris, Chloris roxburghiana and Cynodon äactylon are
abundant. In the periodically flooded valleys grasslands are highly productive.
Seasonal swamps are a common feature on the southern side of the Group Ranch and of major
importance for the provision of water to people, livestock and wildlife in the wet and dry seasons
(e.g Lake Loonkujit, Emparbal Naibor, Kaponko, Emparbal Olkarkari).
Toroka river is the most important seasonal river in the Group Ranch. Running along the
northern part of the ranch it ends at Lake Kaponko in the south-western part of the Group Ranch.
In Elang'ata Wuas group ranch boreholes, sub-surface dams and wells have been constructed
which are owned privately or communally. Pans are the most widespread water facility. Boreholes
are also very common. They are concentrated in Orpirikata, two (not functioning) are communally
owned and the rest are private. There are other boreholes at Ndupa and on the way to Mile 46
trading centre. Wells are very common in KMQ in the Toroka river, near Mile 46 and near
Naudot.
Livestock keeping in Elang'ata Wuas is primarily characterized by trekking the animais for
watering from the far south to the far east in cyclical periods of three to four days in the drier
months of the year. This is necessary because the south-westem comer, used as a dry season
grazing area for group ranch members and individual ranchers alike, lacks watering points.
Another dry season area for the livestock owners living near Singiraini and Mile 46 is in the
notth-western comer of the ranch. Pastures in neighbouring Kilonito group ranch are ftequented all
the year round. Livestock diseases include ECF (around KMQ and the eastem border only), F&M,
Blackquarter for cattle and Footrot, Brucellosis for shoats. Dips are widespread but, due to lack of
water, hardly ever operate. New breeds of cattle have been inttoduced like Sahiwal, Friesian,
Ayrshire, Guemsey, Jersey, Hereford, Charolais for cattle and Galla goats, Blackheaded Persian
sheep and Dorper sheep. Poultry keeping and apiculture can also be seen.
Gazelles, giraffes, zebra, ostrich, hyenas and wolves are the most common wild animais.
Lions, léopards and cheetah are also present and make frequent attacks on livestock, especially on
the western side of the group ranch.
Cultivation is on the increase although success is limited. Limestone nüning concentrâtes in
KMQ. Individuals also engage in marble mining. Others seil sand at a mere Ksh. 100/- a truck.
Four women's groups are active in steer-fattening, cultivation and handicrafts.



















Figure 8.8 Elang'ata Wuas Group Ranch
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LORNGOSUA GROUP RANCH PROFILE
Lomgosua (phase ni) group ranch (38,282 ha) is situated soutb of Elang'ata Wuas group ranch
covenng Ruanje and Lorngosua sublocations of Lomgosua Location, Centtal Division. It Stretches
westwatds from Bissel Trading centre (not included in the ranch) located some 30 km south of
Kajiado Town on the road to Namanga. Some 3,000-4,000 Matapato Maasai live on the ranch.
Along the northern border with Enkaroni and Elang'ata Wuas group ranches some individual
ranches can be found.
Two trading centres, Lorngosua where the first shop was constructed in 1958 and Ilmotio (1965)
serve as purchasing centres for several food and household items. Lorngosua is situated in the
centre of the ranch and Ilmotio on the western border. These shops acquire their items from Bissel
Trading Centre in the east. Lomgosua primary school was started in 1979, followed in 1982 by
Ilmotio. There are no dispensaties in Lorngosua group ranch. A World Vision sponsored mobile
clinic has been paying only monthly visits since 1988. The sick have to trek all the way to Bissel
dispensaty for attention. Two churches have appeared in the area smce the mid-1980s; one at
Lomgosua and another at Ilmotio. Roads are few and not tarmacked yet. Vehicles can hardly use
the few existing roads during the rainy season.
Lomgosua group ranch has an undulating landscape with a few isolated hills (Lemeipoti, Ruanji,
Laasur, Longai, Kipokot). As in Elang'ata Wuas group ranch the altitude falls from the east (1,750
m) towards the west (1,350 m). Rainfall is higher than in Elang'ata Wuas, ranging from 500 to
600 mm annually. Most of the ranch is in agro-climatic zone V. The main soils are well drained,
very deep sandy loam to clay orthic luvisols in the west, chromic luvisols in the east of the ranch.
The lauer soil type also occurs in the central part mixed with imperfectly drained clayish eutric
planosols. The hilly parts are covered with mainly friable, stony clay loam eutric regosols.
The végétation on the ranch shows a wide variation the principal types being bushed grassland,
wooded grassland among scattered patches of open grassland. Acacia species are abundant as is
Balanttis aegyptica (Maasai name: lorngosua), Commiphora africana and grasses like Pennisetum
mezanium and Themeda triandra.
Several seasonal rivers (e.g. the Ruanji, Olmorkeya and Isinon) cover most parts of the ranch.
In the northern région several swamps can be found in the rainy seasons after the flooding of
these rivers. In the Isinon river World Vision has built a dam. Several small and a few large pans
(near Ilmotio and Enchorro) have also been dug holding water from 2 weeks up to 4 months after
the rains. North and south of Ruanji hills, near Bissel and west of Lorngosua centre, several wells
have been dug. Often labour from Tanzania is hired for this time-consuming job. Some of these
wells are very abundant and provide water al the year round. Lomgosua ranchers also make use of
wells in Bartimaro group ranch Qlmarba wells). In 1957 a borehole was constructed in Lorngosua
centte.
Dry season grazing areas are found on the neighbouring Osilalei group ranch as well as towards
the south-east of Lomgosua centre. In this area water is scarce and ECF prevalent. Other common
diseases are CBPP and Anaplasmosis. Unfortunately no operaüonal dip is available. The people
use hand-spraying pumps. These are said to be little effective in tick control. The commonest wild
animais on the ranch are giraffes, gazelle's, elands, impalas, hyenas and foxes. These species do
not pose a serious problem to the livestock economy.
Cultivation is increasing although the plots are small and receive minimal attention due to the
amount of attention required for livestock keeping.
Lomgosua area has only one women's group which is not functioning well if at all.
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METO GROUP RANCH PROFILE
Meto (phase III) group ranch (28,928 kmz) is situated in South Matapato Location, Centtal
Division of Kajiado District, bordering Tanzania. Approximately 2,750 Matapato Maasai live on
this ranch. Originally Meto group ranch included adjacent Oldoinyo Orok group ranch as well. In
the process of splitting the ranch 12 individual ranches were formed (3 at Empukani, 2 at
Oloshoibor, l at Kumpa and 5 at Oloirimirimi).
Meto trading centre has 5 shops, a dispensary, a priraary school and a village polytechnic. The
CPK Anglican Church has a building here, They also run the Maasai Rural Training Centre sub-
station. Enkeju e Lerai has only one shop, a nursery school and a CPK church. Other
dénominations have planned to establish themselves in Empukani (Baptist Church), Oloshoibor
(African Inland Church) and Kumpa (PCEA). Roads in the area are virtually non-existent, except
for a junction between Bissel and Meto.
On Meto group ranch three distinct land units can be distinguished, namely; the plains (Empukani
and Oloshoibor in the south, Oloirimirimi and Kumpa in the north-east and Iltirpen in the south-
western area of the ranch); the gently sloping hills (e.g. Noohatuani where Meto trading centre is
located, Olgos, Olkiu and Enkeresuna); and lastly the hills (Lempalakai in the north, Muntarakua
and Kukuo in the south-west; Losirua, Ruanje Kipaipiyoi and Parmung'at in the north-west.
Lolayioni, Sambu, Loltiamiloi and Nemampuli hills are located in the central région). The ranch
varies ui altitude between 1,479 m to 2,100 m. The average rainfall is 600 mm annually.
Most of the soils are a combination of well drained, deep reddish brown sandy clay loara
chromic luvisols and imperfectly drained black, very firm clay eutric pianosols. Vegetation is
almost entirely bushed grassland. Cenchrus cilliaris (African foxtail grass) and Pennisetum
metianum (bamboo grass) are abundant perennial grasses. Acacia tortilis, Oclmum americanum
and Aspillia mozambicensis are the most abundant (rees available. Low and unreliable rainfall
accounts for tuft grass which has a low nutritional value. This is worsened by quite high
températures parücularly in the Ruanje région and in the Enkeresuna where the végétation dries up
rapidly.
All the streams on the Meto group ranch are seasonal. There are a few pans, the most important
one being at Empukani which provides water for a few months after the rains. During the rains the
people and their animais get water from pot holes along the stream beds. There are 3 individual
boreholes and one Kumpa Community borehole. Some wells are also found at Kukuo, Laasur,
Mishiye and Noonkinye. However, these wells frequently dry up. Many people get their water
from Tanzanian springs like the Looretet, Olchorroibor, Lolarrashi, Entapitipi and others. These
water facilities are quite fat away and unreliable. The people living in Enkeresuna water their
animais at points as far as 40 kilomètres away, for example at Ilmarba wells. The Laasur, Kukuo,
Noonkinye and the Mishiye wells dry up frequently.
According to key-informants the MRTC at Meto has fostered improved and commercially based
livestock farming in the area. It has also introduced better subsistence cultivation methods. Many
families have adopted the practice of cultivaüng small gardens where beans and maize are grown
to supplement their diet. This is taking place at a fast rate and some areas like Olkiu which had
not done this before are now doing so.
The problem of disease and pests is also quite dominant. East Coast fever, Black water, Foot
and Mouth and many others have caused much loss of cattle in the years 1972-4 and 1982-84.
Figure 8.9 Lorngosua Group Ranch
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PARTITION, TRANSFER AND MORTGAGE OF LAND IN
SUBDIVEDED GROUP RANCHES IN KAJIADO DISTRICT
9.1 Introduction
In this chapter we will present quantitative data concerning the partition,
transfer and mortgage of land in Olkinos, Embolioi, Empuyiankat, Kitengela
and Poka subdivided group ranches. In addition, improvements made by the
new private ranch owners will be discussed. Both issues are among the most
important arguments used by- opponents and supporters of individual
landownership, respectively. A review of expériences of this process of
changing communal into individually owned land among groups in other
countries will also be presented.
The threat of and the actual sale of land is the most highly debated topic of
today in Kajiado District (see e.g. Pasha 1986, Tobiko 1989a, Dietz & Kutten
1989, Kajiado Focus 1991 a). Por Olkinos and Embolioi we are able to relate
the official land transactions with the characteristics of the households which
we have collected and presented above to gain a better understanding of this
subject. Developments taking place in areas of Kiboko, Elang'ata Wuas,
Lorngosua and Meto not yet subdivided as well as on individually owned
ranches will be used as a base of référence. Before turning to the outcome of
this analysis, the legal procedures concerning the partitioning, selling and
charging of land will be ouüined.
9.1.1 Land Control Board Procedure
According to the Land Control Act, anybody wishing to subdivide, transfer or
mortgage land in his or her possession has to obtain consent from the Land
Control Board of the District. Land Control Boards are purely administrative
bodies whose function is to grant or to refuse consent of particular transactions
brought before them. They cannot and do not have the power to choose
between competing purchasers for the same parcel of land. Land Control
Boards haveuo power to alter contracts agreed upon between two parties.
Kajiado District has three Divisional Land Control Boards: the Purka Land
Control Board covering Magadi and Central Division; the Oloolaiser Land
Control Board for Ngong Division and the Loitokitok Land Control Board for
the division of that name. The Board is headed by the Kajiado District
Commissioner and its members are local Maasai leaders (e.g. councillors,
chiefs, individual ranchers). Board members are supposed to be "watch guards"
in helping the Boards to reach just décisions.
Figure 8.10 Meto Group Ranch In principle the Purka Land Control Board has a meeting every month in
Kajiado Town where the applicants present their cases. Applicants have to
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show the title deed of the plot and explain the intention of the intended
partition, mortgage or transfer of land to the Board The Board will not give
consent if it is of the opinion that the parcel is too small to be split, if division
would be into too many new parcels, too large a portion of land would be sold
or the price offered was too low. Sometimes the head of the household is told
to bring his family to the next Board meeting. If money had changed hands
before consent from the Land Board was sought the transfer will be declared
illegal and will not be accepted.
After consent for subdivision is obtained the owner présents this approval to
the district or any other licensed surveyor who prépares mutation forms. After
conducting the démarcation the forms are registered with the Land Registrar
who issues new parcel numbers. The Land Control Board has to be consulted
anew if the owner wants to transfer one of these partitioned parcels to a buyer
or to his heir. If consent is obtained a transfer document is prepared and new
title deeds issued by the Office of the Land Registrar. Transfers include selling
and gifte mainly by inheritance.
Tafole 9.1 Kajiado District Lands Department Activities 1979-89


























































source KDAK 1979MKn9sü, KDDF 1985 139, MOE7AK7I9B9, MatlStlcal Abstract 1982 and
1988
Note: new titles are mainly the result of subdivisions Title deeds and lease certificates are
documents handed out to the rightnil owner after payment of a fee
The amount of work for the Purka Land Control Board has risen enormously
in the last years. In 1984 a total number of 164 cases (including renewed
applications) for subdivision, transfer or charging of land were dealt with. This
figure remained more or less the same for 1985 (203) and 1986 (187). In 1987,
after subdivision starled, it more than doubled to 398 requests. The following
year it stabilized at 381 cases dealt with. Lastly, in 1989, another doubling
occurred placing the total number of applications at 756.
By 1978 4,929 titles were registered in Kajiado District rising to as many as
18,918 titles by 1988. Most of these, however, are in the Ngong and Loitokitok
régions. The issue of title deeds for the whole of Kajiado District is done by
the Kajiado District Lands Department. The Department's work dépends
mostiy on the land transactions approved by the three operative Divisional
Land Control Boards and records received from the Land Adjudication
Department (see table 9.1).
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9.2 Land Actions Performed by the New Kaputiei Land
Owners
9.2.1 Fragmentation of Parcels by the New Kaputiei Individual Ranchers
From table 9.2 we learn that since the Olkinos group ranch split up in
September 1986 -subsequently followed by Embolioi, Empuyiankat, Kitengela
and Poka group ranches- some 36.7 per cent out of a total of 757 new Kaputiei
individual ranchers applied to further subdivide their privately owned parcel up
until February 1990. In terms of the affected area this amounts to 34.7 per cent
of former group ranch land. The average period for the 757 members during
which they had the opportunity to apply for subdivision was only 30 months.
Reasons for applying for further subdivision were varied. In a number of
cases subdivision was in order to acquire more title deeds which, if needed,
could be inherited by the sons, widows, unmarried or divorced daughters.
Another reason for subdividing a ranch was for obtaining a loan by using the
land as collatéral. Although the whole of the plot could be mortgaged a small
part of the ranch is preferred as it avoids the risk of losing the entire parcel in
case of a failure to meet loan repayments. Finally, subdivision is a condition
for anybody wishing to seil part of his land. Tables 9.2, 9.3 and 9.4 provide an
overview of the applications made to partition, transfer and mortgage land in
the former group ranches of Olkinos, Embolioi, Empuyiankat, Kitengela and
Poka, up to February 1990. Appendix 9.1 shows the maps of the latter ranches.
In principle, the Land Control Board will allow nobody to seil all of his land
and become landless. Among the cases rejected were those with no rationale
for subdivision or transfer, family members who were opposed to thé idea, or
others who had too small a parcel too small to be subdivided or sold. Still,
several cases have been found in which original rejections were allowed later
with or without amendments having been made. Some key-informants stated
that most requests for subdivision are made for thé sale of parcels and less for
inheritance or for mortgage. This seems to be confirmed by thé actions of the
members of the earliest subdivided Olkinos group ranch. Some 68.5 per cent
(37 out of 54 Olkinos members whose applications for subdivision were
consented to) subsequently asked permission to seil one or more lots of their
fragmented plot. Other acts undertaken by this group of 54 Olkinos farmers
were thé giving of gifts (5.6 per cent), mortgage (9.3 per cent) and further
subdivision (1.9 per cent) leaving 14.7 per cent of them undertaking no action
as yet.' From this it may be concluded that thé primary requests for
subdivision made to thé Land Control Board are intended to enable thé selling
of one of the new titles rather for loan acquisition or inheritance.
In addition three members chargea thé whole of their plot
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Figure 9.1 Olkinos Partitioned Parcels as at February 1990
388 Setting Wealth to Buy Poverty Chapter 9: Partition, Transfer and Mortgage of Land 389
Figure 9.1 shows the acceded fragmented parcels on the former Olkinos group
ranch by February 1990. The map includes the ranches divided once as well as
the parcels that were split, sold, fragmented anew and resold. Parcels as small
as l acre can now be found in the Olkinos area. For example one rancher sold
25 acres, which was subsequently further subdivided in 15 portions of 6 acres
(1), 2 acres (5) and l acre (9), and transferred to 14 immigrants.
9.2.2 Transfer of Land Among the New Kaputiei Individual Ranchers
After partitioning the individual ranch it becomes possible to transfer part of it
to a willing buyer or an heir. Table 9.3 shows that 16.0 per cent of the new
Kaputiei individual owners made the effort to fill in land transfer application
forms and défend their requests before the Land Control Board. This happened
within an average period of 25 months. By February 1990 11.1 per cent of the
ranchers had obtained consent to transfer 1,977 ha of land, either as a sale or a
gift, and this was 2.7 per cent of the total subdivided group ranch area. The
willingness to transfer land on Kitengela group ranch is astonishing. One out of
seven Kitengela ranchers applied to transfer part of the individual ranch within
a short period of only 9 months!
Tables 9.4 and 9.5 provide information on the number of sellers, acreage,
price and the ethnicity of the buyers for already acceded and pending transfers,
respectively. So far 78 Maasai, equivalent to 10.3 per cent of the total number
of former group members sold 1,728 ha or 2.4 per cent of their original group
ranch land in return for Ksh. 18,525,205/-. In addition 39 people (5.2 per cent)
are waiting for consent before selling another 823 ha for a total of Ksh.
9,907,000/-. In other words 110 ex-group ranch members (14.5 percent), have
sold or are in the process of selling 2,551 ha or 3.5 per cent of former group
ranch land at a price of Ksh. 28,427,205/-.2 This is the equivalent of an
average land price of Ksh. 11.144/- per hectare. On average, the households
will have earned Ksh. 258,4297- from the sale of land. Figure 9.2 shows the
Olkinos inhabitants who sold part of their land.
It should be noted that the sale of land does not have a constant pattern but is
radier one of "boom and slump". This is illustrated by table 9.6. Apparentiy an
initial selling out by those who want to do so is followed by others some time
later. Pioneer sellers show up again after some time.
2 Out of a total of 117 sellers (78 consented and 39 pending) seven sold land before and are
waiting for consent to seil anolher portion, meaning that a total of 78 plus 32 members (110
members) are involved in the commercial transfer of former group ranch land. The seven second-
time sellers come from Olkinos (4), Embolioi (2) and Kitengela (1). If we exclude Poka group
ranch, as this ranch only recently subdivided, the percentage of members involved in commercial
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nurriber of persons involved in selling totals 41 instead of 36 as shown in table 9.4 because of 5
ranchers who sold anew in another year.
Our main interest, besides the extent to which subdivision and selling occurred
in the subdivided group ranches, was directed to the spécifie socio-économie
identity of the seller. Would there be a spécifie group of Maasai involved in
this practice of selling land? Which spécifie set of features could possibly be
associated with the willing-seller type of Maasai individual rancher?
For Olkinos and Embolioi we now had the opportunity to link the personal
and socio-economic characteristics of those who sold land and those who had
not. Table 9.7 summarises the présence or absence of a corrélation between the
sale of land and a whole range of personal, household or plot characteristics of
the Maasai ranchers of Olkinos and Embolioi.




























we iound a corrélation between the selling of land and dass of wealth, though
the significance level was above the 0.10 threshold (0.1165). A major problem in respect to the
wealth variable analysis is that, often pan of the money earned from the sale of land is used to
buy livestock. Also, our wealth estimate (livestock per AAME) does nol include possible other
family fortunes. Wealth stored in a bank account or in capital assets is not included.
To overcome the flrst problem we tried to relate the group of sellers to numbers of livestock
owned by them in early 1988 as recorded by the Livestock Census. For Olkinos a group of 10
sellers and 20 non-sellers could be ttaced from the original Census files. The average wealth
figures for the group of sellers was 5.86 LE/AAME for January 1988 and 6.70 LE/AAME for
January 1990. The group of 20 non-sellers, showed a similar trend in that Iheir wealth was placed
at a raean of 8.33 and 9.39 LE/AAME for 1988 and 1990, respectively. In other words, the group
of sellers seems to be less wealthy than the non-sellers although with the data available now this
cannot be statistically validated.
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The above information suggests that âge, éducation, wealth, main occupation or
size of the plot are of no sigmficance as far as the sellmg of land is concerned.
Seilers of land can be found among the young, old, literate, illiterate, nch and
poor alike. The involvement of all of these groups seems to reflect the broad
range of viable logic behind the selling of land; acquisition of capital for
Investment in productive assets, expensive consumer goods or for sheer
subsistence.
For Olkinos corrélations were found to exists between the land availability
per household member and thé selling of land. The trend is that households
increasingly seil land the more land per person is held m possession. However,
among the group of most well-off land-holding households no one is involved
in this practice. In this group of landowners the former committee-member
households are over-represented. Thus there is a strong corrélation between
committee-membership and the dislike for the selling of land No former
committee-member had sold a single pièce of land from nis own parcel by
early 1990. Some, however, had bought land from another group ranch
member and resold this shorüy afterwards with a huge profit.4
9.2.3 Mortgage of Land By the New Kaputiei Individual Ranchers
Besides offering land for sale parcels are used as collatéral when acquiring
loans from a financial institution Table 9.8 summarises the amount of land
mortgaged as well as the number and amount of the loans taken by the new
Maasai individual ranchers
Table 9.8 Original Plot Owners Mortgage of Land to Financial Institutions as
at February 1990





















































For instance, a fonner Olkmos committee-member bought 2226 ha at Ksh 110.000/- and















Percentage of land mortgaged
Road
Figure 9.3 Mortgagees of Olkmos Land as at February 1990
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Comparing the number of people and amount of land involved in mortgaging
versus selling of land makes clear that the Maasai owners seil thek land rather
than use it as collatéral to acquire money. Only 17 applicants (2.2 per cent)
intend to or actually mortgaged 1,195 ha or 1.6 per cent of the area for a loan
totalling Ksh. 4,098,000/-. Of this group two Olkinos ranchers had also sold
land and one Embolioi rancher was willing to do so. It has been suggested that
selling off land is a faster, less obstructive and more compréhensible way of
acquiring money than mortgaging one's plot. Figure 9.3 shows the 7 Olkinos
ranchers who took loans using their individually owned land as collatéral.
It is thought that the low level of loans requested is partly due to the
absolute or relative unavailability of funds but also to rejections by finance
institutions, lack of familiarity with the procedures, high interest rates and fear
of default among prospective borrowers. It is hard to know the relative
importance of each of these factors. It seems, however, that most ranchers are
simply not interested in obtaining credit. Loan rejection is estimated to be 15
per cent overall. Default among established individual ranchers is high. Also
the relative unavailability (small sums of Ksh. 5,000-50,000 only) is said to be
a handicap when a large loan is required.
Within our survey sample we found 5.6 and 1.4 per cent of the Olkinos and
Embolioi population, respectively, stating they had mortgaged parts of thek
land. This corresponds quite well with the official land mortgagees percentages
of 6.0 and 1.5 of the total population of these territories. On average
mortgagees obtained some Ksh. 30.000/- per ha. Land mortgaged amounted
from 20.0 up to 132.0 ha. Mostly Pan African Credit or the Kenya Commercial
Bank provided the loan.
We were mainly interested to know if those taking up loans by mortgaging
their land showed any special personal characteristics. Por Olkinos a positive
corrélation between thek main occupation, wealth and éducation in relation to
the mortgaging of land was found. For the seven households who had
mortgaged part of thek land six heads of households had thek main occupation
in the public sector (two politicians and two civil servants) or were self-
employed businessmen (one cattle traders and one shopkeeper). Only one
person mentioned livestock keeping as his main occupation. Rieh households
and those whose heads of households had had a higher level of éducation were
also over-represented within this group of mortgagees. It should be realized
that it is not yet clear if these characteristics are themselves the impetus or
whether they reflect the minimum requkements imposed by the lending
institutions. Former committee-members are also strongly represented within
the group of mortgagees. Thek expérience in dealing with loans will be a
possible explanation for this.
None of the established individual ranchers or buyers in our sample stated
that they had mortgaged land. However, a large number of individuals within
both of these groups stated that they had obtained a loan without using thek
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plot as collatéral (see table 9.9).5
In other words, individualization as such does not seem to have resulted in
a boom in loans taken up by the ranchers. Property located elsewhere or a well
paid job could also be used for the acquisition of a loan. For Olkinos, Maasai
having thek main occupation outside the livestock sector such as businessmen,
politicians and civil servants are now the only people responsible having a loan
and the only ones willing to take a new one. Among those ranchers who had
had a loan in the past the committee-members are strongly represented.
Table 9.9 Past, Present and Future State of Loans Among Respondents















































































Embolioi shows a different situation. Of ten current Embolioi borrowers (i.e.
including those having a loan without mortgaging land) seven stated thek main
occupation to be livestock keeping. This ratio is more or less congruent with
the Embolioi overall employment characteristics. Still, taking into account the
main occupation of the Embolioi previous and willing borrowers, totalling 5
and 11 persons respectively, the non-livestock sector is slighdy over-
represented among the group of (willing) borrowers. Otherwise no special
group involved in money-borrowing practices was found among the new
individual ranchers.
Meto and Elang'ata Wuas group ranch members seem to underline the
favourite position of the rieh and educated as the people specifically stated to
be willing to borrow in the near future. In Elang'ata Wuas the Maasai of 20 to
40 years of age are among the most interested in acquking a loan. Among
buyers and established individual ranchers there is no significant distinct group
of Maasai involved in money-borrowing.
Buyers involved in spéculation, however, did use their newly acquired plots to obtain a
loan.
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9.3 Land Buyers Personal Characteristics and Land Actions
In this section we will deal with the activities of land buyers in the Kaputiei
area in more detail. In chapter 8 information concerning ethnicity, household
size, livestock wealth and ownership of land for our small sample of buyers of
Olkinos land was presented. Now we would like to have a slightly broader
look at this group of land seekers. We will specifically study their motives and
objectives for buying land in Kajiado District. In addition, we will present their
subséquent land transfer activities after having acquired their own parcel of
land in the district.
Table 9.10 Characterisücs of Olkinos Parcel Buyers _










25 Secondary Subordinate Livestock,
Nairobi cultivation
University
45 Primary Veterinary Livestock,
officer cultivation
32 Primary Pastoralist Livestock,
culü'vation












58 Secondary Retired civil Cultivation uses tractor,
servant market crops













70 None Cultivator Cultivation children in
Kiambu
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Information presented in chapter 8 refers to those buyers who had actually
setüed on their newly acquired land. Of 9 buyers interviewed in the Olkinos
area 3 were Maasai and 6 non-Maasai. Table 9.10 summarises some relevant
details concerning the buyers' background such äs ethnicity, place of origin,
résidence, âge, éducation, main occupation and use of newly acquired plot.
The information provided in table 9.10 for setüed buyers suggests that thèse
are not the most poor of Kenya's society. Moreover, as stated by some of the
elders, they receive financial support from their children. None of the Kikuyu
kept livestock. It has been suggested that fear of cattle rusüing by the Maasai
was preventing them from doing so. As stated before, most buyers of Olkinos
territory had not yet settled at the time of survey. A generalization of the
Characteristics of the settled group will therefore be a rather biased picture of
the buyers in Kajiado District.
In the tables 9.4 and 9.5 facts concerning land dealings for all buyers from
Olkinos and other group ranches were presented. Although we lacked details
about the level of éducation, âge, main occupation and the like, ethnicity was
known and any subséquent action taken in respect of the fragmentation,
transfer or mortgage of land. Key-informants were able to provide some
background information on this group of buyers both Maasai and non-Maasai.
Out of a total of 37 plots sold to non-Maasai on Olkinos group ranch all but
6 were acquired by Kikuyu. Two land-buying companies, 2 Kamba, l Kalenjin
and l Arab also bought land. The latter was said to have plans for small
industry. Among the Kikuyu buyers were rieh businessmen, civil servants and
some less well-off. The Maasai who bought 9 plots in Olkinos were mosûy
former Olkinos group members, individual ranchers, civil servants and local
politicians.
Among thé 8 Maasai buyers of land in Embolioi were a local hotel-owner,
a teacher, a Land Control Board member and some individual ranchers. A total
of 18 plots was sold to non-Maasai. Only one Indian was among thé group of
otherwise Kikuyu buyers. This man had settied and cultivated beans mainly. In
fact, Embolioi is better-known for ils (informai) selling of land to Indian
gypsum miners. Most of these are Indians living in Nairobi who 'buy' land per
acre for some Ksh. lO.OOO/- to Ksh. 20.000/-. The acquired plots are exploited
in their strip mining business using bulldozers and shovels.6
Gypsum (hydrated calcium sulphate) is a basic ingrediënt in the cement industry, in
fertilizers, in piaster materials and the like. Production in the area starled in 1968 (see TARDA
1984:33). By early 1985 it was estimated that some 2,000 acres had been laid to waste (see KT
28/03/85). In an earlier article the estimate presented had been only 70 acres (see KT 28/11/84).
Local workers receive some Ksh. 30A to 50/- per day, depending on their productivity. On a
monthly basis people may make up to Ksh. 1,500/-. By the mid-1980s land was leased for some
Ksh. 130/- to 150/- per day (see KT 28/11/84). The Indian miner managed to get some Ksh.
l.OOO/- to Ksh. 1.500/- per tons, of which some 10 per cent was paid to the then still-functioning
Embolioi group ranch (see KT 28/03/85).
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The major negative aspect of thjs work is that it turns the pastures into
wastelands of waterfilled low dépressions, dotted by rocky, man-made hills.
Ironically, Embolioi Maasai themselves are involved in this practice by
offering their labour to sift through the soil to collect pièces of gypsum. Some
résidents do not bother so much about the environmental dégradation because
the basins act as small pans. The animais, however, do not seem to like the
collected water from these dépressions so much as it is too salty.
In Empuyiankat all non-Maasai buyers were Kikuyu with one woman
buying three parcels. None of them had setüed by that time. Authorisation was
given to the sale of land m Kitengela and that was also mostly sold to Kikuyu
in the event.
The relationship of cultivators with the soil is much more direct than for
pastoralists. In fact, for the latter, digging the earth is a sign of poverty. In
contrast cultivators actually work the soil and directly use the produce grown
from it.
Davison (1987:19) quotes a Kikuyu woman stating that "Without land we
are nothing". She recalls, how prior to British involvement, land among the
Kikuyu was perceived as a sacred, generative resource belonging to their
ancestors. The introduction of land registration (i.e. the Swynnerton Plan)
during the 1950s resulted m a precedence of individual landownership vested
in males heads of households which marginalized the usufruct rights of
women. Only after Independence were women allowed to own land. With the
recent introduction of land sales in the Kikuyu area women began to worry
about land security and tensions between neighbours and even family members
erupted over land. The unconditional provision of credit for land purchase was
proposed to ameliorate this situation (see Davison 1987:26). In addition to land
as a necessary resource for making a living, several writers and key-informants
mentioned the aspect of a certain obsession among the Kikuyu for acquiring
land at all costs as land is considered to be the only true indication of wealth.
In the Ngong area, Kikuyu women groups are also active, as land buyers.
Maas (1986:29-52) has reported for a Kiambu Kikuyu women group stating
that "it's always a good thing to have land". Initially, the group worked
together to improve their houses After that almost all the group's income was
invested in the acquisition of land. However, this was not used for farming
purposes. According to Maas the group was simply investing money in land
for status and spéculation and as a security for old age. This last reason was
mostly to strengthen the position of the women within their families (vis-à-vis
their daughters mainly) and to lessen their dependence on their sons and
daughters-in-law.
Out of the 46 plots bought in Olkinos 6 have been further subdivided into 30
new plots. Tables 9.11 and 9.12 provide information about the actions taken by
the buyers of land concerning the juridical status of their newly acquired plots.
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Second time transfers had also occurred as two Maasai owners resold their
newly purchased parcels to new non-Maasai buyers. Three people mortgaged
their land.
So far 8 new owners in Olkinos, Embolioi and Empuyiankat subdivided 11
plots totalling 408 ha into 90 new ones. They furthermore resold 9 plots or 61
ha and mortgaged 6 parcels totalling 124 ha. It therefore seems that, for the
moment these new buyers prefer to mortgage twice the amount of land that
they would offer for sale. Apparently, selling for spéculative reasons is not
much done. However, when analyzing the pending transfers and mortgages
another picture émerges. An extra total of 61 ha is being offered for sale while
only 4 ha is being offered as collatéral for a loan. In other words, selling and
mortgaging seems to be equally frequently performed practices among the
group of primary buyers. As we have seen this is quite different from the
initial (Maasai) sellers.
Besides those seeking a quick fortune by way of spéculation (some Maasai,
an Empuyiankat Kikuyu women and land-buying companies mainly), the
majority of the buyers seem to be land conscious and development oriented,
Maasai and non-Maasai alike. In fact, some of the Maasai who sold only
recently purchased land used their profits to invest them in acquiring double
this amount of land. Within our sample of 9 buyers the Maasai from Kiserian
offered his 50 acres to a willing Indian buyer at a price of Ksh. 700,000/- in
February 1990. This parcel of land had been bought from an Olkinos resident
in March 1988 for only Ksh. 150.000/-!
To illustrate this land-consciousness we could also refer to thé construction
of the Kiserian-Isinya road. Among Maasai politicians a quarrel emerged when
one of them tried to change the initial plans and redraw the road's location to
run closely along his parcel of land. Others backed by a Maasai government
top-official, opposed this move. Now the road trespasses over land recently
bought by the latter. In this way the development of the plot or its eventual
sale will be much more profitable!
Unfortunately, the original Maasai landowners had underestimated the value
of what they had once owned. Let us have a look at the use they made of the
money they had obtained from these sales.
9.4 Use of Loans and Money Obtained from the Sale of Land
A most interesting issue was to acquire information concerning the utilization
of the proceeds of the sale of land and loans taken. Would the Maasai involved
indeed devote this money to productive Investments? Do différences exist
between sellers and mortgagees? Did Maasai or non-Maasai buyers invest in
thé same way? Or was the money used for other purposes, possibly even
outside Kajiado District?
Information from key-informants had made clear that analyzing thèse issues
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would be a difficult exercise. In addition to thé usual reluctance to open one's
books on monetary dealings, the overall disapproval of land sale repeatedly
aired by a number of individuals and institutions outside and within thé Maasai
society has given this practice a stigma. Those land-selling Maasai who rather
consumed tue proceeds instead of making structural improvements on their
ranch would not be very willing to show their records.
Table 9.13 clearly shows that, after individualization, increasing numbers of
Maasai ranchers in Olkinos, Embolioi and established Kajiado individual
ranchers alike made improvements after thé individualization of
landownership.7 In Olkinos, for example, the percentage of people involved in
infrastructural improvements rosé from 21 to 56 per cent of all Olkinos
ranchers. Embolioi group ranch percentages rose from a mère 8 to 45. Those
ranchers who did not make improvements after obtaining their own parcel
mosüy stated a lack of financial resources or thé fact they had not yet settied.
Among thé group of buyers a similarly high percentage of infrastructural
improvements made could be observed. Unfortunately, we lack detailed
information concerning thé construction of facilities by individuals on thé
ranches not yet subdivided.8







- lack of finance
- lack of knowledge






































































b = before individualisation; a = after individualization
It should be clear that thé figures do not gwe information about thé total number and kind
of improvements made. Moreover, they do not show thé total number of farmers who made an
unprovement over both periods. The main aim is to show thé change in thé relative number of
ranchers involved in establishmg one or more improvements before the time of subdivision as
compared to after subdivision
8 It is known that two groups of Mélo Maasai of 4 and 8 people, took thé initiative of
drilling a borehole. Some opposition existed to this as it was feared that land was being claimed
before thé process of subdivision was to Start. Still, all group members now make use of the
boreholes by paying a small fée.
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Table 9.14 Corrélation of Infrastructural Improvements Made Before and


























yes no yes no
5% 18% 0% 5%
2% 75% 1% 94%
7% 31% 1% 40%
0% 62% 0% 59%
source: autnor's survey
Note: the group of non-sellers excludes ranchers who mortgaged land. The group of non-
mortgagees excludes the sellers.
Confronted with the increase in the Implementation of improvements, we are
interested to evaluate the effect of the title deed by comparing sellers and
mortgagees with non-sellers and non-mortgagees (see table 9.14).
For both groups, sellers and non-sellers, an increase can be recorded in the
number of ranchers who made improvements. For example, for Olkinos 18 per
cent of the ranchers -excluding mortgagees- made an improvement After
subdivision this increased to 44 per cent. However, the rise in Olkinos ranchers
involved in improvements is significantly higher among the group of sellers.
Before subdivision they made up 33 per cent of the improvers or 6 per cent of
all ranchers. Afterwards this rose to 55 per cent or 24 per cent of all ranchers.
Por the group of Olkinos mortgagees a less clear picture emerged. Although
overall the number of people involved in improvements grew from 23 to 38
per cent, the relative portion of mortgagees did not (notably).
For Embolioi ranchers in particular the effects of selling on possible
improvements made is also questionable. The relative position of the sellers
before and after individualization stands at 20 and 22 per cent of the group of
people who invested in improving the infrastructure. For Embolioi mortgagees
these figures were 0.0 and 2.5 per cent. In other words, non-sellers and non-
mortgagees seem, in général, to be just as development oriented.
Table 9.15 Source of Finance for Infrastructural Improvements (abs)
Source of finance Olkinos Embolioi Ind. R. Kap.























































source: autnor s survey
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Table 9.15 shows the sources of finance used for the improvements. A similar,
if not even more important question concerns the kind of infrastructural
improvements made. Are these investments those to increase the carrying
capacity of the ranch such as pans, boreholes or fences? Table 9.16 présents an
overview of the number of ranchers who constructed such facilities.


















































































































































source: autnor s survey
b = before individualization; a = after individualization
figures refer to (hè absolute number of respondent« involved in the construction of a particular
kind of facility. The total number of improvements will be slightly higher as sorne people erected,
for instance, two modern houses.
For the majority the building of a modern house seems to have been the most
favoured endeavour. Fences -for shambas mainly- sprayraces and pans
followed though some way behind. Boreholes were not erected, the costs
involved being probably too high.9 In contrast, the established individual
ranchers were in a much better position in respect to the supply of water and
dips alike.
The group of buyers mostly invest in fences and tanks. Their small plots
allow them to do so more easily. Watertanks are used for human consumption
and the roofcatchments of their newly erected modern houses are used to fill
these tanks.
In other words, as far as the Olkinos and Embolioi Maasai are concerned, it
can be concluded that the apparently positive effect of group ranch subdivision
in respect of the amount of infrastructural improvements should be diluted to
Drilling a borehole costs some Ksh. 220.QOO/-. Additional funds are needed for a pump
(Ksh. 96,000) and diesel. Moreover the risk of failure exists. Fencing a 40 ha plot with barbed
wire and pôles will cost some Ksh. 150.000/-. If all neighbours participate this sum of money
could at best be halved. For erecting a modern house one needs some Ksh. 100.000/-.
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some degree as most investments in infrastructure are in consumer facilities
such as modern houses and less in dips or boreholes.
Among the group of Olkinos ranchers who made improvements before
subdivision, mortgagees of land and wealthy (stratum III) livestock owners
were over-represented (see table 9.17). Some 66.7 per cent of the mortgagees
had made some improvement before subdivision. More specifically all of them
had dug a pan, whereas among the group of non-mortgagees, no-one had. For
Embolioi these relationships could not be confirmed.
Table 9.17 Statistically Significant Corrélations Between Improvements





















































Note: "AU improvements" includes, houses, boreholes, pumps, dips, sprayraces, wells, tanks, pans,
dams but excludes fences.
When considering the effected improvements after subdivision we can see that
Olkinos sellers of land were over-represented among those who made an
improvement on their ranch. This group was also mostly involved in fencing.
This is also the case for those who built a house (37.2 per cent of the sellers as
compared to 23.4 per cent of the non-sellers). This latter relationship was,
however, not significant. Olkinos ranchers who constructed a pan after
subdivision can mainly be found among the educated and those Maasai having
their main occupation outside pastoralism. Before subdivision this was mainly
done by those ranch members who, after subdivision, mortgaged their land (i.e.
mainly committee members). Por tank constructors no special group was
found.
For Embolioi the group of non-educated Maasai was most significant
among those who invested in some kind of improvement after subdivision.
This relationship was also found to be significant for the érection of a fence
after subdivision. Before subdivision the group of "non-pastoralists" was
mostiy involved in this latter aspect.
The relations sketched above can also be specifically viewed from the angle of
those who fenced, sold or mortgaged land. It has often been propagated that
the fencing of rangelands would start a shift towards the capitalization of
livestock production and include a process of intensification resulting in higher
productivity.
So far, Olkinos and Embolioi members have not fenced their ranches.
Enclosures have been erected only for ol-okeri and shamba. Olkinos ranchers
who fenced after subdivision are mainly among the group of educated Maasai
and land sellers. Por Embolioi this latter relationship was not found to be
Statistically significant. Instead, ranchers who were occupied outside the
livestock sector were mostiy among the group of fencers. This relationship was
also valid for the group of educated Embolioi heads of households. The single
corrélation found between Olkinos after-subdivision-fencers and infrastructural
improvements made was in the construction of pans (10 per cent of the fencers
did so, whereas none of the non-fencers did). Two out of six before-
subdivision-fencers constructed a tank whereas none of the non-fencers. Por
Embolioi none of these relations were found.
With respect to sellers and mortgagees of land and infrastructural
improvements made it was found that the Olkinos mortgagees were over-
represented in before-subdivision construction of pans and fences. After
subdivision the group of Olkinos sellers were mainly seen among those who
constructed some kind of improvement and fencing.
We now come to a review of the spending of money for other than
infrastructural improvements. In chapter 8 we already mentioned ranchers
using the proceeds from the selling of land to buy livestock instead of
destocking their ranch (see section 8.4.3). In the words of an Olkinos rancher
who remarked that hè had been lucky to have procured some land at the time
of the group ranch's subdivision, 'I feel I should seil part of my land to buy
animais, cultivate a pièce of land and finally get married'. He had already
found some willing buyers but the selling process was still proceeding.
Another Olkinos landowner involved in the cattle trekking business on the
route from Emali to Ngong livestock markets said he wanted to seil all of the
plot and leave the area. The same intention was aired by an Olkinos medicine
man and his brother both roaming in Maasailand. Two other brothers of these
men had sold land and ended up drinking beer in Isinya pubs. Another Olkinos
respondent admitted that hè had sold land to use the money for drinking.
This practice of selling land and misusing the proceeds is often criticized.
For example, one Maasai observer stated 'we are selling land but instead of
developing the remaining portion, we rush to buy Peugeots which are parked at
bars, awaiting to take home the owner after "gulping" the proceeds from land
transactions. The vehicle may drive you home or equally to death' (see Kajiado
Focus 1991a:10).
This statement does not stand alone and has also been aired by key
informants within the Maasai society, offïcers within the Ministry of Livestock
Development and by the national newspapers (see e.g. DN 15/01/87 and
Standard 31/08/87). In some cases the Land Control Board has told applicants
for land transfer to disappear and apply anew the moment they were sober.
Another Olkinos Maasai, coming to grasp the finite character of the amount of
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land that could be sold, offered the same portion of his land to various people.
He was ordered by the Purka Land Control Board to stop this practice. To
avoid getting involved, Maasai sometimes illegally "seil" their land without
going through the Land Control Board procedures (see DN 23/01/87). Once the
buyer realises his position he needs a lot of time and effort to recover his
frequently squandered money. Nonetheless, sometimes he will succeed or even
end up as the legal landowner as a compensation for the money lost! Some
key-informants stated that potential buyers sometimes followed this strategy on
purpose.
We tried to check the complaint about "buying cars" by analyzing the
number of cars in possession and the time of their purchase. Table 9.18 shows
the percentage of respondents for each of the survey locations, including the
total number bought -some owned more than one car.
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Note: information for time of purchase is lacking for some of the Kaputiei and Loodokilani cars.
The favourable position held by the established individual ranchers is clearly
shown. Whereas Olkinos members did possess a reasonable number of cars
before the first sale of land, Embolioi car ownership is of more recent date.
However, by correlating the land sellers with the recent car owners, no valid
relationship could be found. Most car owners belong to the "rieh" wealth
stratum.
Land held under private ownership was seen as a prerequisite, or at least a
major incentive for raising consciousness concerning responsible use of
resources. Improved range management by destocking the ranch, the
introduction of rotational grazing, the burning of the pastures, the planting of
trees and the growing and provision of extra feed was expected to be
increasingly implemented. Table 9.19 shows that the percentage of ranchers
who applied these improvements before and after the start of subdivision (i.e.
1987) is very modest. Burning pastures to get rid of ticks and eradicate shrubs
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and poor grasses which will then be replaced by young fresh herbage was
feared for the possibility of things getting out of control or for a failure of the
rains.
Sena (1990:67) has argued for the planting of belts of trees and the growing
of napier grass as supplementary feeding. Potter (1989:14-18) questions this
latter option as he does commercial reseeding and hay-making. Instead in situ
ranch conservation and the planting of sorghum should provide additional
sources of fodder. Commercial feeds are too expensive and will resuit in
unprofitable holdings, especially for beef cattle. Only strategie supplementary
feeding to female cattle of 1-2 kg per day during the post-calving period could
ensure reconception as soon as possible. Improved breeds could also be
supported in this way. These have a rather poor tolérance of the conditions in
Kajiado District so, to raise the likelihood of their survival, they could be
given a high quality diet (see Potter 1989:18). Mention has been made of the
option of mixing in chicken dung as a means of extra feeding (see van Klinken
Conf. file paper. A more detailed account of processes of intensification and
diversification of the Maasai livestock economy is provided in chapter 10.

























































































Note: Maasai pastoralists provide leaves of spécifie trees (e.g. olparramta, oloirten, oltimigomi) to
their livestock (calves mainly) dunng the dry season. Acacia pods are mainly provided to goats.
These practices were excluded ftom the extra feed category. Extra feeding provided by the
Olkinos rancher was cabbage. The Kaputiei individual rancher feeded napier grass. Burning of
grass was mainly done to eradicate ticks. After the introduction of acaracides burning of pastures
decreased notably (see White & Meadows 1981:25).
In the following section a review of expériences of changing land tenure
législation among other African pastoral groups is presented. The effects of
these adjustments will serve as a base of référence for the Maasai situation
outlined above.
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9.5 Review of Expériences of Individualization of African
Pasture Land
Analyzing the evolutionary process of the individualization of landownership
among the Maasai raises questions about the causes, details and final results of
similar developments of this kind of land tenure transformation among other
groups such as African pastoralists in particular.
In chapter l we mentioned that a growing number of African countries are
switching to a land policy characterized by Western concepts of adjudication
and registration of individual title deeds. According to Riddell (1988:39), since
the early 1980s economie planning in developing countries has wholly
abandoned social property concepts and embraced a planning pattern which
emphasizes a form of private property rights. In spite of doubts and harsh
criticisms expressed about the appropriateness of implementing this concept in
the rangelands by researchere, Non-Governmental Organizations and
représentatives of Western Governments alike (e.g. Lawrance Mission), several
pastoralist groups have been confronted with the privatization of land
ownership.
One of the first expériences with the effects of changing land tenure among
nomadic pastoralists in Africa has been reported by Dufour for the Bédouin
pastoral society living in Tunisia. In 1935 a decree was published which
contained provisions about the exploitation and fair distribution of collective
lands. However, the result was that the plots of equal size allotted to each
member of the group were quickly snapped up by the most enterprising and
riebest members. The result was a concentration of landownership in the hands
of a small aristocratie group (see Dufour 1971:44-5).
At the time of Independence, similar attempts were made but failed as well;
'the plots allocated were too small; and the beneficiaries, having neither credit
nor the technical advice required for rational working of their newly acquired
land, either neglected it or hastened to seil their rights in it' (Dufour 1971:45).
This experiment was abandoned in 1960. A new reform of agriculture was
promulgated in 1969. The législative arsenal of the Government again lacked
any power to stop the concentration of holdings. A continually widening gap
between "big" and "small" farmers is characteristic of the land tenure situation
in Tunisia.
Ezeomah described the situation for the pastoral Fulbe (Fulani) of Nigeria. The
need to provide food for a growing population resulted in the extension of
cultivation at the cost of traditional grazing areas and enhanced the importance
of individual landownership. The importance of communal rights decreased
resulting in increased conflicts between farmers and pastoralists. Ezemoah
pleaded for the establishment of grazing reserves providing facilities such as
water, access roads, improved grass and other feeds (see Ezeomah 1987:43). A
similar call was made by the Fulbe themselves, as early as 1970. Their newly
created National Livestock Association expressed, among other things, its
concern with regard to their land and herding problems, the security of cattle
routes and the lack of représentation at state level.
According to Milazi (1988:51), Botswana's changing rangeland tenure system
is partiy the result of an increased population and partly a response to
government programmes aimed at increasing employment and income in rural
areas. Two spécifie development initiatives were the World Bank Livestock
Development Programme of 1972 followed in 1975 by the Tribal Grazing
Land Programme (TGLP). The former was mainly oriented at fenced ranching
and infrastructural development at the expense of social support while giving
litüe attention to sociological factors (see Milazi 1988:52). The latter
programme declared the subdivision of tribal land into three zones of land
tenure; communal, commercial and state i.e. reserved land. The major aims of
this programme were to halt the dégradation of pastures that had increasingly
become concentrated in the hands of a few wealthy people. Both trends had to
be stopped.
Bennet et al. hold that the TGLP drew heavily upon the "Tragedy of the
Commons" paradigm as formulated by Hardin in 1968 (see section 9.6.1), and
that, in the end, most of the programme's resources went to large, commercial
holders in exclusive tenure areas. Above all, most large holders do not seem to
have adopted the improved production and land use pracüces envisaged by the
TGLP (see Bennet et al. 1986:viii). Furthermore, some ranch owners brought
their cattle to the communal areas under drought conditions (see Hinderink &
Sterkenburg 1987:193). To make matters worse increasing commercialization
encouraged by an EEC subsidy had replaced tribal and extended family
obligations and communal management with individualistic and compétitive
behaviour to the detriment of the ranch (see Blaikie & Brookfïeld 1987:195).
Another well-known project geared at the radical transformation of pastoralists
into "modern" ranchers was started among the Ankole of southwestern Uganda
in the mid-1960s by the United States Agency for International Development
(USAED) and the Government of Uganda. The project was intended to create
125 cattle rahches of several thousand acres each, to be placed in the hands of
'competent ranchers who will be able to undertake large-scale beef production
on an economically viable basis' (Doornbos & Lofchie 1971:166). By 1968
only forty ranches had been completed.
One of the major causes for this failure of implementation was the
controversy between the several parties involved, especially between the
USAID and the Government of Uganda. The issue of ranch tenure forced all
other planning considérations into the background. The primary point at issue
was whether to allow absentée owners to acquire a ranch and this resulted in
intense debates and politica! struggles. USAID feared that the allocation of
!*'
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ranches would lead to politically influential individuals acquiring ranches at the
cost of the original inhabitants. Doornbos and Lofchie recalled the process of
negotiations between USAID and the Uganda Government. They demonstrated
a major failure of communication both between and within the sections of the
two parties. The rôle of diplomatic considérations was also highlighted.
Pressure from the American embassy resulted in a situation by which USAID
could not take a strong position against the ranch tenure question. As a resuit
top officials and influential businessmen had been able to allocate to
themselves most of the 40 ranches that had been constructed (see Doornbos &
Lofchie 1971:186).
Gunn (1990:156-161) for northern Somalia shows us a rather similar picture of
the implementation of livestock development projects including the
introduction of new land tenure législation. By 1975 all land was secured in
the name of the state making it illegal to own land privately. Only small
parcels (30 ha) could be leased for 10 year periods. However, grazing land, as
opposed to agricultural land, was excluded from this, leaving pastoralists
without legal claims. Classifying marginal land as agricultural land enabled the
création of private rangeland "exclosures" in the intermediate zone between
pastures and cultivated plots. For example, by 1982 there were 14,500 of these
ranches, so densely packed around the perimeter of the grazing land that no
corridors were left for transient herds to get to the town's permanent wells (see
Gunn 1990:161).
The owners of these ranches were small livestock co-operatives introduced
by the govemment as a new form of collective ownership in the pastoral areas.
Although initially designed for poor pastoralists the members now included the
more wealthy. In fact, these co-operatives mainly acted as a family-owned
private Company situated in the better-watered areas of the range and receiving
outside aid for infrastructural developments. Moreover, while holding these
special rights to dry season pastures and receiving assistance, many co-
opérative members had the majority of their livestock graze on the free
ranching areas.
Let us resumé considering the situation in respect of changing landownership
and mounting pressures laid upon the pastures by other activities for some of
the afore mentioned Kenyan pastoral groups (see chapter 3).
Oba (1987), reporting on the Obbu Borana living in the north-east corner of
Marsabit District bordering on Ethiopia, concluded that, by the late 1980s,
farming was being practised at individually selected relatively high potential
plots within communal rangelands. Bushland and forest clearings had resulted
in the enclosure of some 200 km2 of formerly communal land in the Obbu
Borana area. Although no legal ownership was connected to this it could serve
as a basis for the near future. Some wealthy stock-owners grabbed as much as
possible at the cost of the less well off. 'This has happened on Marsabit
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mountain, where big traders-cum-farmers and pohticians have acquired
disproportionately large farms relative to those of poor families' (Oba
1987:41).
Sandford (1983a:93) states that the Borana pastoralists supported the
introduction of grazing blocks only to the extent that they provide a device for
keeping Somali pastoralists out of the area.
For Tana District, Kelly (1987:82) informs us of the Orma worries in respect
of controversial plans of the Kenyan Government to appropriate a large portion
of dry season grazing lands to be turned into an irrigated rice-growing scheme
(Bura). Private and Company ranches predominantly owned by non-Orma
wealthy farmers, urban businessmen, merchants and parastatals, and National
Parks reduced the pastures available to a fast growing number of Orma
pastoralists.10 Nowadays, the compétition for pasture is reported to be very
intense at tunes. Furthermore, diversification into farming by the Orma along
the banks of the Tana River has raised tensions between the original Pokomo
farmers and the encroaching Orma.
9.6 Land Tenure and Livestock Development: A Review of
Theoretical Considérations
The issue of land tenure in livestock herding Systems in relation to overgrazing
of pastures is a frequently debated and highly controversial topic among
researchers from a large number of fïelds such as économies, anthropology,
ecology and geography and amongst decision-makers, development workers
and, last but not least, livestock keepers themselves. A second topic of debate
is the rôle of land tenure versus the commercialization of livestock production
Systems.
9.6.1 Land Tenure and Land Degradation
It has recenfly been estimated that 15 per cent of the earth's land area has been
degraded by human activities to varying degree (see UNEP 1992:42). The main
causes of such dégradation are overgrazing (34.5 per cent), deforestation (29.5
per cent), agricultural activities (28.1 per cent), over-exploitation (7 per cent)
and bio-industrial activities (e.g. excessive manuring 1.2 per cent). We would
like to remind that thé total area of grazing land in thé world comprises of
some 24 per cent whereas land under cultivation is 11 per cent, forests and
woodlands comprise 31 per cent and 34 per cent is classified as "other land".
Between 1969 and 1979 Iheir population doubled, mainly as die resuit of immigration of
Wardey people.
Il-
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In other words the relative importance of overgrazing for land dégradation is
less than the figures presented above would suggest.
About 3.5-4.0 million ha of rainfed croplands are currently lost every year
in the world's drylands (0.8 per cent of the total dryland rainfed area). In
addition, 1.0-1.3 million irrigated ha are wasted (0.8 per cent of the world's
total irrigated area in the drylands) (see UNEP 1992:43).
Percentages of rangelands within drylands most affected by désertification
are highest in North America (80 per cent), South America (75 per cent) and
Asia (74 per cent). Africa (73 per cent) ranks fourth.11 By the late 1970s
estimâtes stated that roughly 75 per cent of the publicly held rangeland and 60
per cent of the privately held ranges in the United States were in fair to poor
condition as a result of overgrazing (see Gilles & Jamtgaard 1982:1).
The link between overgrazing and land tenure was popularized by Garret
Hardin's classic article about the "Tragedy of the Gommons" written in
1968.12 Hardin argued that any commonly held and collectively owned
resource that is exploited by individuals will be overused. He used common
ownership of rangelands as an example to demonstrate his point of view.
Common pastures shared by individually owned herds will lead to a situation
of over-exploitation as no incentive opérâtes for individual herd-owners to
reduce their number of animais. The benefits of reducing one's herd will be
passed on to their neighbours, whereas the costs are a bürden for the individual
herder. In other words, although Hardin and others realise that land tenure is
only one of the causes of ranch depletion, it is postulated that only under
individual tenure is it possible to control the number of animais on a ranch as
then the costs and the benefits would apply to one and the same individual.
Unfortunately, this simple and apparently straightforward idea has resulted
in some kind of doctrine which perceives füll individual ownership of land as
the only viable option for sound livestock development (e.g. the prevention of
overstocking and the increased marketing of livestock) in every région of the
world. However, as Sandford (1983a:16) rightiy stresses, it is seldom
remembered 'that the alleged greater efficiency of private over communal-
landownership was initially based on évidence in fertile northern Europe not in
arid tropical rangelands, and that in Europe also the social conséquences were
often dire'. In Africa's drylands conditions preclude thé development of
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11 More widespread than désertification is thé graduai détérioration of agricultural soils in
dryland areas. expansion of cropping, with ever-shorter fallow periods, into areas with marginal
rainfall exposes thé soil to wind érosion (see World Bank 1992:55).
12 As Blaikie and Brookfield point out a "common" is a resource or facility which is
distinguished by three characteristics; it is subject to individual use, not to individual possession;
users have independent rights of use and only as a group can users exclude others who are not
members of that collective (see Blaikie & Brookfield 1987:186).
i
individually owned ranches unless huge areas are allocated.13
Furthermore, it is often forgotten that traditional controls over the use of
resources existe among thé livestock communities (e.g. thé Maasai H-oshori). In
a number of cases these traditional forms of tenure have deliberately been
destroyed and this has made environmental dégradation possible.14
Vittianen (1982:60) has shown that for thé Kababish pastoralists of
Northern Kordofan in Sudan the spread of agriculture to areas with littie or
uncertain rainfall was the main cause of désertification. The ploughing of dry
season pastures even in times of drought resulted in désertification mainly by
way of wind érosion. In addition, the loss of these pastures has led to
overgrazing of the remaining wet season pastures.
As stated above the rangelands in füll private ownership in the United States of
America or leases such as in Australia also suffer from dégradation.15
Examples presented in section 9.5 seem to underline the view held by some
writers that environmental dégradation is similar if not worse on private
commercial ranches than it is under the traditional communal System.
Individual ranchers are able to exploit communally held resources whilst
preserving their own pastures for the dry season. Those ranchers who had
13 Rainfall varies considerably from year to year in the rangelands of the Sahel and Bast
Africa. In parts of Kenya areas of rain storms rarely exceed five kilomètres in width and on
average less than one kilomètre. The conversion of common rangeland into private holdings would
only impede the movement of animais and increase the possibility of overgrazing. To prevent this
Gilles & Jamtgaard estimated that Maasai herders must have access to 120,000-200,000 hectares
(see Gilles & Jamtgaard 1982:3/4).
14 Jodha has shown how in semi-arid western Rajasthan (India) traditional controls over
grazing lands (Jagirdari syslem) were removed and some 25 per cent of the pastures were
transfert«! into private ownership for cultivation in the early 1950s. Following this décline,
livestock farming underwent several changes. The mean size of herds decreased, the proportion of
sheep and goats increased while that of improductive animais declined. This latter development
was mainly the result of stall feeding implying higher private costs. The growing importance of
smallstock was said to have resulted from the fact that these can better deal with degraded
pastures and provided easier access to better-watered areas elsewhere. The increased marketability
and profitability of animal products in recent years was mentioned by Jodha as being an
explanation of the above mentioned changes (see Blaikie & Brookfield 1987:196-207).
According to Jodha those who were able to gain from the process of the privatization of
communally owned land are now also in a better position to exploit the remaining pastures for
commercial purposes. Processes that have led to the dégradation of land have also resulted in a
strengthened stratification of the population. Meanwhile, on the land converted from pastoral to
arable use under pnvatization, all the conséquences of using ecologically marginal land without
regard for its vulnerability were seen.
15 Behnke (1983:9) describes how in Australia and in North America people starled to use
fences when grazing became a scarce resource ui order to control land rather than cattle. The idea
was not to close themselves in but to keep others out. Initially livestock production became less
productive because the ranches became overstocked and overgrazed as the flexibility to handle the
marginality of the area was lost.
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ranches too small to provide an adequate standard of living for their families
are forced to oversteek them in case no other source of livehhood or
communal pastures are available. In addition, if market priées are high the
overstocking of privately owned ranches could become very lucrative by
investing thé profits in other enterprises (see Gilles & Jamtgaard 1982:3).
USADD, prompted by thé disappointing performance of ils livestock and
range management projects decided by thé mid-1980s to conduct a major
review of its policies towards thé livestock sector (see above for thé Ankole
livestock development project). Attention was primarily directed towards
African land tenure problems. Planners often pointed out that communal land
tenure was the major obstacle to increased animal output for urban markets and
range conservation. Development projects thus embraced the "Tragedy of the
Gommons" paradigm as a rationale for establishing individual rights. However,
expérience has shown that tenure reform has often not been an effective
instrument in fulfilling either growth or conservation policy objectives. The
USAID study concluded that in most pastoral production areas of Sub-Saharan
Africa, communal tenure makes économie and ecological sensé (see Bennett et
al. 1986:158). The group ranch System was viewed as being the most suitable
arrangement for thé better range areas, although it was recognized that in thèse
areas ranches would need to compete with cultivation and game parks.
Close attention should be paid to thé developments of regulatory and
Community management institutions for communal land usage. It was realized
that tins would be a long and difficult undertaking, especially as nowadays
planning is dominated by some form of private property rights. If thèse new
property rights undermine the sound management of marginal pastures and/or
bring an end to économies of scale in thé provision of certain facilities, e.g.
boreholes and fencing then Community ownership of land seems to be more
favourable. Whenever such économies of scale do not exist and pastures are
plentiful or when careful management and maintenance of numerous scattered
small facilities, e.g. open wells is required, then private ownership may be
préférable.
In itself private ownership is not enough to conttol livestock numbers at the
low levels usually desired by range scientists. The occurrence of both types of
land tenure within thé same area could resuit in parasitic behaviour by
individual ranchers at the cost of communally owned pastures. Apart from
combating overgrazing land tenure adjustments are often proposed to stimulât«
commercialization of pastoral livestock production.
9.6.2 Land Tenure and Commercialization
Commercialization within pastoral Systems is an even more hotly debated topic
among scientists, development planners and administrators. As with thé
concept of land dégradation a complex set of parameters shape thé process and
final outcome of thé commoditization of livestock production. Several théories
which deal with agrarian change hâve looked at this process closely. Most
theones stress that land tenurial adjustments are crucial m respect of
transforming a subsistence-based livestock producing System to one orientated
to thé market. Swynnerton's plan to intensify Kenya's agricultural production
and thé Kenya Livestock Development Programme that introduced group
ranches in Kenya both recognised this aspect.
Attempts among groups of subsistence-oriented pastoralists in other
countries hâve almost ail failed. As Behnke (1983:3) states, no ranching
scheme has ever engineered a complète and abrupt reorganization of a pastoral
society. Some pastoralists, however, did commercialize their herding opérations
aU at once, frequently disregarding outside help and without fenced ranching.
This récognition has led Behnke to make a threefold division among livestock
producing Systems: subsistence pastoralism, open-range ranching and fenced
ranching. Each of thèse Systems is thought to hâve its own particular rationale
and characteristics of production. The most striking différences are that
subsistence pastoralism dépends on natural pastures in climatically unstable
environments forcing animais to move in search of grazing or water or to
avoid diseases. This results in high labour demands.
Open-range ranching refers to the "cowboy" type of ranching found in
Médiéval Spain and after thé American Civil War. These opérations were
much less labour intensive. Ranchers were relatively rieh in stock and market-
oriented.
Fenced ranching is normally carried out on large Stretches of land (between
1,000-100,000 ha) which carry large permanent herds of some 1,000-10,000
animais. Fencing was seen as a shift in thé commercialization of cattle to one
of cattie and land. But, as Behnke highlights, fences were seen as only thé
beginning and they were followed by thé increased use of artificial watering
points, fodder production, thé use of irrigation, veterinary inputs and feed
suppléments.
In other words, when shifting from open-range to enclosed ranching,
production becomes increasingly characterized by high rates of capital
investment, whilst labour remains low or is even economised upon.
Behnke stresses that it should be remembered that commercial livestock
Systems can be organized differentiy and include ranchers who use traditional
methods of husbandry, housing, clothing and thé like. Range ranching should
be included as a form of commercial ranching. The major problem facing
subsistence pastoralists in Africa nowadays is that, in contrast to the western
world of free resources and few people, they need to substitute an intensive
System of production for an extensive System of production for exchange.
The idea of subsistence pastoralists becoming primarily market-oriented
would seem to be one lacking ail comrnon sensé. A relative shortage of
livestock and an apparent abundance of labour should not allow thèse
pastoralists to seil their source of livelihood, even if commercial outlets and
reasonable priées exist
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Marketing and productivity have often been interchanged when evaluating
different forms of livestock production. However, several wnters have shown
that the inclusion of subsistence milk consumption, relatively cheap inputs of
land and grazing and the like places nomadic pastoralism in an equal if not
even a more favourable position with respect to productivity (see e.g. Dahl &
Hjort 1976, Swift 1982, Behnke 1985). Commercialization of livestock
production involves a redéfinition of production goals, not necessarily an
increase in thé level of productivity (see Behnke 1983:25). Moreover, thé
moment off-take channels become unreliable in time of stress, pastoralists will
still be forced to keep a larger number of animais within their herds than are
stricuy necessarily for human consumption, as a security against periods of
drought. Thus commercialization could lead to even more "surplus" animais.
In chapter 7 (section 7.3.1) we briefly looked at the process of
commercialization among Maasai pastoralists. Lack of incentives (low priées,
moderate needs) and a poor marketing structure have been mentioned amongst
the most important reasons for thé relatively moderate rate of commercialized
livestock production in Kajiado District (see also chapter 4). In chapter 6, we
hâve shown that Maasai pastoralists certainly reacted to market incentives as
livestock was offered to illégal outiets mainly, offering higher priées.
Research conducted by White and Meadows in thé early 1980s showed that
thé basic profïtability of individual ranches per livestock unit was not higher
than that of group ranches and that higher individual ranchers' household
income levels were attributable to higher livestock numbers, steer fattening
opérations (largely AFC fmanced) and to non-livestock sector activities (see
White & Meadows 1981:vi). Moreover, it should be realized that group
ranches and Tanzanian pastures hâve provided young steers for fattening on
individual ranches. Subséquent marketing will be recorded in the accounts of
the individual ranchers.
Evangelou (1984:260) also found no significant différences in the levels of
marketing between individual ranchers and group ranch producers suggesting
that the individualization of land tenure would not stimulate commercial
production in Maasailand. Moreover, Evangelou states that the rates of
livestock off-take among the Kajiado Maasai are as high as possible under the
present circumstances. In chapter 6 we demonstrated that Maasai pastoralists
have always been interested in selling catüe and have not avoided illegal
trading if priées offered by official markets were too low. In chapter 10
contemporary commercial livestock actions will be considered in detail.
9.7 Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter we presented an analysis of the outcome of group ranch
subdivision in Kajiado District with respect to the transfers of land and the
improvements made. Any rancher willing to partition, transfer or mortgage
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land bas to seek permission from one of the three Kajiado District Land
Control Boards. This Board has been afforded the power to turn down an
intended fragmentation, sale or mortgage of land. Nonetheless, in genera! the
Boards approve most applications after adjustments advised have been made.
After consent is obtained, new title deeds are issued by the Office of the Land
Registrar in the district. In the last decade the number of Kajiado District titles
registered has risen enormously from 4,929 in 1978 to 18,918 in 1988.
The subdivision of group ranches is one of the main reasons for this growth
in the number of title deeds. Olkinos, Embolioi, Empuyiankat, Kitengela and
Poka group ranches had been subdivided in February 1990. In this way, a total
of 757 Maasai received their privately owned parcel of land. Between
September 1986 and February 1990 some 36.7 per cent of these ranchers
applied for authority to further subdivide their individual ranches.
For Olkinos, the earliest subdivided group ranch, 64 members (55.2 per
cent) had done so. From this group 54 gained actually permission to partition
their plot into two or more parcels. Finally, 37 people (68.5 per cent of the
group of 54) subsequently asked consent for the sale of one or more lots. In
contrast, in addition to the 3 Olkinos ranchers who mortgaged all of their land,
5 members who had subdivided their ranches charged part of their land. In
other words requests fpr parcel partitioning seem intended to render the sale of
part of the ranch possible rather than to using it as collatéral for a loan.
Including data from the other subdivided group ranches showed that, by
February 1990 78 Maasai or 10.3 per cent of all former group members had
obtained consent to transfer 1,728 ha of land in return for a sum of Ksh.
18,525,205/-. This is 2.4 per cent of the total former group ranch temtories. No
spécifie set of characteristics could be perceived for the group of sellers.
Nonetheless, the group of Olkinos former committee-members turned out to be
foremost among the group of non-sellers. Those committee-members who did
seil had bought their land previously and apparently for spéculative reasons.
Furthermore, a corrélation was seen in the plot size per person and the selling
of land. The more land available the more will be sold, except by the most
well-off land holding households who are not engaged in selling at all. This of
course reflects the fact that the group of former committee-members are very
much aware of the value of the land they possess as well as the shortcomings
this amount of land still poses for fenced ranching livestock production.
Obtaining loans from financial institutions by offering land as collatéral
does not appear to have developed significantly among the Maasai new land
owners. Only 17 applicants (2.2 per cent) of all former group members
intended to or actually mortgaged 1,195 ha or 1.6 per cent of the former group
territory. It was stated that the selling of land is a much faster, less obstructive
and more compréhensible way of obtaining money than is mortgaging one's
plot. Financial institutions (especially the AFC) also seem to be somewhat
reluctant to provide loans, except in die case that the prospective borrower has
been formally educated to a high level and has other more important sources of
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income besides livestock keepmg. Only Emboüoi seems to part somewhat from
this rule. The individualization of land as such seems therefore not to have
resulted in a boom in loans obtained by the ranchers. Other factors such as the
level of éducation, the main occupation, expériences or lack of it with financial
institutions seem to be of more importance.
The group of land buyers in Olkinos group ranch was also analyzed in order to
obtain information concerning thek area of origin, main occupation, résidence,
éducation, âge and thé like. The foremost motives and objectives for buying
land in Kajiado District were dealt with. In addition to thé 9 buyers that had
settled in thé area or resided nearby, key-informants gave information about as
many buyers as possible and this revealed that, out of a total of 37 plots sold
in Olkinos area, ail but 6 were acquired by non-Maasai. Rieh business men,
civil servants and less wealthy people were among thé Kikuyu buyers. Maasai
buyers were mainly former Olkinos committee-members, individual ranchers,
civil servants and politicians. Another spécial group of informai buyers found
were Indians who were practising strip gypsum mining on Embolioi group
ranch.
Evaluating thé actions taken so far by thé buyers of land showed a
préférence for mortgaging land instead of reselling it. The inclusion of pending
partition, transfer and mortgage applications shows that thé frequency of selling
or mortgaging seems to be more or less equal. This is in great contrast to the
Maasai préférence for selling rather than mortgaging land.
Information was also gathered concerning thé utilization of the proceeds of the
sale of land and loans taken. On Olkinos the percentage of people who made
infrastructural improvements rosé from 21 to 56 per cent of all Olkinos
ranchers. The Embolioi group ranch percentage increased from a mère 8 to 45.
Lack of funds or thé fact of not being settled were among the most frequenüy
mentioned reasons for not conducting an improvement. Comparing Olkinos
sellers versus non-sellers and mortgagees versus non-mortgagees shows that
both groups were increasingly engaging in infrastructural improvements.
However, the rise amongst the group of sellers is significantly higher. No clear
picture emerged for the borrowers. Embolioi ranchers also seemed to be äs
much development oriented either selling or non-selling, mortgaging or non-
mortgaging their land. This is also reflected in the fact that only 5 Embolioi
members said that they had used the proceeds of thé sale of land and no one
mentioned the use of a loan. Olkinos had higher figures with 33 times the sale
of land and 10 cases of loans named as the source of the finance required for
the construction of infrastructural improvements.
The kind of improvement made was also considered. The building of a
modern house seemed to have been the most populär. Fences (mainly for
shambas mainly), sprayraces and pans followed but at some distance.
Boreholes had not yet been drilled. The group of buyers was mostly investing
in fences and watertanks.
So far, the ranches have not been fenced by the original Olkinos and
Embolioi ranch owners. Like drilling boreholes, this is a costiy innovation.
Those Olkinos ranchers that did fence their shamba or ol-okeri were mainly
found among the group of educated Maasai and land sellers. For Embolioi it is
the non-pastoralists who are mostly involved in this.
In other words, most of the infrastructural improvements made seem to have
occurred in non-productive facilities such as the building of a modern house.
People will need to seil another part of their parcel in order to undertake real
development. Other accusations about consumer behaviour by the Maasai
ranchers who sold part of thek land were frequently referred to the buying of
cars and the drinking of beer. However, no clear corrélation could be found in
this respect.
The marginalized Maasai who roam and who have no involvement in the
former group ranch matters and the like, seem to be the most willing to seil
part of thek ranches and eam the salary of a lifetime all at once! Some
excesses have apparently followed!
We also looked at the less capital-intensive improvements made in range
management. Hardly any innovations had been undertaken since the time of
subdivision. Potter (1989) has stressed the common sense nature of this attitude
as these adjustments would not be economically viable anyway.
This chapter was concluded by presenting a review of the expérience of the
individualization of African pasture land and some theoretical reflections on
this issue in relation to environmental dégradation and commercialization as
well. Examples from Tunisia, Nigeria, Botswana, Uganda, Somalia and other
Kenyan districts all report of the decreasing availability of land for nomadic
pastoralism. All reports show features of our outline of the Maasai history of
land use, land ownership and land policy in the last Century. Increasing
compétition for the better-watered pastures by encroaching farmers, herder
cultivators as well as absentée herd owners were found to varying degree.
It is Government and programmes sponsored by international donors which
have mostly either by intention or not been responsible for the introduction of
individually owned ranches. Dominated by the doctrine of the "Tragedy of the
Commons" concept, overgrazing and commercialization would be dealt with
effectively once the collective ownership of pastures was ended. In fact, the
final outcome of these projects propagating privatization and the subséquent
commoditization of land was often that influential and wealthy people were
able to grab large parcels of land at the expense of a large group of less
wealthy and less powerful pastoralists. Furthermore, traditional rules for
pasture management have increasingly been thwarted and rendered useless.
Several writers report that thcy predict that land tenurial changes and
commercialization will ultimately lead to the further stratification of society.
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White and Meadows, referring to the economie viability of Maasai group
ranches versus existing mdividual ranches, concluded in the early 1980s that
'Group ranches should not be sub-divided into individual units but, for
the time being, should stay under group ownership. (...) Division of
group ranches into mdividual units would not replicate the apparent
success of the individual ranches in Kajiado but would result in sub-
viable economie units, since the landtpopulation ratio of the average
group ranch is much below that of the average individual ranch. Also,
since dry season grazing on group ranches is only available in a few
areas, shared by all members, sub-division would lead to acute problems
of access' (White & Meadows 1981:vi).
Statements such as this can nowadays also be read in Worl Bank Develompent
Reports. Rememberring the World Bank's initial position towards the Maasai
lands (Narok District in particular) and the Banks suive for private ownership
of land the following sounds revolutionary:
'Pastoralists in Africa face particular problems in maintaining access to
their traditional pastures. An example is the case of the Maasai and
Samburu of Kenya. At one time the Kenyan government hoped to set up
group ranches as a way of increasing beef exports while retaining
collective management. Recently, the government has promoted the
privatization of these ranches, asserting that corporate land tenure
impedes rational land management The Bank study notes that Maasai
elders regard private landownership as an "alien concept" and express
fears that "subdivision may lead to a disastrous change of lifestyle of the
Maasai people." The only source of income for the Maasai people is
livestock. Their culture provides them with a system in which they can
preserve the arid and semi-arid areas (..) in such a way that certain areas
are put aside in periods of drought in order to keep grazing areas in
good condition. Although lately it has become more difficult to do, it
still works within and among group ranchers, especially where upgraded
cattle breeds are introduced. However, in the fragile (send-) arid areas it
might even become impossible to keep livestock on an individual basis
on small plots; it will also irrevocably lead to soil érosion, overuse of
water resources, and désertification' (World Bank 1992:37-38)
In this chapter we have tried to highlight the issue of access to land for Maasai
pastoralists after subdivision. It seems to underline the expérience of other
pastoralist groups that the individualization of land mostly benefits those who
are among the most influential and wealthy members of society. We ought to
speak of the "Tragedy of the ï/ncommons" to underline that ultimately a small
group of well-off people are able to restrict access to land for a large crowd of
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less well-off people, instead of all acting irresponsibly towards a collectively
owned resource.
Moreover, as stated and proved by several authors (e.g. Fallon (1962:28)
and Evangelou (1984:253)) individual landownership is no guarantee for proper
range management. Also this research has shown that instead of destocking
theoretically overstocked individual ranches the owners not seldom bought
more livestock from the proceeds of the sale of land. In fact, also commercial
livestock production on individual ranches could lead to a more profound
misuse of that particular tract of land in case the owner is forced to oversteek
his ranch because of a large household demand or because of loan repayment
obligations. Not livestock but human numbers are of importance.
In thé next chapter we will review the current Maasai abilities and stratégies
applied to cope with the decreasing land resource
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Figure 9.4 Kitengela Subdivided Group Ranch
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Figure 9.6 Poka Subdivided Group Ranch
CHAPTER 10
THE FUTURE OF MAASAI PASTORALISM IN KAJIADO
DISTRICT
10.1 Introduction
Nomadic pastoralism requires livestock, labour and land in order to fulfil its
major goal which is the provision of food for the stock-keeping human
population. Cossins (1983:217) mentions three series of constraints which have
to be overcome in the pursuit of this aim:
1. Normal - seasonal events: episodes of diseases, parasites, availability of
forage;
2. Disasters - epidemie disease, drought;
3. Long-term changes - irreversible loss of dry-season grazing, land tenure
changes.
Nomadic pastoralists constantJy try to manipulate all three production factors to
meet the mainly milk-oriented production goal of traditional subsistence
pastoralism. Several stratégies (long term) and tactics (short term) are
employed in order to spread risks and to physical, economical and social
survival. The most important livestock related, risk-avoiding stratégies and
tactics are:
1. Communal possession of pastures and water allowing for optimal flexibility.
This strategy is employed in order to optimize the use of the low ecological
potential of the arid and semi-arid rangelands, their minimal and unreliable
précipitation and of disease-infected areas.
2. Diversification of the family's herd; i.e. the keeping of catüe, camels, goats,
sheep and donkeys, each having spécifie requirements for food and water
and possessing different production capacities and abilities to adapt to the
harsh environment. This diversification allows for the use of all the
ecological possibilities and provides complementary output for the pastoral
household.1
For example, catüe and sheep are grazers and prefer grass pastures. Camels and goats are
browsers, eating the young shoots and leaves of trees -although they sometlmes also eat grass.
Camels can go for long distances, require watering only once in two weeks, produce milk even in
the dry season and have a high drought survival rate but also a high calf mortality. Cattle have a
tower rate of survival, have to be watered daily and cannot go for very long distances but they do
produce excellent milk and méat and are used to stock capital. Goats are stronger than sheep and
reproduce very quickly. They are mainly kept for méat and are less important for milk in thé dry
season. Donkeys are used as carriers.
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3 Herd accumulation, sélective breeding and the dominance of the female sex
in the herd's composition Besides using different species, pastoralists use a
spécifie sex composition strategy favouring females in up to 60-70 per cent
of the total herd in order to maximise the production of milk and the
reproductive capacity of the herd.
4. Relations with "stock associâtes" or "bond-friends". Animais are given to
friends or relatives in order to spread the risks. In fact, each man is in the
centre of a field of diverse formalized inter-personal social relations. This
fact acts as a disaster-insurance as the "owner", in rebuilding his herd, seeks
help from his stock-associates. Provision of labour is also an option.
With diminishing land resources the Maasai pastoralists need to diversify or
intensify all their economie activities. Those Maasai who have lost their land
or who will only be able to legally claim restricted access to inherited lands,
will have to look for new opportunities.
Several possibilities can be mentioned as ways of withstanding the décline
in catüe wealth and some of them relate to the above mentioned stratégies.
Among these are:
1. diversification of production (e.g. increased importance of small stock,
cultivation, wage labour);
2. intensification of production (e.g. improved breeds, better veterinary care);
3. commercialisation of production (i.e. increased sales of livestock and its
produce) together with changmg food habits (i.e. increased intake of grains
and other agricultural products instead of livestock products).
In the last decades several authors have reported Maasai households adopting
one or more of the above-mentioned stratégies (e.g. Berntsen 1979a, Metson
1974, Campbell 1979b, Njoka 1979, Ingule 1980, White & Meadows 1981,
Grandin et al. 1982, Bekure et al. 1987). For an analysis of several
characteristics of our survey population we will compare our data with that of
thèse authors.
Metson (1974) conducted a survey among 172 Maasai spread over all of
Kajiado District. Campbell (1979b) interviewed 164 Maasai pastoralists, 90
Maasai farmers and 135 non-Maasai farmers in the Loitokitok région. Njoka
(1979) concentrated on 148 Kaputiei households. Ingule (1980) interested
himself in the acceptance and means of the introduction of improved breeds
among a group of 300 Maasai all over Kajiado District. White and Meadows
(1981) collectêd information on Poka, Olkarkar, Kiboko, Elang'ata Wuas and
Lorngosua group ranches and adjacent individual ranchers. Twelve households
were interviewed In each group ranch. The main object of their research which
was undertaken between August 1980 and July 1981, was to quantify the
extent to which group and individual ranch development had changed the
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pastoral production system and improved the living standards of the Maasai
(see White & Meadows 1981 :i). Kiboko, Olkarkar and Poka were considered
as representing the developed group ranches in Kajiado District, while
Lorngosua and Elang'ata Wuas exemplified the undeveloped ranches.2 Finally,
the research conducted by the International Livestock Centre for Africa among
282 Maasai households in Olkarkar, Merueshi and Mbirikani group ranches in
the early 1980s revealed very detailed information about labour, livestock
management and commercial livestock production (see Grandin 1982; Grandin
et al. 1982, Bekure et al. 1987).
But what is the state of diversification and intensification of the Maasai
economy in the early 1990s? In the following section we will present a brief
overview of our sample of 500 (former) group ranch Maasai households, 34
established Maasai individual rancher households and 9 land buyer households
in respect of the adaptive stratégies employed.
10.2 The Personal Characteristics of the Sample Population
In section 8.1.1 the basic characteristics of our surveyed population were
presented. Here we will consider to some more detailed information concerning
their personal features such as âge, level of éducation, additional training and
knowledge of languages. All of these are thought to be of importance in order
to assess the ability of the Maasai population to cope in the future.
The level of éducation of the head of household per wealth class as found in
this survey is shown in table 10.1. It shows that, except for the Olkinos buyers,
half to almost all of the heads of the households interviewed had never been to
school. For the group as a whole at best some 20-30 per cent had had some
primary éducation. No statistically significant corrélation was found with the
wealth class in this respect. The rieh, however, show in genera! more educated
heads of household.
Metson (1974:table 7) reached an overall figure of 15.7 per cent of
educated Kajiado Maasai heads of households for 1974. Except for Kiboko our
survey found a remarkable improvement as compared to 1980 figures presented
by White and Meadows (1981:62). Their sample in Kiboko, Elang'ata Wuas,
Lorngosua and of individual ranchers recorded that 8, 17, 8 and 33 per cent of
heads of households, respectively, had obtained some kind of formai éducation.
2 Unfortunately, White and Meadows used another method to stratify their survey population,
a chief was asked to appoint ranchers for three distinct groups of nch, average and poor classes
For every group ranch 12 households were selected, four stemming from each wealth class
However, in companng White and Meadows' data with those of ILCA for Olkarkar shows that in
fact White and Meadows had straüfied their population into medium, nch and very nch groups
Desptte Uns setback, we will at times refer to their data wliilst beanng m rmnd the small size and
the bias m White and Meadows' sample
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Table 10.2 Heads of Household Additional Training and Knowledge of
Kiswahili and English (%)
Olkinos Embo- Kiboko Elang'ata Lom- Meto Ina.
(n=108) Hoi (n=38) Wuas gosua (n=104) ranchers































































Note: m = Maasai; nm = non-Maasai.
We also collected information concerning additional training followed by the
heads of household (see table 10.2). Overall 15.3 per cent of the sampled heads
of household had attained some kind of additional training. This is in line with
the 16.3 per cent figure found by Metson (1974:table 8).
The kind of training most frequently mentioned for our group was
veterinary training (83 per cent) and range management (19 per cent). Other
main catégories of additional training named were blue collar jobs (16.9 per
cent), military/police/security (13.3 per cent), social/health (10.8 per cent),
priest/catechist (9.6 per cent), commercial (7.2 per cent), formai adult
éducation (6.0 per cent), other (13.3 per cent). The favourable position in terms
of levels of éducation is also shown in the higher percentage ability to
read/write Kiswahili and English among the northern Kaputiei heads of
households, established individual ranchers and the group of buyers.
Besides considering the head of the household, information was gathered about
other household members. For the younger génération (from 5-18 years of age)
in particular a significantly better school enrolment rate was found (see table
10.3). Différences between locations were nonetheless rather high. For
instance, the Kaputiei group ranches had much lower percentages of non-
educated than the southern Matapato and Loodokilani ranches.
White and Meadows (1981) found 57 per cent of their 5-18 years of age
cohort attending school (Kiboko 67 per cent; Elang'ata Wuas 40 per cent;
Lorngosua 41 per cent; individual ranchers 82 per cent). Surprisingly, for
Lorngosua and individual ranchers these figures are above those found by our
survey 10 years later. This probably stresses the bias in the White and
Meadows' sample as it is mainly among the wealthy households that the
percentage of educated household members is highest.
The sex composition of school-attending children found by White and
Meadows for Kiboko stood at 70 per cent for boys and 67 for girls; Elang'ata
Wuas boys 56 per cent and girls 45 per cent; Lorngosua boys 59 per cent and
girls 15 per cent. Metson 1974 (table 10) found overall figures for the
percentage of school-attending children of 16.9 for boys and 8.7 for girls.
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Table 10.3 Level of Education Household Members (above 5 years of age)
Olkinos Embohoi Kiboko Elang'ata Wuas
Tot M F Tot M F Tot M F Tot M
5-18
None 16.2 18.0 14.3 27.9 21.6 35.9 32.0 31.5 32.7 51.2 44.0 60.2
77.3 75.5 793 69.7 74.9 63.0 59.0 56.5 62.2 47.1 54.5 38.0




None 57.0 18.7 70.3 56.8 4.4 81.9 77.5 30.8 93.4 77.6 58.6 86.8
Prim. 26.3 43.7 20.0 29.4 68.9 10.6 146 38.5 6.6 13.1 21.3 9.0





































































































































source: auffior s survey
In addition to the level of éducation we were interested in the place of
résidence of the household members. In some families the head of the
household résides away from the household's home whilst sometimes other
household members were also stated to be living elsewhere for most of the
year. Employment is the main reason for this temporary absence. In table 10.4
information concerning this aspect of income earning strategy is given.
It was among the group of buyers that this form of "absentée ownership"
was most significant. Also, one out of four Olkinos ranchers did not stay in the
household résidence for most of the year. A différence between these two
groups is that buyers mostly réside outside Kajiado District in an urban area,
while the Olkinos ranchers usually stayed nearby in another Olkinos or
Embolioi borna.
Nairobi was mentioned by some two thirds of the head of households as
their urban place of résidence outside Kajiado District. Also mentioned were
Athi River, Eldoret, Nakuru and Mombasa. Por other household members
Nairobi was only important for the group of buyers, the Olkinos and individual
ranchers' households. A wide variety of other places was found (e.g Mombasa,
Athi River, Isiolo, Kisumu). The reason for residing elsewhere is mostly linked
to the performance of off-ranch employaient. In the following section attention
will be paid to this diversification strategy of the Maasai household economy.
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Note: m = Maasai; nm = non-Maasai.
10.3 The Diversification of the Maasai Economy
Filmactor, personnel officer, computer specialist, university lecturer, NGO-
officer, travel agent, pilot; who would have thought half a Century ago or even
less that all of these jobs could be filled by Maasai in 1990? Though still
exceptional the Maasai do occupy these jobs nowadays.
Por each household interviewed we recorded the current and former main
occupation(s) of the heads of household. Table 10.5 gives the main occupation
in broad catégories held by the heads of households at the time of survey.



















































































Source: auffior s survey
Note: m= Maasai; nm=non-Maasai.
Table 10.5 tells us that stock-keeping is no longer considered to be the main
occupation of some 20-30 per cent of the heads of households interviewed. In
the North Kaputiei ranches in particular, people have turned to other types of
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employment (mainly wage labour). In the south (Lorngosua and Meto) stock-
keeping is still the most important activity. This is more in line with the
situation found by Metson of 97.7 per cent of the heads of households stating
that stock-keeping was their main occupation (see Metson 1974:table 11). The
most important off-ranch main occupations in the mid-1970s were teaching (l
per cent) and shopkeeping (0.5 per cent).
By the early 1990s some head of households were engaged in public
employment such as that of policeman, soldier, teacher, civil servant,
accountant and magistrale. Private employment included jobs as watchman, lab
technician, tour guide, cook, waiter, mechanic, industrial labourer, carpenter,
bus conductor and corpse washer in the mortuary. Private businessmen
included stock traders/meat suppliers, hide and skin traders, butchers, shop
owners, blacksmiths and taxi drivers.
A number of respondents said they had more than one occupation. Some were
even said to be involved up to in 4 different jobs. For instance, someone could
be employed as a policeman while running a shop, owning a taxi business and
helping in cultivating the shamba. Table 10.6 summarises the percentage of
heads of households involved in several activities. It shows that, in général,
half of the heads of households are engaged in a second income-earning
activity mostiy cultivation or the keeping of livestock. Private businesses were
also often mentioned,
Table 10.6 Number of Other Activities of Heads of Households




























































































































































































































.Source: autnor s survey
Note: m = Maasai; run = non-Maasai.
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Metson (1974:table 12) recorded a total of 59.9 per cent of livestock owners
having an extra occupation, livestock trading (47.1 per cent) in particular. An
increase does not seem to have occurred in the number of Maasai heads of
households engaged in other occupations alongside stock-keeping. Lack of
detailed data from Metson's survey hinders any definitive statement on quality,
timespan and number of third or more jobs.
The activities performed by other household members were also noted. An
overview of the main activity of all other household members is shown in table
10.7. It reveals that, besides the involvement of household members in
livestock herding and house-keeping some 5 per cent of them helped the head
of household to earn money either by running a private business or by way of
wage employment. These percentages are higher among the group of buyers,
Maasai and non-Maasai alike.






































































































Note: m = Maasai; nm = non-Maasai.
A certain stigma exists concerning young Maasai who flood the streets of
Nairobi looking for jobs as watchmen (askari) for shops, factories and houses
in the better-off residential areas of the city. The Standard (21/12/80 and
12/04/84) reported that, since 1975, the number of Maasai watchmen hired by
employers in Nairobi had increased tremendously. This will also be the result
of the good réputation of Maasai watchmen. Letters in newspapers have
praised the Maasai for their tnistworthiness, hard-work and bravery (see DN
30/12/77). The Standard estimated that in 1980 some 600 Maasai were
roaming Nairobi doing all sorts of jobs, mosüy guarding shops, 24 hour night
clubs and cars. Most of these watchmen were said to be from Kajiado District,
particularly from the Ngong area and from Samburu (see DN 24/08/82). The
With respect to the main activity mentioned it should be realised that more tasks than these
are performed. School-going children, for instance, will help in household duties, milking and
cultivation.
Tl
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over-representation of the Ngong Maasai is explained by its proximity to
Nairobi, good transport facilities and the increasing shortage of land in the
area. The older génération of Maasai labourers in Nairobi came to the city after
the drought of 1975. By the early 1980s the number of young semi-educated
Maasai was thought to be rising among the group of Nairobi watchmen.
The data presented in table 10.4 and 10.7 and our analysis of émigration
from the district before, however, show no évidence of a massive flight of the
Maasai to Nairobi for employaient as askari by the late 1990s. It should also
be realised that this kind of employaient is of a temporary nature. After having
saved enough money most Maasai want to return to their area of origin (see
DN 28/04/85). In a survey among 77 young male Maasai of Esokota group
ranch (i.e. 18-30 years of age) five were found to be residing in Nairobi: two
soldiers, two parastatal employees (one security officer), and one watchman. In
total eight more watchmen were counted in nearby Kajiado and Ngong towns
(see Kantai 1989:12-15).
One of the most important opportunities for diversification is cultivation. In
section 8.6.2 attention was paid to the increasing amount of land set aside for
cultivation. After a period of drought many Maasai décide to try cultivating a
shamba. Metson (1974:table 39) still found only 9.3 per cent of her sample
households practising cultivation. By 1990 our figures give a percentage of
42.3 per cent cultivating households (see section 8.6.2).
Table 10.8 reveals that it is the lower wealth stratum households which are
particularly engaged in cultivation. For all locations the poor showed the
highest percentage of farming households. However, not the middle but the
higher wealth class takes up second position in this respect. Thus the often
aired statement that cultivation is solely for the poor seems outdated.
Nowadays even the most wealthy also seem to be interested in farming.
Table 10.8 Cultivating Households by Wealth Strata
































The farmers' main reason for practising cultivation was for subsistence reasons,
though some respondents used the produce for exchange or sale to raise a littie
money. Non-Maasai wives hâve played a rôle in increasing acceptance of
cultivation which is said to have been alien to thé Maasai because of the low
and unpredictable rainfall and due to cultural barriers (crop production being
seen as an inferior venture) (see e.g. Sinket 1990:93 and van Klinken & oie
Seitah 1990:99). Irrigated agriculture in particular is becoming a favoured
occupation among Maasai pastoralists (see Masharen 1989:9).
Chapter 10: The Future of Maasai Pastoralism in Kajiado District 435
We also questioned those not engaged in cultivation as to why they were
not. In table 10.9 the reasons for not cultivating a shamba are presented.
Table 10.9 Reasons For Not Cultivating (%)
Lack of (reliable) rainfall
Lack of (money for) labour
No interest/no need
Not/just setüed
Lack of good land
Crop damage by animais
No seeds/equipment
No farming knowledge





























































Lack of adequate and reliable rainfall and inadequate availability of labour are
the main reasons mentioned by the households for not practising cultivation.
The problematic position of large parts of Elang'ata Wuas group ranch is
reflected in that 60.0 per cent of these households mentioned the lack of
reliable rainfall as being the major obstacle. The suitability of the soil was
hardly mentioned. This is in line with the remarks made by Mortimer in 1932
concerning the failure of cultivation in the Sultan Hamud-Konza area being
foremost drought and infestations of caterpillars and locusts (see KLC
1934:1250). Likewise Metson (1974:table 31) found that only 15.7 per cent of
the respondents mentioned poor soils as an obstacle to farming.
The percentage of cultivating households that hire non-Maasai labour is highest
among individual ranchers (64.3 per cent) and Meto Maasai (56.2 per cent),
followed by Embolioi (48.1 per cent), Olkinos (43.6 per cent), Lorngosua (42.3
per cent) and Kiboko (10.0 per cent). None of the Elang'ata Wuas respondents
mentioned the hiring of labour.
Table 10.10 suggests that both sexes are involved in all aspects of
cultivation. Men seem to be slightly over-represented in ploughing, while
planting, weeding and harvesting are mosüy done by women. Rather
surprisingly, daughters are less involved in cultivation than we had expected.
Other members (dependents or casual labourers) are mainly involved in
ploughing.
In the past, cultivation has often been propagated by the Colonial
Authorities as an alternative to stock-keeping. However, diversification into
cultivation enables a growth in livestock numbers directly as well as indirectly.
The proceeds of commercial agriculture are often reinvested in the livestock
sector (see Masharen 1989:9). Likewise, subsistence production leaves,
potentially, more milk for the calves. Th'is provides an extra stimulant for their
growth and reduces the risks of calf-mortality.
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source: autnor s survey
We believe that account should be taken of the fact that the diversification of
the household economy not always lead to an analogous level of growth in
income. For example, productivity in the livestock sector is likely to fall if less
time can be spent on this enterprise. As early as the 1930s, Count Dornhoff,
reporting to the Kenya (Carter) Land Commission, pointed out the difficulty of
rearing cattle in agricultural-potential areas which are often fly-infested. In that
case the borna is located too far away and control over the cultivated plot is
lost allowing wildlife and livestock to destroy crops (see KLC 1934:1208).
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Research assistants in Embolioi reported a relative lack of interest in the
liyestock enterprise when households were engaged in the mining industry.
Likewise absentée individual ranchers, having their main occupation mosdy
outside the livestock sector, mentioned a similar negative aspect to their
homebound livestock enterprise performance. Overall, however, diversification
enables the spread of risks and créâtes opportunities for "straddling" so that
earnings, knowledge and expérience obtained in occupations outside livestock-
keeping can be used to one's own benefit (see Poyck 1985:35).
Several authors have stressed the need for the diversification of the Maasai
economy, particularly in coping with the négative conséquences of group ranch
subdivision. Nevertheless, as Potter (1989:30) remarks 'Agriculture is incapable
of doing it alone'. Sources of income outside agriculture should be sought to
help the Maasai to fulfil the needs of a growing population.
Apart from cultivation, three spécifie opportunities for diversification were
mentioned by the 1989 AS AL conference: the exploitation of minerais, tourism
and livestock based industries (see van Klinken & öle Seitab. 1990:100).
Instead of having others reap the benefits of the district's fortunes (e.g. the
mining companies or the tourist industry) it was said that the Maasai
themselves should take advantage of these assets. At least they should be
compensated fairly for the labour provided in the mining business and the
negative effects of tolerating wildlife on their pastures.
Campbell (1986:51) perçoives a largely untapped potential for the
development of livestock-related small-scale industries. For example,
slaughtering and leather-working activities could generale off-farm
employment. In this way a new opportunity could be provided for the Maasai
population without disrupting their socio-économie System. Holland (1989:21)
stresses that some of these industries (tanning, slaughter, leather-craft) exist at
the fringes (e.g. Athi River, Ong'ata Rongai) of Kajiado District but that they
are mostly run by the Kikuyu, partially because of the Maasai's traditional
negative attitude to these activities. Still, he pictures a change in the outlook
for Maasai engagement in slaughtering, butchering and leather-crafts. It is
mostly women who play an important rôle in the development of the latter
activity. Today as well as products being exported to the Nairobi tourist stores
handicraft shops can also be found in Kajiado District.
Campbell (1981b:58) points out that some of the following conditions
would have to be met: suitable scale of opérations; improved quality of
livestock, hides and skins and appropriate financing arrangements. We would
like to underline the present difficult position of the leather-processing industry
world-wide. After the Second World-War until the early 1980s conditions for
this industry flourished. Since then overproduction in Australia and the increase
of shoats-keeping in Europe as a result of the EG-milk quota, resulted in a
collapse of the market. Priées dropped" and factories closed. In Australia 20
million sheep were killed in an attempt to restore a balance between supply
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and demand (see Volkskrant 22/07/92).
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Diversification within the livestock sector of the Maasai household economy,
i.e. changing the herd's composition, is another option. We already mentioned
the growing importance of small stock as opposed to cattle (see section 8.1.1).
Furthermore, the importance of poultry, rabbits and apiculture (bee-keeping) is
rising. Pigs are found in the Ngong area. It is mostly non-Maasai households
that are involved in these enterprises (see table 8.3).
A revolutionär/ development has been the recent introduction of camels to
Kajiado District.4 The Ministry of Livestock Development in co-operation with
the AS AL programme managed to transport 110 camels from Wajir District to
willing buyers of the Kajiado Maasai.5 A subsidy from the ASAL programme
allowed the price of a camel to be set at Ksh. l.OOO/- only. The idea was that
camels as browsing animais provide an opportunity to Maasai pastoralists to
make better use of the taller shrubs and bushes available in Kajiado District.
Moreover, watering is only required three times a month, resulting in a
high(er) rate of survival during times of sévère drought. Also, milk production
during these times continues longer than with cattle. Drawbacks to camel
keeping are their proneness to diseases (e.g. Trypanosomiasis), high calf
mortality, expensiveness and problematic handling. A successful introduction
will depend on the Maasai getting used to the milk and the animais ability to
survive in the semi-arid ranges of Kajiado District. This is particularly true for
newborn camels.
Finally, as Sinket (1990:96) rightly stresses, certain infrastructural
improvements (communications, water supply, éducation) must be undertaken
to make the process of diversification possible. Bekure et al. (1987:448-9) also
call for an integrated rural development effort although they place most
emphasis on the intensification and commercialization of the livestock
economy. Community development centres run by local Maasai development
workers trained in practical skills and geared to livestock extension (including
veterinary services, maintenance of water facilities, provision of inputs and
Camels are the dominant species kept by Saharan pastoralists. They also use the camel to
nde oa In contrast East African pastoralists are called herders-on-foot. Pastoral groups like the
Turkana, Rendille, Gabbra and Somali, living in the arid zones of northern Kenya, keep camels
but not for human transpon. Pastoralists, especially those living in the semi-arid areas, offen
hardly have any camels but concentrate on cattle and small stock.
5 On October 2nd 1989 the camels were handed over to the 58 Loodokilani and Matapato
Maasai owners at Bissei Holding Ground. Among the buyers were established individual ranchers
äs well as group ranch members and one women's group. It was agreed to form five camel
herding groups herded by a herdsman. Reactions so far have been positive (e.g. camel meat is
highly appreciated). But some Maasai herding boys in Lomgosua group ranch killed a camel that
had gone astray. They had never seen one before and feared that this giraffe-like créature would
attack their cattle.
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breeding stock, livestock marketing) adult éducation, infrastructural
development and maintenance should be started at local level. In addition to
national and international commitments poil taxes should be introduced to
finance these projects. In the following sections we look at the intensification
of the Maasai economy.
10.4 The Intensification of the Maasai Economy
To raise output from livestock labour, resources and capital can be adjusted to
increase productivity. We tried to gain information for a number of thèse
parameters in respect of the intensification of Maasai livestock production. The
issue of increasing primary production (i.e. raising herbage production by
applying a proper stocking rate and other range management practices such as
water improvements) has been dealt with in chapters 7 and 8. Hère our interest
will primarily focus on the means applied to improve secondary productivity
(i.e. to directly raise the output per animal: use of veterinary medicines,
vaccinating, dipping or spraying of animais, introducing improved breeds,
frequency of milking and thé like). The conséquences of thèse measures are
mostly thé intensification of labour and capital.
Cultivating practices can also be intensified, for example, by irrigating
which gives shorter intervais between farming seasons (i.e. thé intensification
of land use) or by intensifying inputs of labour or capital (e.g. fertilizers,
pesticides, improved seeds).
10.4.1 The Intensification of Livestock Production
According to Poyck (1985:22) thé Maasai society of the past was characterized
by a minimal labour intensity of as little as 1 to 2 hours a day as livestock
herding was mostly performed by the older children. It is understood that
Poyck only refers to men in respect of labour input as in the past the labour
intensity for women would have been higher considering their nomadic
existence (i.e. packing up and rebuilding their huts) and relatively large herds
(i.e. milking many animais).
In thé early 1930s Count Dornhoff told thé Kenya Land Commission that
'ail thé cows which are fresh in milk are generally milked but then many of
thé cows which would still give some milk are left over. I know that a cow
will give on an average not more than half a gallon [2.3 1]. I should think thé
average is below that, I should say about three pints [1.7 1]. (...) there is a gréât
deal more milk than is used' (KLC 1934:1205/6). It is not known whether or
not Dornhoff was acquainted with thé Maasai practice of milking only two
teats leaving thé others for thé calves.
As reported by de Leeuw and Wilson (1987:381) assessing milk yields in
traditional herds présents considérable difficulties, one major problem being thé
Ir» "
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partitioning of total milk output into that taken by calves and that for human
consomption. The ILCA survey among Maasai households has also made clear
that milking stratégies of poor households (less than 30 cattle) differed from
that of wealthy ones (over 250 head). Rieh herd owners took only 20 per cent
of the potentially available milk, whereas poor households extracted near the
maximum. In rieh households only one third of the cows with calves were
milked, mainly once a day rather than twice daily as was practised by poor
households (see de Leeuw & Wilson 1987:381).
Potter (1989:14) mentions a maximal daily yield of 3 litres per Maasai cow,
of which, after allowing the calf to suckle, only one litre would be available
for human consumption. Thus a 100 ha farm could support about 20 cows of
which some 15 would be lactating continuously. In other words, a maximum of
15 litres per day is expected for the household, causing Potter to see relying on
subsistence production from natura! grazing to be foolhardy.
We asked respondents to estimate the daily milk production of their herd of
cattle available for human consumption, the number of times livestock was
milked, and the practice of milking small stock (see table 10.11).





























































































































The data presented in table 10.11 should be interpreted with gréât care. As
stated above by de Leeuw and Wilson several factors are involved in
determining thé actual availability of milk for human consumption. For
instance, thé seemingly smaller quantity of milk available for human
consumption among thé Kaputiei households is congruent with a lower need as
their households are also smaller. The degree of diversification is also expected
to influence the need for milking for human consumption. The ability to
purchase food lowers the demand for milk and meat from the herd. In contrast,
poor people are forced to milk more animais for larger quantifies at the
expense of the calves. The high daily production of 1.9 litres for Meto cows as
compared, for instance, with the 0.6 litres for Kiboko could be due to the
relatively less wealthy households living in Meto group ranch as compared to
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the better-off Kiboko Maasai. The litres produced per cow presented here do
not necessarily reflect the milking quality of the cows.
Nevertheless, our data seem to confirm the afore mentioned practice of rieh
ranchers milking less animais than are potentially available (i.e. 55 to 79 per
cent) while other ranchers milk some 70 to 95 per cent of all the lactating
cows. Households milking small stock are mainly found among the Matapato
and Loodokilani Maasai. The impact of the dry season period on milk output
can be seen in that the availability of milk per household is significanüy higher
during the wet periods. Again no hard conclusions can be drawn as to output
per animal.
Another factor influencing the household's production of milk is the number of
improved breeds available. Under favourable conditions these animais are able
to produce more milk than indigenous breeds. For instance, White & Meadows
(1981:iii) reported that: 'the Sahiwal crosses in the zone IV areas recorded
higher milk yields than the Small East African Zebus throughout the study
period, even at the end of a long dry period from August to mid November
1980, when it was thought that conditions might have been too harsh for them,
with adverse effects on milk production.'
As highlighted in chapter 6 the Maasai pastoralists have always shown an
interest in keeping improved breeds. Colonial régulations, however, frustrated
the importation of Boran cattle from northern Kenya. Since Independence a
significant number of bulls of other breeds have been introduced into Kajiado
District in an attempt to improve the quality of the Maasai herds and to
increase the production of milk and beef. The most important introduction has
been the Sahiwal (Bos indicus) which is a comparatively recent arrivai to
Kenya from Pakistan (see White & Meadows 1981:23). Other exotic animal
types, though much less in number, include Boran, Friesian, Ayrshire,
Simmental, Jersey and Charolais. These animais have been bought either as
pure breeds or as a cross-breeds with the local Zebu.6
The original Maasai sheep were the Red Maasai sheep (also named Fat-
Tailed Brown Maasai). Since the early 1970s crossbreeding is reported as
being on the increase. For this purpose use is made of Dorper and Blackheaded
Somali sheep in particular. Other imported sheep species are the Merino and
Suk. According to White and Meadows (1981:24) the upgrading of goats is
6 The Small East Afncan Zebu is the major breed of Hast Africa. U is smaller than the Boran
or Sahiwal. Several types of the Small East African Zebu exist that vary somewhat in size and
colour. The Maasai type shows many signs of other breeds, parucularly Nandi Zebu, Boran and
Ankole longhorn found in Central African countries. In général, Maasai Zébu are taller than other
Small East African Zebu. The typical colour is black. Though the milk yield is low the catUe tend
to be long-Hved (breeding lives of 15 catüe in 20 years). They can go for long distances and can
stand being without water for two to three days (see Pratt & Gwynne 1978:147). They have a high
tolérance of local diseases and a long breeding life. Potter (1989:22) questions the hardiness of
European breeds and wams against the unconsidered condemnauon of the Zebu.
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less common. The Small East African goat still dominâtes the Maasai
household's flocks. In fact, bef ore the 1960/61 drought there were hardly any
goats in some parts of Kajiado District goats. This has changed nowadays and
the Galla goat has become populär for upgrading purposes. Other exotic goats
are the Boer goat and Tockenburg goat (particularly in Ngong).
Ingule studied the time of acquisition and important factors involved in
adopting improved breeds among a group of 300 Kajiado Maasai (see Ingule
1980:60). It turned out that over the 1940-1980 period almost three quarter of
the respondents had acquired their improved breeds in the 1961-1970 period.
According to Ingule the rôle played by the Maasai Rural Training Centre-
Isinya has been of importance. Members of MRTC visited cattle dips to inform
the Maasai herders concerning exotic breeds. The 1960 disaster was mentioned
as a significant moment for speeding up the adoption of improved breeds.7
By 1980 four out of nine Kiboko households owned some Sahiwal crosses.
comprising 15 per cent, 25 per cent, 40 per cent and 50 per cent of their herds,
respectively. On Elanga'ta Wuas five of the nine households (56 per cent) had
improved breeds in their herds, but on Lorngosua all cattle owned had local
Zebu. Among individual ranchers a total of 52 per cent had upgraded animais
(see White & Meadows 1981:24). For the late 1980s Sinket (1990:95) noted a
trend in Kajiado District in animal production towards dual purpose breeds,
Sahiwal in particular.
We tried to gain some insight into the percentage of improved breeds within
the Maasai herds of today. In chapter 4 we cited a Ministry of Livestock
Development estimate that by the end of the 1980s 60 per cent of the district
herd would still be local Zebu. The exact importance of improved breeds is
hard to détermine and was outside the scope of this survey. We restricted
ourselves to determining the number of pastoralists having improved breeds at
all. In addition information was gathered on the types of improved breed.
Table 10.12 provides an overview of these aspects. It shows that Elang'ata
Wuas group ranch members in particular seem to be significantly more
interested in improved breeds than other Maasai. This is not in line with
ILCA's statement that the introduction of improved breeds is mainly restricted
to group ranches that receive higher rainfall (see Bekure et al. 1987:420).
However, though improved breeds have higher watering and feeding
requirements the impact of livestock diseases seems to be crucial in
understanding the adaptation of improved breeds. It is said that ECF is present
mainly in the higher rainfall receiving zones of the district (see White &
Meadows 1981:31).
We would like to point out the impact the ending of the status of closed district had on the
banning of livestock imports and the importance of outside assistance after 1960.
Table 10.12 Percentage of Pastoralists Having Improved Breeds and































































































































































source: autnor s survey
* crossbreed of Dorsst Horn and Persian Blackhead sheep.






















































































































































































# mainly anthrax in Olkinos, Elang'ata Wuas and Lorngosua and contagious abortion among
animais of Meto and Matapato individual ranchers.
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According to the Ministry of Livestock the five major livestock diseases found
in Kajiado District are East Coast Fever, Trypanosormasis, Foot & Mouth,
CBPP and rinderpest (see KDDP 1988:106-7). The latter had been almost
eradicated while CBPP occurred in mostly periodic outbreaks. ECF and
Trypanosomiasis cannot be controlled by vaccination and are, in général,
responsible for livestock deaths. Only preventative treatment, by way of
dipping is possible. Table 10.13 provides an overview of the percentage of
Maasai herders that mentioned that their animais had been affected by some
kind of disease in 1989. The prevalence of ECF and F&M for cattle and ECF,
Contagious Caprine Pleuro Pneumonia (CCPP) and diarrhea for shoats is
clearly shown.
Apparently the major reason for the relatively better performance of
improved breeds in the Loodokilani area compared to other parts of Kajiado
District seems to be related to the remarkably lower frequency of ECF. This
peculiarity of the Loodokilani area has been recognized by several author's
(see e.g. van Klinken & ole Seitah 1990:97 and White & Meadows 1981:27).
Several respondents also stated that they had transferred part of their herd to
the Loodokilani area because of the relatively less frequent occurrence of
livestock diseases. One key informant, a Maasai individual rancher from
Olkiloriti, stated hè had transferred 40 young steers acquired via an AFC loan,
to a relative in Elang'ata Wuas to avoid ECF which was prevalent in his home
area. Likewise, at the time of the 1988 Livestock Census ranchers from North-
Kaputiei often mentioned the Loodokilani area as the destination for cattle they
had temporarily transferred from the household's home area.
For small stock the percentage of ranchers stating to have disease-affected
animais was much lower thân among cattle owners. This could be the rationale
for the slighüy larger number of ranchers who had improved sheep or goats as
compared to improved cattle (see table 10.12). The much higher body weight
of Dorper sheep, in particular, is populär among Maasai pastoralists. Likewise
the Galla goat is said to produce more milk than the local Maasai breed.
Nevertheless, at the Conference on the Future of Maasai pastoralists it was
reported that the Galla goat is more susceptible to pneumonia (see van Klinken
& ole Seitah 1990:97).
Other types of upgraded shoats are also more vulnérable to diseases than
the indigenous species. Among our group of respondents one Olkinos rancher
mentioned that hè had bought a Boer goat in 1985 which died within 12
weeks. Another had only recendy bought a Merino sheep that had died soon
after. For this reason some Conference participants favoured a strategy of
sélective breeding with the local Maasai goat in order to raise milk output
while preserving the qualities of hardiness and résistance to diseases.
Table 10.14 shows the main reasons given by some of the Maasai
pastoralists for having no improved breeds. High acquisition costs were most
often mentioned. The risks and the lack of availability were also among the
l
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main reasons given for having no improved breeds Lack of interest in these
was hardly ever expressed. As a result of the vanety m topographie location,
local environmental conditions and wealth standards the importance of each of
the factors mentioned above varies.














































































































































The lack of upgrading centres was one of the main problems pointed out by a
study conducted by TARDA in the early 1980s. It was then concluded that:
'One of the constraints facing ranchers in Kajiado District is absence of a
reliable source of improved beef stock. It is therefore proposed that four
holding grounds i.e. Namanga, Emali, Kuku and Shombole be converted into
duo-purpose centres for rearing better performing stock as well as
accommodating buil camps' (TARDA 1984:123). In spite of these
recommendations no action has been taken since then and the 1989 AS AL
Conference also called upon the Government to be more active in ensuring the
availability of improved breeds.
That year the new Kajiado District Development Plan revealed a willingness
to upgrade the Maasai herds by the development of AI service and the
encouragement of "buil camps" (see KDDP 1988:96). Financial assistance from
the Kajiado ASAL Programme finally made it possible to build a Livestock
Multiplication Centre. In Mile 46 the former holding ground (840 ha) was
allocated to be turned into a centre for upgrading small stock. If successful,
cattle improvement will also be taken in hand (see ASAL 1989-November:6)
Until the present time the Sahiwals were mainly obtained from upgrading
centres in Naivasha and the Borans from Mutara. In 1988 and 1989 official
imports of Sahiwal bulls stood at only 63 and 50. Boran bulls numbered 25 in
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1989 and Friesian bulls 2 and 3 in 1988 and 1989, respectively (see MoLD/AR
1988, 1989). Apart from these official channels more improved breeds were
obtained either from local upgrading centres or family members, friends and
markets in or outside the district (see table 10.15). In genera! the ranchers tried
to acquire a single buil for upgrading their cattle herd. Likewise rams and
bucks are favoured though female sheep and goats are also purchased.
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Note- for all acquisitions of improved breeds (both small and large stock) we recorded thé place of
procurement. In général a transaction consisted of only one or two animais.
Finally, we tried to gain some information about the willingness of the Maasai
to increase thé relative number of improved breeds within thé Maasai herds.
Table 10.16 shows that a nearby multiplication centre will be warmly
welcomed by thé Maasai herders for cattle and small stock alike. The low
percentage of Olkinos ranchers having improved breeds as demonstrated in
table 10.12 is also reflected in their réservation about increasing their numbers.
Table 10.16 Maasai Willingness to Increase thé Number of Improved Breeds
in Herds and Flocks













































































The intensification of thé Maasai livestock sector therefore mainly involves thé
increased application of capital to thé acquisition of improved breeds. In
addition, thèse breeds are more susceptible to disease and call for increased
expenditure on thé buying of veterinary medicines and vaccinations. Finally,
because of this and thé more fréquent need for water the input of labour has
also been intensified.
The Kajiado District Development Plan (1988:106-7) estimated that some
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35 per cent of Kajiado cattle was vaccinated.8 This low percentage is mainly
due to problems occurring at the supply side such as the poor supply of
vaccines and the district's poor infrastructure. A setback of vaccinating one's
animais is a drop in milk production and the risk of other diseases affecting the
animal as the health condition of the animal is lowered (see White & Meadows
1981:iii). On the other hand animais which are dipped have a higher rate of
survival and higher milk production as the ticks obstipate the udderteats of the
cow. It was reported by one key-informant that dipping had raised the rate of
survival of calves from 25 to 75 per cent.
Table 10.17 Veterinary Care Practised by Maasai Pastoralists (per cent)




























































































































Table 10.17 shows thé practices applied by thé Maasai ranchers in respect of
thé veterinary care practised. It shows that nowadays most Maasai households
are involved in dipping or hand-spraying their livestock.9 Vaccinating is
mostly practised among thé Elang'ata Wuas ranchers. Their dedication to
8 Vaccinations are mamly given to control CBPP, Rinderpest and F&M. ECF and
Trypanosomiasis, being tick-born diseases, cannot be controlled by vaccination. Only preventative
treatment by way of dipping or spraying the animais with acaricide (see Pratt & Gwynne
1978:184-6). The bites of thé ticks (Theileria lawrencei) act as transmitters of ECF. Treatment of
ECF is only effective in thé very early stages of thé disease. Dipping should be done every five
days as thé best way lo control East Coast Fever. The Olkinos enumerators came across a stränge
belief among some Olkinos ranchers that milking the cow "dry" would prevent it from being
affected by ECF. Trypanosomiasis is spread by thé tsetse fly (Glossina). For "Tryps" several
curative drugs are available. Mention was already made of thé practice of buming bush to
eradicate thé fly. In thé Magadi area a tsetse trap has recently been introduced. A blue cloth,
drenched in cow or buffalo urine equated with cheap natural Chemical attractant Unes a plastic
bag. The flies are then killed by heat once they enter this bag (see DN 21/09/89).
9 It should be kept in mind that thé table provides no information concerning thé frequency
and quality of thé dipping practices. In général dipping is done once every week. The dipping bath
could be too watery or out of date which will make thé treatment in-effective whilst too strong a
solution could harm thé animal. A problem also is that ticks become résistant to a certain type of
acaricide. Hand-spraying was favoured for its mobility but is said to be less effective.
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veterinary measures was also recognized by White and Meadows (1981:27)
stating that on Elang'ata Wuas ECF was no problem, yet all households
recorded the use of acaricide over the survey period.
Finally, improved feeding could increase the output of the livestock
enterprise. Before we have shown that the provision of extra feeding or range
improvement is virtually non-existent among the Maasai pastoralists
interviewed (see table 9.19). According to several authors natural pastures will
continue to be the main source of animal feed in the district (see e.g. Sinket
1990:94). Only in those rangeland areas where conditions are favourable, can
the planting of, for example, napier grass be tried. Lowering of grazing
pressures through the opening up of too remote water-deficiënt pastures by
establishjng new watering points is another option. A more even spread of
livestock over the rangelands could therefore be a positive side effect of the
subdivision of group ranches. On the other hand it does increase the risks of
overgrazing on a local scale. Improved feeding, watering and management will
be necessary if improved breeds are adopted. In conclusion, intensifying the
input of capital (e.g. breed improvement, veterinary drugs, use of acaricide,
watering, etc.) is seen as the best improvement possible (see Bekure et al.
1987:421).
10.4.2 The Intensification of Cultivation
In genera! the growing of crops under rainfed conditions in the rangelands of
Kajiado District is successful in only 3 out of 8 seasons (see Bekure et al.
1987:417). Ways to offset the problem of poor rainfall and to increase the
production of crops are shown in table 10.18.













































































































source: autnor s survey
Note: application of a tractor means an intensified use made of capital while extensifying the input
of labour.
The use of certified seeds seems to be the most wide-spread adoption so far.
The favourable position of non-Maasai buyers is also clearly reflected.
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10.5 The Commercialization of the Maasai Economy
449
In section 9.6.2 we quoted several authors who had conducted one or more
years follow up studies of livestock transactions and who had stated that, for
many years, the Maasai had sold virtually all their saleable cattle (see
Evangelou 1984:256-7). In the foregoing we provided district-wide offtake
figures for Kajiado cattle and small stock (see table 4.18). The impact of
periods of drought (high offtake of up to 40 per cent) and tunes of post-
drought (a mere 7 per cent) are significant as are climatic fluctuations on an
annual basis. The outbreak of disease also influences the number of animais
marketed as does the recurring obligation to pat school fees.10
Most of the above mentioned sales are provoked by events unlike the sales
which are part of buying-fattening-selling or stock-trading practices. The high
totals of female cattle also point to the still primarily milk-oriented livestock
economy of the Maasai pastoralists.
10.5.1 The Selling of Livestock
The functions of livestock transactions are numerous. Among the most
important is the sale of livestock for the payment of school fées, médianes,
clothing, furniture and the like. Por 1974 Metson found a total figure of 32.6
per cent of respondents who had sold livestock over a one year period (see
Metson 1974:ll/table 23). We found that, over a one month period in late
1989, 30 to 74 per cent of the respondents were involved in the selling of
cattle (see table 10.19).11 This could illustrate a growth in the importance of
commercial livestock transactions. For small stock this figure stood at 21 to 64
per cent. Table 10.19 also shows the high reproductive rate of small stock and
the net offtake of the herd, taking into account slaughtering and other
transactions such as exchanges and gifts.
In table 10.20 the effect of wealth on livestock transaction stratégies is
highlighted. It can be concluded that the percentage gross offtake from poor
rancher's herds and flocks is, in général, higher than that of most of the rieh
households.12 Taking purchases into account the net offtake of the middle
In this section we will restrict ourselves mostly to a qualitative analysis of this issue as we
were only able to collect information about livestock transactions by Maasai pastoralists
concerning a period of one month (December 1989).
11 Multiplying this monthly figure by 12 to reach the annual offtake is pointless as livestock
transfers occur in peaks. Likewise the number of newborn animais is subject to spécifie periods of
the year.
12 It should be noted that our figures refer to a number of animais without discriminaüng
between the young or the mature. A more detailed analysis considering monetary values will be
presented in forthcoming publications.
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group is sometimes higher than that of the poorest group.























































































































































































































# by February 1990
* compared to November 1989 situation (i.e. - calves/shoats born or bought + numbers sold)
@ excluding exchanges or gifts,
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White & Meadows 1981 (appendix table 7) found overall cattle offtake (sales)
percentages of 13.3, 12.3 and 12.0 for Kiboko, Elang'ata Wuas and Lorngosua,
respectively in the August 1980-July 1981 period. Figures for shoats were 8.1,
6.4 and 10.6 per cent. For individual ranchers from Kaputiei, Loodokilani and
Matapato they found annual offtake figures for cattle of 18.8, 22.6 and 12.7
per cent and for small stock of 24.5, 1.0 and 4.8 per cent.
For our sample ranches table 10.21 offers a detailed overview of the broad
variety and relative importance of livestock transactions such as sales,
exchanges, gifts and slaughter. Forms of acquisition are also shown. The data
of table 10.21 highlights thé importance of taking into account these other
forms of acquisition and offtake when valuating thé pastoral livestock System.
For example, in Olkinos it was found non-salé offtake was responsible for
between 17 and 42 per cent of gross cattle offtake, depending on thé wealth
class. Commercial sales were only enumerated for thé riebest Olkinos
households.
Bekure et al. (1987:306) found that in Olkarkar and Mbirikani sales were
responsible for 82 and 76 per cent, respectively, of cattle offtake. For shoats
thèse figures were only 38 and 10 per cent. It was concluded that many sales
simply do not go through market channels. Our data underline this statement. It
can be seen that thé level of sales of shoats in our sample is higher. This could
mean a grown importance of commercial sales but could also be due to
différences in place (closer to Nairobi) and/or in time (Christmas). In général,
thé sales of small stock decrease when thé level of wealth rises. This seems to
be in line with White and Meadows (1981:iv) who reported that rieh
households mainly depended on thé sale of cattle while poorer households
mainly relied on thé selling of small stock.
Exchange as a form of livestock acquisition offers the advantage of
knowing exacüy what kind of animal is obtained as the former owner is, in
most cases, a relative or a friend. Sometimes the exchange is in part a gift
when, for instance, a goat is exchanged for a cow. Gifts are provided for
helping a friend or relative in need, for tightening social relations or for
conducting a ceremony. Bekure et al. (1987:303) rightly stress that the gifting
of small stock in particular is a very important social mechanism among the
Maasai. Small stock is also mosüy used for home slaughter.
Bekure et al. (1987:318) found that commercial purchases accounted for 58
per cent of the reported cattle acquisition in Olkarkar and only 37 per cent in
Mbirikani. Figures for small stock were 47 and 39 per cent, respectively, but
thought to be overestimated. Among our group of respondents purchases of
cattle are highest among the northern Kaputiei ranchers and less so among the
Matapato ranchers. The Meto ranchers in particular obtained most animais via
exchange. In contrast purchases and gifts are the most important ways for
acquiring small stock. Appendix 10,1 gives more information concerning the
sale and purchase of cattle and shoats.
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10.5.2 Selling Hides and Skins
453
For 1974 Metson found that only 25 per cent of the interviewed households
sold hides and skins (see Metson 1974:table 22). We were also interested in
the commercial importance of this livestock related activity. Households were
asked if they had sold or bartered cow hides, calf skins or shoats skins during
the last month. Table 10.22 gives the outcome.
Table 10.22 Selling of Hides & Skins (percentage of households involved by
wealth strata)
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Olkinos and Embolioi were mainly involved in the selling of hides and the rieh
were particularly active sellers. The other ranches were less involved in the selling
of hides. The selling of shoats skins is mainly practised among Elang'ata Wuas
ranchers.
The nearby présence of the Olkinos tannery and Athi River Leather Industries
possibly explains the higher degree of involvement of Olkinos and Embolioi
ranchers in the selling of hides and skins.
10.53 The Selling of Milk
Metson (1974:table 24) found that only 4.5 per cent of the Maasai households
interviewed selling milk in 1974. The early 1990s experienced a similar level of
commercial milk offtake. Most sellers, however, seem to have starled only recently,
i.e. since the 1984/85 drought. Only among the group of individual ranchers and
Kiboko group ranch members was some above average interest in the selling of
milk recorded. It seems as if it is mainly the group of less wealthy group ranch
stratum l households and the most wealthy individual ranchers who are involved in
this practice. Established ranchers in Kaputiei were particularly active in selling
milk. In comparison, the Loodokilani and -even more- the southem Matapato
individual ranchers showed only modest interest in the selling of milk. In terms of
the amount of milk sold, another picture émerges. Embolioi and Loodokilani
ranchers had high average sales per household per week. In contrast, Kiboko
members sold only very small amounts. In général, per household between 10 and
20 Utres of milk are sold per week.
In addition to the fact that some households had no surplus for sale, marketing
and transport problems were the most frequently mentioned reasons for not selling
milk. Those who did seil said that town dwellers (41 per cent), restaurants (32 per
cent), local résidents (e.g teachers, quarry workers - 23 per cent) and a co-operative
dairy (4 per cent) were the purchasers.
According to Potter (1989:24) the commercial production of milk on subdivided
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farms is hampered by hygiëne, transport and marketing difficulties. Only on a few
favoured sites close to the small number of population centres does Potter see a
Potential for milk production to develop into a major commercial activity. Holland
(1989:23) bas stated that a locally based dairy industry needs a network of small-
scale trucks which would pick up thé milk locally, particularly during the wet
season when milk is a little more abundant A cost-benefit analysis should be made
first Like Potter he expressed doubts about the viability of a year round milk
industry unless using high inputs and operating in favourable areas.
The Kajiado Ministry of Livestock Production actively tries to assist the farmers
in the high-potential zones of Ngong but also Kitengela in improving and
commercializing the production of milk (e.g. the Kitengela milk cooler).
In addition to milk some households (Elang'ata Wuas and individual ranchers in
particular) seil eggs, honey or manure.

































































































































































































10.5.4 The Selling of Crops
Finally, information was gathered concerning the number of households
involved in the selling of crops. Metson (1974:table 40) reached a figure of 3.5
per cent of those interviewed who claimed to seil crops. We recorded 21
households stating to have sold crops in 1989. This is equivalent to 3.9 per
cent of all respondents or 9.1 per cent of all farming households. Buyers (40
per cent) and Olkinos households (25 per cent) are the ones most involved in
the selling of crops.
Maize and beans are the crops most frequently sold. These are destined for
the neighbouring households or towns in the main. In général, only small
quantities are involved and the bulk of the harvest is used for home
consumption. The change in dietary habits among the Maasai has been going
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on now for some time. The use of foodstuffs other than milk, blood and meat
is said to be on the increase. As Njoka (1979:256) reports, non-livestock
products like sugar, tea, maize cake, porridge and beans were populär among
most of the families even before 1950. Bread and chicken are the most recent
introductions. A cultural banier against the eating of pork and fish still exists.
Another aspect of this change in diet is that it allows the Maasai to obtain a
relatively favourable gain in calories when livestock is sold to purchase maize.
This is the result of favourable tenus of trade of méat to grain products.
Following this strategy the livestock requirements for a household can be
lowered (see Dietz 1987:127, O'Leary 1987:64, Oba 1987:39).
Finally, we asked the households if they had a bank account as this was
thought to be an indication of a more financially-oriented attitude. 66.7 per
cent of the buyers stated that they had a bank account. Except for the
individual ranchers (62.5 per cent), the Elang'ata Wuas ranchers (24.3),
Olkinos (23.5), Embolioi (10.0), Lorngosua (8.0), Kiboko (3.1) and Meto (1.9)
were much less involved in this. It should be taken into account that it is only
in recent times that financial institutions or banks have been present in
Loitokitok (1984) and Magadi (1990). Ngong and Kajiado have had AFC
branches since 1963 and 1973.
10.6 Maasai Pastoralism in the 1990s
In the foregoing some of the problems the Maasai face today have been
touched upon such as difficulties in obtaining improved breeds, disease
threatening their herds and flocks or impossibility of their young people
beconüng registered group ranch members which could make them squatters in
the near future.13 In the mid-1970s Metson (1974:table 49) recorded that the
main problems the Maasai were facing at that time were human health (88.9
per cent), lack of water (88.4 per cent), shortage of schools (72.3 per cent),
wildlife (48.8 per cent) and catüe disease (45.3 per cent).
Table 10.24 shows a detailed overview of the major problems as put
forward by our group of respondents in early 1990. For each group ranch we
indicated the three most frequently mentioned problems in bold type. Lack of
water is still the most often mentioned difficulty Maasai households face in
Kajiado District. Similarly important are the problems caused by animal
disease. The favourable position of the Elang'ata Wuas ranchers is clearly
illustrated. Lack of capital cornes in third place. Other important problems are
the poor infrastructure and the prédation of game. These latter are usually
13 In this last section we will briefly highlight the most important problems in the daily
running and improvement of their household économies as seen by the respondent« themselves. In
our view, this should be a starting point for any local or foreign organisation wishing to assist the
Maasai in improving their standard of living.
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problems on a local scale.
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In comparison with Metson the signiflcance of human health has become less
relevant. This could be due to the period of drought the Maasai were facing at
the time. Also problems of the lack of schools seems to have been reduced.
This is a good development, although one should keep in mind that the
demand for schools is still on the rise, that classes are crowded with pupils and
a shortage of trained teachers exists. The Maasai population still has a long
way to go in improving ils level of éducation.
It is thought that higher standards of eduction will be necessary for those
Maasai who, in the years to come, will not be able to make a living the way
their fathers and grandfather did. Besides formal éducation, training will be
needed for those Maasai wanting or needing to remain in the pastoral sector.
In 1988 the Ministry of Livestock Development, in co-operation with the
ASAL-Programme, starled up the "North Kaputiei Extension Project". It was
intended to train farmers of the five subdivided group ranches of Olkinos,
Embolioi, Empuyiankat, Kitengela and Kisaju as well as established individual
ranchers in this région in "zero grazing" techniques and other methods needed
to compensate for the shrinking availability of land.
More specifically, the project aims to assist the ranchers in the procuring
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and management of superior breeds, to assist in the organization of the use of
dips and boreholes and to enhance the diversification of livestock enterprises,
e.g. poultry, apiculture etc. Besides giving démonstrations in the area, seminars
and tours to other districts such as Baringo and Machakos have been
organized. Initially, former group ranch committee-members were used as
contact farmers who were to announce these activities in their area. This did
not work well and nowadays every farmer is contacted individually.
One of the results of the project was the création of dip committees in
Empuyiankat, Olkinos and Embolioi. In Embolioi, however, internai struggles
arose causing this group to malfunction. Also, in some areas village
development committees have been formed who are now in charge of grazing
and other development matters.
In respect of the commercialization of the Maasai economy it can be reported
that the World Bank has announced plans for a livestock-marketing project.
Earlier drafts of this plan have been criticised as it threatens to be a blow to
the trading system of many young Maasai livestock traders. Small groups of
them are involved in the transporting of catüe and small stock from the interior
of Kajiado District to the Nairobi markets.14
Fearing the need to import meat in the near future the call for the Maasai to
increase their offtake can still be heard. To feed its fast growing population it
is realised that shortages of beef might arise, particularly whenever subdivision
of group ranches results in the replacement of livestock-keeping on cultivation.
The statement made at the second conference on the future of the Maasai in
Kajiado District by Mr. John Keen, Assistant Minister within the Office of the
President, that land should be used for that for which it is best suited; i.e.
livestock-keeping, is an indication that doubt on the soundness of subdivision
is widespread.
It was nevertheless realised among the conference participants that the process
of the subdivision of group ranches has become irréversible. The latest reports
from Kajiado District are that subdivision is moving forward at an accelerating
rate. To speed up group ranch dissolution private surveyors are being
increasingly involved in this process.
The conference participants considered the future for pastoralism in the
present set-up to be bleak (see van Klinken 1992:61). In my view this is not
necessarily the case as subdivision has given new impetus to some of the
flexibility and mobility of the Maasai pastoral system. Corrupt committee-
14 Ironically, in its latest World Development Report, the World Bank stated that: 'African
pastoralists, such as the Maasai and Samburu of Kenya, are able to exploit apparently marginal
savannahs (...) Building on these strengths requires great care, expertise, and patience. But
development projects that do not take existing practices into account often fail (World Bank
1992:93).
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members can no longer frustrate developments and the misuse of group
territory by individual ranchers has been stopped. Informal groups could
possibly act as a viable alternative to the former group ranches. This would
allow for casier and better management.
I agrée, however, that with the dissolution of group ranches and the
individualization of landownership a Trojan horse has entered Kajiado District
and the registration of individual ranches has resulted in the commoditization
of land. What had been predicted by Eliot in the beginning of this Century and
was restated by Lawrance in the mid-1960s, i.e. that the ultimate infiltration by
other groups cannot be stopped by any means -including the registration of
land- looks likely to be fulfilled by the end of this Century.
The Maasai have a saying that 'non can live like bird, on a branch' (see
Peron 1984:71). Nevertheless, non-registered youngsters in Olkinos who
wanted to attend a group ranch meeting on subdivision were refused. They
were told to go to a tall nearby tree and build their house on top! The
ownership of land will resuit in a profound and structurally altered Maasai
society. In the words of a Maasai participant at the "Limuru Conférence"
'Ironically, because of thé newly acquired value attachée! to land, and due to
thé commercialization of this inelastic commodity a new "tribe" of landless
Maasai is in the making, swelling thé ranks of many other Kenyans who hâve
gone there before' (Polong 1990:105). At the second conference Minister John
Keen used the word 'disastrous' and coined thé phrase 'thé Maasai is, in a
way, his own enemy' (see van Klinken 1992:11).
The participants of thé second conférence on thé future of the Maasai
brought forward thé following resolutions in respect of land (see van Klinken
1992):
1. There is gréât diversity in the land potential of the district and the process of land subdivision
should take place based on the economie viability of the units. Alongside thé process of
subdivision studies should be undertaken to impress upon proper land use for thé people based
on économie advantages that would be best accrued ftom the land parcels.
2. The Agricultural Land Acts and Land Control Acts governing the subdivision of parcels to
economically viable units, should be firmly adhered to as to the recommended sizes within
certain ecological zones. This is so to enable the Land Control Boards to make appropriate
recommendations on the economie size of the land parcels. The Ministry of Agriculture and
Livestock Development together with other relevant bodies they would like to consult or
incorporate should come up with minimum acreages in the district immediately.
3. Group Ranch Accounts auditing unit of the Ministry of Lands under the Registrar of gronp
représentatives should be reactivated to ensure proper accounting of funds in Group Ranches.
4. Politicization of group ranch management issues should be discouraged as politicians
manipulate the ranch committees to their own benefit.
5. A moratorium on land sales on long term basis of 25 years be imposed immediately to curb
indiscriminate land sales.
6 Localize Land Control Boards to place the onus of controlling land sales and transfers on local
people by ensuring fair représentation by people electing their own people in the Land Control
Boards. These will be people of integrity and chiefs and Assistant chiefs should veto and
approve transactions.
7. Title Deeds should go to family units rather than to individuals to safeguard the family
?"|
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interests in the land.
8. The Ministry of Lands, Departments of Land Adjudication and Survey should be revamped to
ensure smooth subdivision of the group ranches.
9. Co-operative organisations in the pastoral areas should be encouraged, be it under group
ranches, individual ranches or family ranches as this is one factor that will ensure success and
sustainability.
10. During subdivision provisions must be made to ensure that all members have access to public
Utilities e.g. watering points, saltlicks, etc.
11. We recornmend that the AS AL Programme in the district ensures that a task force be formed
to ensure that these recommendations are passed on to the relevant authorities for
Implementation.
12. Group ranch subdivision alternatives:
-The Konza concept: where members are settled on a portion of the ranch and the rest of
the land is used as a commercial ranch
-The Olkiramatian concept: zoning the ranch into various economie units e.g, agricultural
area, tourist attraction zone and ranching.
-Embolioi concept: individual ranchers on already subdivided ranches regroup under a co
-operative arrangement to manage their resources more effectively.
Although Mr. Keen had stated that the Government would consider the
outcome of the conference at length I doubt whether, for instance, a 25 year
moratorium on the sale of land could be implemented. Such a step, however,
seems to me a necessary step be it only for 5-10 years or so. In addition,
consciousness raising, the provision of soft loans, the imposition of land
ceilings and the taxation of landownership to reduce land spéculation, are all
believed to be necessary instruments to stop the indiscriminate selling of land
in Kajiado District. If this process is not halted future Maasai générations will
be the ones left holding "the grapes of wrath". Being aware of this risk young
Maasai nowadays blame their fathers for "selling wealth to buy poverty".
10.7 Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter an overview has been presented of the diversification,
intensification and commerciali/ation of the Maasai economy as recorded
among our group of respondents by early 1990. In the previous chapters we
have already reported on the growing involvement of Maasai households in
cultivation. Poor households in particular, but also the rieh concentrate on this
activity. Those who had shown no interest indicated climatological reasons or
the lack of labour as the reasons for this.
We concluded that, increasingly, Maasai heads of household have their
main occupation outside the livestock sector. In particular, wage labour either
in public institutions or in private enterprises has become a major way of
earning a living (some 20-30 per cent of the respondents). Others mentioned
running their own business. In général, some 90 per cent of the heads of
households remained at the household's home for most of the year. The
exception being Olkinos, where 25 per cent were staying elsewhere. Still,
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résidence outside the district was recorded for only 6.4 per cent of the group of
Olkinos heads of households whereas, for other ranches, this was not above 3.0
per cent.
Diversification also includes the change in the composition of the Maasai
herds. A remarkable development has been the increase in the importance of
small stock. Recently camels have been introduced into the district. It is still
too early to judge the wisdom and the potential of this move.
The intensification of the Maasai economy is another option implemented
by many Maasai. One of the opportunities is the raising of the production of
milk through the introduction of or the increase in the number of improved
breeds. Obstacles to this were said to be high purchase "priées, non-availability
and vulnerability to disease and drought. Huge différences were recorded with
respect to the importance of upgraded stock in both herds and flocks. In
général, the percentage of ranchers having upgraded small stock is higher than
for improved cattle.
Finally, we looked into the commercialization of the Maasai economy. We
tried to get an idea of the relative importance of commercial sales and
purchases. In particular it was the rieh who were among those mentioned as
having sold animais for commercial reasons. We also highlighted other sales,
slaughtering, exchanges, loans and gifts as these actions should also be taken
into account when considering livestock offtake figures. It was estimated that
an additional 30 per cent of stock are removed from the herds because of these
afore-mentioned reasons. The sale of hides and skins was mentioned by half of
our group of households. In contrast, the selling of milk was recorded for a
mere 5 per cent of the respondents. The sale of crops was also negligible.
In 1962 Fallon wisely prophesied that 'The future of the Kajiado Masai largely
dépends on what happens to their land' (see Fallon 1962:46). The Maasai of
Kajiado District still have the future in their own hands. This is true for those
Maasai having a large enough individual ranch or who are members of a group
ranch. The younger génération, however, will in the near future be confronted
with a reduced access to land as a result of the process of group ranch
dissolution into individually owned parcels. It is expected that this will result
in a process of stratification and marginalization within Maasai society. The
intégration of different forms of land use and the création of alternative
employaient opportunities should be given the highest priority. Education is of
major importance in this respect. In the short term attention should be
primarily directed at curtailing the selling out of land. Consciousness raising
and training in methods of increasing the output of livestock herding is
required on the small parcels. First of all a moratorium on the sale of land
could be of major help in preventing the Maasai selling their land to outsiders.
To stop this practice would be a diffïcult a but necessary step to benefit the
Maasai, their children, the district's wildlife population and the Kenyan
economy.
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Table 10.25 Livestock Transactions by Wealth Class in December 1989 (as
percentage of households involved)
Olkinos Embolioi Kiboko Elang'ata
Wuas
Lorngosua Meto























































15.4 33.3 54 4
7.7 0.0 0.0
7 7 0.0 0.0
7.7 0.0 0.0












































25.0 32.1 14.3 31.0 30.6
0.0 7.1 47.6 3.4
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Table 10.26 Types of Livestock Transactions by Wealth Class in December







































































































































































































































































































i n m i n
7.5 2.0 2.3 11.3 5.4
0.0 0.8 0.0 0.1 0.2
0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.8
0.0 1.4 0.0 0.8 0.6
0.4 0.1 0.5 0.6 0.6
0.2 0.3 1.9 0.4 0.8
0.4 0.2 (1) 0.6 0.2
0.2 0.8 0.3 1.4 0.8
0.4 0.8 0.9 1.1 2.3
4.2 1.3 1.2 11.0 2.6
0.0 0.3 0.0 0.4 0.0
4.3 1.7 0.2 3.4 3.2
0.0 0.6 0.1 4.3 0.2
4.0 2.4 2.7 3.3 2.3
0.1 0.1 1.6 1.6 0.3
0.0 0.1 2.6 0.6 0.6
0.2 1.1 0.6 3.0 0.6









































n ra i ii
1.3 0.3 0.2 7.3
5.8 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.2 (1) 0.2 0.0
0.4 0.0 0.0 2.3
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.4 0.4 0.0 0.2
0.7 0.0 0.0 0.2
0.8 0.0 2.0 4.6
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
3.1 0.7 6.0 2.5
0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
0.5 0.1 0.0 2.1
1.5 0.0 0.0 0.4




































































































In 1982 Anders Hjort expressed his astonishment about the fact that so little
systematic research had been carried out on losses of land and on the effects of
such losses among pastoral societies. He called for the need for co-operation
between geographers and anthropologists on studying the spécifie peculiarities
of pastoral land use:
'Certainly, it would lead to a better appréciation of the local relations to the
macro-society if present-day local conflicts over grazing are not analyzed
in the ethnie terms which govern the contestants' perceptions, but rather in
terms of a compétition between different economie Systems over productive
land which pushes its victims against each other. (...) The immensity of the
problem of pastoral land loss seems to fail to impress planners and public
opinion alike. Perhaps harsh figures on the rate of resource shrinking is the
only way we can communicate it? This is an example of research
anthropologists as well as ecologists should do if we want to be of any
practical use to those whom we study' (Hjort 1982:22).
This study has been an attempt to review the Maasai pastoralists use and
ownership of land from a geographer's perspective, while taking into account
ecological, economical, and socio-cultural aspects. Special attention has been
paid to the process and conséquences of the individualization of land
ownership in the Maasai area as it developed over the last Century. In the
following pages, we will present a review of this évolution chronologically,
whilst distinguishing four major periods. Referring to the model for analysis
presented in chapter l we will draw conclusions concerning the causes and the
conséquences of these changes in the use and ownership of land for each
spécifie period.
A. 1890-1920: Arrivai of the Europeans and the Formation of Maasai
Reserves
Since the mid-19th Century neighbouring agricultural and pastoral groups such
as the Kikuyu, Kamba, Kalenjin, Pokot and Turkana had starled to occupy
certain patches of a vast area of some 160,000 km2 which had once been
firmly controlled by the pastoral Maasai. Approximately 60,000-70,000 km2 of
this territory was located in present day Kenya. Internecine wars amongst the
Maasai and human and livestock diseases had resulted in the death of some 90
per cent of all livestock and half of the human population. This had weakened
the Maasai's once very powerful position while that of the group of
agriculturalists had grown in strength. Actually, the picture outlined above of
the changing fortunes and base of power was nothing new. Sphères of
influence and control over land in the African continent had always been a
dynamic feature like an ebb and flow.
The arrivai of the European colonizers in the heart of what later was to be
called the East African Protectorate in the late 19th Century put an end to this.
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After the arrivai of the British colonizers the pace by which thé Maasai were
losing their pastures was accelerated.
In 1895 thé Maasai people were separated after a straight boundary was
drawn from thé Indian coast to Lake Victoria in thé interior. This meant thé
création of Tanganyika, governed by thé Germans, thé East African
Protectorate and the Ugandan Protectorate, both in the hands of the British. For
mainly stratégie and commercial reasons British interest was foremostly
directed towards thé latter territory. The East Africa Protectorate was more an
obstacle than an asset to thé colonizers. To recover part of the high costs
involved in thé construction of thé "Uganda Railway" linking thé port of
Mombasa with Lake Victoria settlers were invited to corne to thé East Africa
Protectorate by offering large grants of land at extremely low priées. Arriving
settlers simply went out and chose whatever area they liked. The
Administration offered Jewish refugees from Eastern Europe thé Maasai held
Uasin Gishu plateau as their new homeland. The proposai was ultimately
rejected as it was decided to establish an autonomous Jewish state in Palestine.
As non-Europeans were prevented from buying land the high-potential areas
north of Nairobi became known as the "White Highlands". African land rights
were violated in every respect. Of the 31,000 km2 of European maximum
setüed land area (excluding forest reserves) 18,000 km2 were former Maasai
lands.
In 1904 a treaty was signed between thé British and Maasai which meant a
renewed division of Maasai into a northern and southern reserve totalling some
24,000 km2. This was a réduction to some 35-40 per cent of their former
territory. In this way thé Maasai were deprived of their best pastures as thé
assigned reserves had been traditional Maasai pastoral lands.
The treaty was slightly adjusted in the following years as an extension was
needed for thé too small northern reserve. In 1911 thé "Second Maasai Treaty"
was signed making it possible to remove the Maasai from thé north to an
extended Southern Reserve gazetted as thé Maasai Reserve District by 1918
(some 38,000 km2).
Referring to our framework for analysis presented in figure 1.2, each of the
contexts mentioned (from local to international) can be seen to hâve played a
rôle in the loss of access to land by the Maasai pastoralists. The international
context (i.e. the establishment of colonial power in Kenya to serve the interest
of European nations for stratégie reasons mostly) overruled the local tensions
among thé Maasai and towards agricultural groups. The arrivai of thé British
resulted initially in a stabilization of thé Maasai's already weakened powers
and control over land and stopped the incursion of other groups into their
territory. The British, fearing thé Maasai, joined a pact which enabled thé latter
to regain some strength by thé means of punitive expéditions against other
groups. With numbers of both livestock and human beings growing worries
were expressed by thé local administration (i.e. national context).
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At the turn of thé Century plans were made by administrators (Eliot) in a
close though unofficial alliance with influential settlers (eg. Delamere) to
remove the Maasai from their best grazing areas. In later years a settler-
dominated Land Board even gained legal influence in directing the local
governors to serve the settler interests at the cost of those of the Maasai and
other African groups.
Lucrative land législation was enforced. The "First Crown Lands Ordinance"
of 1902 proclaimed that ail public land was Crown land under the control of
thé Administration. African land rules were simply overruled by the issue of a
single paper. Non-Europeans were excluded from acquiring land, ultimately
resulting in a ségrégation of the population along racial lines. Amendments
made in later years allowed settlers to lease pastoral land of up to 10,000 acres
at exceedingly low priées. Some settlers and European land-buying companies,
however, were able to obtain over 100,000 acres, mostly in the heart of the
Maasai country. As thèse arrangements were in conflict with thé London
guidelines, problems arose over this state-enforced législation and development
policy supported at the national level.
The somewhat unconventional move of endorsing two treaties (1904, 1911)
was made to "safeguard" Maasai interests. Actually thèse agreements served
settler's interests and resulted in the removal of the Maasai from their best
grazing areas near Naivasha and Laikipia. In return the Maasai were restricted
to newly created reserves of much lower carrying capacity. Most of this
"reserved territory" was traditional Maasai land, anyway. Large parts of the
new pastures, however, suffered from infestation with tsetse fly, lacked water
and had an overall lower grazing capacity. In combination with thé huge
réduction in land quantity thé final conséquence was the stress placed upon thé
Maasai's ability to herd their livestock. Moreover, a huge land concession of
some 900 km2 was granted to thé Magadi Soda Company to exploit thé soda
deposits at Lake Magadi. The 1915 Crown Lands Ordinance allowed thé
extension of leases from 99 to 999 years, removed restrictions on thé
accumulation of land and extended thé définition of Crown land to 'all lands
occupied by thé native tribes and ail lands reserved for thé use of any members
of any native tribes.' This last clause still allowed the Govemor to extract
reserve land for lease or sale to white settlers while Africans and Asians were
still excluded from purchasing land outside the reserves.
Maasai loyalty to British and settler interests had been rewarded with the loss
of their best pastures and thé prohibition of selling and improving their cattle.
This led the Maasai to opt for an attitude of nonchalance, distrust and eventual
résistance. Possibly, thé internai tensions between thé Maasai and their
expérience of thé colonizers' powers were responsible for thé seemingly rather
modest protest made by thé Maasai. Support in their claims for land and
requests for development only came from individual administrators. As a
conséquence some of them were removed from their posts. Support from
churches was virtually non-existent and sometimes they were even opposed to
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the Maasai. Just like the Colonial
concentrated on "civilizing" the Maasai.
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Government, missionaries mainly
B. 1921-1945: The Period of Neglect
In the inter-war period an increase in the number of settlers was seen. In
following the Maasai other African groups were also restricted to too small
reserves. They eventually became a source of cheap labour for the settler-
owned farms and plantations. White settlers engaged in livestock keeping,
feared the compétition from African herders and opposed any real development
of African livestock husbandry. Quarantine régulations and heavy taxation were
imposed. The former hindered traditional African access to livestock markets
or the obtaining of bulls for interbreeding. More quarantine stations were
constructed only after newly arriving settlers had raised the demand for
(African) cattle.
In the words of Zwanenberg and King (1975:97) 'The restrictions on African
pastoral development in Kenya can only be understood in relation to the
positive emphasis that was placed on European stock development. African
pastoralists in Kenya were sacrificed on the altar of white seulement'. One of
the draw backs of the restrictions imposed was the apparent overstocking of
the reserves. During times of drought the reduced mobility and lost access to
dry season grazing pastures was feit. The Maasai repeatedly showed their
interest in water development and inoculations to raise the carrying capacity
and prevent livestock diseases, providing funds for these actions themselves.
Withtn the Local Administration opinions differed concerning the economie
development policy within the Maasai reserves. The final outcome was a
policy favouring only the development of the ghee and hides business.
The history of livestock marketing has also made clear that the often aired
criticism concerning pastoralists' interest in large herds of low quality stock
resulting in overgrazing is questionable at the very least. Quarantine prohibited
the sale of livestock. Priées offered by private traders and illégal sales
flourished to the detriment of official ones. At the same time the administrators
blamed the Maasai for not wanting to seil their animais! Moreover, repeated
periods of drought and livestock diseases diminished the size of the herds
considerably Part of the "surplus" was in reality an msurance against these
disasters.
The Maasai repeated their protest against their loss of land, including some
minor disputed areas along the Chyulu triangle and the Uganda Railway and its
Magadi branch, totalling some 720 km2 to the Kenya (or Carter) Land
Commission installed to review African land grievances. The Maasai
furthermore requested the removal of the artificial boundary between them and
the Tanganyika Maasai and aired their wish to be reunited.
The Native Land Trust Ordinance introduced in 1930 prohibited the lease of
land by non-natives if occupied or needed by Africans. Non-Maasai who
infiltrated Kajiado District were nevertheless not ejected by the Kajiado Local
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Administration. Some individual Maasai also favoured the coming of these
agriculturalists to cultivate Maasai owned plots. As a group, however, the
Maasai disliked this massive influx.
The final report of the Kenya Land Commission reaffirmed the policy of the
Administration towards pastoralists in totally opposing any extension of their
land. In fact, the Commission, which had not given serious considération to the
Maasai grievances, blamed them for having so much land to the detriment of
Europeans and other African groups.
As the result of the Land Commission's work new land législation came into
force by the end of the 1930s: Native Lands Trust Ordinance (1938), Crown
Lands (amendaient) Ordinance (1938). The latter redefmed the various land
catégories: 1) 'Native' instead of 'Crown' land for the original reserves; 2)
Temporary Native Reserves and 3) Native Leasehold Areas.
Though some of the African groups may have profited somehow from these
new arrangements it was noted by the late 1930s that the settlers, comprising
less than 0.2 per cent of the total estimated population, owned 5.5 per cent of
all and 18 per cent of Kenya's good agricultural land area. This was the real
cause of the economie crisis in the African Reserves and the influx of non-
Maasai to Kajiado District. Still, due to their low numbers cultivation was of
minor importance. In 1931 less than 1,000 acres was under cultivation in the
whole of the Maasai Reserve. During the 1930s and 1940s it remained an
activity mainly performed by drought-stricken Maasai and immigrants.
From the foregoing review it becomes clear that, in général, British colonial
administrators simply disregarded any genuine development efforts in favour of
the Maasai Reserve. With white settlers gaining influence and the British
Government sending commissions (not all of them deserving the label
"knowledgeable" and "impartial") no group was willing or able to protect
Maasai interests. Moreover, the Maasai themselves, feeling betrayed and
coming to realize the conséquences of the loss of their high potential pastures
north of Nairobi during the early 1930s drought in particular, simply ignored
most of the programmes starled (specifically the éducation programmes).
Several state-imposed régulations concerning livestock quarantines, market
outlets and taxation mostly favoured the settler community. The Maasai
overcame some of these problems by setting up their own system of (illegal)
livestock trade which earned them much higher returns. The opening of the
Liebig's meat factory at Athi River in 1937 could not change this practice as
the Company, though begun under favourable conditions, was unable to
compete with individual traders. Priées offered feil by some 25 to 50 per cent.
During the war Kajiado District supplied between 10,000 to 13,000 head of
cattie annually, or almost 60,000 in total to the specially installed Meat
Marketing Board. This, however, was a more or less obligatory provision as,
after the war, this figure dropped considerably.
Estimâtes in 1930 for the Kenyan Maasai and their livestock reached some
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48,400 people, 720,000 cattle and 820,000 shoats residing in a Maasai Reserve
comprising some 39,000 km2. In other words, the Maasai of those days owned
on average 16.8 LE/AAME. Potential mean availability of land was 100.0 ha
per AAME. Stocking densities were therefore 6.0 ha/LE. This means that,
overall, the availability of land and livestock during those days (shortly before
the 1933 drought) allowed the Maasai to subsist entirely on a diet of milk,
blood and meat, while the size of herds stayed within the potential carrying
capacity of the Maasai Reserve.
The actual capacity will have been lower due to the huge numbers of wildlife
sharing the Kajiado pastures at that time. Also, some localities within the
Reserve were heavily infested with tsetse flies or lacked sufficient water. The
latter was (partly) the result of the Maasai Treaties and the consequent loss of
watering points for the benefit of white settlers along the Maasai Reserve's
northern boundary. Approximately 40 per cent of the Reserve was, as a result
of these problems, considered to be useless or, at best, of low value. The
migration of the Uasinkishu Maasai towards other section's land in the western
Narok région also caused some local congestion and hardship.
Still, Colonial Administration and special committee's reports concerning
overstocked Maasai rangelands should be seen as being at least slightly
exaggerated. Possibly, economic-political reasons and the fact that most
reviews were made in a post-drought situation have been responsible for this
conclusion about overstocking.
Land législation, favouring white settler's interests created an artificial
scarcity of land in the African Reserves. As a result infiltration towards the
high-potential zones of the less populated semi-arid régions occurred. No firm
policy was conducted to stop this practice. Compétition for land in these
régions was therefore indirecüy caused by the development policy favouring
and protecting the interests of the white settlers. Their powerful position was
only stopped by the British Colonial Office the moment the settlers tried to
gain self-government, otherwise the whole Administrative apparatus had served
the white farmer's activities.
C. 1946-1963: Grazing Scheme Experiments in Land Management and
Development
Forced migration of squatters residing on the European-owned farms back to
the African reserves starled after World War II. Demand for land was further
extended as 90,000 ex-military recruits needed to be taken care of. These
developments augmented the natural growth in the too small African territories
(between 1945 and 1962 the African population of Kenya increased from 5.0
to 8.4 million people). The authorities, however, mainly kept on pointing to the
legal and the poor ecological condition of the African Reserves. Rather than
expanding the African Reserves at the cost of the "White Highlands" the
strengthening of communal control over land was seen as a device to stop
environmental dégradation. For this purpose the African Settlement Board was
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created in 1945. This Board (after 1953 named the African Land Development
Board (ALDEV)) constructed over 1,600 dams, over 200 wells, a mere 50
boreholes and other water availability improving measures in the rangeland
areas of Kenya.
Substantial economie progression, however, did not occur. Ultimately, by
1952 some African groups (Kikuyu in particular) took up an armed struggle
against the British colonial administration. Disagreement among the settlers
concerning the best approach to dealing with this uprising weakened their
position at the cost of London influence. As in the twenties and thirties several
commissions were sent to review the situation and to advise on thé reforms
needed. The most important reform document was the "Swynnerton Plan" of
1954. The main aim of this plan was to intensify thé development of African
agriculture. One of thé prerequisites was said to be conducting a programme of
land consolidation and registration in thé high-potential zones. Because
financial institutions had not been willing to provide funds to farmers without
privately owned land, the idea of communal landownership had been dropped
as early as the beginning of the 1950s. In addition, the economie potential of
the pastoral areas was underlined by the "Swynnerton Plan". Measures were
considered necessary to improve productivity. Marketing (outlets) and grazing
management (de-stocking, range management, water improvement, tsetse
eradication) was the main concern.
In addition, the Local Native Councils had become involved in development
oriented projects (water, éducation, health and infrastructural developments
mainly). Finances were derived from a Local Native Council tax, fées, fines,
grants and the proceeds of sand, wood and limestone royalties. The Maasai
continued to be the highest taxed group in Kenya. Missionary activities had
also gained in importance by the end of the 1950s. Most of their efforts were
in the field of éducation, health care and water development.
In Kajiado District, grazing control was a first priority in the eyes of the
local administration. Again, no firm évidence of the need to pursue this policy
was available. On the contrary, reports for the year 1948 (semi-drought) stated
that the rangelands of Kajiado District were in good condition. Possibly the
Maasai décision of 1946 to abolish the section boundaries allowing free
grazing for all Maasai in every part of the district had helped to rationalize the
use of the Kajiado pastures. Still, with drought conditions worsening, tensions
between sections grew and section boundaries were re-introduced. In practice,
however, throughout the 1950s massive movements by all sections were made
and relations between them were good in général.
The Administration tried to persuade the Maasai to accept some form of
grazing control. By allowing a maximum number of stock in the vicinity of a
borehole it was attempted to gradually form some kind of ranch unit. A pilot
experiment had starled at Konza in 1949 as part of the ALDEV programme.
Twelve families, 1,285 disease-free cattfe, 9,325 completely fenced hectares, 2
boreholes, a cattle dip, rotational grazing, a manager and veterinary assistant
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were the ingrédients that were to provide the Maasai with a bright example of
western superiority in livestock improvement. The initial success, except for
the frequently broken fencing, was said to have generaled much enthusiasm
among the local Kaputiei Maasai. Their eagerness, however, was mainly for
dipping as this was the main reason for the comparatively better condition of
Konza stock during a favourable year. Fencing and relational grazing played
either only a minor rôle or no rôle al all. Frictions developed between thé
manager and thé Konza ranch Maasai, particularly concerning de-stocking. The
latter was a government objective which had not been mentioned at the start of
the scheme.
Plans to divide the whole of the district into ranch unils were dropped after
investigation showed that, with the exception of the Kaputiei area, most of the
district was unsuited for a static form of ranching because of climatic and
geological conditions. The Konza experiment was continued under more strict
conditions until 1959. Some participants withdrew. The scheme was completely
abandoned at the height of the 1960/61 drought and ultimately was turned into
individual ranches.
In Kisonko (1954), Malapato (1957) and Loodokilani (1959) "Sectional
Grazing Scheines" were starled by the mid and late 1950s. Hère the Maasai
were also mainly interested in modern methods of husbandry such as dipping
and inoculation and water provision improvemenl. The Schemes again tried to
enforce strict grazing control in addition to traditional range use. On the other
hand the Adminislralion stated thaï it realized that, owing to the vagaries of the
rains, an even pattern for grazing control would never be achieved. Indeed by
1959 every control in the Kisonko scheme had had to be abandoned due to the
drought and the Maasai trespassing to other districts. The main advantage of
the Scheme had mainly been the construction of water improvement works.
Individual ranches were another new phenomenon of the 1950s. The first
individual ranch was starled up in 1954 by Reverend Daudi Mokinyo in Ihe
Elang'ala Wuas area. In 1956, afier failing lo find water, anolher location near
the Toroka river was chosen where borehole drilling turned out to be more
successful. By the end of the 1950s more Maasai (chiefs and teachers mainly)
had opted for individual ranches. The Colonial Administration of those days
feared that land-grabbing for spéculative reasons was the main reason behind
the applications for individual ranches. A maximum ranch size of 2,000 acres
was introduced.
After having purchased the ranch it needed to be developed. This was a very
coslly business which was severely hampered by high raies of interest. Still, by
1963, Kajiado District had a total of 24 individual ranches located in several
parts of the district. In addition, a programme of land consolidation was begun
in the Ngong area by 1961. Although opposed by Maasai elders this move was
encouraged by ihe young and educated and backed by the Kajiado County
Council.
One of the reasons mentioned for this action was that it was said to stop
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infiltration by non-Maasai (mainly Kikuyu) agriculturalists. After the war,
increasing numbers of them had come to Kajiado looking for land lo be
cultivated. Their eyes had fallen on the high-potential areas such as Ngong,
Namanga and Loitokilok. These areas had suffered from charcoal burning and
forest clearing for agricultural purposes in particular. At times the alien
squatters were removed and the areas closed for cultivation. The Kajiado Local
Native Council inslalled a special commillee for appraising every applicant
before consent for résidence was provided in order lo check the influx. In 1951
more comprehensive and effective législation (i.e. Land Usage By-Laws) was
inlroduced empowering section councils lo control ihe spread of cultivation in
Iheir lerrilories. Irrigated agriculture was starled in Loitokitok locations such äs
Kimana, Sinnet and Rombo. In the Ngong area some cash crops (coffee,
pyrethrum) were introduced.
The land législation and the déclaration of Ihe Emergency which enabled
Kikuyu Ihought to be involved with Mau Mau activities to be evicted, at times
reduced the area under cultivation. Special villages had been created in the
Ngong area to control Kikuyu immigrants. The number of non-Maasai
increased during the 1950s. This increase had accelerated by the end of Ihe
Emergency in 1959. Belween 1948 and 1962 the number of Kajiado Districl
non-Maasai had risen from some 2,500 lo 15,200 or, in other words, from a
mere 9.0 per cent to over 22.0 per cenl. Approximately 40 per cent of these
non-Maasai were Kikuyu, mostly residing in the Ngong area.
Tourism also gained importance. Within a decade the number of visitors to
the Amboseli Game Reserve had increased lenfold, making lourism Ihe main
source of revenue for Ihe Kajiado Dislricl Council. After Ihe war a slrong
international lobby for conservation had developed. More protection for
wildlife was also sought in the Maasai areas By December 1946 the Nairobi
National Park (117 km2) was proclaimed which meant Ihe loss of Ihis grazing
area for Maasai cattle. In 1947 Amboseli National Reserve (3,260 km2) was
gazelted. The Maasai did not lose access Ihis time, allhough, over Ihe years,
Ihe Administration had Cried several times to force the Maasai to restricl
liveslock numbers near the Ol Tukai swamps which had become a tourist rest
camp. By 1961 negotiations had slarted belween ihe Maasai and Ihe Kajiado
County Council to set aside a 78 km2 slock-free area to be leased lo a lourisl
industry corporation.
The Maasai pastoral economy in the post-war period was characterized by an
initial drop in liveslock numbers lo some 335,000 head of caltle on Ihe one
hand and an increased (official) offlake, paitly in response lo increased
liveslock priées, on ihe olher. Until the mid-1950s the number of black-market
sales (to Nairobi, Central Province and Tanganyika in particular) were doublé
the official sales. This was the resull of the revenues of Ihe former being some
20 per cent higher lhan of Ihe laller. Auctions organized on a voluntary basis
were a failure, even after raising official livestock priées. Liebig's had run into
trouble and had to close down as early as 1949. The following year the Kenya
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Méat Commission (KMC) took over the Liebig's factory. Now official
producer priées became even less lucrative, with private traders paying more
than doublé the KMC priées. Illegal trade with Tanganyika via Illasit became
very populär. Kajiado Administrators deliberately allowed this practice to
continue as it was an important source of revenue for the Maasai and, through
taxation, for the Administration as well. By 1955 Illasit was made an official
outlet and official sales increased dramatically to some 25,000 annually.
By 1960 the Maasai livestock economy collapsed once more as thé resuit of
a sévère drought. Livestock numbers decreased by some 65-80 per cent. Food
aid had to be provided to some half of the Kajiado District population. The
KMC was paying very low priées and could not handle the huge numbers of
cattle offered. Outside assistance from Tanganyika was refused for commercial
and stratégie reasons. It was feared that this competitor would take over part of
the corned-beef export market.
Reviewing thé post-war period up till Independence African protests could be
seen growing louder in response to thé Colonial Administration'« policy of
sending squatters back to thé too-small reserves. This action was foremost a
political and economie move to safeguard settler interests. The raised
consciousness and increased self-confidence among thé African population,
mainly Kikuyu, started an active opposition which ultimately resulted in a
struggle for freedom. The winds of change had also swept through British
Colonial policy resulting in less sympathy for thé dominance of Kenyan affairs
by settlers. These developments at the local, national and international levels
resulted in an érosion of thé influence of settlers by the beginning of the
1950s. Africans began to gain some influence in thé National parliament.
Economie reform programmes were proposed for thé African Reserves,
including thé semi-arid rangelands to develop thé économie potential they were
"discovered" to possess. Much attention was given to thé question of land
consolidation and thé change of land tenure in thé high-potential zones. Initial
ideas of strengthening communal tenure were dropped and individual
ownership propagated instead by way of the adjudication and registration of
land.
For thé rangelands opinions differed as to thé right approach. Local level
Maasai politicians in Kajiado District had started acquiring large individual
ranches without the legal means to do so. Support for these individuals was,
however, provided by thé Local County Council, not infrequently because of
private interests. The Colonial Administrators expressed their concerns, but did
not actively oppose this development. Instead they tried to introducé once
again a means of destocking thé Maasai pastures by proposing thé création of
grazing schemes. Thèse were accepted by thé Maasai for économie reasons
(i.e. thé improvement of livestock and the availability of water sources)
mainly. The effect on herd movements and destocking, however, was very
modest. Only in thé Loitokitok région was some form of relational grazing
achieved. Times of stress disrupted this range management practice. The Konza
grazing experiment and other surveys had also made clear that an idea to
divide thé district into a spécifie number of ranches was unsound from an
ecological point of view.
Moreover, the land resource base available for Maasai livestock herding
started to dwindle as more agrieulturalists started to Infiltrate and occupy thé
high-potential dry season grazing pastures. This and thé instalment of the
Amboseli Game Reserve and Nairobi National Park, partly in response to an
international conservationist lobby, put a further strain on thé availability of
land for livestock.
Worried Maasai repeatedly asked that thé reasons for thèse tensions be
removed or they fought their own battle with thé întruders. Moreover, with
negotiations begun to handover power to the African population in an
independent Kenya, thé Maasai feared that this influx of outsiders into their
area would grow into enormous proportions. Indeed, spokesmen of the
agricultural Kikuyu, the most powerful African group at the time, repeatedly
said that an Independent Kenya should be a country where every person was
free to live. In other words, thé safety provided by thé Maasai Treaties of 1904
and 1911 was under threat After organizing themselves into their own political
party the Maasai went as far as to request thé United Nations to recognize a
Maasailand which comprised of Tanzanian and Kenyan Maasai. This proposai
was as much condemned to fail, as thé Maasai request to thé British
Government to hand back the former "White Highlands" the pastures of
Laikipia, Uasin Gishu and suchlike.
D. 1963-1980: The Formation of Group Ranches
We placed the birth of the group ranch concept at somewhere between the
1955 report of the East African Royal Commission favouring individual land
tenure for the whole of Kenya and the Lawrance Mission of 1965 which
favoured the establishment of large ranches with ownership vested in the name
of a group in Kenya's semi-arid régions. As the Mission reported:
'we are conscious of the limitations imposed by the fact that the Kenya
Government has for several years been widely committed to a policy of
individual absolute ownership. (...) sometimes individual absolute
ownership can be an impediment to development fthough] in some of the
semi-arid areas of the country it would be wasteful and even harmful to
register in individual ownership land which is badly eroded or denuded of
grass cover, for the owners may be unable to assist, let alone dérive a cash
income, from holdings until remedial action has been taken to restore the
land to productive capacity' (Lawrance 1966:34-5).
The Lawrance Mission argued that group ownership would be a much more
suited form of land tenure to deal with the fragile conditions of the Maasai
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lands.
In short the idea of a group ranch meant the setting aside of a certain pièce
of land to be communally owned by a group of people who were recorded and
registered as the legal owners through membership of the particular ranch.
Unlike in the past, livestock movements would be restricted within the group
ranch 's spécifie boundaries and non-members would be forbidden to bring their
animais to graze. Through the provision of loans for infrastructural
development and steer fattening an attempt was made to radically transform the
nomadic subsistence-oriented production of the Maasai pastoralists into a
sedentary, more commercial System. This market-oriented production was to
bring about a destocking of the Maasai pastures while at the same time
providing méat for the national market and international market.
The Maasai were reasonably favourable about this proposai. Besides
welcoming the idea of water provision, veterinary care, improved livestock
breeds and the like, a major rationale for accepting the group ranch proposai
was the increase in the number of Maasai acquiring individual ranches and the
fears of the encroachment of non-Maasai into the District. Also the fear that
even more land could be lost to game Reserves or National Parks played a
rôle.
Discussions concerning the status of Maasailand reached a height in the early
1960s. The Maasai feared that Independence would end the Maasai Treaties
which gave them exclusive rights to occupy Kajiado and Narok Districts.
Among the Kaputiei Maasai, in particular, the land tenure debate was
significant. A wide variety of propositions such as the registration of the
section under one title deed or the création of a fringe of individual ranches
near the northern boundary to stop illégal infiltration were discussed. The
Colonial Authorities disagreed with the one title deed option. Young and
formally educated Maasai supported by the Kajiado County Council suggested
the idea of individual ranches. Elderly Maasai opposed the move to
individualization. Support for the latter was given by the Lawrance Mission
that criticized the haphazard approach of the government to the Maasai land
question and the illegal approval of the création of individual ranches.
In the end, all of the Maasai sections accepted the group ranch concept,
although in some régions of northern Kaputiei and the better-watered parts of
the Ngong area individualization was preferred and opposition to the formation
of a group ranch persisted. In these ranches the group ranches, though
officially registered, never functioned as such.
The actual establishment of group ranches followed a phased programme.
After declaring an "Adjudication Section" any person claiming to have an
interest in a particular section had to bring his claim before the Adjudication
Committee which was comprised of not less than ten people. Most of these
were recruited from the group of educated Maasai, politicians and government
officiais. Further subdivision into individual and group ranches followed after
60 days. Finally, a group ranch committee was installed and a certificate of
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incorporation issued by thé Land Registrar of Kajiado District and thé group
was officially registered under a spécifie name.
In 1964 thé pilot Poka group ranch had already been started m the south
Kaputiei location. In 1969 phase one of the Kenya Livestock Development
Project (KLDP I) was officially started. By 1970, 14 group ranches, covering
over 10 per cent of the district's area were recorded in the Kapuüei area.
KLDP II, which had started in late 1974 had added 16 ranches comprising
another 25 per cent of the Kajiado District area. Finally, by 1980, 20 more
ranches had been incorporated. These are often referred to as "phase three
group ranches" but no World Bank funds were provided for them. This brought
the total number of group ranches to 51 covering some 15,200 km2 or some 75
per cent of the Kajiado District area.
The Kajiado District group ranches were effective in stopping an educated
elite of Maasai allocating huge chunks of former communal land to themselves
that had been set aside. as individual ranches. Secondly, the group ranches
initiated livestock management techniques and the construction of facilities
such as boreholes, dams, troughs, tanks, pipelines and cattle dips. Thirdly,
group ranches stimulated the building of schools, shops and health centres. A
last achievement of the group ranch development is said to have been to allow
wildlife to continue roaming freely over large parts of Kajiado District.
Besides these accomplishments the problems and failures of the group ranch
project have also been mentioned; delays and problems in project
implementation; disappointing rates of Investment and difficulties in loan
repayment; continuing trespassing of group ranch boundaries; refusai to de-
stock ranches; no real transformation to a market-oriented livestock production
and corruption among several group ranch committees.
The final outcome of these problems and the resulting frustrations was a
growing wish among many Maasai for the subdivision of the group ranch into
individually owned shares.
When reviewing the création and performance of Kajiado District group
ranches it can be concluded that in many respects, the group ranch concept as
proposed by outsiders was an artificial création which lacked a firm traditional
sociological as well as an ecological basis. The Kenya Livestock Development
Project responsible for the implementation of this change in land tenure was
moreover overambitious in aiming at the destocking of the pastures and the
commercializing of production, while they took hardly any account of
pastoralists stratégies and household needs.
Still, the introduction of the group ranch had organizational, juridical and
economical conséquences. At local level group ranch committees meant that a
new instrument for land use régulation had appeared. lts effectiveness in terms
of the initially target set of boundary maintenance was, however, rather
modest. Of more importance was the juridical conséquence of group ranch
membership. By the late 1960s the status of closed district was removed. From
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now on non-Maasai, very well represented at the national level, xwere able to
enter the Maasai districts much more easily. The installation of group ranches,
however, excluded outsiders from legally buying land. Only land from
individual ranchers could be acquired, as in the Ngong and Loitokitok areas.
It should be borne in mind that, whereas in the mid-1960s the Lawrance
Mission had pleaded for communal tenure, a decade later the World Bank
openly condemned the Maasai's capacity to stop other Kenyan groups
acquiring land in Maasai districts. Narok District was particularly criticised for
having large tracts of high-potential land suitable for farming close to those
who were virtually landless and living in the densely populated neighbouring
districts.
The group ranch also gave an opportunity to the young and educated Maasai
to gain influence m Maasai society at the expense of the traditional Council of
elders. International donors also had a say in th& livestock, enterprise of the
Maasai by supplying technical personnel and providing funds.
The finances donated by international organizations as "soft loans" ultimately
reached the group ranches at high interest rates. Channelling the money
through the Kenyan Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) was said to have
been the main reason for this. It was frequently a problem to repay loans. Not
seldom was repayment of the loans problematic. This was either the result of
corrupt group ranch committees or because of natural causes such as droughts
or disease killing the steers bought for fattening. For group members that had
failed to benefit from these loans it was hard to understand and to accept the
reasons for repaying them.
In addition, the use of the group's pastures by herds belonging to
neighbouring individual ranchers and the massive rise in the number of young
Maasai calling for registration contributed to growing negative feelings towards
the group ranch and fuelled the ultimate call for subdivision.
E. 1981-1990: The Dissolution of Group Ranches and the
Individualization of Land Ownership
In the early 1980s no clear position was taken by Government in response to
the call for the subdivision of group ranches -apparently because the
Administration itself had doubts and individual departments were in dispute
with each other.
In général, those opposing subdivision claimed that the ultimate result would
be the aliénation of land to the non-Maasai, the création of sévère érosion in
areas where cultivation was to start, the loss of Maasai culture and the
restriction of the movement of wildlife and livestock to the detriment of the
meat producing and tourist attracting functions of the district.
Supporters of group ranch subdivision said that it would help self
advancement and raise standards of living, boost the ability to procure a loan
using the freehold title deed as collatéral, minimize the exploitation of the poor
by rieh households, promote Maasai engagement in agricultural and industrial
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enterprises and facilitate better maintenance of the existing infrastructure.
By 1990 a total of 40 group ranches had made the décision to dissolve their
ranches. Seven had already gone through the procedure and the members had
obtained their private titles. Only the 4 Magadi Division group ranches
opposed the idea of subdivision, while another 7 ranches, mostly from
Loitokitok, had not yet decided. In other words, at that time the whole of
Ngong and Central Division, which included 78 per cent of the ranches, had
ceased existing or were soon about to do so. Alongside this process a whole
range of other difficulties arose including disputes over ranch boundaries,
corruption in plot allocation and conflicts between registered and non-
registered group members.
The effects of the group ranch process of subdivision into individually owned
parcels were investigated in this study. Attention was given to the ecological
and economie viability of the new, individual ranches. Aspects of land use,
including patterns of résidence, fencing, livestock movements, cultivation and
wildlife habitats were also considered. This analysis was based on the post-
subdivision developments as they occurred in Olkinos and Embolioi group
ranches since late 1986 until the beginning of 1990 (see chapter 8). For cross
référence purposes, developments in other, not yet divided, group ranches (i.e.
Kiboko, Elang'ata Wuas, Lorngosua, Meto) as well as buyers and established
individual ranchers were provided.
In the first place we presented some characteristics of our sample population
and concluded that the declining trend of cattle ownership per person as
demonstrated over the 1950-85 period had halted. In our sample population we
counted an ownership of 9 l heads of cattle per person with the addition of
12.9 shoats per person. The resulting 1:1.42 ratio for cattle/small stock was
significantly different from the ratio of 1:0.77 found in these ranches
(excluding Lorngosua and Meto) in 1977 (see ILCA 1979:10).
In contrast, hardly any or only a modest change had occurred with respect to
the percentage of female cattle within the Maasai herds. For Embolioi this
proportion reduced from 69 per cent in 1968 to 54 per cent in 1990. The
overall 1990 percentage of female cattle within the Maasai herds stood at 68
per cent for group and 67 per cent for individual ranchers. A structural switch
to a market and meat-oriented economy for cattle does not seem to have
occurred.
Wealth classes among our group of respondents are based on livestock
équivalents owned by active adult male équivalents (LE/AAME). A fairly even
distribution along three strata was found. The same cut-off points had been
used as defined by the ILCA for their 1980 population. Their stratification
showed a larger group of respondents in the middle stratum and less in the
lower one.
The remainder of chapters 8 and 9 dealt in particular with the outcome of the
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group ranch subdivision process in Olkinos and Embolioi. An overall positive
attitude towards the process of subdivision and allocated plots was recorded
among the Olkinos and Embolioi ranchers. Approximately l out of 5
households, however, had mixed to negative feelings concerning the size of the
plots allocated.
After subdivision the former Olkinos members possessed a 46.71 ha mean
size ranch within a range from 11.00 to 132.00 ha per parcel. In Embolioi the
average plot size was 93.37 ha varying from 30.0 to 225.0 ha. The process of
subdivision had been most favourable to the most powerful within the Maasai
group ranch constellation. In both ranches former committee members had
obtained above average plot sizes (Olkinos: 81.80 ha as compared to 42.53 for
non-members and Embolioi 130.74 ha versus 86.84 ha).
Landownership per person decreased over the 1986-90 period due to natural
population growth and the sale of land. The average availability of land for
Olkinos ranchers was reduced from 8.43 ha/person in 1986 to 7.06 ha/person
in 1990, a 16 per cent fall. Embolioi figures for these years are 15.53
ha/person and 14.29 ha/person, respectively. The Olkinos gini-coefficient,
expressing the inequality of the distribution of plot sizes, increased from 0.26
to 0.33.
One of the main questions concerning the subdivision of group ranches deals
with the economie and ecological viability of the allocated plots. For an
estimation of the economie viability we starled considering the number of
animais owned per AAME. It was concluded that overall livestock ownership
was 11.4 LE/AAME or some 30 per cent above the 8.6 LE/AAME requirement
for self-sufficiency from pure pastoralism. However, livestock and population
numbers are not uniformly distributed over all households. All of the stratum I
households and a large part of those in stratum II live below the level enabling
them to practise pure pastoralism. In other words, within our survey area
approximately 40 per cent (Kiboko) to 65 per cent (Meto) of the Maasai
households are considered to be no longer able to depend solely on their
animais for food requirements. For Olkinos and Embolioi percentages found
were 48 and 51, respectively.
Herd sizes needed by each household imply certain demands in the amount
of land required. In the past several authors have mentioned minimum land
requirements for individual ranches of some 80 ha per adult male or 467 ha
per household which is far from the Olkinos plot sizes. Starting from a
minimal land requirement needed for self-suffiency it was concluded for
Olkinos and Embolioi that only a mere 10 per cent or less of the households
had a sufficient large parcel during the dry season period. The other parcels
would be severely overstocked. Moreover, since the time of subdivision, this
capacity has been eroded by another 1-2 per cent.
Starting from four different catégories of landownership based on a situation
of deficit or surplus for the wet season or dry season situation, it was estimated
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that for those Olkinos households lacking sufficient land in both seasons still
40.3 per cent owned a large enough number of animais for complete self-
sufficiency. In the reverse situation of having enough land for both seasons 75
per cent of these parcel owners were self-sufficient in livestock. For Embolioi
these figures were 28.6 per cent and 100 per cent, respectively. We also
concluded that, for Embolioi large numbers of households held a reasonable
amount of land although they lacked the animais to make use of it.
Asked for their opinion on the economie viability of their individual ranch a
large majority (84.9 per cent) of the Embolioi considered it to be highly viable.
Olkinos households, with generally much smaller parcels, showed more mixed
feelings in this respect and only 43.5 per cent believed their parcel to be viable
or highly viable.
The imbalance between livestock and land raises questions about the ecological
viability of the allocated parcels. Information provided by the Kajiado District
1988 Livestock Census was presented, showing the recommended stocking
rate, actual stocking density, estimated range condition and trends and the
availability and condition of water sources for our sample group ranches.
According to these figures the overstocking of most ranches (except Embolioi)
was established at ratios of 1.7 to 2.9 times the densities allowed. However,
overall range condition was stated to be fair or even good, as in the case of
Kiboko.
Pans and tanks turned out to be the most important sources of water in our
study area. Boreholes were also available, particularly among the group of
individual ranchers. Most striking was how individual ranchers to rely on
boreholes for watering their animais during the dry season. In genera! the
northern group ranches made use of rivers while those in the south relied on
wells and pans during the dry season period.
The availability of pasture in the dry season showed the opposite picture with
Olkinos and Embolioi ranchers mainly complaining of an inadequate quantity
of dry season reserves on their privately-owned parcels. Half of the established
individual ranchers (mainly Matapato ranchers) were also of this opinion. Short
and long-term thresholds were applied and revealed that, for both Olkinos and
Embolioi, the livestock densities had increased resulting in a theoretically
unviable ranch size in Olkinos for 72.0 per cent of the households in the short
term and as high as 93.0 per cent in the long term. For Embolioi these figures
were 36.5 and 63.5 per cent, respectively.
This outcome has led us to question the postulation that the individualization
of land tenure will resuit in a réduction of the stocking rate at carrying
capacity levels. In fact, those ranchers that actively changed the number of
animais on their ranch did so by increasing rather than decreasing their total
number of animais, irrespective of whether or not they possessed an over or
understocked ranch. Established individual ranchers behaved similarly.
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Besides the level of stocking we looked at the changes in grazing
management practices after the subdivision of Olkinos and Embolioi group
ranches. It was found that some 20-25 per cent of households interviewée had
located part of their herd in other bornas at the time of the survey. Kaputiei
established individual ranchers mentioned a total of 21.4 per cent. Overall a
total of 32.4 established ranchers' households mentioned they that had
transferred part of their livestock away from the ranch. Therefore, among the
group of Matapato and Loodokilani individual ranchers a similar number of
households had animais located elsewhere when compared to their
neighbouring group ranch members.
Detailed information for 1989 medium and long-term herd movements of
cattle and small stock revealed that it was not so much the legal status but
rather the ecological condition of the ranch which was the driving force behind
transferring animais to other places for medium to long periods of time. Also,
no firm évidence could be found for a trend towards thé commoditization of
grazing. Only two households mentioned that they had paid money to gain
access to pastures elsewhere.
The fencing of complète ranches has not yet occurred among thé group of
respondents. Huge fences could only be seen in thé "Presidential Area" of
Kisaju which was mainly owned by wealthy immigrants. In thé Olkinos and
Embolioi areas small enclosures protecting shambas and ol-okeri from both
domestic and wild animais were increasingly being erected. This increase is
faster than thé increase in thé number of shambas over this same period.
Enclosures made in thé not yet subdivided group ranch areas show even higher
percentages of households involved in this practice. The increase in this is not
as fast,
In our view it is the fencing of the shambas and ranches by non-Maasai
which will pose the major threat to the mobility of Maasai livestock. Their
need to défend their major economie activity of cultivation and the small, and
less costly to fence parcels will resuit in the fast growth of small enclosures
scattered over the former group ranch territory. In contrast, the non-appearance
of fenced ranches among the Maasai respondents was attributed to the fact that
Maasai ranchers are less accustomed to fencing practices, that they face higher
costs and that they are less willing to fence as they realize that, due to the
climatic conditions, to fence ranches will ultimately lead to sévère problems.
Since the early 1980s a huge increase has been seen in the total number of ol-
okeri and shambas either fenced or unfenced. Of the total sample population
42.3 per cent claimed to be cultivating a shamba in 1990 as compared to 10-15
per cent bef ore the 1984/5 drought. Both the number of shambas and the
acreage covered has increased rapidly. We estimated that the area under
cultivation had increased over this period from 0.1-0.2 to 0.53 per cent of the
total area available to our sample population (i.e. including the non-cultivators).
Ö
We also tried to highlight the compétition for pastures by game in our study
area. According to official wildlife estimâtes based on aerial counting, a
décline in the number of wild animais was recorded. This trend was confirmed
by our respondents. A doubling of the human population and increased fencing
is expected to further reduce compétition from wildlife, particularly in the
north-Kaputiei area. Overall, these new developments in land use and land
tenure will contribute to a further réduction in the accessibility of grazing areas
to Maasai herds.
Chapter 9 dealt exclusively with the outcome of the group ranch subdivision in
Kajiado District with respect to transfers of land and improvements made. An
analysis was made of the fragmentation, sale or mortgage of the subdivided
lands of Olkinos, Embolioi, Empuyiankat, Kitengela and Poka group ranches
by February 1990. A total of 757 Maasai had received their privately owned
parcel of land by this time. By February 1990 36.7 per cent of these ranchers
had applied already for further subdivision of their newly acquired parcels. Of
this group 78 Maasai or 10.3 per cent of all former group members had
obtained authority to transfer 1,728 ha of land. This is 2.4 per cent of the five
former group ranch territories.
No spécifie set of characteristics could be disentangled for the group of
sellers. Nonetheless, the group of Olkinos former committee-members turned
out to be foremost among the group of non-sellers. Those committee-members
who did seil land had previously bought this from a neighbouring rancher -
apparently for spéculative reasons.
The often-stated premise about the possibility of and incentive for the offering
of land as a collatéral once land is in single private hands could not be
confirmed. Only 17 applicants (2.2 per cent) of all former group members,
intended to or actually mortgaged 1,195 ha or 1.6 per cent of the former group
ranch territory. It was stated by the Maasai that the selling of land is a much
faster, less obstructive and more comprehensive way of acquiring money than
is mortgaging. Financial institutions also seem to be somewhat reluctant to
provide loans, except when the prospective borrower has been well educated
and has other more important sources of income.
The group of land buyers in Olkinos group ranch was also analyzed in order to
obtain information concerning their area of origin, main occupation, résidence,
éducation, âge and thé like. This revealed that, out of a total of 37 plots sold in
Olkinos area, ail but 6 were acquired by non-Maasai. Rieh business men, civil
servants and less wealthy people comprised thé group of Kikuyu buyers.
Maasai buyers were mainly former Olkinos committee-members, individual
ranchers, civil servants and politicians.
Evaluating thé actions both pending and confirmed taken by the buyers of
land so far showed that, in contrast with thé Maasai, there was an equal
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préférence for mortgaging and for reselhng of land.
We were mainly interested in the use made of the proceeds of the sale of land
and loans taken. For Olkinos and Embohoi detailed information in this respect
had been collected.
In Olkinos the percentage of people who made infrastructural improvements
rose from 21, before subdivision, to 56 of all Olkinos ranchers afterwards. The
Embolioi group ranch percentage increased from a mere 8 to 45, respectively.
Lack of funds or not being settled were among the most frequently mentioned
reasons for not conducting an improvement. A comparison of Olkinos sellers
versus non-sellers and borrowers versus non-borrowers showed that both
groups were increasingly engaging in infrastructural improvements. However,
the rise amongst the group of sellers is significantly higher. No clear picture
emerged. Embolioi ranchers also seemed to be as much development oriented
in either selling or non-selling, mortgaging or non-mortgaging of land. Olkinos
ranchers mentioned the sale of land 33 times and loans in 10 cases as being
the source of finance for constructing infrastructural innovations. For Embolioi
this was 5 and O, respectively.
Attention was also given to the kind of improvement made. The building of a
modern house was most populär improvement. Fences (mainly for shambas),
sprayraces and pans followed though at a distance. The group of buyers are
mostly investing in fences and watertanks.
In other words, most of the infrastructural improvements made seem to have
occurred in non-productive Investments such as the building of a modem
house. People will need to seil another part of their parcel to start real
development. Those Maasai having had previous no involvement in thé group
ranches seem to be the most willing to seil part of their ranch and earn a
lifetime's salary ail at once. Some excesses hâve apparently, followed like thé
drinking of beer and the buying of cars. Attention was also paid to the less
capital intensive improvements made in range management. Hardly any
innovations were accomplished since the time of subdivision. Potter (1989) has
stressed the common sensé of this attitude as these adjustments would be
economically unviable anyway.
In the last chapter we concentrated on the processes and the degrees of
diversification, intensification and commercialization of the Maasai economy
among our group of respondents in early 1990. To balance the réduction of
land available for livestock-keeping and the growth of the human population
alternative ways of making a living need to be sought. We tried to gain
information about Maasai initiatives in this respect. Our main conclusion was
that, besides the grown relevance of cultivation, a significant number of heads
of household nowadays find their main occupation outside the primary sector.
Wage labour has become a major source of income varying over the surveyed
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locations from 7 to almost 30 per cent of the interviewed heads of household.
Moreover, a majority of these ranchers were involved in more than one
activity.
Diversification of the livestock economy includes a change in the
composition of the Maasai herds. Besides the growing importance of small
stock, other kinds of animais, including camels, can be found nowadays in
Kajiado District.
The intensification of the Maasai economy mainly refers to raising the
production of milk and meat through the keeping of improved breeds. Among
the major obstacles to this the ranchers mentioned the high priées of purchase,
the scarcity of these breeds and their vulnerability to disease and drought.
Overall the attitude of the Maasai is positive and most ranchers are willing to
increase the number of these breeds in their herd.
Finally, we looked into different forms of commercialization of the Maasai
economy. We tried to value the importance of commercial sales and purchases,
in particular. Among those ranchers who claimed to seil for commercial
reasons the rieh were most prominent. Non-commercial sales, slaughterings,
exchanges, loans and gifts were also found as forms of livestock offtake. We
estimated that sales make up some 70 per cent of herd offtake.
Approximately half of our group of respondents had sold a hide or skin in
the preceding month of the survey. In contrast, only a mere 5 per cent
mentioned the selling of milk. Also the sale of crops was negligible.
Reviewing the developments in Kajiado District in the last decade leaves one
with the impression of a people under increasing pressure on their way of life.
A shrinking land resource because of increasing numbers of Maasai people and
the even faster-growing numbers of migrant settlers in the district,
malfunctioning group ranches and the call for subdivision of these, a lack of a
clear Governmental land policy and corrupt land practices threatening large
groups of Maasai off the rangelands they used to control exclusively until very
recenüy all contribute to this.
In my opinion, there is no single cause of the Maasai problems of today.
Rather there is a combination of factors, as mentioned above which are at the
heart of the matter. Still, we would like to stress that the situation the Maasai
face today cannot be understood without understanding the history of their
ownership of the land. Likewise the invasion of non-Maasai in the district is
mainly caused by an imbalance of the distribution of land in other parts of
Kenya.
Furthermore the rôle of the Kenyan Government should be stressed. Central
Government's initial opposition to the subdivision of group ranches seems to
have changed towards a standpoint of modest support for this process. Once
the dissolution of group ranches was no longer opposed by (part) of the
Administration the process of subdivisio'n began at füll speed. In my opinion,
none of those who allowed this process to start fully realised the possible
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negative side effects it could have for a large number of Maasai people, their
children, the district's ecology, the livestock economy, wildlife and the tourism
sector. If they were aware, however, then it is they who should be blamed
would they should be blamed for allowing it to happen without clear guidelines
and amongst a group of people who were not yet ready to withstand the
clamour for land within modern day Kenya. Nowadays, Government officials
judge the initial outcome of group ranch subdivision to be disastrous. The best
the Maasai youngsters can hope for is that their parents will value the wealth
they still own as a non-renewable resource and that the Government's apparent
récognition of the seriousness of the current situation will not be remain mère
words but will resuit in thé action required.
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In de jaren 1883/84 slaagde de jonge Schotse geoloog en ontdekkingsreiziger
Joseph Thomson er als eerste Europeaan in het gebied van oostelijk Afrika
gelegen tussen de Indische Oceaan en de bronnen van de Nijl te doorkruisen.
De relatief onervaren Thomson ondervond op zijn tocht verrassend weinig
tegenstand van de als zeer bloeddorstig afgeschilderde en daarom zo gevreesde
Maasai. Deze Oost-Afrikaanse veehouders waren echter door een
aaneenschakeling van vijandigheden met naburige akkerbouwers, door
onderlinge twist en door ziekten van mens en dier zeer verzwakt, zelfs zodanig
dat sommige groepen zich onder de hoede van de Europese nieuwkomer
schaarden in de hoop op betere tijden.
De gevraagde bescherming werd gaarne geboden, maar de Maasai
betaalden hiervoor wel een hoge prijs. Al direct deelden de Europese indringers
het Maasai volk op door van de kust naar het Victoriameer een vrijwel rechte
lijn te trekken. De noordelijke Maasai kwamen onder het gezag van het Britse
"East Africa Protectorate" en de zuidelijke Maasai onder dat van het Duitse
Tanganyika. In 1904 en 1911 werden de "Maasai Verdragen" gesloten tussen
vertegenwoordigers van de noordelijke Maasai en de Britse koloniale
autoriteiten. Resultaat hiervan was dat deze Maasai exclusieve gebruiksrechten
verkregen ten aanzien van twee van elkaar gescheiden reservaten, tezamen
ongeveer 24.000 km2 groot. In latere jaren werd deze splitsing in de "East
Africa Protectorate" ongedaan gemaakt door het meest noordelijke gebied in
handen te geven van blanke kolonisten en het zuidelijke reservaat uit te breiden
tot 38.000 km2. Desondanks zagen de Keniaanse Maasai hun oorspronkelijke
territorium van ongeveer 60.000-70.000 km2, met zo'n 40% afnemen.
De verliezen in kwalitatieve zin waren zo mogelijk nog belangrijker. De
beste weideterreinen werden door Europese immigranten overgenomen. Dit
was mogelijk dankzij de actieve medewerking van het Britse koloniale bewind
dat zorgde voor een gunstige wetgeving betreffende landbezit, op soepele wijze
omging met de restricties die golden bij de toewijzing van land en
terughoudend was bij het opleggen van straffen.
Het aan de Maasai toegewezen reservaat omvatte uitgestrekte gebieden
waarin gebrek was aan water of gras. In andere delen werd het gebruik
bemoeilijkt door veeziekten. De Maasai gaven herhaaldelijk te kennen de
beweidingscapaciteit van het gebied te willen verhogen door verbetering van de
watervoorziening. Ook toonden zij grote belangstelling voor het vaccineren van
het vee. Dit laatste was ook in het belang van de inmiddels in grote getale
toegestroomde blanke kolonisten.
In de periode tussen de beide wereldoorlogen concentreerde de koloniale
machthebber zich op het beschermen van de door de Europese immigranten
opgezette veeranches. Quarantainemaatregelen belemmerden de Maasai in hun
traditionele pogingen betere veesoorten vanuit noordelijk Kenya te importeren.
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Ook de legale verkoop van Maasaivee werd bemoeilijkt, evenals de vrije trek
van Maasaaikudden op zoek naar gras en water. Daarentegen floreerde in het
Maasaigebied de illegale veehandel die in handen was van privé handelaren die
beduidend hogere prijzen boden.
In deze periode van belemmering en veronachtzaming kwamen de
Maasai voornamelijk in de schijnwerpers ten tijde van de "Kenya Land
Commission". Deze commissie, ook wel vernoemd naar haar voorzitter Carter,
had als taak een onderzoek in te stellen naar de door de Afrikaanse bevolking
geuite protesten tegen het verlies van land. De Maasai verklaarden ten
overstaan van deze commissie recht te hebben op een aantal aangrenzende
zones en claimden een gebied van in totaal 720 km2. Bovendien verlangden zij
dat de kunstmatige grens tussen hen en de Maasai in Tanganyika werd
opgeheven. De Carter commissie wees echter op de zeer geringe
bevolkingsdichtheid in het Maasaigebied in vergelijking met die in de naburige
gebieden van Europese boeren en Afrikaanse akkerbouwers. Gezien deze
geringe bevolkingsdichtheid was het weinig verwonderlijk dat de illegale
vestiging van Afrikaanse akkerbouwers in het Maasaigebied oogluikend door
de lokale bestuurders werd toegestaan. Behalve tot een uitbreiding van de
akkerbouw leidde deze vestiging ook tot een verminderde vraag naar goed land
in de "White-Highlands", waar blanke kolonisten zich de betere gronden
hadden toegeëigend.
Na de Tweede Wereldoorlog kwam de discriminerende politiek van de
koloniale regering in toenemende mate onder vuur te staan. Niet alleen vanuit
de Afrikaanse bevolking kwamen steeds meer protesten tegen de achterstelling
van de inheemse meerderheid ten gunste van een kleine groep blanke
kolonisten, vrij snel kwamen dergelijke protesten ook vanuit Groot-Brittannië
zelf. De Afrikanen zochten de oplossing in gewapende strijd ("Mau Mau"), het
moederland reageerde door een aantal onderzoekscommissies in te stellen. Het
uit deze commissie-activiteiten voortgekomen "Plan to Intensify the
Development of African Agriculture", beter bekend als het "Swynnerton Plan",
betekende een breuk met het verleden, dat gekenmerkt was geweest door
desinteresse voor en belemmering van het functioneren en het welzijn van de
Afrikaanse samenleving. Het in een eerder stadium gepropageerde idee van
communaal landeigendom als de beste garantie voor een verantwoord
landgebruik werd, voorzover het de vruchtbare en natte hooglanden betrof,
vervangen door dat van individueel landbezit. Voor de semi-aride gebieden
werd een programma voorgesteld dat moest leiden tot beter Weidemanagement
en maximale veebezetting.
De Maasai werd gevraagd in te stemmen met een systeem waarbij een
maximaal aantal families rondom een waterput gesitueerd zou worden.
Getracht werd om aldus een vorm van "ranching" te ontwikkelen. Enige
ervaring hiermee had men in Maasailand al in het midden van de jaren veertig
opgedaan via het zogenaamde Konza experiment. Dit project had tot doel een
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kleine groep Maasai kennis te laten maken en ervaring te laten opdoen met
westerse methoden van veehouderij. Omheining van de weiden, weiderotatie,
veterinaire hulp en intensieve verzorging moesten, als voornaamste elementen
van het project, een breuk met het traditionele nomadische verleden
bewerkstelligen. De Maasai waren bijzonder geïnteresseerd in deze moderne
methoden. Problemen ontstonden echter ten tijde van droogte maar met name
naar aanleiding van de verplichte vermindering van de kuddegrootte. Plannen
om het gehele district in "ranch units" op te delen werden ingetrokken nadat
onderzoek had uitgewezen dat als gevolg van klimatologische en geologische
omstandigheden slechts het noordelijke deel van het district voor deze vorm
van exploitatie geschikt was.
Aan het eind van de jaren vijftig en het begin van de jaren zestig
werden toch weer ontwikkelingen in gang gezet die een verandering moesten
bewerkstellingen in de rechten ten aanzien van het land en daarmee in de wijze
van veehouden. In 1954 werd de eerste privé ranch toegewezen en snel daarna
deden tal van Maasai het verzoek ook voor zo'n ranch in aanmerking te
komen. De belangstelling kwam vooral uit de hoek van hen die enig formeel
onderwijs hadden genoten. Een andere ontwikkeling was de registratie van het
Maasailand in de Ngong regio. Hier hadden in toenemende mate andere
Afrikaanse volken hun toevlucht gezocht teneinde de groeiende congestie in de
eigen reservaten te ontlopen. Deze congestie was mede ontstaan doordat de
blanke kolonisten steeds meer landaibeiders hadden afgestoten en naar de eigen
reservaten teruggestuurd. De vruchtbare gebieden in het Kajiado district
vormden voor deze landlozen een aantrekkelijk alternatief. Vestiging in dit
gebied was echter alleen mogelijk met toestemming van de Maasai. Ten tijde
van de noodtoestand was zelfs dit niet langer een legaal alternatief, maar na de
opheffing van de noodtoestand vond de toestroom van niet-Maasai weer in
versneld tempo plaats.
Het creëren van een gordel van individuele ranches in het grensgebied
met de Kikuyu werd gezien als een mogelijkheid om illegale vestiging tegen te
gaan. Al spoedig bleek evenwel dat dit, van meer ontwikkelde Maasai
afkomstige, idee voornamelijk ten eigen bate werd aangewend. Tal van oudere
Maasai en de koloniale machthebber constateerden terecht dat de mogelijkheid
tot verwerving van individuele ranches zou leiden tot landspeculatie, maar
waren niet in staat of bereid het proces te stoppen.
De toenemende vestiging van akkerbouwers, de reservering van delen
van het weidegebied voor wildparken en de naderbij komende
onafhankelijkheid verontrustten de Maasai in die tijd zodanig dat zij herhaalde-
lijk protesteerden tegen de ontwikkelingen. De toestroom van andere
Afrikaanse groepen in met name het gebied van de noordelijke Kaputiei
Maasai nam snel toe. Voorstellen om een gordel van individuele ranches in het
grensgebied met de akkerbouwende groepen te creëren of het als geheel
registreren van de Kaputiei bleven bij plannen. De vrees dat het exclusieve
recht op het land na de onafhankelijkheid verloren zou gaan bracht de Maasai
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er zelfs toe een verzoek bij de Verenigde Naties in te dienen tot hereniging
met de Tanzaniaanse Maasai en de vorming van een eigen staat. Dit verzoek
werd echter niet gehonoreerd, evenmin als de verzoeken tot teruggave van
vroeger Maasai gebied.
In het begin van de jaren zestig werden de Maasai getroffen door ernstige
droogte. Grote aantallen vee gingen verloren, waardoor de Maasai opnieuw in
een kwetsbare situatie kwamen. Onder deze omstandigheden gingen zij
akkoord met de oprichting van communale ranches: een bepaald stuk land
werd toegewezen aan een groep mensen die na registratie als lid van de groep
het wettelijk bezit over dit deel van het Maasaigebied verwierven. Het
dagelijks bestuur van de ranch kwam in handen van maximaal 10 personen,
gekozen uit de leden. Zij dienden er onder andere op toe te zien dat het vee
binnen de grenzen van de ranch bleef en er voor te zorgen dat er leningen voor
infrastructurele voorzieningen werden afgesloten en tijdig afgelost. Ook kregen
zij het beheer van deze voorzieningen. Op deze wijze poogde de overheid de
zelfvoorzienende Maasai-economie te transformeren in marktgerichte produktie.
Met uitzondering van enkele regio's werd het voorstel door de Maasai
geaccepteerd. Naast de mogelijkheid om de watervoorziening en de veterinaire
diensten te verbeteren zagen de Maasai in het voorstel ook een mogelijkheid
om de uitgifte van individuele ranches, het opzetten en uitbreiden van
wildparken en de infiltratie door akkerbouwers tegen te gaan. In 1964 werd een
proefranch (Poka) opgezet. Uiteindelijk resulteerde dit in de gefaseerde
vorming van 51 communale ranches in een gebied van 15.200 km2,
overeenkomend met ongeveer 75% van het Kajiado District. In 1969 werd een
start gemaakt met de eerste fase van het "Kenya Livestock Development
Project", dat voornamelijk gefinancierd werd met fondsen van de Wereldbank.
De uitvoering was in handen van de landbouw- en ontwikkelingsinstanties van
de Verenigde Naties (FAO en UNDP). Het streven van de projectleiders naar
een meer marktgerichte produktie werd naar de mening van de donoren echter
niet voldoende gerealiseerd. Het negeren van de groepsranchgrenzen, de
weigering de kuddegrootten te verminderen, corruptie bij vele comités, tegen-
vallende investeringen en problemen met de aflossing van de leningen waren
de overige redenen om in 1982 verdere financiering stop te zetten. Het project
bleek te ambitieus en had te weinig rekening gehouden met pastorale strateg-
ieën en behoeften.
In het begin van de jaren tachtig neemt de roep om te komen tot opdeling van
de groepsranches toe. Tot de mogelijk positieve effecten werden gerekend de
(vergrote) mogelijkheid om leningen af te sluiten, het tegengaan van de
exploitatie van de armen door rijke huishoudens, de ruimere mogelijkheid
andere activiteiten (zoals akkerbouw) te beginnen en de mogelijkheid om de
bestaande infrastructuur beter te beheren en nieuwe voorzieningen in te voeren.
De tegenstanders waren evenwel bevreesd voor verkoop van land aan
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buitenstaanders, erosie in de gebieden waar akkerbouw uitgeoefend zou gaan
worden, verlies van de Maasaicultuur en inperking van de bewegingsvrijheid
van wilde dieren die van vitaal belang zijn voor het toerisme in het district.
Begin 1990 hadden 40 ranches besloten tot opdeling. Bij zeven ranches
was op dat moment het proces van opsplitsing reeds geheel voltooid. Slechts 4
ranches hadden opsplitsing afgewezen.
Deze studie concentreert zich op de gevolgen van de opdeling. Met name de
ontwikkelingen op het vlak van landbezit werden nader onderzocht. Daarnaast
werd aandacht besteed aan de ecologische en economische levensvatbaarheid
van de nieuwe kleine individuele ranches. In twee voormalige communale
ranches (Olkinos en Embolioi) werd de nieuwe individuele bezitters gevraagd
naar de door hen doorgevoerde laadtransacties, het aangaan van leningen en de
introductie van veranderingen op het vlak van Weidemanagement, afgrenzing
van het weidegebied, infrastructuur (zoals waterputten) en diversificatie
(bijvoorbeeld de introductie van akkerbouw). Ter vergelijking werd tevens
onderzoek verricht bij een aantal (nog) niet opgedeelde communale ranches en
bij reeds bestaande individuele ranches.
Geconstateerd werd dat de opdeling van de communale ranches met
name voordelig was voor de voormalige leden van het ranchcomité. Zij
verkregen de grootste en best gelegen bedrijven. Verder bleek dat maximaal
10% van de Olkinos en Embolioi huishoudens zo veel land hebben verworven
dat zij in staat zijn om zowel in de droge als de natte periodes op de eigen
ranch zo veel dieren te houden dat zij geheel van de veehouderij kunnen
bestaan. Sinds de opdeling van de ranches in 1986 is dit aantal nog eens met
een extra 1-2 procent afgenomen. 43% van de Olkinos huishoudens meende dat
hun ranch economisch levensvatbaar zou zijn. Voor de grotere Embolioi
ranches lag dit percentage op bijna 85.
Uitkomst van het onderzoek was voorts dat 72 tot 93% van de Olkinos
ranches te veel vee zouden hebben in het natte, respectievelijk het droge
seizoen. In Embolioi was de situatie iets beter: 37 resp. 64%. De vaak geuite
veronderstelling dat de individualisering van het landbezit zou leiden tot een
vermindering van de veestapel tot op het niveau van de draagcapaciteit van de
ranch wordt hiermee weersproken. Integendeel, veel ranchers blijken extra vee
te hebben gekocht, ongeacht de veedichtheid op hun ranch.
Gezien deze situatie zal het geen verwondering wekken dat de Maasai
pastoralisten ook na de opsplitsing vast hebben gehouden aan hun strategie van
veeverplaatsing. In Olkinos en Embolioi had ongeveer 20-25% van de huishou-
dens een deel van het vee elders gesitueerd. Het vinden van weidegrond is niet
de enige verklaring; een belangrijke reden is ook dat hiermee andere huishou-
dens worden geholpen en dat bepaalde ziektes worden ontlopen. Bij de al
langer gevestigde individuele ranchers en in de communale ranches werd een
zelfde strategie geconstateerd. Met andere woorden, niet zo zeer de legale
status als wel de ecologische situatie en intermenselijke relaties zijn van
508
invloed op de graaspatronen van het vee. Vooralsnog vindt de mobiliteit plaats
zonder financiële vergoedingen. Slechts twee huishoudens rapporteerden te
hebben betaald voor het verkrijgen van toegang tot elders gelegen weidegebied.
De door de tegenstanders vaak geuite vrees dat de individuele ranches omheind
zullen worden en daardoor de trek van het vee en het wild ernstig belemmerd
wordt lijkt vooralsnog ongegrond. De omheiningen beperken zich tot op heden
voornamelijk tot het akkerland en tot speciaal voor ziek en jong vee gereser-
veerde kleine weiden. Het geheel omheinen van de ranches is erg duur. Het
zijn daarom met name immigranten, die nu op legale wijze land kunnen
verkrijgen in het voormalige communale gebied, aktief bezig zijn met
omheinen. Daarnaast hebben enkele zeer rijke opkopers van land grote
hekwerken geplaatst. Afgezien van de financiële consequenties beseffen vele
Maasai dat het geheel afsluiten van de eigen ranch onder de huidige
klimatologische omstandigheden tot problemen zal leiden. De uitsluiting van
wild kan in de nabije toekomst echter wel een motief zijn om toch tot
volledige afrastering van de ranches over te gaan. Corridors en een uitgebreid
netwerk van vrienden zullen het dan mogelijk maken het vee zo nodig nog te
verplaatsen.
De komst van niet-Maasai heeft geleid tot een uitbreiding van het
akkerland. Toch is de feitelijke omvang daarvan nog beperkt (0,53% van het
studiegebied). Ook de Maasai leggen overigens een grotere belangstelling voor
akkerbouw aan de dag. Ruim 40% van de onderzoekspopulatie bedreef enige
akkerbouw. Voor de droogte van 1984/5 was dit nog slechts 10-15%.
Uitgebreid werd in deze studie stilgestaan bij de door de nieuwe land eigenaren
ondernomen landtransacties. Er werd een analyse gemaakt van de verdere
opdeling, verkoop en het als onderpand bij leningen gebruiken van de nieuw
verworven ranches. Naast de Embolioi en Olkinos ranches werden daarbij nog
drie andere opgedeelde ranches in de beschouwing betrokken (Poka,
Empuyiankat en Kitengela). Een totaal van 757 Maasai van deze voormalige
ranches bezat in februari 1990 een eigen ranch. 36,7% van hen had reeds
besloten het land verder op te delen. 78 Maasai (10,3%) hadden toestemming
verkregen een stuk land te verkopen. In totaal betrof het 1.728 ha ofwel 2,4%
van het voormalig communale bezit.
De groep verkopers vertoonde geen specifieke kenmerken. Wel kwam
uit het onderzoek naar voren dat voormalige comitéleden niet tot de verkopers
behoorden. Een enkel voormalig comitélid dat een stuk land had verkocht had
dit enkele maanden eerder van een buurman gekocht. Speculatie bleek zeer
aantrekkelijk te zijn vanwege de snel stijgende landprijzen en de exorbitant
hoge bedragen die daardoor geboden worden. Een Olkinos Maasai eigenaar zal
bij verkoop van zijn gehele ranch ongeveer ƒ 75.000 kunnen krijgen, d.w.z.
een bedrag dat overeenkomt met ongeveer 25 jaren loonarbeid.
De voormalige comité-leden waren wel significant aanwezig in de groep
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van personen die een lening hadden aangevraagd. Slechts 17 personen (2,2%)
hadden in totaal 1.195 ha (1,6%) van het land als onderpand voor een lening
aangeboden. Volgens de meeste Maasai is de verkoop van land een snellere en
eenvoudiger mogelijkheid om geld te krijgen dan het aangaan van een lening.
De financiële instellingen zijn namelijk niet erg toeschietelijk en lijken,
onuitgesproken, ook allerlei eisen te stellen bij het verstrekken van een lening,
zoals een bepaald ontwikkelingsniveau en de aanwezigheid van
neveninkomsten.
Degenen die stukjes land gekocht hadden waren voornamelijk niet-
Maasai. Deze groep bestond zowel uit rijke zakenmensen en ambtenaren als uit
minder draagkrachtigen. De enkele Maasai onder de kopers waren gevestigde
individuele ranchers, voormalige comité-leden en politici. De groep van
landkopers vertoonde een evenwichtige verdeling voor wat betreft het opnieuw
verkopen (speculatie) en het als onderpand voor een lening aanbieden van de
grond.
Aandacht werd in het onderzoek ook besteed aan de vraag in hoeverre de
Maasai in Olkinos en Embolioi infrastructurele verbeteringen hadden
aangebracht nadat ze een eigen ranch hadden verworven. Op beide voormalige
groepsranches werd wat dit aangaat een toename geconstateerd. Het feit dat
een deel van het land verkocht werd of dat een lening werd aangevraagd
speelde hierbij geen rol. Het is echter niet uitgesloten dat de doorgevoerde
verbeteringen niet eveneens zouden hebben plaats gevonden indien deze
ranches niet opgedeeld zouden zijn.
De aangebrachte verbeteringen lagen voornamelijk in de consumptieve
sfeer. Moderne huizen werden het meest gebouwd, daarna volgden
investeringen in omheiningen, veterinaire voorzieningen en infrastructurele
werken ter verbetering van de watervoorziening. De groep van opkopers
investeerde vooral in omheiningen en watertanks.
Tenslotte werd in deze studie een overzicht gegeven van de aanpassingen in de
huishoudeconomie van de Maasai. De toename van de akkerbouw werd
hierboven reeds gememoreerd. Vooral de armere huishoudens houden zich hier
meer mee bezig, maar ook de rijkste huishoudens, die in staat zijn
arbeidskracht in te huren, tonen er belangstelling voor. Zij die geen akkerbouw
bedrijven doen dit voornamelijk vanwege het klimaat of een tekort aan
arbeidskracht. Daarnaast blijken de Maasai huishoudens in toenemende mate
een inkomen buiten de landbouwsector te verwerven. Deze diversificatie
betekent voor Olkinos dat nog slechts 70% van de hoofden van huishoudens de
veehouderij als de meest belangrijke activiteit beschouwt. Ruim 22% is in
loondienst en ongeveer 5% heeft een eigen onderneming. Deze trend is ook, zij
het in mindere mate, waarneembaar op de overige ranches. Sommige hoofden
van huishouden verblijven dientengevolge de meeste tijd elders. Over het
algemeen is er echter geen sprake van een definitief vertrek naar gebieden
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buiten het district. Een uiting van diversificatie is ook de veranderde samen-
stelling van de kuddes. Het onderzoek bevestigde dat geiten en schapen meer
betekenis hebben gekregen. Recentelijk zijn ook dromedarissen (camels) in het
Kajiado gebied geïntroduceerd. Het is evenwel nog te vroeg om een uitspraak
over de haalbaarheid van deze ontwikkeling te doen.
Intensivering van de traditionele Maasai-economie is een andere optie
die door vele Maasai huishoudens is aangegrepen. Een van de mogelijkheden is
het verhogen van de melkproduktie door de introductie van goede melkkoeien
of uitbreiding van hun aantal. Een probleem hierbij is de hoge prijs, de
beperkte beschikbaarheid van goed melkvee en hun gevoeligheid voor ziekten
en droogte.
Nog weer een andere mogelijkheid is de produktie meer te commerci-
aliseren. Het is namelijk een misvatting dat de Maasai niet in de verkoop van
vee geïnteresseerd zouden zijn. In het verleden hebben zij hiervoor wel
degelijk belangstelling getoond. Vermeld moet worden dat de kuddegrootte niet
alleen door verkoop kan afnemen, maar ook op andere wijze tot stand kan
komen, en wel door slacht, leningen, giften en ruil. De verkoop van vee uit
puur commerciële overwegingen bleek vooral aan aangelegenheid te zijn van
de rijke huishoudens; gedwongen verkopen bij ziekte van het vee of vanwege
problemen in het huishouden kwamen bij deze groep minder voor. Over het
algemeen vormden de verkopen ongeveer 70% van het totale aantal tot afname
leidende transacties.
Ongeveer de helft van de huishoudens verkocht huiden en vellen. Met
name de rijkere huishoudens waren hierin actief. Daarentegen verkocht maar
5% van de respondenten melk. Ook de verkoop van akkerbouwprodukten is in
dit deel van het Kajiado District verwaarloosbaar.
De Maasai hebben hun toekomst thans nog grotendeels in eigen handen. De
jongere generatie zal in de toekomst echter geconfronteerd worden met het feit
dat een Maasai niet meer automatisch toegang heeft tot zijn of haar
geboortegrond. Verdergaande sociale stratificatie en daarmee gepaard gaande
marginalisatie lijken onafwendbare ontwikkelingen. De vraag naar weidegrond
zal versneld toenemen, terwijl onder meer door de uitbreiding van de
akkerbouw en de individualisering van het bezit de beschikbaarheid ervan zal
afnemen. Het zoeken naar mogelijkheden om vormen van landgebruik zo goed
mogelijk te integreren en het creëren van alternatieve vormen van werkgele-
genheid verdienen in het ontwikkelingsbeleid de hoogste prioriteit. Educatie
speelt daarbij een belangrijke rol. Op korte termijn lijkt prioriteit te moeten
worden gegeven aan goede voorlichting over de mogelijkheden van deskundig
en verantwoord landgebruik en dienen landverkopen aan speculanten te worden
tegengegaan. Een moratorium op de verkoop van land, taxatie en een
maximum bezit van land en goede voorlichting zijn nodig om te voorkomen
dat de Maasai hun huidige rijkdommen verruilen voor toekomstige armoede.
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